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Abstract 
This thesis examines the purchaser-provider split in the contexts of two Tasmanian 
local government areas — Hobart and Sore11. In particular, it addresses whether the 
focus of the purchaser has been redirected in a way that prioritises the assessment 
and meeting of the needs of public service customers over the hitherto preoccupation 
with service production. This implies a clear shift of emphasis from inputs and 
processes to outputs and outcomes. In proceeding with that assessment, other 
research is reviewed along with the presentation of the results of the council case 
studies. 
The study investigates whether that split has had an effect on councils' total service 
spending, employment and organisational culture and practices. The behaviour of 
these variables over time then provides the basis for determining whether there is an 
asymmetry in outcomes between the two councils as a result of the introduction of 
the purchaser-provider split. The thesis uses a longitudinal research design to analyse 
data collected from interviews and secondary sources such as reports, strategic and 
annual plans, and newsletters. 
This thesis finds that local governments in Tasmania are still preoccupied with inputs 
and processes regardless of whether services are delivered by internal or external 
providers. The purchaser-provider split has been found to be unrelated to service 
category-level spending. The introduction of the model has not led to reductions in 
total municipal service spending but has decreased employment. The impact of the 
split on quality of services is unknown. Concern with outputs is evident although this 
has a weak relation to outcomes. The purchaser's attention has been drawn more to 
achieving outputs than outcomes, even though both are supposedly its responsibility. 
This evidence, although mixed, does serve to qualify earlier research results which 
posited improvements in delivery outcome through the split for some services. 
vii 
INTRODUCTION 
Local government is not constitutionally recognised as a level of government in 
Australia. This lack of recognition together with the establishment of new state 
governments following Australia federation in 1901 has, arguably contributed to the 
low esteem in which that sphere of government has been held. Local government has 
been considered as a creature of the state government and a convenient 
administrative arrangement to which it could delegate part of its functions. Thus, the 
overriding philosophy for local government was one of regulation and stewardship of 
certain public assets rather than ensuring that local communities were provided with 
the full range of services and facilities required for a reasonable quality of life. 
Over the past two decades, however, local government has emerged from its 
traditional origins as a provider and maintainer of infrastructure works programs to 
become a form of government with increasing responsibility for residents' well 
being, the overall quality of life of its local communities and the delivery of a wide 
range of services. Subsequently, the social, economic and environmental concerns of 
local residents now find their place alongside physical infrastructure development 
imperatives as important responsibilities of Australia's local governments. 
Municipal governments could not, however, have developed in these directions if 
they had not embraced changes that were necessary to overcome the problems of 
limited autonomy and a lack of power of general competence that were hampering 
the effective conduct of local government business. These changes to which local 
government in all Australian states have been subjected, were launched as part of the 
national reform agenda which was aimed at ensuring the highest possible levels of 
efficiency through programs of management reform, targeting better use of 
resources, and productivity increases to enable more to be done with less. The 
national reform agenda was in turn informed by an international menu of reform 
initiatives collectively referred to as the new public management. 
No state and territory in Australia has been left untouched by these waves of reform 
which came under three headings: legislative, managerial and microeconomic. These 
policy-induced changes have substantially altered the nature and form of local 
government. Legislative reforms have changed the essential elements of councils' 
operations: granted them wider competence powers, improved accountability 
mechanisms, reduced detailed prescriptions and changed planning and other 
delegated powers. Managerial reforms saw the major and continuous change for 
local government in its functional responsibilities, in the level of expenditure not 
covered by rates and borrowings, in the demands placed on its professional officers, 
and in the need for councillors to be adaptable and change attitude to their tasks. 
Microeconomic reform demanded economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the 
conduct of council business; it drew attention to ownership, outputs, costs, structures 
and systems; and it located public provision in relation to markets. 
This thesis focuses one of these three broad categories of reform, that of 
microeconomic reform, and narrows down to the study of one of its aspects known 
as the purchaser-provider split and its impact on service delivery, employment and 
organisational culture and practices in two Tasmanian local government areas — 
Hobart and Sore11 councils. Although two Tasmanian local government areas are the 
focus of analysis the investigation makes comparison with the experiences of other 
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Australian municipal governments with the purchaser-provider split. In particular the 
impact of the purchaser-provider split on service spending in the Council of Sydney 
and Mornington Peninsula Council in the states of New South Wales and Victoria 
respectively have been examined in such service areas as property management, 
parks maintenance, light fleet management, street cleaning, road construction, and 
maintenance of physical infrastructure. The study also draws on research literature 
on the impact of the purchaser-provider split on local governments in the UK and 
New Zealand. A service specific approach to the evaluation of the impact of the 
purchaser-provider split has not been attempted (even though selected individual 
services for which performance indicators were developed since 1999 have been 
examined). Instead all services which organisation has been affected, in terms of 
policy and delivery by the purchaser-provider split, have been considered. 
Research questions 
A number of questions are posed in this study about the applicability of the 
purchaser-provider split to the public sector. Some commentators view the 
application of the model to the public sector as appropriate, while others are doubtful 
about its usefulness for the conduct of public business. The answers to these 
questions should furnish some insights about the appropriateness or otherwise of the 
purchaser-provider split as a model for the public sector. 
Because public sector goods and services are varied and wide-ranging alternative 
mechanisms are required to deliver them efficiently and effectively. Governments 
may employ bureaucracy, policy networks or contracting regimes to provide its 
citizens with goods, services, rules and money. Considered against the backdrop of 
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the inherent limitations of the purchaser-provider split, the multiplicity of, and 
preference for, different approaches for public provision of goods and services, a 
question arises. That is, whether the purchaser-provider split is a preferred and 
effective management tool for implementation in many countries. This question is 
especially relevant in an era where resources globally are becoming scarcer and any 
attempt at experimentation with this paradigm shift in management will entail the 
consumption of the already scarce resources while the experiments are not 
guaranteed positive outcomes. 
Another point is that the public sector today faces challenging times. Throughout the 
world, governments are under challenge to deliver services with fewer resources in 
an atmosphere of increasing demand for more accountability. Driving the taxpayers' 
dollars further, while at the same time ensuring high standards of service delivery, is 
the task that must be met by those who operate the public sector. A dilemma is 
therefore faced: that of avoiding waste of resources which trial and error under the 
purchaser-provider split entails, and meeting citizens' demands for improved service 
delivery with accountability, which the purchaser-provider split promises. One 
therefore wonders how this dilemma is resolved in countries that are experimenting 
with the purchaser-provider split, especially how those who operate the public sector 
are able to gain a clear understanding of the context and framework within which 
they operate, up to the minute knowledge of international best practice, and a variety 
of skills needed to manage a complex array of interfaces. 
A third point is that implementation of a policy as Pressman and Wildavsky argue, 
will become less and less effective as the links between all the various agencies 
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involved in carrying out a policy form an 'implementation deficit'. Goals have to be 
clearly defined and understood, resources made available, the chain of command be 
capable of assembling and controlling resources and the system able to communicate 
effectively and control those individuals involved in the performance of the tasks 
(Pressman and Wildavsky 1973). Obviously, the purchaser-provider split entails 
differing modes and layers of separation. This means several different departments, 
agencies and units - both public and private, in-house or external, may be playing 
roles as owners/funders, purchasers, providers or policy advisers. The different 
players will pursue different aims and objectives. While some organisations, 
agencies and providers, especially private ones, may be concerned with the 
commercial and/or efficiency objectives, others such as the owners and purchasers, 
may endeavour to strike a balance between efficiency and equity concerns. It will 
also mean that different strategies will be employed in pursuit of the different aims 
and objectives. In such a situation, establishing a link between the mosaic of 
organisations, agencies and units, assembling resources for them and building an 
effective control as well as chain of command and communication among them in 
order to avoid an 'implementation deficit' should be a formidable task indeed. Such 
implementation challenges must prove quite difficult to overcome by public 
organisations which are implementing the purchaser-provider split. 
A fourth argument is that the adoption of the purchaser-provider split may force the 
emergence of new patterns of relationships between in-house departments, agencies 
and units. This shift may come about because agencies, departments and units which 
hitherto cooperated and collaborated in efforts to achieve common organisational 
goals may now be locked in keen competition with one another for contracts to 
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provide a good or service for their client. The competition obviously will breed 
tension and secrecy between in-house business units. And yet these agencies and 
units are expected to hang together to accomplish the mission of the organisation. 
One therefore wonders whether the co-existence of competition with collaboration is 
possible in organisations which are experimenting with the purchaser-provider split. 
And whether this is done in a way that achieves integration and effectiveness in the 
formulation and implementation of projects, programs and schemes under the 
purchaser-provider split at the district, sub-district and sectoral levels. 
In addition, the introduction of the purchaser-provider split as an alternative 
mechanism for public provision of goods and services may raise important questions 
about public accountability. If large amounts of public expenditure are diverted 
through private suppliers, how are these bodies to be held to account for their 
actions? This question is relevant because if governments insist on elaborate 
procedures of formal accountability it will not only have implications for the market 
interest in delivering these supplies but also the price quoted for delivery. Hence, 
governments, in seeking to reduce the costs of providing services determined in the 
broader public interest, will face up to commercial pressures to tailor decisions 
toward financial rates of return. One is therefore left to contemplate how 
governments are able to strike a balance between their costs reduction and 
accountability concerns and the commercial incentives they must provide to attract 
suppliers to deliver services under the purchaser-provider split. 
Furthermore, the purchaser-provider arrangement is promulgated as best practice in 
many OECD countries. Yet for lower levels of government in these countries 
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together with developing nations, even if they now recognise the efficiency gains 
that derive from the adoption of the model, they face acute shortage of resources and 
bureaucratic support and capacity to effect a transformation of the policy into 
concrete projects and programs for the benefit of their people. One therefore wonders 
how effective implementation of the model is achieved without adequate resources 
and the skilled manpower at the local level in the developed countries and at all 
levels of government in the developing countries. 
Finally, the purchaser-provider split is built around notions of efficiency gains, 
which may be achieved at the expense of equity. However, the huge efforts in the 
public sector are driven by equity considerations which can only be attained, at a cost 
in terms of total output. This implies achieving a balance between efficiency and 
equity objectives obviously is not an easy task. This is because governments are 
constrained by scarcity of resources in meeting the needs of their citizens, meaning 
the simultaneous attainment of efficiency and equity objectives within the budget 
constraints should be a formidable undertaking indeed. 
Aims and objectives of the thesis 
The purpose of this study is to appraise the implementation of the purchaser-provider 
split in Hobart and Sorell councils in the State of Tasmania in comparative 
perspective. The thesis has pursued the following objectives: 
1. To examine the modes of the purchaser-provider split which are adopted and 
implemented in Hobart and Sore!! councils. 
2. To examine the projects, programs and services which are provided under the 
purchaser-provider split in Hobart and Sore!! Councils. 
7 
3. To determine the nature of government-citizen connectedness as it relates to 
the roles, strengths and wider contribution of the community sector under the 
purchaser-provider arrangement. 
4. To evaluate the impact on the services which are provided under the 
purchaser-provider split in Hobart and Sorell councils in comparative 
perspective. In particular it has been investigated whether the purchaser-
provider split has led to: 
• councils shifting emphasis from inputs and processes to outputs and 
outcomes and so are able to concentrate on strategic policy issues; 
• reduction in service expenditure and improvement in quality of product; 
• the creation of internal markets that relate to particular councils sub 
units, agencies and departments and sectors in specialising with the 
provision of goods and services. 
5. To assess the effect of the purchaser-provider split on employment of Hobart 
and Sorell Councils. 
6. To determine the impact of the purchaser-provider split on the organisational 
culture and practices of Hobart and Sorell Councils 
7. To find out the problems that are encountered in the implementation of the 
purchaser-provider model 
Significance of the study 
The focus on municipal government is predicated on the notion that what occurs at 
the local level has much more direct impact on the everyday lives of ordinary people 
than national level activities. Scant attention has been paid to local government 
activities compared to the coverage of events at the upper tiers of government. This 
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thesis therefore represents an attempt to highlight the importance of community level 
activities and government, and the promises and challenges of implementing 
government policies at that level. 
Secondly, the project is considered appropriate and relevant to current development 
trends globally and in Australia in particular. Like many other countries, Australia 
has embarked on a bold public sector reform program since the late 1980s and early 
1990s to date. Australian local government reforms in all the states and territories 
were vigorously pursued during the 1990s. And in the case of the state of Tasmanian, 
the statewide local government modernisation process, and the purchaser-provider 
split in the two study councils (Hobart and Sorell) were respectively launched in 
1990/93 and 1996. However, the modernisation process and the purchaser-provider 
split have not been able to achieve all of their objectives because of what has become 
known as the 'implementation deficit'. This thesis can make an important 
contribution to the literature on the on-going debate on policy implementation and 
public sector reform. 
Thirdly, it would contribute to the literature on the purchaser-provider split as an 
alternative governance mechanism, and perhaps add a new dimension - its 
significance at the local level. In addition, the study can establish a platform for 
rethinking on the state of the purchaser-provider split to gear towards the furnishing 
of new insights and collective measures for improvements at the local level in 
Australia and other countries. Moreover, the study may encourage other researchers 
to examine other policies that have been implemented at the local level in Australia. 
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This may be necessary in order to furnish inputs that may inform implementation 
reforms or policy reform altogether. 
Hypotheses of the study 
A hypothesis is a tentative answer to a research problem, expressed in the form of 
clearly stated relation between the independent and dependent variables. Hypotheses 
are tentative answers because they can be verified after they have been tested (Frank-
Nachmias and Nachmias 1996). 
The hypotheses that have been tested in this study are: 
• Hi: The use of the purchaser-provider split will be unrelated to service 
category level spending. 
• H2: The incidence of the purchaser-provide split will be negatively related to 
total municipal service spending. 
• H3: The incidence of the purchaser provider split will be negatively related 
to total municipal employment 
Research design and methods 
The research design of the study involves the analysis of the impact of the purchaser-
provider split on three functional areas: service delivery, employment and 
organisational culture and practices in two Tasmanian local government areas — 
Hobart and Sorell. Each council adopted and implemented the purchaser-provider 
split to the extent that fitted its context. Hence, the project used a structured focused 
comparative case study methodology (George 1979; Sartori 1991) by examining the 
same sectors in each municipality. This approach adopts what has been described as 
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the 'most similar' systems approach (Roberts 1978). According to Roberts 'where 
the problem is one of identification and accounting for specific differences, selection 
of units of analysis which possess many similarities in terms of relevant variables 
makes easier the identification of variables which do differ' (Roberts1978: 293). The 
'structured, focused comparison' (George 1979) puts emphasis on specification of 
research problem and objectives; case study research; and drawing out theoretical 
implications of the case studies. 
The rationale that guides the selection of cases in the controlled comparison 
(comparative) approach is not numbers but variety that is, cases belonging to the 
same class that differ from each other (George 1979). Hobart and Sorell Councils 
have dissimilar characteristics in terms of size, population, revenue raising capacity, 
leadership style, bureaucratic support and capacity, as well as outlays on services, 
just to mention a few. For example, Sorell Council has 7.5 times the area of the 
HCC, but its population is 4.3 times less than that of the HCC. It raises almost 7 
times less the revenue of the HCC, has 12.5 times less the net asset of the latter, and 
possesses 3.1 times less the number of rateable properties of the HCC. Twenty three 
percent of its revenue comes from grants while 60 percent derives from rates (KPIC 
2004). Compared with the 6 percent and 69 percent respectively for grants and rates 
in the case of the HCC, it can be concluded that the HCC has greater capacity for 
own-source revenue generation than Sorell Council. Sorell Council employs a total 
of 66 people and lacks many of the requisite professional staff for the efficient 
discharge of its responsibilities (KPIC 2004). In contrast, the total workforce of the 
HCC is 584 and this relatively larger workforce enables it to be better served by the 
requisite professional staff than almost all the other councils in the state of Tasmania 
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— an advantage that has enabled it to adopt more quickly to microeconomic reform 
notions such as commercialisation, corporatisation and the purchaser-provider split. 
By investigating the impact of the purchaser-provider split on the same sectors in 
these characteristically different municipalities, symmetries and/or asymmetries in 
response outcomes can easily be determined. This view is supported by George when 
he argues that 'a simultaneous comparison of two or more cases if each comprises an 
instance of the same class of events can be an excellent research strategy for the 
cumulative development of theory' (George 1979: 52). 
The pace of reforms in Australian local government can make it difficult for 
practitioners and scholars alike to keep abreast of all these changes. A meaningful 
strategy is to track and evaluate these shifts based on a few case studies since this 
approach is seen as a more rewarding exercise than a more superficial analysis of 
many cases (Lijphart 1971). Lijphart contends further that in general, the problems of 
reliability and validity may be smaller for the investigator working with the 
comparable cases approach. 'He can analyse his smaller number of cases more 
thoroughly, and he is less dependent on data that he cannot properly evaluate' 
(Lijphart 1971: 171). Lijphart's view is supported by the use of specific cases in 
some studies of local government (Chapman 1995; LGB 1997; Ryan 1997; Aulich 
1997; Haward and Zwart 2000). For these reasons, two Tasmanian local government 
cases — Hobart and Sorell Councils, are used to evaluate in detail the impact of the 
purchaser-provider split on service delivery, employment and organisational culture 
and practices. 
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Even one-shot case studies have been undertaken. For example, Head Start (a 
preschool program) which was introduced as part of the Community Action Program 
and later became a permanent part of the Antipoverty Program in the US, was 
evaluated for its effectiveness using the one-shot case design (Frankfort-Nachmias 
and Nachmias 1996; Anderson 1984). Similarly, the Cuban Missile Crisis had been 
studied as a single historical case that offered useful material for the development of 
many theories (Allison 1971). Thus, it had been investigated as an instance of 
deterrence failure by George and Smoke (1974); coercive diplomacy by George et al 
(1971); and crisis management by Holsti (1972). 
This project involves a combination of primary (qualitative analysis) and secondary 
data analysis methods. The secondary data sources for the project included annual 
reports, strategic and annual plans, and newsletters as well as media releases of the 
two councils. The reports of the general reviews of the HCC and Sorell Council by 
the Local Government Board (LGB) as well as the reports of the Tasmanian Local 
Government Office, Department of Premier and Cabinet, on the key performance 
indicators of councils also proved invaluable as sources of secondary data for the 
study. So too did reports of the National Office of Local Government, Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance, and the Tasmanian Local Government 
Association as well as the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
These secondary data were used to complement the primary data because it enabled 
the investigator to better understand the historical context. By analysing data 
collected in different times on similar issues, the researcher was able to describe and 
explain change in relation to efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery, 
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employment and management in the pre-purchaser-provider split era compared to the 
period since the introduction of the purchaser-provider split. As Heyman (1987) 
points out, in research on more contemporary issues, the investigator searches 
through a wide range of materials covering different areas and eras, which may result 
in greater scope and depth than is possible when using a single primary data research 
project. 
The secondary data was also employed for comparative purposes. Comparisons 
between the two study councils enlarged the scope of generalisations or conclusions 
and provided additional insight. For example, data on employment, service spending 
and service levels enabled the investigator to measure variables such as efficiency, 
economy and effectiveness in service delivery in the two councils in comparative 
perspective. As Heyman suggests, particularly in relation to survey research: 
Secondary analysis of a series of comparable surveys from different points in 
time provides one of the rare avenues for the empirical description of long-
term changes and for examining the way phenomena vary under the 
contrasted conditions operative in one or several societies at several points 
(Heyman 1987: 17). 
There were methodological reasons, aside the conceptual-substantive ones outlined 
above, for the extensive use of secondary data analysis in this project. Rather than 
conduct several studies, the investigator used data collected by others in addition to 
his and thereby saved time and efforts as well as other resources that would have 
been committed to the many studies. Second, the availability of data over time 
enabled the researcher to employ a longitudinal research design. This design 
permitted some assessment of the cause and effect relationships among key 
variables. Baseline measurements a decade or two ago in relation to relevant 
variables of this project were found, and similar data collected more recently were 
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also located. Indeed, 'when researchers compare their primary data with those 
collected in earlier studies, they essentially conduct a follow-up to the original 
research' (Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias 1996: 306). Third, the analysis of the 
secondary data improved measurement by expanding the scope of independent 
variables in the operationalisation of concepts. For example, in the 'Planning and 
Development Service' area the investigator compared the average number of 
calendar days for the HCC and Sore!! Council to process planning and buildings 
approvals, noting the influencing factors on the figures catalogued in the reports of 
the Tasmanian Office of Local Government, Department of Premier and Cabinet. In 
Heyman's words, the secondary analyst: 
Must examine the diverse array of concrete indicators, assorted specific 
manifestations of behaviour...He is likely to be more exhaustive in his 
definition of a concept, to think about it not only in his accustomed way, but 
in all sort of odd ways (Heyman 1987: 24) 
A semi-structured in-depth interview model was employed. This model involved a 
small number of key questions which allowed respondents to add information or 
amplify issues that led to further elaboration of the topic. These questions addressed 
each of the key points outlined under the research problem and objectives section 
of this study that were designed to assess the effectiveness of the introduction of the 
purchaser-provider split into Hobart and Sorell Councils. 
In-depth interviews were held with key informants, with these informants in each 
council initially identified by their professional responsibilities and interests in 
relation to the purchaser-provider split policy development and implementation. This 
approach provided a means for exploring complexity and detail of process that could 
not be examined by alternate, more structured survey instruments such as 
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questionnaires or analysed using quantitative methods (see Liamputtong and Ezzy 
2005). It also provided information on policy development that complemented the 
formal documentary content analysis. The use of a semi-structured interview allowed 
comparability of the council case studies, recognising the pitfalls of such in-depth 
interviewing without this structured focus (see Devine 1995). 
Different interview schedules were employed for the two councils. These differences 
reflected the relative extent of the difficulty encountered in negotiating access and 
participation in each jurisdiction. The authorities in the HCC agreed to the 
investigator's request to hold individual separate interviews on different dates with 
respondents. The request was granted perhaps because other researchers in the past 
had studied the council and had conducted separate individual interviews with no 
attendant problems. The publication of the results of those studies either in 
newsletters, reports or academic documentary material would have boosted the 
profile of the council. Hence, separate individual interviews for the purpose of 
producing yet another academic document on the council was in order. Studies that 
have been done on the HCC, and known to the investigator, are Ryan (1997) and 
Noga (1997). 
Moreover, management built experience and skills as informants over time and was 
therefore receptive to the suggestion for separate individual interviews. Further, as a 
capital city council, the HCC is the state of Tasmania's focus of the tourist industry, 
and its face for the visitor. It also occupies a strong leadership position in local 
govenunent. These tourism focus, and leadership status have given the council a 
particular responsibility in promoting and marketing itself and the state (LGB 2002). 
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It would therefore not undermine these goals by preventing access, or putting 
obstacles on the way, of those who want to conduct studies on the council. Rather it 
would like to be seen as a local government that encourages and facilitates access 
and participation in its activities. 
The individual interviews were held with senior managers who had responsibilities 
and interests in terms of policy making and implementation connected to the 
purchaser-provider split. Four directors comprising two each from the client and 
provider sides of the council were interviewed. Separate dates were arranged for the 
four directors to ensure that each director gave an independent perspective and 
assessment of the impact of the purchaser-provider split on the council. These 
interviews not only afforded opportunity for multiple perceptions about the 
implementation and outcome of the purchaser-provider split to be gathered, but it 
also ensured that the views that were expressed were not skewed by one side of the 
split. 
In contrast, management of Sorell Council agreed to a group interview instead of the 
individual interviews that were much sought after by the investigator. The reason for 
the decision was not accessible to the researcher. Even though the investigator was 
aware of some of the pitfalls of such an interview approach with the possibility of 
groupthink responses, the approach provided the only opportunity to gain 
information. A possible explanation for the decision could be that such a project was 
novel (unlike for the HCC) in Sorell Council, and management was uncertain about 
what the attendant problems of granting individual interviews would be. This fear 
was probably heightened because respondents may not have had past experience and 
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skills, unlike their counterparts in the HCC, with such a process. The concern in a 
situation like that probably will be that some of the utterances of participants may 
conflict with the official position of the council. 
The general manager and two out of the three departmental managers sat in for the 
group interview. Sorell Council while it has appointed a general manager had not 
adopted a full purchaser-provider split since the client and provider sides are still 
integrated. So there was no concern about managers' views, unlike in the HCC, 
being skewed by one side of the split. However, it could not be completely 
guaranteed that the presence of, and/or responses by, other managers did not 
influence or bias the views of the manager whose turn it was to respond. 
Nevertheless, the interview process was structured so that no manager was 
interrupted at the beginning, middle or end of his responses. 
The combination of primary data and secondary data analysis enabled the 
investigator to make a more credible and comprehensive comparative evaluation of 
the impact of the purchaser-provider split on service delivery, employment and 
organisational culture and practices in the HCC and Sorell Council, while noting the 
influence of other factors such as the modernisation process. 
Scope and limitations of the study 
The project is concerned with the analysis of the impact of the purchaser-provider 
split on service delivery, employment and organisational culture and practices in two 
Tasmanian local government areas — Hobart and Sorell Councils. It compares and 
contrasts the outcomes of the implementation of the model in the two municipalities. 
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It sharpens the analysis by comparing the experiences of some Australian mainland 
councils with the purchaser-provider split with the evidence of the Tasmanian 
council case studies. This then enabled the implications of the analysis for the 
conceptual underpinnings of the purchaser-provider split to be assessed. 
The limitations of this thesis are that its findings cannot be used to generalise to 
larger populations and applied to different social and political settings. Most research 
is concerned not only with the effect of one variable on another in a particular setting 
studied but also with its effect in other natural settings and on larger populations. 
These weaknesses however, are compensated for through an in-depth analysis of the 
cases. The advantage of this in-depth analysis is that it is suited for the development 
of what Diesing (1971: 196) describes as typological theory and what George (1979: 
59) refers to as "rich, differentiated theory", which in contrast to a general 
explanatory theory, is cast in the form of contingent genralisations and has the 
capability for more discriminating explanation (George and Simons 1971: 511). 
George elucidates this point clearly by contrasting a general explanatory theory such 
as "war is the result of miscalculation" with a richer, more differentiated theory 
comprised of contingent genralisations that identify the different conditions under 
which different types of miscalculations lead to different types of war outbreaks. He 
then concludes that obviously the: 
Second type of differentiated theory not only has greater explanatory power, 
it also has greater practical value for policy makers because it enables them to 
make more discriminating diagnoses of emerging situations in which some 
kind of miscalculation might lead to outbreak of violence (George 1979: 59). 
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Indeed investigators who prefer the controlled comparison (comparative) research 
strategy are often attracted to it precisely because it enables the development of this 
type of differentiated policy-relevant theory (Dieseng 1971: 195-6). Thus political 
scientists who use the controlled comparison method of analysing cases have in 
common with historians and clinicians generally an interest in developing the kind of 
theory that enriches understanding of each particular case — that is, each instance of 
the class of events in question (George 1979: 59). Hence, the researcher by selecting, 
investigating and comparing the two councils in terms of the impact of the 
purchaser-provider split on three functional areas: service delivery, employment and 
organisational culture and practices was able to develop an enriched understanding 
of each particular case — that is, each instance of service delivery, employment and 
management. 
Modernisation process 
Australian local governments have been subjected to unprecedented reforms over the 
past decade. Gerritsen (1996) distinguishes two waves of reforms within local 
government over the past three decades. The first wave began in 1973 and some of 
its aspects are still at various stages of implementation. The components of this phase 
include a myriad of structural, economic, legislative and industrial shifts that have 
reshaped councils' internal practices, their modes of service delivery and their 
jurisdictional boundaries (Gerritsen 1996: 33). The second wave was ushered in the 
early 1990s, and 'emphasised a broad program of microeconomic reform, including 
national benchmarking and national competition policy' (Dollery and Worthington 
2000: 3). This second phase has continued more or less unabated in all states and 
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territories irrespective of the political colour of state and Commonwealth 
governments. 
For Tasmania, these waves of municipal government reform have been wide-ranging 
and far-reaching as to warrant an umbrella label known as the Modernisation 
Process. The elements of the modernisation process are legislative reform, review of 
the financial relationship between the state and local government, rationalisation of 
roles and functions between the two spheres of government and amalgamations. The 
evaluation of these four categories of reform in this thesis is done with respect to 
efficiency, democracy and accountability. These components of the modernisation 
process have not been implemented to the same extent, with the same vigour and 
over the same length of time. The rationalisation of roles and functions, and the 
review of the relative revenue capacities available to each level of government have 
lagged behind legislative and boundary changes. 
The consequences of these shifts on the autonomy and general competence power of 
councils to appropriately respond to the needs of their communities are explicated. 
Also examined is the extent to which these reforms have affected accountability of 
local governments towards their communities. The driving force behind council 
amalgamations was the quest for greater efficiency through economies of scale. 
Secondary considerations were fostering some sense of community or community of 
interest, and representation and participation. These topics are explored by 
comparing the outcomes of the 1990/93 boundary changes with the 1997 
amalgamation proposals. Finally, the consequences of these reforms in terms of 
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providing an enabling environment for councils to adopt the purchaser-provider split 
are examined. 
Outline of the thesis 
This thesis is divided into eight chapters and organised such that chapters one to six 
are devoted to the discussion of public sector reforms at the international, national 
and state levels as well as the local sphere of government. The last two chapters 
focus on analysis relating to the outcomes of the implementation of the purchaser-
provider split in two Tasmanian local government areas, Hobart and Sore11. 
Chapter one examines public sector reforms as a universal phenomenon that reflects 
the ideology of the new public management which swept through many western 
democracies with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of 
public business. Some of its components include measures such as decentralisation, 
privatisation, incorporation, deregulation, introduction of executive agencies, internal 
markets or the use of purchaser-provider split, and tendering and bidding schemes. 
The chapter contends that the wave of public sector reforms represented a steep 
learning curve in that western democratic governments, irrespective of political 
colour, sought to learn from one another, and in a number of instances deliberately 
adopted and adapted structural models from one or more jurisdictions. 
Chapter two discusses the doctrines, strengths and weaknesses of the theories that 
underpin the purchaser-provider split. These are public choice theory, agency theory 
and the new public management. It also explores the influences these theoretical 
traditions had on the Australian model of public sector reform, including the 
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purchaser-provider split. The chapter concludes, acknowledging that although many 
other ideas, theories and perceptions as well as economic pressures and political 
imperatives played roles in the reform process, public choice theory, agency theory 
and the new public management have had significant impact on the Australian as 
well as other western democracies' models of public sector reform. 
The third chapter is devoted to the discussion of the purchaser-provider split. The 
model's principle and goals together with the conceptual frameworks that undergird 
it (public choice theory, agency theory and the new public management) are 
explicated. How the model is expressed in the Australian local government sector, 
and the theoretical budgetary effects of its implementation in this sphere of 
government are examined. This is followed by an outline of the Australian National 
Competition Policy (NCP). Then the relation of the NCP to both the purchaser-
provider split and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) are sketched. The 
chapter provides the framework upon which subsequent chapters of this thesis are 
built. 
The consequences of globalisation for governments as they attempt to enhance the 
competitiveness of their national economies, have made gaining up to the minute 
knowledge of international best practice critical. Hence, it is important to highlight 
the aspects of the new public management that Australia has imported from abroad 
in order to enhance good public management at home. Chapter four does just that by 
reviewing public sector reforms at all levels of government in Australia. The reform 
agenda the Australian government adopted can be grouped under mainly three 
headings: microeconomic, managerial and legislative. These policy-induced changes 
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were first implemented at the upper tiers of government and local government was 
instigated to follow suit. The chapter looks at these three broad categories of reform 
at all levels of government, and particularly in detail at the local government sphere. 
It is discernible from the chapter that the reform agenda has substantially altered the 
nature and form of Australian local government. 
In the fifth chapter, the three broad categories of reforms identified in the preceding 
chapter are explored in detail in respect of their impact on local government in the 
State of Tasmania. First, changes that occurred at the state level are sketched, after 
which the outcomes of the implementation of the local government reforms are 
presented. The changes introduced by the State Government included among others, 
reform of state authorities, a restructuring of state service, budgetary and 
management reform, and changes in the policy process and the statutory framework 
within which the state public sector operates. In the local government sector, the 
modernisation process is the umbrella term for the three broad categories of reforms 
identified in the preceding chapter. The reform program focused on structural 
change, legislative change affecting the powers local government may exercise, and 
procedural changes to the manner in which they operate. The outcomes of the 
reforms are appraised along lines of efficiency, democracy and accountability. 
The purpose of chapter six is to capture in detail the implications of these far-
reaching local government reforms for the Hobart City Council (HCC) and Sorell 
Council (that is, the impact of the modernisation process). The evaluation of the 
outcomes of the reforms, like in the preceding chapter, is conducted in respect to 
criteria of efficiency, democracy and accountability. The chapter compares and 
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contrasts the outcomes of the reform in the two councils. The comparison has 
revealed that differential outcomes have attended the reform efforts and these 
asymmetries are attributable in part to resource differentials and the level of 
bureaucratic support and capacity towards the change process. Chapter seven 
concentrates on the institutional changes in the HCC and Sore11 Council that resulted 
from the introduction of the purchaser-provider split and the NCP. The examination 
has shown that the purchaser-provider split has changed the councils' organisational 
structures, behaviours and practices. The chapter then provides the backdrop against 
which the final chapter is able to evaluate the impact of the purchaser-provider split 
on service delivery, employment and organisational culture and practices in the HCC 
and Sore11 Council. The analysis has revealed that the effects of the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider split are different for the two councils. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM 
During the 1980s orthodoxy arose that the state needed to be 'rolled back'. 
Governments had grown too large with sprawling bureaucracies consuming ever 
more resources but failing to make significant improvements in service delivery. The 
need to rein in budget expenditure coupled with rhetoric about efficiency led to 
pressure to `downsize' government. While reform programs in one form or another 
have been around since the inception of 'development administration' in the 1950s, 
their most recent manifestation has been far more radical than the incremental efforts 
of earlier years. The present menu of reform initiatives includes a list of measures 
which are a very difficult bundle to wrap together neatly. Some countries have 
experimented with one or two of these kinds of reforms while others have adopted all 
of them: decentralisation, privatisation, incorporation, deregulation, introduction of 
executive agencies, internal markets or the use of the purchaser-provider split as well 
as tendering or bidding schemes. 
Because these market mechanisms are interrelated and the effective application of 
any one of them may require the complement of relevant others, it is important to 
distinguish between those of them that are used in this thesis. Corporatisation refers 
to the creation of 'a corporate form, either a company under the general companies 
legislation, or a statutory authority under its own legislation' (PSC 2003: 5; Willet 
2000). Corporations generally have the intent of conducting revenue-generating 
commercial-type activities. Competitive tendering denotes an arrangement where 
'rival agencies submit bids to deliver a specified quantity and quality of service. The 
lowest bid wins the contract, provided that proposals for service production are 
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credible' (Boyne 1998a: 697). Privatisation broadly means the processes by which 
assets or activities owned and controlled by the public sector are subjected to market 
forces. These include the competitive tendering for activities once carried out solely 
by public service organisations; the deregulation of markets; and the transfers of 
assets to the private sector by share floatation or private sale (Corbett 1996; OECD 
2002). Contracting out is the hiring of private sector firms or non-profit organisations 
to provide goods or services for the government. Under this approach, the 
government continues to finance the services or goods and has general management 
and policy control over the type and quality of goods or services to be provided 
(TCCG n.d). 
This chapter discusses public sector reform on the international scene including the 
purchaser-provider split. It draws together literature on the experiences of many 
western democracies and concludes that public sector reform is a universal 
phenomenon affecting all countries irrespective of political system with the aim of 
enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of public business. 
Public sector reform initiatives 
The first wave of reforms with regard to the business of administering the modern 
state occurred in Britain in the second half of the nineteenth century with the civil 
service reforms. In the US reforms were initiated in the second and third decades of 
the last century with progressivism (United Kingdom 1998; Hughes 1994, 2003)). 
The main thrust of these reforms was to professionalise the public service by 
ensuring that selection and promotion were based on merit rather than patronage, 
rule rather than discretion governed how public process and decisions operated, and 
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public service was oriented by norms of impersonality, correct procedures and 
consistency. This type of social organisation was new. It has to be established against 
an older ethos that emphasised personalised and local loyalties to kin, neighbourhood 
and political allies (Kamenka 1989; Lane 2000; Hughes 2003). 
The bureaucratic model, as the reform was termed, overthrew the first order of 
personalised and local loyalties to kin, neighbourhood and political allies. The 
bureaucratic model delivered two basic mechanisms for the conduct of the public 
sector: the bureau and the public enterprise (Lane 2000; Halligan 2004). The bureau 
was designed to handle non-economic activities ranging from military matters, police 
and judiciary to education and health. Whereas the public enterprise was the 
mechanism recommended for economic activities in so far as the public sector would 
take care of such activities that is, they could not be entrusted to the market — the 
market failure argument (Lane 2000). Impersonality was to ensure that public 
officers carried out their duties without fear or favour and that if the position were 
separated from the person, office holders would not confuse personal values with 
official ones. 
In short, impersonality was aimed at enhancing continuity and efficiency in the 
conduct of public business. Rules and regulations, which guided all processes and 
procedures, were designed at achieving standard service delivery and accountability. 
Obedience of rules and regulations was one of the yardsticks for measuring 
performance and progression in the public service, while hierarchy was viewed as an 
effective means of exerting management's control and supervision over public 
employees as well as promoting economy and efficiency in the conduct of public 
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business. The citizens to whom the public sector rendered services were regarded as 
beneficiaries of government standardised services, and from whom expression of 
gratefulness was expected. Services were not customised to be responsive to the 
individual citizen's preferences and expectations (Guth and Mills 1970; Bozeman 
1979; Kemanka 1989; Behn 2001). 
By the late 1970s and 1980s the bureaucratic model was challenged. Questions 
began to emerge as whether the model provided an adequate analysis of its actual 
mode of functioning, or whether it had really formulated a model for how it could be 
made to work effectively. 'Hierarchical structures are not necessarily the most 
efficient of organisations if comparing outputs with inputs. Bureaucracy may be ideal 
for control but not necessarily for management' (Hughes 2003: 32). The bureaucratic 
model engenders certainty but is usually slow in moving; work may be standardised, 
but at the cost of innovation (Hughes 2003). These problems certainly seemed to be 
evident in many public organisations, drawing criticisms that governments had 
grown too large with sprawling bureaucracies consuming ever more resources but 
failing to make significant improvement in service delivery or 'reining' in budget 
expenditure. These criticisms were weighty enough to prompt a new wave of public 
sector reforms (Lane 2000; Emy and Hughes 1991; Hughes 2003). 
Although the stated objectives for public sector reform vary across political systems, 
two major foci have been evident almost everywhere over the past two decades. 
First, political leaders have sought to assert authority over their bureaucracies and the 
interests embedded therein, in order to effect greater economy and efficiency in the 
management of government resources. Second, they have sought to make the 
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delivery of public services more responsive to the needs and requirements of citizens 
as clients, consumers, and customers of government operations (Aucoin 1998: 310; 
Emy and Hughes 1991). 
The forces that were responsible for the changes were many and varied in context 
across political systems. Virtually everywhere, however, they embraced the 
imposition of budgetary austerity as governments attempted to control and discipline 
public spending; the implications of globalisation for governments as they sought to 
enhance the competitiveness of their national economies; the rising expectations of 
individual citizens and businesses for quality service; and the opportunities new 
information technology provided not only for effecting savings but also for re-
engineering the delivery of services (Aucoin 1998: 310; Hughes 2003). As a result, 
there has been a surprising convergence between what have been the differences 
among political systems in at least two respects: first, structures that seek 
organisationally to separate responsibilities for policy and operations respectively; 
and second, designs to provide for more integrated service delivery systems (Aucoin 
1998: 310; Hughes 2003). In each of these respects, the management dimensions of 
government have received a political salience that managerially minded reformers of 
the past could only denote as wishful thinking (Hood 1990a; Pollitt 1990; Zifcak 
1994). 
Associated closely with de-bureaucratisation has been the progressive application of 
explicit 'contractual' type regimes in place of traditional hierarchical arrangements. 
Contractual relationships in the management of public services are clearly not a new 
trend, especially in the case of relationships between government and the commercial 
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private sector (Purchase and Hirshhorn 1994). 'What is relatively novel, however, is 
the extent to which contractual relationships have been extended across government' 
(Aucoin 1998: 312) in order to 'set explicit targets for the provision of public 
services, to establish service standards, to apply performance measures, and to 
impose more demanding and transparent reporting and accountability regimes' 
(Aucoin 1998: 312; OECD 1994). 
These measures culminated in a considerable degree of decentralisation of authority 
within the organisational hierarchies of government. Yet this is not where the wave 
ends, as some might prefer (Barzelay 1992). Following these shifts were designs 
both to control the impulses towards bureaucratic autonomy and to require 
performance according to centrally imposed targets and standards. The direction of 
efforts at achieving decentralisation and centralisation at the same time unavoidably 
led to dispute, even confusion, as to what exactly constituted the bottom line of 
public management reform (Aucoin 1990a). This certainly seems to be the case 
where conflicting directives have been given to those responsible for achieving 
greater productivity in the management of public resources while ensuring increased 
service quality in the delivery of public services (Ingraham 1995). 
Despite the contradictions evident in the simultaneous de-bureaucratisation-
centralisation movements, structural changes in several regimes have been 
phenomenal, and some might even wish to characterise them as 'revolutionary'. 
'Western democratic governments may not have been reinvented in the process', but 
it is clear that the 'older order has passed away in several important respects and, 
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equally important, traditionally bureaucratic model, in its various forms across 
Western political systems, has diminished dramatically' (Aucoin 1998: 313). 
Even though 'there is no one best way of organising' (Wilson 1989: 25), there is no 
denying that governments in different jurisdictions have made efforts to 'learn from 
one another, and in a number of instances have deliberately adopted and adapted 
structural models from one or more other jurisdictions' (Aucoin 1998: 313). 
Obviously, some are leaders while others are laggards, however, the tendency has 
been to adopt common, even generic, principles of good public management, despite 
significant, even fundamental differences in constitutional and political systems 
(Aucoin 1998; Holmes and Shand 1995). 
There were also structural shifts, as a common feature, across political systems to 
respond to the need for improved management and delivery of public services. And 
this entailed the reduction of the authority of central management agencies to 
regulate and direct line departments or agencies. Although the power of central 
agencies has been enhanced in most cases and central policy departments are still 
responsible for policy-making, those in charge of the management and delivery of 
services have generally been given increased authority to decide on the ways they 
use their resources to meet their obligations (Aucoin 1998: 313; Boston et al 1998; 
Hughes 2003). 
In a few countries, this entailed major structural changes to the central management 
of government. For example, in Australia and New Zealand the once-powerful 
central control agencies responsible for staffing and associated matters of personnel 
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administration were transformed into primarily policy advisory and administrative 
agencies (Aucoin 1998; Emy and Hughes 1991; Hughes 2003). Even where such 
phenomenal changes have not occurred, the central corporate management structure 
of government has been subject, if not to a major rationalisation or streamlining of 
powers, at least to a reorientation of functions (Clark 1994; Lindquist 1996). 
'Uniform, standardised, and government-wide policies, rules, and regulations 
respecting financial, personnel and related administrative practices have been thinned 
out, whittled down, or replaced with guidelines and advice on 'best practice' (Aucoin 
1998: 314). This has been the case even in those systems, such as Sweden and 
Germany, where centralised management systems have not been the norm for all 
functional areas of administration or have not been as intrusive as in other systems, 
such as the Anglo-American system (Aucoin 1998). 
The management and delivery of public services in Sweden and France have long 
been undertaken primarily by separate operational agencies, as well as lower orders 
of government, so it is not surprising that these systems have been characterised by 
relatively minimal central management agency control over the administrative 
aspects of public management. When compared with the 'Westminster systems, 
among others, they have thus had less to reform, at least along lines of 
decentralisation' (Aucoin 1998: 314). 
Nevertheless, in Sweden there has been increased devolution of authority. 
Devolution has been pursued in part as an austerity measure, that is to transfer some 
national responsibilities to local authorities. Equally important, however, it has been 
an initiative designed to de-bureaucratise state-citizen relations and thus an attempt 
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to reclaim legitimacy of the state in its relation with civil society (Aucoin 1998; 
Pierre 1993). Germany has embarked upon some administrative deregulation, but the 
huge efforts at structural reform concentrated on the local sphere of government, 
where collaborative attempts were made to implement new schemes for the 
management and delivery of public services that promote greater economy and 
efficiency (Derlien 1993). 
Even in France, long seen as the central administrative state, reforms to decentralise 
and devolve authority for the purpose of improving public management and 
enhancing legitimacy of the state has been effected (Aucoin 1998). Here increased 
delegation of management authority to the field offices of the national government 
has thus been pursued together with devolution of authority to local government. 
Modernisation of the national public service enhanced the powers of local officials, 
and this coincided in time with the establishment of new local government regimes 
that brought about the diminution of central government control over the 
management of public business at the local level (deMontricher 1995; Roaban 1993). 
In Britain and New Zealand the 'powers of local government and associated local 
authorities have been reduced by centrally imposed new structural frameworks that 
require them to adhere to national public management systems and practices' 
(Aucoin 1998: 315). Hence, both countries have pushed further the extent to which 
local government and associated local authorities are portrayed as an elongation of 
the national state. In several important respects, however, the motive of central 
government changes has been 'to provide citizens with greater 'user say' or choice - 
a form of centrally imposed decentralisation' (Aucoin 1998: 315). In Australia and 
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Canada, the two Westminster federal systems, as well as in the United States, there 
have been efforts to reduce the overlap and duplication between federal and 
state/provincial orders of government. In the process federal governments in these 
systems have sought to redirect their efforts on the core responsibilities of the 
national government. Here too there is a kind of decentralisation compelled from the 
centre (Aucoin 1998). 
Tracing the purchaser -provider split within the reform agenda 
Some countries while they pursued these general themes of reform (discussed in the 
preceding section) aimed at achieving greater administrative decentralisation, also 
took further steps to promote economy and efficiency in their operations. The 
Westminster systems led the way in implementing the most significant structural 
changes in pursuit of this objective. These changes represented a marked shift from 
the traditional ministerial department model that has long characterised the 
organising principle under the Westminster system (Aucoin 1998). In every case 
these changes were carried out to remedy the limitations and inadequacies that were 
inherent in the departmental model with regard to achieving effective political 
direction and control on the one hand, and good management on the other. 
Among the Westminster systems, Britain and New Zealand were the first to embark 
upon such organisational changes. Although the two countries did not alter the 
traditional ministerial departmental model in exactly the same manner, each 
acknowledged that it was imperative to institute measures to separate organisational 
responsibilities for policy and operations, referred to as the purchaser-provider split 
(Boston et al 1997; Greer 1994; Campbell and Wilson 1995). 
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The purchaser-provider split is a component of the leading contemporary strategies 
for public sector reform that is promulgated as best practice in OECD countries. 
Great Britain, New Zealand and Australia have all embraced this reform. The United 
Kingdom has uncoupled three-fourths of its civil service, while in New Zealand the 
percentage is about 90 percent. The report that proposed the 'executive agency' 
model and led to the restructuring of the British system continued in this vein, 
arguing for an increased separation of responsibilities as necessary to improve the 
management of government operations (United Kingdom 1988). 
Britain and New Zealand instituted this design by creating structures that were based 
on the supposition that the most effective way to achieve economy, efficiency, and 
service quality in public management was to ensure that those primarily charged with 
the responsibility for operational matters of government were assigned roles in these 
regards and granted the needed authority and autonomy to decide on how they will 
carry them out (Aucoin 1998; Halligan 2004; OECD 1998). In each case this implied 
clarifying relationships between ministers and those responsible for operational 
matters according to contractual type agreements (Aucoin 1998: 316; Aulich et al 
1999). 
These efforts have resulted in the creation of new and alternative models to the 
ministerial department framework in Britain and New Zealand. The alternative 
models are significantly different from the traditional departmental structure in that 
the extent to which a new set of principles informed structural change across 
government is evident and considerable. The institutional designs applied to give 
effect to these models are not uniform or standardised in all respects. However, the 
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rationale on which they were predicated was markedly different from that that had 
informed the design of the ministerial departmental model (Aucoin 1998). They are 
dissimilar in three important respects. 
First, they postulate that enhanced public management is best achieved when 
ministers are required to make their objectives sufficiently explicit and transparent in 
order to distinguish between the desired policy outcomes they decide to pursue and 
the outputs they are prepared to sponsor and fund as public service responsibilities in 
pursuit of these outcomes (Aucoin 1998: 316; Ryan et al 2000). Second, they assume 
that horizontal network of contracts rather than hierarchies; represent the most 
effective way of delegating authority not only for managing resources but also 
applying administrative practices that promote economy and efficiency in the 
conduct of public business. Third, they assume that 'these first two conditions are 
prerequisites for the creation of management systems that secure performance 
according to ministerial targets and standards and clarify the accountability of 
ministers and public service managers respectively' (Aucoin 1998: 317). 
The implication of these assumptions is that ministers (or their departmental policy 
advisors) should not set and tender policy advice, as well as implement policy 
(Aucoin 1998; New Zealand Treasury 1987: 756). If intervention is warranted then 
political executives and their policy advisors should make their intention public, by 
for example, changing the terms of their contracts with operational agency managers 
(Aucoin 1998). On their part, heads of operational units are obliged to abide by the 
terms of their contracts, including their responsibilities for adhering to the corporate 
management policies contained in their contracts; if they do not sanctions will apply 
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(Aucoin 1998). To the extent that the behaviour of ministers and operational agency 
heads is in conformity to the principles of the model, responsibilities for policy and 
operational matters are separated (Aucoin 1998; Aulich et al 1999; Ryan et al 2000). 
The governments of Britain and New Zealand recognised that the state could at least 
potentially continue to meet its obligations without necessarily directly providing all 
the services. This implies ministers ultimately assume political responsibility .for 
providing services irrespective of whether the supplier is an internal or external 
vendor. They are also responsible for setting the terms of the contracts which 
providers must abide by. However, they are not responsible for decisions of the 
heads of provider agencies (or their subordinates) which are taken on the basis of the 
explicitly assigned authority of these public service executives (William 1997; 
Aucoin 1998: 317). The relationship between the politician and the operational unit 
head is not the typical superior — subordinate kind found in the ministerial 
departmental model; rather it is reconfigured into one epitomised by principal-agent 
models. The contractual mode of relationships has thus sought to change a 
fundamental characteristic of the traditional model. When considered against the 
backdrop of the legislative basis for the adoption of this model, 'the New Zealand 
system is more definitive on this point than is the British regime where the executive 
agency structure has been implemented by executive prerogative' (Aucoin 1998: 
317). Nevertheless in each system an important change has taken place, a shift that is 
unprecedented. 
In deciding to make radical changes to the traditional ministerial departmental 
model, even after a number of administrative reforms had been pursued, these two 
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Westminster systems drew in part from their own experiences. The British system 
traditionally operated with an array of non-departmental organisations with varying 
degrees of association to the central structures of government (Hogwood 1995). 
Perhaps it was because of the problems that were inherent in this design of the 
machinery government that successive generations of reformers continued to 
recommend that the 'executive' functions of government, that is, the responsibilities 
for policy implementation and service delivery, be separated from the policy 
function, which would remain the principal role of central ministerial departments 
(Aucoin 1998). 
In New Zealand the reform agenda mirrored a more contemporary experience, that 
is, the design that had been put in place in the mid 1980s for the direction, 
management and accountability of the state enterprises. By adopting the basic 
principles of this design for the core public sector, they reconfigured relationships 
between ministers and the chief executives of departments and subsequently 
extended them to a range of non-departmental agencies called "Crown entities" 
(Aucoin 1998; Boston et al 1998; Ormsby 1998). The changes to these two 
Westminster systems represented major shifts from their own traditions, at least in 
regard to their elaborate application, to what had been the central public service 
organised in ministerial departments (Aucoin 1998). However, innovations were 
rarely discernible in terms of organisational design from a comparative perspective. 
In several European systems, particularly Sweden, the uncoupling of policy and 
operational responsibilities has long characterised public administration (Kicket and 
Jorgesen 1995); hence the pattern of convergence across political systems. 
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Australia and Canada, which are federal Westminster systems initially showed little 
enthusiasm in any widespread adoption of the British or New Zealand model. 
Relatively early in its reform endeavour, Australia instituted a purchaser-provider 
split in the provision of common services within government (APSC 2003; Stewart 
1999). It also gradually transferred some operational activities of departments to 
separate agencies (Aucoin 1998: Halligan 2004). For the most part, however, the 
operating assumption under successive Labor governments (1983-96) was 'where 
there is considerable discretion at the operational level and the success of the policy 
depends heavily on how it is implemented, it is most desirable that policy advice and 
program delivery be integrated' (Keating 1993: 11). On a more elaborate note, 
reforms in line with the Australian National Competition Policy required local 
governments to separate the service planning and service delivery roles, referred to 
as 'separation of purchasing and providing'. The split between purchaser and 
provider roles is usually made on strategic/core functional lines and service delivery 
lines. 
In 1989 Canada embraced a modest version of the British executive agency model by 
establishing what was referred to as 'special operating agencies' (SOAS). Unlike 
either the British or the New Zealand model, however, all these agencies were 
created as units within departments, and their chief executives were clearly 
subordinate to departmental deputy ministers (or in some instances to an official 
below the level of deputy minister). In addition the design was applied to a very 
limited number of government operations; none involved the provision of a major 
public service (Canada 1994; Aucoin 1996a). Subsequently, however, on an ad hoc 
basis, new separate agencies were created or announced for a number of major 
40 
operations, including the operation of the Department of National Revenue and 
National Parks Service. None of these new agencies has been, or will be, established 
as an SOA (Aucoin 1998). 
Assessing the reforms 
Evaluating for the beneficial effects of the last two decades of public sector reforms 
is a tricky exercise because success means different things to different people. The 
reform measures are essentially political and social experiments and unlike scientific 
experiments, explanations of success or lack of success are subject to multiple and 
often conflicting interpretations (Savoie 1998: 395). Some might interpret evidence 
as a clear indicator of success while others might dismiss it as a vivid sign of failure. 
Notwithstanding the difficulties in objectively assessing the success of the various 
reforms, it can be said that somethings have changed in the public sector during the 
last two decades. Some of the changes are: relaxation of the strict control and 
command systems; granting of more freedom to government managers to manage 
both human and financial resources; greater delegation of authority to operational 
managers; and increased consciousness of public servants everywhere to introduce 
(or improve) performance measurement systems for virtually every field of public 
activity (Aucoin 1998 Savoie 1998; Hughes 2003), and the reported success of their 
application in several countries (Savoie 1998). Moreover, the reforms have made 
public servants far more conscious of service quality and the need to focus on clients 
in the delivery of government services (Savoie 1998; Breul 1996). For example, 
Total Quality Management (TQM) in North America and the citizen's charter in 
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Britain have contributed to stronger emphasis on responsiveness in government 
operations (Savoie 1998): 403). 
In addition, the efficiency rhetoric of the reforms has forced public organisations to 
diversify their sources of supply, as well as establish a split between their purchaser 
and provider roles (Ormsby 1998; Savoie 1998; Halligan 2004). This has led to 
efforts to continually compare the costs of providing particular services or 
purchasing them from outside government (Savoie 1998; Dollery et al 1997; Hughes 
2003). Moe (1984) sees these changes as increasing economic efficiency by 
overcoming agency failure in an interlocking series of principal-agent relationships. 
There have been three major types of enterprise reform aimed at overcoming agency 
failure: changing ownership (including privatisation), increasing competition, and 
overhauling performance guidelines (Domberger 1992: 168). 
The new public management (a set of economic and managerial doctrines that 
dominated the bureaucratic reform agenda of the 1980s and 1990s) inspired reforms 
of the past two decades are not as prominent as they once were. 'Renewal and the 
search for efficiency have led to a change of direction in a number of countries' 
(Siverbo 2004: 401). In certain areas the focus has shifted to improving democracy 
(Pallot 1999). However, this does not imply that there is no trace of new public 
management (NPM) in the countries that pioneered the use of market approaches. 
'On the contrary, many models remain in use and still have strong advocates' 
(Siverbo 2004: 402). The difference now is that few (if any) consider the models to 
be the panacea for solving the efficiency problems in the public sector (Siverbo 
2004; Dunleavy et al 2006). 
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Some criticisms have been levelled against the NPM-inspired public sector reforms. 
Some of the criticisms are modest while others are fundamental (Siverbo 2004). 
Examples of modest criticisms are that NPM, through increased fragmentation, has 
created co-ordination problems and costly separate management hierarchies for 
similar functions (Lapsley 1999; Savoie 1998), implementation difficulties (Pettersen 
1999; Lapsley 1999) — in particular if professionals have not recommended change 
(Groot 1999), increased institutional and policy complexity (Dunleavy et al 2006) — 
and has not increased efficiency (Dunleavy et al 2006; Lapsley 1999). 
Other critics point to fundamental adverse consequences of government reforms. 
They blame the NPM-informed reforms for creating inequality, inefficiency, 
ineffectiveness, increased costs, and a dissatisfied general public (Dunleavy et al 
2006; Evans 1997). For example, the claimed improvements in services provision 
that had been attributed to the "Next Steps" agencification program in the UK have 
now been closely questioned (James 2003; Talbot 2004). New Zealand's pioneered 
NPM structural reforms have left a country of 3.5 million with over three hundred 
separate central agencies and forty tiny ministries, in addition to local health service 
authorities (Dunleavy et al 2006: 470). Since Alan Schick (1996) hailed New 
Zealand for its far-reaching administrative fragmentations, the reforms in general 
have in fact 'proved ineffective in helping the country make the most of its economic 
prospects' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 471). By 2000 New Zealand recorded the second-
lowest level of gross domestic product (GDP) per capita among OECD (Organisation 
for Economic Corporation and Development) countries, although from 1999 a new 
Labour Government embarked on more successful non-NPM policies (Dunleavy et 
al 2006: 471). 
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However, it is difficult to determine which criticisms are fairest, because there are 
not many empirical studies (Groot 1999), and for the reason that evaluations of NPM 
in certain cases have not been supported by the people responsible (Broadbent and 
Laughlin 1997). The character of the post-NPM regime is currently being formed. 
Some argue that a 'range of connected and information technology-centred changes 
will be crucial for the current and new wave of change' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 467). 
The new wave of reform, they contend, will focus on themes of integration, needs-
based holism, and digitisation changes. 'The overall movement incorporating these 
shifts is toward digital-era governance' which entails 'reintegrating functions into the 
governmental sphere, adopting holistic and needs-based structures and progressing 
digitalisation of administrative processes' (Dunleavy eta! 2006: 467). 
Conclusion 
Public sector reform appears to be a universal phenomenon that reflects the ideology 
of the new public management which swept through many western democracies with 
the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of public business. 
The factors that instigated the reforms were many and varied across jurisdictions. In 
almost all political systems, however, they enfolded the imposition of budgetary 
austerity as governments strived to control and discipline public expenditure; the 
consequences of globalisation for governments as they attempted to enhance the 
competitiveness of their national economies; the growing expectations of individual 
citizens and businesses for quality service; and the opportunities new information 
technology provided not only for effecting savings but also for re-engineering the 
delivery of services. Many governments, irrespective of political persuasions 
organisationally decoupled responsibilities for policy and operations, while they 
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emphasised the importance of the management aspects of their operations. 
Contractual relationships have been extended across governments in order to set 
explicit targets for the provision of public services, to establish service standard, to 
apply performance measures, and to impose more demanding and transparent 
accountability regimes (OECD 1994). 
Virtually everywhere the need to respond to demands for improved management and 
delivery of public services has become urgent. Action here has involved a reduction 
of the authority of central management agencies to regulate and direct line 
departments. The real beneficiaries of this shift are those responsible for the 
management and delivery of services who have been given increased authority to 
decide on the ways they use their resources to meet their obligations. 
The wave of public sector reform represented a steep learning curve in that Western 
democratic governments, irrespective of political colour, sought to learn from one 
another, and in a number of instances deliberately adopted and adapted structural 
models from one or more jurisdictions. Undoubtedly, some are leaders while others 
are laggards, however, the tendency has been to adopt common, even generic, 
principles of good public management, notwithstanding significant, even 




THE IDEAS AND THEORIES UNDERPINNING PUBLIC SECTOR 
REFORMS 
The wave of public sector reforms that swept across many developed countries in the 
mid 1980s and 1990s was instigated by a combination of economic pressures and 
political imperatives. In these advanced industrial democracies the impulse for 
reform came from public indebtedness, fiscal stress and the need to make significant 
improvements in service delivery, and the resultant preference for a much more 
efficient public sector (Dunleavy et al 2006; Quiggin 2000; Schwartz 1994). No less 
important as an instigator of reform was the centre stage status which market liberal 
ideology assumed under Prime Minister Thatcher in Britain, President Reagan in the 
US (Lane 2000) and especially Prime Minister Lange (with his free market finance 
minister, Mr Douglas) in New Zealand, and the consequent preference for a smaller 
public sector and a more extensive use of market mechanisms — contracting out, 
commercialisation, corporatisation and privatisation (Boston et al 1998; Quiggin 
2000). The need to exert political control over the bureaucracy was yet another 
causal factor of the reforms (Hughes 2003; Aucoin 1998; Lane 2000). These 
dynamic economic and political pressures were also present in Australia and did 
provide the impetus for public sector reform (Halligan 2002). 
The economic and political factors certainly played a crucial part in the reform 
process, but there were also certain bodies of economic and administrative theory 
that shaped the Australian as well as other western democracies' models of public 
sector reform. Particularly influential in this regard were public choice theory, 
organisational economics — especially agency theory, and managerialism or the new 
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public management (Boston 1998; 1995; Dunleavy et al 2006; Hood 1990b; Scott 
and Gorringe 1989). This does not imply that other theoretical traditions had no 
influence on the nature of the reforms. Property rights theory, neo-classical economic 
theory and game theory, among others, also coloured the thinking and policy 
proposals of governments during the course of the 1970s to 1990s. So too did various 
politicians, academics and think tanks as well as business leaders who made 
important contributions to reform discourses and the identification of policy options. 
This chapter examines the doctrines, strengths and weaknesses of public choice 
theory, agency theory and the new public management. It then explores the 
influences these theoretical traditions had on the Australian model of public sector 
reform. Further, it sketches the influence these theories had in the Tasmanian context 
on agendas of change particularly at the local government level. The management, 
structural and legislative components of the local government modernisation process 
have been informed in some respects by these theories. These said components have 
concentrated on two main agendas which are namely the improved management of 
resources, and governance issues especially the redefinition of roles and 
responsibilities of the various actors in municipal government (Aulich 1999b; LGB 
2002). In the next chapter these three theories are used as conceptual frameworks for 
undergirding and explicating the model of the purchaser-provider split. 
Public choice theory 
Public choice theory is a branch of economics that developed from the study of 
taxation and public spending. It was articulated in the 1950s and captured 
considerable attention in 1986, when James Buchanan, one of its two leading 
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architects (the other was his colleague, Gordon Tullock), was awarded the Nobel 
Prize in economics (Shaw 2002: 1). Public choice theory has had an immense impact 
on political science, public policy and public administration during the past three 
decades (Hughes 2003; Mitchell 1988; Self 1993; Shapiro 2005). Apart from the 
seminal work of Buchannan and Tullock (1962) other prominent scholars who have 
written on the subject include Anthony Downs (1957; 1967), William Niskanen 
(1971) and Mancur Olsen (1965). McLean (1986) explains that public choice theory 
has focused on four themes: the problem of aggregating individual preferences; 
studies of formal social choice, concentrating particularly on the spatial theory of 
voting; studies that focus on individuals as rational actors (voters, politicians, 
bureaucrats, lobbyists etc.) and seek to explain how these actors will behave in 
different institutional settings with different incentive structures; and the analysis of 
collective action problems (that is, problems that arise because the pursuit of 
individual interests produces suboptimal outcomes for the group). 
Central to the public choice literature is the notion that all human behaviour is 
dominated by self-interest. Individuals, in other words, are rational utility 
maximisers. Buchanan captures this view in the following manner: 
...in one sense, all public choice or the economic theory of politics, may be 
summarised as the 'discovery' or 'rediscovery' that people should be treated 
as rational utility maximisers of all their behavourial capacities (Buchanan 
1978: 17) 
Public choice theory takes the same principles that economists use to analyse 
people's actions in the marketplace and applies them to people's actions in the 
collective decision-making. Economists who investigate behaviour in the private 
marketplace assume that people are motivated by self-interest. Although most people 
base some of their actions on their concern for others, the dominant motive in 
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people's actions in the marketplace — whether they are employers, employees, or 
consumers — is a concern for themselves (Shapiro 2005; Shaw 2002). Public choice 
theorists make the same assumption — that although people acting in the political 
marketplace have some concern for others, their main motive, whether they are 
voters, politicians, lobbyists, or bureaucrats, is self-interest (Niskanen 1971; Hughes 
2003; Shaw 2002). 
Hence, public choice theory is, in essence, the application of microeconomic 
principles to political and social areas. According to Dunleavy the "rational actor" 
model which is central to all public choice perspectives assumes that: 
• people have sets of well-formed preferences which they can perceive, rank 
and compare easily; 
• their preference orderings are transitive or logically consistent; 
• people are `maximisers' who always seek the biggest possible benefits and 
the least costs in their decisions. They act rationally when they pursue . their 
preferences in an efficient manner and maximise benefits net of costs. On this 
formal definition, someone behaves 'rationally' if they optimise their 
preferences in a consistent fashion, however substantively ill-advised we may 
judge their preferences to be; and 
• people are basically egoistic, self-regarding and instrumental in their 
behaviour, choosing how to act on the basis of the consequences for their 
personal welfare (or that of their personal family) (Dunleavy 1986: 3). 
It can be inferred from these arguments that businesses seek to maximise their 
profits, government officials strive to maximise their departmental budgets 
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(Niskanen 1971), while politicians endeavour to maximise their votes (Downs 1957). 
As Self puts it: 
Following this approach, voters can be likened to consumers, pressures 
groups can be seen as political consumer associations or sometimes as co-
operatives; political parties become entrepreneurs who offer competing 
packages of services and taxes in exchange for votes; political propaganda 
equates with commercial advertising; and government agencies are public 
firms dependent upon receiving or drumming up adequate political support to 
cover their costs (Self 1985: 51) 
This view about the behaviour of bureaucrats in particular assists in explaining the 
pervasive nature of 'office politics' found in any public organisation. It also explains 
why the argument that individual appointed officers work for themselves instead of 
the public interest, cannot be completely discounted. Individuals do strive for 
personal advancement, and bureaucrats in a position to do so tend to press for more 
resources for their agencies. The health department for example, catalogues 
compelling justifications for demanding larger appropriations, arguing the most 
valuable asset of a nation is its people, and healthy people are productive people. 
While the environment ministry paints a dooms day scenario of our planet to explain 
why more money needs to be allocated to fight global warming. This may not always 
be attributable to personal motives, but personal and organisational interests may 
coincide (Hughes 2003). The successful bureaucrat is often the one who can fight for 
the maintenance of existing funding levels or increases in appropriation to his 
agency. The traditional model of administration cannot adequately explain office 
politics of this kind (Hughes 2003). 
Viewing all human behaviour through the lenses of economics has led to a great deal 
of suspicion among public choice proponents of the notion that politicians are 
'primarily concerned with societal well-being or the common good, or that they and 
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their advisers are guided by fundamental ethical precepts' (Boston et a/ 1998: 17). 
Moreover, concepts like 'public spirit', 'public service', and 'public interest' have 
received scant attention in the public choice literature (see Djankov et al 2003; 
Kelman 1987; Mansbridge 1990; Tullock 1984). Two of the reasons for this are that 
they are believed to be devoid of meaning or relevance, and because of the great 
probability of their being applied to legitimise the demands of sectional interest 
groups (Boston et al 1998). 
Public choice theorists see nothing wrong with the pursuit of self-interest in the 
economic marketplace (with a few notable exception) to produce socially desirable 
outcomes, but many are concerned that importation of such a behavioural orientation 
into the political marketplace can have serious adverse consequences. The tendency 
for example, will be for politicians to seek the advancement of their own particular 
interests to the detriment of many of their constituents. Interest groups will indulge in 
rent-seeking behaviour at the expense of the wider community, while bureaucrats in 
their quest to maximise their budgets, will appropriate ever-increasing quantities of 
resources (Niskanen 1971; Chang and Geoffrey 2002). The end result, argue some 
critics, is an over-sized state that will struggle to guarantee national security, 
maintain law and order, and satisfy voter preferences. Individual liberty will be 
curtailed, and powerful interest groups will capture a disproportionate share of the 
national income. And institutional rigidities will be created, thereby reducing 
economic growth (see Olsen 1982). 
These concerns prompted many public choice proponents to promote relatively 
conservative agendas (for example, reducing the size of the state, selling public 
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commercial assets, curbing the functions of government agencies, and maximising 
liberty — understood in the limited sense of freedom from coercion) (Boston et al 
1998: 18; Djankov et a/ 2003). In arguing for the reduction of government 
bureaucracy, proponents made two claims: first, that government bureaucracy greatly 
restricted the freedom of the individual and its power needed to be reduced in the 
name of 'choice'. 'Freedom was better than serfdom and consumer choice better than 
bureaucratic command' (Hughes 2003: 40). Second, although linked to the first 
point, market theorists contended that the traditional bureaucratic model did not 
provide an equivalent package of incentives and rewards to those of the market. It 
was therefore considered less efficient than market arrangements (Hughes 2003). 
This criticism in part prompted the development of public choice's perspective that is 
aimed at maximising the choice of the individual. Choice allows for greater 'user 
say' in the shaping of the content and delivery of government services 
In advocating the introduction of public choice ideas into the public sector, Ostrom 
(1974) insists that the bureaucratic mode of organisation is less efficient or effective 
than permitting choice through markets. Markets generally provide a more efficient 
form of allocation in that they allow for individual ambitions to lead to optimal 
outcomes following the insights of Adam Smith (1976). 'Competition, consumer 
sovereignty and choice provide incentives to lower costs, which are arguably absent 
in the bureaucratic model of administration' (Hughes 2003: 41). Public choice 
arguments are virtually aimed at rolling back the state. A model usually promoted as 
a viable alternative irrespective of the specifics of a given case, is the reliance on 
market arrangements. One consequence of public choice endeavours has been to 
push back the barriers between public sector and private sector, trying to define those 
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circumstances where public supply is justified (Hughes 2003: 41). As Niskanen 
argues, 'if the structure and incentives in a bureaucracy have to be changed so much 
to improve its performance, why not rely more on private markets, where this 
structure and incentive now exists' and 'a wide range of services financed by 
government are also marketed, or are potentially marketable in the private sector' 
(NIskanen 1973: 54). Following this argument, public service should be reduced to 
the bare minimum with many current functions transferred to the private sector or 
simply abolished (Hughes 2003). 
The abuse of power hypothesis on the part of politicians has given weight to the 
suggestion that elected officers should be prevented, if necessary, through 
constitutional changes, from running budget deficits or imposing taxes beyond a 
certain level (Brennan and Buchanan 1980; 1985; Buchanan 1987). Similarly, 
because departments have strong interest in their own survival, they should not both 
tender advice and implement policy (New Zealand Treasury 1987: 756). This 
argument was instrumental in the introduction of the purchaser-provider split into the 
public sector in order to separate the role of government policy advice from its 
operational responsibilities. It is claimed that if both roles are co-located in the 
bureaucracy it is highly likely that the advice emanating there from will be biased 
and bureaucratic capture will occur. Finally, all services provided by the state should 
be made as contestable as possible (Boston et al 1998; Chang and Geoffrey 2002; 
Dunleavy et al 2006). This principle of public choice theory instigated the expanded 
use of competitive processes in the public sector in order to diversify government 
sources of supply, a process argued to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in the 
conduct of public business. 
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Criticisms of public choice theory 
Without doubt public choice theory, like all other theories, has limitations. The 
theory has been attacked from many fronts (see especially Barry 1965; Dunleavy 
1991; Hoogerwerf 1992; Self 1993; Shaw 2002). At least, three of these criticisms 
are salient. Its implausible behavioural assumptions and its limited predictive power, 
among others, are attacked. First, critics attack the argument that individual 
behaviour is mostly motivated by self-interest and that broader normative 
considerations, such as concern for others, do not colour the individual's thinking. It 
is true that self-interest is a major, and sometimes dominant motivating factor driving 
individual action. However, it is also the case that human beings are influenced by 
many other fundamental precepts and values. More often than not people do not 
behave opportunistically or violate contracts, even when the potential gains (both 
short and long-run) from shirking or free riding are great (Boston eta! 1998; Shapiro 
2005). Appointed officials are not interested in only maximising their departmental 
budgets (if indeed this interests them at all). They are also motivated by such values 
as credibility, integrity, duty, professional standards, and doing a good job. 
Moreover, they canvass a wide-range of policy preferences and they work hard to get 
government to adopt them. If their policy preferences are adopted and implemented 
the expected outcome would benefit all the community not only bureaucrats. 
The suggestion that politicians are mostly or solely concern with maximising votes, 
unperturbed by considerations of ideology, ethics, or the quest for a just society, is 
also questionable (Boston et al 1998: 30; Shapiro 2005). It should therefore be 
realised, as Boston et a/ puts it, that, 
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people are not merely economic beings, but also political, cultural and moral 
beings who inhabit an economic system that is profoundly influenced by, and 
in a sense dependent upon, the attitudes, habits, beliefs, assumptions, ideals 
and ethical standards of its members (Boston et al 1998: 30). 
Any theory that does not accord sufficient weight to, or even disregards these 
broader contextual factors, social relations, and normative commitments is at best 
misleading and damaging (see Aaron 1994; Boston et al 1998; Dore 1983; 
Granoverter 1985; Mansbridge 1990; Sen 1977; 1987; Shapiro 2005; Stewart 1993). 
Fortunately, public choice theorists are beginning to incorporate these considerations 
into the literature. 
Another public choice view that has been scrutinised relates to problems involved in 
managing opportunism. The question that is posed is whether it is better to limit 
opportunism or take it for granted and organise institutional and monitoring 
arrangements accordingly (Hood 1986: 109-13; Wright et al 2001). Some are of the 
view that our hands are tied, contending that human behaviour is unchangeable; it is 
not dependent upon or conditioned by contextual factors; it is not structurally 
determined. Hence, humans should take opportunism as given and fashion our 
institutions in ways that will accommodate it. However, this argument is hardly 
supported by evidence (Perrow 1986). What the evidence tends to reveal is that while 
opportunistic behaviour cannot be eliminated it can certainly be reduced, or at least 
modified, by a variety of institutional mechanisms. As Hood notes, these embrace: 
accepting as employees only people who show signs of vocation or 
permanent calling to the work in question, as tested by rigorous scrutiny, 
screening and probation procedures, not casual job-hoppers momentarily 
attracted to the pay or the job, lifetime career service (another facet of 
`vocation'). This may encourage people to take a 'long view' which may 
limit opportunism, especially if allied to more or less automatic progression 
by seniority and 'cradle to grave' benefit from the employer. Long induction 
and training procedures, to cultivate a sense of enterprise solidarity and to 
limit the grosser aspects of self-serving behaviour (Hood 1986: 110). 
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However, such measures might have disadvantages. As Hood observes, this might, 
exchange competence for loyalty, effectiveness for honesty, independent 
thought for group think, analytic capacity for piety, capability for seniority. It 
may mean being too kind to employees with burnout, declining competence, 
skill obsolence (or who are just plain failures) — in short, to do without all the 
potential benefits of opportunism, in terms of dynamism, quick-wiredness, 
adaptivity (Hood 1986: 111-12). 
It is ironic that the attention public choice theory was, and is, attracting comes at a 
time when its explanatory power is weakening. As many commentators have 
observed, the policies of liberalisation and deregulation embarked upon by OECD 
countries during the 1980s conflict with the predictions of many public choice 
models (which generally assume that it is in the short term electoral interests of 
politicians to promote tighter regulation). This point aside, the predictive power of 
public choice theory has been found wanting in many areas of social and political life 
(see Bendor and Moe 1985; Boston et al 1998; Boyne 1987; Foster 1994; Blais and 
Dion 1993; Self 1985; 1989; 1993). Public choice theory for example, has difficulty 
in giving reasons why people bother to vote, why they give to charity or donate 
blood, why they join 'public regarding' cause groups which are devoted to the 
promotion of common interests, and why legislators often act contrary to the 
expressed preferences of their constituents (Boston eta! 1998: 32). 
Finally, the budget maximising assumption of Niskanen (1971) has been severely 
criticised (Blais and Dion 1991; Conybeare 1984; Dollery and Hamburger 1993; 
Shapiro 2005). Contrary to Niskanen's hypothesis, empirical evidence suggests that 
in most bureaucracies there is little connection between the size of a department and 
its status or between the growth of departments and the salaries of their employees. 
As Wilson argues, 'One wonders why Niskanen thinks bureaucrats are so desirous of 
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maximising their budgets if they can enjoy so few of the fruits' (Wilson 1989: 118). 
Niskanen later conceded that his initial formulation was inadequate and that 
bureaucrats aim to maximise their discretionary budget rather than the total budget 
(Niskanen 1994: 281). 
The implications of insights from public choice theory for the study and conduct of 
public policy are not undebatable. However, one thing is clear, that is, 'the need for 
theories that take into account a wider range of considerations, particularly the 
importance of ideas and values, in explaining human behaviour and policy choices' 
(Boston et el 1998: 32). Moreover, once the notion that politicians, bureaucrats, and 
voters are wholly or exclusively self-interested is abandoned, the problem of 
provider capture need no longer be central (even though it cannot be disregarded). 
The lesson to be learnt is that we cannot encapsulate the political system in an 
impermeable membrane to prevent it from invasion by vested interests. What we can 
do is to ensure that the decision-making processes are transparent, democratic and 
fair (that is, that they provide opportunity for all interests to be adequately 
represented). 
Agency theory 
Agency relationship is in effect said to exist whenever one party, a principal, hires 
another party — an agent — who possesses specialised knowledge and skills 
(Eisenhardt 1989; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Halligan 2004; Jensen and 
Meekling 1976) to provide agreed quantity and quality of goods or services, or 
undertake specified tasks on behalf of the principal for which the former rewards the 
latter. In this relationship the welfare of the principal becomes affected by the 
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decisions of the agent (Arrow 1985; Barney and Ouchi 1986; Jensen and Meekling 
1976). Principal — agent relationships can be established between individuals, 
individuals and organisations, or between one organisation and another. Examples of 
these relationships can be cited. In an employer employee relationship, the employer 
is the principal and the worker is the agent; in a lawyer client relationship, the client 
is the principal and the lawyer is the agent; and in the political arena, voters can be 
seen as principals who contract with politicians (their agents) to undertake a range of 
tasks and activities on their behalf (Weingast 1984). As Moe suggests, 
the whole of politics can be seen as a chain of principal-agent 
relationships, from citizen to politician to bureaucratic superior to 
bureaucratic subordinate and on down the hierarchy of government to the 
lowest-level bureaucrats who actually deliver services directly to citizens. 
Aside from the ultimate principal and ultimate agent, each actor in the 
hierarchy occupies a dual role in which he (or she) serves both as principal 
and as agent (Moe 1984: 765). 
The concern of this theory is that the welfare of the principal may not be maximised 
because principals and agents tend to have divergent goals and different 
predisposition to risk (Wright et al 1996). Specifically, principals are thought to be 
risk neutral in preferences for individual firm actions since principals can diversify 
their shareholders across multiple firms (Wiseman and Gomez-Mejia 1998). 
Similarly, principal government authorities can diversify their sources of supply 
across multiple contractors both internal and external. In contrast, agents are 
assumed to be risk averse since agent employment, security and income are 
inextricably linked to a single firm (Donaldson 1961; Williamson 1963). In other 
words, agents are assumed to be risk averse in decisions regarding the firm in order 
to minimise risk to personal wealth. Contracts have thus become central in agency 
models to minimise costs in agency relationships. 
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Agency theory is grounded in economic utilitarianism (Ross 1973). Because the 
theory narrowly focuses on the principal-agent relationship, and is armed with a 
given set of assumptions, its contribution is that it provides logical predictions about 
what rational individuals may do if placed in such a relationship (Wright et al 2001). 
Moreover, the agency relationship is conceived in the context of a single principal or 
agent. This is beholden to the social science doctrine of methodological 
individualism (Donaldson 1990). The argument of agency theory is that economic 
phenomena should be examined from the standpoint of deliberate behaviour of 
individuals since economic life can best be understood as maximising behaviour on 
the part of all individuals. In this context, the agency problem is pronounced — if both 
the agent and the principal are utility maximisers, because the presumption is that the 
agent will act in the best interests of the principal (Jensen and Meckling 1976). 
Originally, agency theory was employed primarily to deal with problems emanating 
from the separation of ownership and control in firms, especially the difficulty of 
ensuring that managers act in the interests of their shareholders. With time it was 
realised that agency problems of this nature were also prevalent in the social, 
economic and political arenas. In Jensen and Meckling words: 
The problem of inducing an 'agent' to behave as if he/she were maximising 
the principals' welfare is quite general. It exists in all organisations and in all 
co-operative efforts — at every level of management in firms, in universities, 
in mutual companies, in cooperatives, in governmental authorities and 
bureaus, in unions, and in relationships normally classified as agency 
relationships such as are common in the performing arts and the market for 
real estate (Jensen and Meckling 1976: 309). 
Proponents of agency theory, like public choice theorists and neo-classical economic 
theorists, assume that each party acts in its own self-interest — a rational, self- 
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interested, utility maximiser. This assumption gives rise to the so-called agency 
problem because the interests of the principal and agent may conflict (Boston et al 
1998; Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; Wright et a/ 2001). Moreover, as Boston et al 
note: 
Management of many principal-agent relationships is complicated by 
incomplete information, asymmetrical information and various uncertainties: 
agents generally have access to information that principals do not (and vice 
versa) and have an incentive to exploit this situation to their advantage 
(Boston et el 1998: 18). 
The behaviour of agents is often not amenable to scrutiny or observation by 
principals; and there are frequently uncertainties surrounding the way an agent's 
actions are translated into the outputs (outcomes) sought by a principal (Boston et al 
1998). The agent may shirk or engage in self-serving behaviour, such as using work 
time and organisational resources for personal gains (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992; 
Wright 2001). The more autonomy and independence the agent enjoys and the 
greater the specialised knowledge required to perform the task, the more significant 
the 'moral hazard' becomes (Holmstrom 1979). The concept of 'moral hazard' was 
first developed in the insurance industry, where an insurance policy may create an 
incentive for the policyholder to cause an accident, such as the loss of a business 
through arson (Arrow 1985). Information asymmetries that provide one party (the 
agent) with information that is unavailable to the second party (the principal) can 
give rise to moral hazard (Gomez-Mejia and Balkin 1992). 
To achieve an optimal form of contracting, and to reduce the moral hazard inherent 
in agency relationships, principals develop mechanisms, or 'rules of the game' to 
monitor agents' actions via rewards and sanctions (Rees 1985). When an agent has 
high autonomy, independence, and highly specialised knowledge, monitoring 
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becomes difficult and expensive, so principals will rely on incentives to reward 
agents for appropriate outcomes (Tosi and Gomez-Mejia 1989). Although principals 
are also thought to be opportunistic, agency theorists have given scant attention to 
this side of the scale (Gorringe 1987; Wright eta! 2001). 
Another concept that features well in the agency literature is adverse selection. 
Unlike moral hazard (which is asymmetry of information problems after the 
negotiation of a contact), adverse selection arises from a particular type of 
information asymmetry that might exist prior to the negotiation of the contract 
(Boston et al 1998: 20). Agency problems related to adverse selection stem from the 
fact that some of the information that the principal wants to know about an agent is 
difficult to observe. As a result, the agent has an information advantage over the 
principal. A good example of this type of problem relates to the selection of people 
to fill job vacancies. In such cases a good deal of information about the applicant's 
ability and character may not be revealed by merely examining the qualifications, 
work records, references and so forth. Information relating to the applicant's 
intelligence, beliefs, values, attitude, work habits, and creativity are most unlikely to 
be discernible from the documents presented (Boston et al 1998). Hence, the 
employer cannot ascertain with precision each job seeker's true 'type' and cannot be 
sure of selecting the best applicant for the job. On the other hand, the best applicant 
may not be in a best frame to demonstrate that they are in fact the best because all the 
job seekers endeavour to present themselves in a positive light in order to secure the 
job. Here too, the employer risks making an adverse selection. It should not be 
forgotten that the employees also face the problem of not knowing the employer's 
true 'type'. 
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The utility of agency theory is demonstrated by its application to analyse a range of 
policy issues, particularly those dealing with selection of agents, the design of 
remuneration systems (for example,. output-based verses input-based reward 
systems, direct incentives like price-rates versus indirect incentives like career 
structures etc.), and institutional arrangements (e.g. in-house provision versus 
contracting out)' (Boston et al 1998; Aulich 1997). It also worth noting that the 
objective of agency theory at the societal level is to improve efficiency, optimise 
resource allocation, and increase savings. 
Criticisms of agency theory 
All theories have their limitations and shortcomings and agency theory is not an 
exception (Wright et al 2001; Donaldson 1990a; 1990b; Moe 1984; 1990; Bendor 
1988; 1990; Davis and Gardner 1995) Some of these criticisms are also levelled 
against public choice theory (for example. the limitation of the preposition that 
agents are self-interested, lazy, the failure to account adequately for contextual 
factors, like ethics and culture, and the inclination to draw parallels between 
characteristically different fields such as politics and economics (Boston et al 1998; 
Wright et al 2001). In addition to the above criticisms agency theory has received 
attacks from several other fronts: 
Agency theorists have tended to ignore the question of power and authority in 
human relationships. They have also focused much more on the problems 
posed by opportunistic agents than opportunistic principals. Thus, little 
attention has been given to how principals might misrepresent their 'type' 
and thereby mislead or exploit their agents (Boston et al 1998: 32; Wright 
1998). 
The use of simple agent-principal models to describe and analyse complex 
social interactions and constitutional relationships can be misleading and 
inappropriate. In particular, such models cope poorly with situations where 
agents serve multiple and competing principals or where there is 
disagreement over who the principal ought to be (Boston et al 1998: 32-33). 
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Many principal-agent relationships in the public sector have a distinctive 
character. This is partly because the managerial disciplines supplied by 
private capital markets do not usually apply, it is also because public 
authority and coercive power play a crucial role within the governmental 
sphere such that many exchanges and 'contracts' are involuntary. For these 
reasons, familiar principal-agent relationships are transformed into something 
that is provocatively different from...straightforward applications (Moe 
1990: 232). 
Even where agent-principal models are relevant to the interactions under 
examination, the policy implications of agency theory are often unclear. 
Further, one of the key policy recommendations arising out of the theory — 
that managerial opportunism in the private sector is best controlled by 
separating the roles of board chairperson and chief executive — remains 
contentious. Empirical evidence suggests that returns to shareholders tend to 
be higher when the two roles are combined rather than separated (Donaldson 
and Davis 1991). 
It is important to clarify some of the points raised above. The first issue is that 
agency theory gives scant attention to the unequal distribution of power within 
organisations and society at large. Thus, principal-agent framework often supposes 
that the parties to a contract are on equal terms, with equal rights and capacities. 
However, in practice many relationships are asymmetrical in nature (Boston et al 
1998). The labour market epitomises a setting with inequalities of power in 
contractual relationships. In virtually all situations employers have disproportionate 
bargaining power compared to their employees. Employers can hire and fire 
employees in many cases, but employees cannot usually get rid of the owners and 
run the organisation themselves. This point may be challenged on grounds that if the 
employer acts unjustly and fails to fulfil his contractual obligations, the worker is 
free to take his labour elsewhere. But the barriers to easy labour mobility are 
overlooked. These barriers include the possible absence of alternative sources of 
work due to high unemployment; the search cost involved in securing alternative 
employment; and the cost to the employees of terminating their contracts [a hurdle 
Gorringe (1988) refers to as hostages] (Boston et al 1998: 33). In the light of these 
63 
problems, it is inevitable that a host of injustices would occur in the labour market if 
the parties are left to voluntarily negotiate their agreed relationships or contracts, as 
well as enforced them, without legislative provisions to protect workers and unions. 
Another problem noted in relation to the applicability of agency theory particularly 
to the public sector, is that it is not sufficiently sophisticated to handle complex 
social and constitutional relationships. It is argued that there are considerable 
differences between the relationships of parents and their children, employers and 
employees, politicians and voters, and ministers and public servants, yet agency 
theory applies the same language and framework to deal with all these interactions 
(Boston et al 1998; Wright et al 2001). Boston et al buttress this point, observing for 
example, that most democratic theorists would answer in the negative to the question 
of whether public servants should always do what government dictates. The reason 
for such a response is that there are clear limits to the responsibility of public 
servants to implement government policy and that the state cannot require 
unquestioned allegiance (Boston et al 1998: 33). In addition, as Heymann states: 
It could be argued that part of the rationale for systems that allow for little 
formal intervention by government — in appointing senior bureaucrats and in 
setting the salaries — is that the bureaucracy should provide some sort of 
'check and balance' on the government's actions — in other words, that the 
bureaucracy has a valid objective other than to carry out government policies, 
broadly defined. In this case, the principal-agent model breaks down, as the 
problem is no longer to induce the bureaucracy, as agent to act in the 
government's interests (Heymann 1988: 34). 
A myriad of competitive, multiple-principal arrangements have been developed 
where by public servants usually serve as the 'partial agents' of various principals — 
their portfolio minister, cabinet, parliament, a public service authority, and so on 
(Moe 1984: 768). The assumption of a solitary principal and agent is hereby 
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invariably extended to include multiple principals and agents. Theories become 
much more complex (and interesting) when they permit for the possibility that 
collections of teams of principals (or agents) disagree or compete over interests and 
goals — a feature of agency relationships Adams (1996) labels the "hydra factor". 
How do agents understand and reconcile the duties delegated to them when they are 
receiving mixed messages and conflicting instructions — and incentives — from 
multiple principals? How do they do so when the contract is exceptionally vague by 
design, or deal with the irreconcilable differences among principals with conflicting 
interests — for example, controversial legislation that requires implementation? When 
do these cleavages among, and collective action, problems confronting principals 
afford opportunities to play one principal off against another? (Shapiro 2005). 
Multiple agents who have been delegated to undertake a task collectively compound 
the agency problems. Agents, too, have competing interests; indeed the interests of 
some agents may be more in tandem with those of their principals than with the other 
agents. Some agents are more risk averse than others; agents may not respond 
uniformly (either positively or negatively) to incentives. Some may be free-riders 
and the existence of multiple principals and multiple agents sometimes increases the 
informational asymmetries and the difficulties of monitoring (Shapiro 2005: 266). 
These asymmetries may be partly to blame for the emergence and thriving of crimes 
in organisations which can go undetected for long periods of time because they are 
masked by complex structures of action. At other times, multiple parties help to right 
the imbalance of information, such as when competitive agents leak information to 
principals in an effort to get an upper hand over other agents (Waterman and Meier 
1998). 
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Agency theory supplies a tool for analysing certain kinds of policy issues and points 
to the part that incentives play in influencing the behaviour of agents, however, it 
provides policy makers with only a limited practical guidance (Boston et al 1998; 
Wright et al 2001). This limitation is illustrated in relation to the optimal level of 
delegation in the core public sector. Agency theorists like Heymann postulates that 
the answer 'is a function of the correlation between the bureaucrat's utility 
maximising behaviour and the government's utility' (Heymann 1988: 33). In other 
words, the answer depends, according to Boston et al 1998 partly on: 
The ease with which a minister (the principal) can monitor and assess the 
performance of his or her (agents) and partly on the costs to the minister of 
maintaining controls over inputs. The ease of assessing performance depends, 
in turn, on such variables as the size of the agency, the nature and geographic 
spread of its operations, the ease of measuring its outputs and outcomes, the 
extent of any moral hazard problems, the extent to which the (policy) 
preferences (or discount rates) of officials differ from those of the minister, 
and so forth. Various moral and cultural factors — such as the bureaucratic 
ethos, notions of loyalty and duty, the degree of trust, and the extent of 
corruption — are also likely to be relevant, but these tend to be ignored by 
agency theorists (Boston eta! 1998: 34). 
If these considerations are to be taken into account then a number of questions are 
provoked: How far should the delegation of responsibility go? Should input controls 
remain and if so, over what kinds of inputs? What kind of incentives (and sanctions) 
should be used? What forms of monitoring should be adopted? How much 
transparency is desirable? What role should parliament and the controller and 
Auditor-General play? (Boston et al 1998: 35). Answers to these questions, 
according to Boston et al (1998), cannot be found in agency theory. Possible sources 
to consult for answers, they contend, are constitutional law, political philosophy, and 
administrative theory. 
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The proposition that principals are in the driver's seat — specifying preferences, 
creating incentives, and making contracts that agents must follow — is also 
questioned (Heimer and Staffen 1998; Sharma 1997). When principals engage agents 
for their expert knowledge, when principals are one-shooters and agents repeat 
players, when principals are unexpectedly made responsible for a new role with no 
time or life experience to articulate preferences, let alone a contract or monitoring 
strategy [for example, the new parents of a critically ill newborn (Heiman and 
Staffen (1998)1, 'the asymmetry of power shifts from principal to the agent' (Shapiro 
2005: 266-7). Political scientists particularly, emphasise the limitations of a theory of 
markets. As Moe notes, 
the more general principal-agent models of hierarchical control have shown 
that, under a range of conditions, the principal's optimal incentive structure 
for the agent is one in which the latter receives some share of the residual in 
payment for his efforts, thus giving him a direct stake in the outcome.. .For 
public bureaucracy, however, there is no residual in the ordinary sense of the 
term (Moe 1984: 763) 
There is no profit that can be distributed to members of public agencies for doing a 
good job and demonstrating model behaviour. In applying agency theory to the 
public sector for example, to establish the relationship between legislative or 
executive branch and administrative agencies, we may continue to use economic 
metaphors: politicians need to maximise their votes; bureaucrats need to maximise 
their budgets. But the metaphor fails to capture the range of incentives at play in the 
political arena, many of which focus on policy rather than profit (Waterman and 
Meier 1998). Indeed the importance of policy commitments undermines agency 
theory's postulation of goal conflict between principals and agents, who may 
sometimes share policy goals (or more accurately, some among the collection of 
multiple principals and agents might do so) (Shapiro 2005). The extent, sources and 
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strategies of compensating for information asymmetries also vary considerably as 
one moves away from market settings (Waterman and Meier 1998; Worsham et al 
1997; Sharma 1997; Bonfield 1975) 
Finally, commentators from a variety of disciplines outside economics also fault the 
assumption of acontextual, ahistorical and static relationship between principals and 
agents (Mitnick 1992). Agency relationships are construed in a broader social 
context that are influenced by outside forces — other agency relationships, 
competitors, interest groups, regulators, legal rules, and so on — that sometimes right 
informational imbalances, offer or constrain incentives, exacerbate the risk of 
adverse selection or moral hazard, provide cover or opportunity for opportunism, and 
so forth (Shapiro 2005: 267). Relationships endure overtime, affording principals and 
agents occasions to gather data about one another. Principals learn better what 
incentives are likely to work. Agents learn more about the preferences of principals 
they serve. They develop reputations; relationships become embedded and parties 
develop histories and personal relationships and become entangled in social networks 
(Granovetter 1985). Overtime, agents acquire constituencies other than their 
principals that buffer them from the 'contracting, recontracting, and sanctioning of 
their principals. Moreover, as 'agents (government bureaucrats, corporate managers) 
outlast their principals (legislators, chief executives), the balance of power between 
principal and agent may shift' (Shapiro 2005: 269). 
The new public management 
The new public management (NPM) represents a model of a paradigm shift of the 
1980s and 1990s in how the public sector is to be managed. It originated in the UK 
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and spread first and foremost to the US, Australia and especially New Zealand, and 
then further on to Scandinavia and continental Europe (Lane 2000). The NPM is part 
of the managerial revolution that has gone around the world affecting all countries, 
although to considerably different degrees. Managerialism or the new public 
management has had a significant impact, especially since the mid to late 1980s, on 
public administration in many OECD countries, not least Australia (Aucoin 1990a; 
Caiden 1988; Halligan 2002; Hood 1995; Gunn 1988). 
Managerialism is not novel; its origins can be traced to at least the late nineteenth 
century and the pioneering work of Frederick Taylor — the founder of 'scientific 
management' or "Taylorism". Managerialism or management denotes, according to 
Painter (1988: 1), 'a generic, purely instrumental activity, embodying a set of 
principles that can be applied to the public business, as well as in private business'. 
Since the mid 1980s, the ideas of the older managerialist framework have been 
revived and given a new life and momentum and influenced in various ways by, 
among other things, public choice theory and organisational economics (Boston et al 
1998). 
Literature now abound on how NPM should be conceptualised and how it has 
changed, in particular as it has evolved through the New Zealand, Australia, UK, and 
latterly European public administration systems. The result is that NPM is a slippery 
label (Manning 2000; Savoie 1995). Different definitions of NPM stress different 
things. For Barzelay (2000: 156), it 'is primarily concerned with the systematic 
analysis and management of public management policy. The policy-domain relates 
to all government processes'. 'Rival conceptions characterise NPM in terms of 
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specific policy principles, of "trait" policy intervention seen as typical or as an 
overall "paradigm" for reforming government institutions' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 
467). But even among these accounts, NPM is construed in a variety of ways. 
Sometimes it is represented as copying business managerialism of a now older kind 
(PoHitt 1993), and in terms of unusually strong customer service orientation. At other 
times, NPM is defined in relation to internal organisational cultures and the use of a 
repertoire of more individualistic, less hierarchical organisational control 
mechanisms (Aucoin 1996b; Hood 1998). Some characterisations additionally seem 
to draw NPM into strongly normative concepts, as in Aucoin's (1990a) discussion of 
the "well performing organisation". Some see NPM as a two-level phenomena — a 
strongly developed and coherent theory of managerial change based on importing 
into the public sector central concepts from (relatively) modern business practices, 
and public choice-influenced theory (Dunleavy et al 2006: 470) 
If there were one label that is used to refer to all kinds of public sector reform, then it 
would be new public management (Aucoin 1990a; Hood 1990a; 1990b; 1995). 
Common to all the public sector reform effort is the attempt to employ new 
governance mechanisms that go beyond the traditional institutions of governance 
such as the bureau and the public enterprise and that employ or imitate market 
institutions of governance (Walsh 1995; Dunleavy et al 2006). The features of the 
NPM have been variously catalogued by different scholars. However, according to 
Hood they comprise seven main points: 
Hands on professional management in the public sector. This means letting 
the managers manage, or as Hood puts it, 'active, visible, discretionary 
control of organisation from named persons at the top'. The typical 
justification for this is that 'accountability requires clear assignment of 
responsibility for action'. 
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Explicit standards and measures of performance. This requires goals to be 
defined and performance targets to be set, and is justified by proponents as 
'accountability requires a clear statement of goals; efficiency requires a 'hard 
look' at objectives'. 
Greater emphasis on output controls. Resources are directed to areas 
according to measured performance, because of the need to stress results than 
procedures. 
A shift to disaggregation of units in the public sector. This involves the 
breaking up of large entities into `corporatised units around products funded 
separately and 'dealing with one another on arm's length basis'. This is 
justified on the need to create manageable units and to gain the efficiency 
advantages of franchise arrangements inside as well as outside the public 
sector. 
A shift to greater competition in the public sector. This involves 'the move to 
term contracts and public tendering procedures' and is justified as using 
'rivalry as the key to lower costs and better standards'. 
A stress on private sector styles of management practice. This involves a 
move away from military-style 'public service ethics' and flexibility in hiring 
and rewards, and is justified by 'need to use 'proven' private sector 
management tools in the public sector'. 
A stress on greater discipline and parsimony in resource use. Hood sees this 
as 'cutting direct costs, raising labour discipline, resisting union demands, 
limiting competitive costs to business' and is typically justified by the 'need 
to check resource demands of the public sector and 'do more with less' 
(Hood 1991: 3-19). 
Some of the points Hood catalogued only became a feature later in the managerial 
reform process in Australia. For example, institutional disaggregation was not 
implemented at the early stages of the reform. However, as the reforms gathered 
momentum, all the various elements have to some degree been present in Australia 
(Hughes 1994; 2003). 
As stated earlier, a good number of these NPM principles can be traced in history. 
Some of them originated from the works of nineteenth century scholars. What is 
novel about the NPM is the way in which these ideas have been combined, the 
manner of their implementation and the vigour with which they have been pursued 
(Boston et al 1998; Lane 2000). Proponents of the NPM insist on its utility for the 
conduct of public business. They stress its neutrality when they assert that both 
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conservative (neo-liberal governments) and social democratic ones applied it. 
Undeniably, the NPM has been combined with a strong 'ambition to roll back the 
public sector, but it is also the case that it has been used in order to strengthen the 
welfare state and make it more efficient' (Lane 2000: 7). 
The NPM does not dictate that the private sector takes over the allocation of 
resources from the public sector but that the public provision of services be managed 
differently (Dunleavy et al 2006; Halligan 2002; Lane 2000). Advocates of the NPM 
argue further that the model does not deal with only contracting out. The use of 
contracts for public provision of services is clearly not novel (OECD 1994). 
Traditionally in the public sector contracting out has been used as a tool for 
arranging certain rather simple services such as catering or cleaning. The NPM not 
only vastly extends the application of contracting out using this tool in many new 
areas such as many kinds of infrastructure as well as education and health care and 
on a much larger scale. The NPM in addition deals with contracting in, that is, 'a 
practical theory about how government can improve its operations through 
competitive contracting whether the provision is in-house or out-house (Lane 2000: 
7). 
Further, the NPM focuses on real phenomena. Symbolically, it uses new and 
technical words that have their origins and also seem to be applicable well outside 
the public sector. Ideas like principal-agent theory, private law 'contracts' and 
shirking are the new catch phrases when it comes to the application of contracting 
under this new governance mechanism. Even though doubts arise as to the public 
sector relevance of this new language, which the NPM implies, it should be 
emphasised that public sector reform under it has affected real and sometimes 
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dramatic changes in several countries (Aucoin 1990; Caiden 1988; Hood 1995; Lane 
2000; Schested 2002; Wollman 2004). The advent of the NPM is a sign of an on-
going revolution in governance, both theoretically and practically (Pollitt 1993). The 
NPM is more than symbolic. At the same time one needs to discuss, criticise and 
penetrate its special terms (Lane 2000). 
Theorists of the NPM argue in addition that the model is more original than merely a 
mixture of public choice theory with private management. If the NPM were merely 
an odd mixture of public choice model and old private sector management, then it 
would indeed be contradictory (Lane 2000). The public choice school advocates 
decentralisation in various forms (political, market, vouchers and user fees), whereas 
old private sector management emphasises centralisation (Hood 1990b; Lane 2000). 
However, 'the NPM is not simply a prolongation of public choice theory. And the 
NPM has a management theory that is more advanced than old Taylorism' (Lane 
2000:7). 
Finally, the NPM should not be interpreted as microeconomics applied to the public 
sector. It represents more than a repetition of cost-benefit approach, which is strict 
application of standard microeconomics to the public sector (Mishan 1995). In fact 
the NPM is much more grounded in entirely new ideas in economic theory with 
considerable departure from neo-classical framework. In particular, the economic 
theory of asymmetrical information has played a role in the emergence of several of 
the core ideas which constitute the NPM. However, it should be 'emphasised that the 
NPM has developed through learning from the real experiments and reforms within 
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the public sector. It was never just an application of private sector ideas' (Lane 2000: 
7). 
Criticisms of new public management 
The practical relevance of the NPM for the conduct of public business is the subject 
of debate, with critics pointing to several limitations (Boston et al 1998; Considine 
1988; Dunleavy et al 2006; Hood 1990b; Painter 1987; Yeatman 1987). In particular, 
the NPM has been attacked on the basis that it lacks both a sound philosophical 
anchor and a solid empirical foundation. It has also been criticised by Boston et al 
for its: 
Constitutional illiteracy, its lack of attention to the need for probity and due 
process within government, its insensitivity to varying organisational cultures 
and political constraints, and its potential for reducing the capacity of 
governments to deal with catastrophes — that is, because of the loss of 
bureaucratic expertise and increasing institutional fragmentation; (Boston et 
el 1998: 36). 
Commentators have also charged that the machine of the NPM has some parts that 
seem to be at loggerheads with one another. Whereas the managerialist component 
stresses a degree of centralised control and top-down implementation, the public 
choice element advocates devolution and decentralisation (Hood 1990b; Lane 2000). 
Similarly, whereas managerialism puts a strong emphasis on the need for bureaucrats 
to be responsive to their customers and clients, some public choice theorists argue 
that responsiveness can be but a thin disguise for interest group capture (Boston et al 
1998). 
Critics have also pointed out that the NPM was simply a mixture of ideas which 
never really hang together, and that when it is deconstructed the NPM has a distinct 
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right-wing tone. It merely overemphasises economic efficiency and neglects other 
criteria — quality, equity, and democracy — with which public sector activities can be 
evaluated (Dunleavy et al 2006; Lane 2000; Tom and Per 2004). 
Opponents of the NPM have also challenged the claims that private management 
principles can be applied equally to both the private and public sectors, and that 
private sector management techniques are generally superior to, and hence provide a 
benchmark for, those in the public sector. Those who attack the NPM concede that 
many, if not most, of the tasks and functions of management (as well as the available 
tools) are similar in both sectors — providing leadership, recruiting, managing and 
remunerating staff; selecting and deploying resources; managing an organisation's 
finances; and monitoring performance (Boston et al 1998; Hughes 2003). However, 
not all the tasks of private management are similar or identical to those in the public 
sector. For example, 'the provision of policy advice, and the whole business of 
policy-making, and law enforcement are distinctive to the public sector' (Boston et 
al 1998: 36). It is also imperative to consider the real differences in relation to the 
contexts in which managers in the private and public sectors operate (Alford 1993; 
Allison 1992; Lane 2000; Moe 1987). It is important, in the light of these differences 
to recognise that some managerialist principles and techniques that are employed in 
the private sector are less suitable to the public sector. The critics' charge is therefore 
loud and clear, that is, public management is different in kind from private sector 
management; thus, it is not simply a branch or sub-set of general management 
(Boston et al 1998; Schested 2002). 
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The NPM as a public policy mechanism 
The NPM represents an alternative governance model which the public sector may 
be, and have been, tempted to adopt, but not uncritically, wholesale and 
indiscriminately. The NPM is essentially tailored to enhance efficiency. When it is a 
question about employment of inputs in order to produce outputs, then efficiency is a 
most relevant consideration to take into account. Since the main goal of private 
sector organisations is to maximise profit it is not surprising that NPM principles are 
most appropriate and applicable to that sector. Efficiency objectives are also 
cherished by the public sector, so appropriate efforts should be made to reduce costs 
while enhancing the effectiveness of government operations by applying some NPM 
principles in areas where it is suitable. However, the huge efforts in the public sector 
are driven by equity objectives which can only be attained at a cost in terms of total 
output. Here, the NPM with its efficiency-oriented bias may not be suitable for 
application in areas where government priority is to promote equity. The use of any 
governance mechanism is always a question of advantages and disadvantages 
(Dunleavy et al 2006; Lane 2000). 
The application of the NPM to the social security sector for example, may make 
support conditional upon the arbitrariness of chief executive officers. As regards the 
soft sector organisations here are characterised by strong collegiality in professional 
groups and may stand up against government (Lane 2000). This resistance may come 
about because professional with their distinctive ethos are not only responsible for 
the provision of services but they are also watching over the implementation of 
universal values transcending the concerns of government. The use of the NPM in 
relation to the judicial branch of government as well as in relation to higher 
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education institutions seems irrelevant. 'Organisations dedicated to the pursuit of 
justice or following the precepts of justice may well use managers to handle a 
number of tasks'. However, 'the chief mode of operation involves another 
governance mechanism, namely collegiality and bureaucracy' (Lane 2000:14). In 
relation to the caring sector neither the NPM nor bureaucracy offers the best 
governance mechanism. Here trust between government and professional groups 
play a major role. However, 'trust cannot be manufactured and put into short-term 
contracts' (Lane 2000: 14). 
The above exposition demonstrates that despite the recent attempts to closely align 
the principles and practices of public sector management with those of the private 
domain, significant differences still remain between the two sectors (especially in 
respect of the operating environment, governance structures and accountability 
relationships). Undoubtedly, these differences have significant implications for the 
way organisations within the two sectors ought to be managed. This observation 
notwithstanding, the boundaries between the public and private sectors are 
sometimes very blurred (Emmert and Crow 1988; Musoff and Seidam 1980). 
Moreover, public entities with commercial objectives (such as state-owned 
enterprises) are more identical to private sector firms than non-commercial public 
sector organisations (for example, departments and ministries). As a result, the 
relevance and appropriateness of managerialist principles are likely to vary across 
the public sector according to the nature and functions of the organisation in question 
(Boston et al 1998). This implies private sector management practices are not 
equally applicable to all public organisations. So too should it not be taken as given 
that private sector organisations are better managed than public sector ones. Nor 
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should it be assumed that private sector practices should have no role in the public 
sector or that managerialist doctrines have no relevance to public sector 
organisations. 
There is no doubt the Australian model of public sector management incorporates 
many features of the NPM. However, those who were, and are, guiding the reform 
agenda did not suppose that private sector management practices should be 
employed wholesale, uncritically, or to the letter to the public sector. In fact, 
throughout the course of the reform program, the distinctiveness of the public sector 
was soundly acknowledged. So too did the organisational diversity within the public 
sector — and policies were fashioned out accordingly. Nevertheless, the private sector 
was often used as a standard against which public sector performance could be 
measured. Thus, the operating assumption was that proven private sector success 
should be held up as a model for the public sector. 
The influence of these theories on Australian models of public sector reform 
Concepts, models and theories are necessary and useful to guide policy-making, as 
they help clarify and direct our inquiry on policy-making, facilitate communication, 
and suggest possible explanation for policy action (Anderson 1984: 8). Policies are 
built on 'theories of the world, models of cause and effect' (Bridgman and Davis 
2004: 5). Theories contain incentives that encourage one behaviour over another, or 
disincentives to discourage particular actions (Bridgman and Davis 2004). In other 
words, theories instigate the search for policy options and act as a road map to action 
and desired policy outcomes. 
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It is undeniable that public choice theory, agency theory and the NPM have had 
significant influence on the Australian models of public sector reform (Halligan 
2002; Hughes 2003). However, assessing the influence of particular ideas, theories 
and assumptions and models on a set of policy shifts in any setting is a difficult 
endeavour due to the numerous factors at play, not least an array of political, 
institutional and technical constraints. Isolating the precise part played by these three 
theories in policy development and implementation is therefore a tricky exercise. 
What is even harder to ascertain are the questions of when, where and to what extent 
they made a difference. Having acknowledged this, the following assessment could 
be made. 
Public choice theory, agency theory and the NPM have contributed to our 
understanding of political and bureaucratic behaviour. Like all conceptual 
frameworks and perspectives, they ask questions that might otherwise have been 
ignored. They offer a range of interesting insights and explanations as to why certain 
institutions exist and why they operate the way they do. They have also produced 
substantial amount of research and empirical data. In Australia, they have challenged 
policy-makers to rethink some of their previous assumptions and to explore new 
ways of organising and conducting public business (APSC 2003; Bridgman and 
Davis 2004; Hughes 2003; Halligan 2002). A testimony to this is the way that 
various policy questions have been redefined. For example, it is now widely accepted 
by all spheres of governments in Australia that monopolistic bureaucratic 
arrangement should no longer be the only mode for delivering public services. That 
multiple models where by external public, private and not-for-profit organisations 
can compete with in-house units will be a way of ensuring the economy, efficiency 
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and effectiveness in the provision of some public services. Those services that are 
inappropriate for external supply can still be provided in-house such as law and order 
maintenance, security and intelligence. 
Other insights and contributions that have derived from these three theories, 
according to Boston et al in New Zealand, and also applicable to Australia include 
the following: 
• the recognition of the importance of transaction costs (both within and 
between organisations) and the need to consider such costs in determining the 
relative merits of in-house provision versus contracting out; 
• the stress on institutional design, especially the need to consider such things 
as information asymmetries, uncertainty, opportunism and incentives in 
drawing appropriate governance structures; 
• the emphasis on improving managerial and political accountability, via 
greater clarity and transparency of ministerial goals and interventions, the 
tighter ex-ante specification of desired departmental outputs, and improved 
ex-post reporting and monitoring of performance; 
• the recognition of the need to give greater attention to the consumers of 
public services, and where possible and appropriate, to satisfy their 
preferences; and 
• the need to rethink some of our existing constitutional arrangements and 
conventions and enhance the checks and balances on the executive (Boston et 
al 1998: 29). 
The influences specific to each of the three theories on the Australian model of 
public sector reform are explicated in turn in this section. The ideas embodied in 
public choice theory such as regarding bureaucrats as budget maximisers, 
questioning the real motives of politicians and coining and projecting producer 
capture as a problem — without doubt have had an influence on the thinking and 
worldview within which the Australian model of public sector reform occurred 
(Hughes 2003). For instance, the move to separate the provision of policy advice 
from policy implementation and regulation was inspired at least in part by public 
choice theory (APSC 2003; Hughes 2003). The public choice tradition was probably 
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also influential in the decisions of Australian governments to diversify their sources 
of policy advice as they sought to draw on a wider range of opinions, research and 
expertise. There has been an expansion in the use of ministerial advisers, consultants 
and advocacy groups (APSC 2003). 
Other contributions of public choice theory embrace the stress on transaction costs 
(for example, in the area of government subsidies and other political interventions), 
the various attempts to curb the role of vested interests in governmental policy-
making (New Zealand Treasury 1987: 44-5) and efforts to reduce the scope for 
political intervention in certain field (for example, monetary policy). 
Agency theory's insights informed the shaping of the policy framework that 
undergirded the corporatisation and privatisation programs (Dunleavy et al 2006; 
Jennings and Cameron (1987). It also played a crucial part in reshaping thinking on 
issues connected to employment relations, incentive structures; remuneration 
systems, and performance management, influencing for example, the shift towards 
fixed term employment contract for senior public servants, the emphasis on the 
relationship between ministers and departmental chief executives (Aulich 1997; 
Boston et al 1998; Dunleavy et al 2006; Hughes 2003; Scott and Gorringe 1987). So 
too did it contribute to the establishment of chief executive performance agreements 
and monitoring arrangements (Boston 1992; Boston et al 1998; Hughes 2003). 
Further, ideas drawn from agency theory have assisted in the development of policies 
relating to institutional design and governance models. For example, the Auditor-
General Act 1987 which sets out the main responsibilities and information gathering 
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powers of the Auditor-General, and the establishment of the Australian Audit Office, 
was guided among others, by insights from agency theory (APSC 2003). 
The role of the NPM in policy discourses, development and implementation in 
Australia is undeniable. The NPM doctrines influenced both the way policy debates 
over public sector reforms have been undertaken and in the specific policies which 
have been canvassed and/or introduced. Policy debates have held up private sector 
standards and commercial models as the standards and benchmarks against which 
public sector performance and management are compared and assessed. Hence, 
government agencies have been likened to businesses; ministers have been depicted 
as board chairpersons and departmental heads have been seen as chief executives; 
parallels have been drawn between the central agencies and a firm's corporate office; 
and taxpayers have been likened to shareholders (Boston et al 1998; Dunleavy et al 
2006; Hughes 2003; 1994). 
As regards policy decisions, there certainly seems to be congruence of the doctrines 
of the NPM with the Australian model of reforms — shift from process to output 
accountability (APSC 2003); the devolution of management control (Aulich 1997; 
Halligan 2002; Hughes 2003; 1998; Mascarenhas 1999); the disaggregation of large 
bureaucratic structures (APSC 2003; Aulich 1997; Hughes 2003; 1998; Ryan 1997); 
the preference for private ownership and contracting out (Aulich 1997; Boston et al 
1998; Mulgan 2006); the emphasis on consumers (APSC 2003); the emulation of 
many private sector management practices (Ryan 1997; Mulgan 2006); and the 
emphasis on cost-cutting and labour discipline (Hughes 2003; 1994). 
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The NPM and Tasmanian local government modernisation process 
The efficiency-oriented principles of the NPM include among others, making 
organisations more businesslike, more accountable for resources; provision of high 
quality services at lower costs; budgetary constraint; and financial management 
improvement. Others are devolution of authority; clearer and stronger accountability 
regimes; and performance evaluation and strategic management. The NPM's 
mechanisms for ensuring efficient service delivery in the public sector embrace the 
application of multiple different forms of provision through competitive tendering 
and contracting, increasing market influence on pricing of goods and services, and 
updating technology to enhance delivery for example one-stop shops, online 
programs, and quality accreditations (Aulich 1999; HCC 2005; LGB 2002). Virtually 
all these shifts have been incorporated into the Tasmanian local government 
modernisation process and steadily suffused into the management culture of local 
government. 
The NPM has also advocated structural reforms to clarify not only roles and 
functions but also the conflicts in the multiple and ill-defined goals of the public 
sector. This entails the rationalisation of roles and functions between spheres of 
government and the separation of government policy advice from operational matters 
— implying the introduction of some of the tenets of the purchaser-provider split. 
The role and function clarification principle of the NPM found expression in 
Tasmania when a thorough review of state and local government functions as well as 
the redefinition of the roles and functions of the various actors in councils were 
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included as a major agenda item in the modernisation process (Aulich 1999b; LGAB 
1992; LGB 2002). 
Legislative changes in the Tasmanian local government reform have facilitated role 
and functions reform somewhat by permitting the use of benchmarking and 
performance measures which aim at identifying the capacities of councils and 
comparing them against "best practice". The theoretical effect of this is that it 
enables municipal governments to focus on problems areas and take remedial 
measures (Witherby et al 1997). Drawing on NPM doctrines, the legislative reform 
component of the modernisation process has also allowed councils to appoint senior 
staff on the basis of fixed-term performance contracts. In the case of staff at other 
levels, award restructuring and enterprise bargaining are having an effect on working 
conditions (Wensing 1997). 
As mentioned earlier, Australia has not embraced the tenets of the NPM wholesale, 
uncritically and comprehensively. Moreover, the ways in which some NPM 
prescriptions have been employed in Australia do not resemble their 
operationalisation in other jurisdictions. For example, New Zealand, Britain and 
Australia have all embarked on machinery of government changes that are in line 
with the NPM doctrines (for example, the separation of policy advice from 
operational responsibilities). Whereas the UK has uncoupled three-fourths of its civil 
service, and New Zealand has disaggregated about 90 percent of its own, in Australia 
for the most part, the operating assumption as noted by Keating was where, 'there is 
considerable discretion at the operational level and the success of the policy depends 
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heavily on how it is implemented, it is most desirable that policy and program 
delivery be integrated' (Keating 1993: 11). 
Even though Australia later elaborately applied the institutional disaggregation 
model, some differences in respect of degree of application still remain between it 
and Britain or New Zealand. A second example is that changes in public sector 
financial management in Britain, Australia and New Zealand have been in tandem 
with the NPM tenets, which prefers output accountability to process accountability. 
This notwithstanding, there remains significant divergence. Britain financial 
management changes, for example, until perhaps comparatively recently, have not 
incorporated some of the elements that are central to the Australian and New 
Zealand's reforms (for example, the distinction between outputs and outcomes) 
(APSC 2003; Boston et al 1998). Thus, it makes sense to argue that some of the 
criticisms that have been directed against the British model of the NPM do not 
necessarily hold water in the case of either the Australian or the New Zealand 
version. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined some of the conceptual frameworks and intellectual 
insights that have influenced the development of the Australian models of public 
sector reform. It has acknowledged that many other ideas, theories and perceptions as 
well as economic pressures and political imperatives played an important role in the 
reform process. Nevertheless, the impact of public choice theory, agency theory and 
NPM, which are separate yet related theories have had significant impact on the 
Australian as well as other western democracies' models of public sector reform. 
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These doctrines have not only reconfigured the language of public debate, but they 
have also changed the manner in which public management issues are 
conceptualised, defined and debated as well as analysed. Consequently the policy 
agenda has been focused on issues connected to the appropriate design of incentive 
structures and governance arrangements, the avoidance of provider capture, the 
acceptance of contestability and contracting, the employment of principal-agent 
arrangements to an array of interpersonal and intergovernmental interactions, the 
reduction of transaction costs and agency costs, and the tighter and explicit 
specification of outputs and outcomes (Boston et al 1998; Shapiro 2005). 
Undoubtedly, the three theories have contributed in important respects to improving 
public sector management in Australia. And despite their weaknesses they have 
furnished the Australian model with logic, coherence and vim. 
The theories have also influenced in some respects the principles and intentions of 
the Tasmanian local government modernisation program. The outcomes of the 
implementation of the program have in turn created an enabling environment for the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split into councils (this will be discussed in 
detail in chapter five which deals with the modernisation process). 
The influence of the theories in driving public sector reform since the early and mid 
1980s in other advanced industrial democracies is also well documented (Aucoin 
1990a; Dunleavy et al 2006; Wollman 2004; Schested 2002;). The policy changes 
that resulted depicted a pattern of convergence across jurisdictions. Despite these 
similarities in reform agendas important differences still remain (in relation to when, 
how, degree of adoption, and with what effects) many of the central doctrines of the 
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theories have been applied. Hence, consistency of the Australian model of reform 
with the NPM tenets should not convey the erroneous impression that it is equivalent 
to say, the British or New Zealand models of public management. Because these 
theories, especially the NPM have tended to over emphasise the efficiency objectives 
to the neglect of other social considerations such as equity and democracy, which the 
huge efforts in the public sector are concerned with, other alternative governance 
models that take on board these neglected facets are being considered (See Box et al 
2001; Dunleavy et al 2006; Tom and Per 2002; 2004). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE PURCHASER-PROVIDER SPLIT 
The separation of state agencies providing goods and services from the agencies 
which purchase those services on behalf of government has become a major plank of 
public sector reform in the UK and New Zealand. For example, in the UK local 
authorities and hospital trusts sign contracts with private companies or in-house units 
for the provision of catering and cleaning services. Local councils and hospitals are 
the purchasers, while private or public sector catering and cleaning companies 
represent the providers (Bailey and Davidson 1999). In New Zealand the impact of 
this separation on councils has seen the establishment of business units known as 
Local Area Trading Enterprises (LATEs) and other arrangements that mark a major 
shift from the traditional bureaucratic model of local government organisational 
structure (Aulich 1997). 
Australian municipal authorities were required to separate policy, regulatory and 
contract management functions from operational responsibilities as part of the 
application of the National Competition Policy (NCP) (Tasmanian Government 
1996). The implementation of this directive has witnessed some councils clearly 
making distinctions between policy advice and operational matters by actually 
restructuring to create client sides and inviting external providers to compete with 
internal units for contracts for the provision of services. For example, some councils 
in the states of Victoria and New South Wales have restructured by introducing the 
purchaser-provider split and applying competitive tenders for the provision of some 
services (Aulich 1997; Applied Economics 2004). 
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This chapter examines the model of the purchaser-provider split. Its principles and 
goals together with the conceptual frameworks that underpin it (public choice theory, 
agency theory and the new public management — discussed in chapter two) are 
explicated. How the model is expressed in the Australian local government sector, 
and the predicted budgetary effects of its application in this sphere of government are 
expounded upon. This is followed by an outline of the Australian National 
Competition Policy (NCP). Then the relation of the NCP both to the purchaser-
provider split and compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) are sketched. The 
chapter provides the framework upon which subsequent chapters of this thesis are 
built. 
The purchaser-provider split denotes a public policy model where there is separation 
of formerly co-located policy and delivery aspects of public service delivery (Boston 
et al 1991). It is an arrangement whereby agents delivering a service are distanced 
from policy, and service delivery outcomes are defined and made transparent in 
contracts or service agreements (Ryan et al 2000). This institutional disaggregation is 
argued to be a better means of meeting the needs of public service customers and 
achieving better value for money (Street 1994; Ormsby 1998; Ryan et al 2000; 
Siverbo 2004). 
The purchaser-provider split entails the separation of government's owner/funder, 
purchaser and provider roles (Boston 1996; DoFA 1995; Ryan et al 2000). 'The role 
of the finder/owner is to assume stewardship of assets (staff, plant, financial), which 
typically rests with the appropriate Minister' (Aulich et al 1999: 3). This is generally 
discharged through ownership agreements between Minister and the chief executive 
89 
of an agency which specify the performance requirements of the agency (Aulich 
1999 et al: 3; Siverbo 2004). The agency is then required to purchase the outputs 
required to satisfy the ownership agreements: this involves determining the 
specifications for the goods and services required by the agency and establishing 
appropriate mechanisms for securing the most effective provider for example, the use 
of procurement or competitive tendering approaches (Aulich et al 1999; Bailey and 
Davidson 1999). The purchaser assumes responsibility for defining levels and quality 
of service or good to be provided (based on standards or an assessment of 
community need), providing resources to enable the provider to meet agreed outputs 
and outcomes, and monitoring the performance of the provider (Aulich et al 1999; 
Bailey and Davidson 1999; Ryan et al 2000). It is important to note that the 
purchaser/funder retains responsibility for the service — it cannot abrogate its 
strategic role or its ownership of the service 
The functions of the provider on the other hand embody obtaining contracts to 
provide services, providing services to meet agreed cost and quality specifications 
and reporting to the purchaser (Aulich et al 1999; Bailey and Davidson 1999; Ryan 
et al 2000). The role may be assumed by in-house government groups or by external 
public, not-for-profit or private sector organisations. While the terminology may 
vary, the purchaser-provider model is mainly about the delineation and often 
separation of the planning and service control functions of government, from the role 
of provider or deliverer of services (Street 1994; Aulich eta! 1999; Siverbo 2004). 
However, separation is discernible at different layers within organisations (for 
example, Minister-CEO, and CEO-organisational unit) and may entail multiple 
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agreements (for example, CEO and the Minister for individual performance contract 
and Minister and CEO for a purchaser agreement for the agency). As a result, the 
purchaser-provider split is described as a complex network of arrangements and 
agreements (Aulich et al 1999). 
The Australian Department of Finance and Administration (DoFA) identified a 
variety of arrangements embraced by governments overseas and in Australia (DoFA 
1995: 5, 9). At one extreme the arrangement involves simply identifying roles and 
functions of purchaser and provider within each area of agency activity, with no 
formal organisational separation. At the other, it may entail specialisation of agencies 
between those responsible for purchaser functions and those with the primary tasks 
of providing public services. Between theses extremes, there are myriad 
arrangements involving separation of provider functios into in-house business units 
of one type or the other. Generally, the organisational separation is 'more defined as 
provider units become engaged in bidding competitively for contracts, so the 
purchaser-provider models are typically associated with situations where there is 
competition between providers' (Aulich et al 1999: 4). The health service offers an 
additional model — one to create internal or 'quasi markets' in situations where 
genuine markets do not exit. Service purchasers coordinate the mix of services they 
feel necessary to achieve desired outcomes: they may purchase different services 
from different providers, both public and private (Aulich et al 1999; Street 1994). 
The purchaser's role may be fragmented by the creation of separate purchasing 
agents responsible to the purchasing department, for example, these agents may be 
responsible for purchasing services for a particular region. This model has been 
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applied in health care provision in a number of jurisdictions (for example, the UK 
where area health purchasers were made responsible for health care purchasing for 
particular areas and GP fundholders purchased services for their own patients) 
(Aulich et a/ 1999). Recently however, the New Labour Government abolished GP 
fund holding and instead created primary care trusts (Talbot and Johnson 2007). A 
similar arrangement is discernible in the Swedish health system where some local 
governments have appointed a number of local purchasers who are responsible for a 
geographic region within the council (Siverbo 2004). Western Australia in the mid 
1990s also followed this approach creating regional purchasing authorities for the 
provision of local health services) (DoFA 1995). 
There are a number of arguments for the purchaser-provider split. First, it is believed 
to minimise conflict and tension between multiple and conflicting roles of agencies. 
The ability to clarify roles and responsibilities is argued to improve client 
responsiveness, engender a clearer focus on individual responsibility, improve 
accountability and increase the capacity of managers to manage (DoFA 1995). 
Second, because there are divergent goals between purchaser and provider, the 
potential for them to conflict is greater: purchasers are concerned with the quality of 
service standards and value for money whereas providers are primarily interested in 
winning contracts. The split is believed to empower the clients, by affording them 
opportunity to have a greater say in what outputs they will purchase in order to 
achieve desired outcomes (Shepherd et al 1996; Aulich et al 1999). In other words, 
the separation provides powerful incentives for policy agencies to be more 
independent and demanding purchasers. At the same time providers are given greater 
management autonomy over how the contracts are satisfied within constraints of the 
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purchaser-provider contract. (Boyd and Cronin 1994; Aulich et al 1999; Ryan et al 
2000). 
Furthermore, it may enable the agencies to focus more on key strategic issues of 
determining the mix and standard of services they wish to provide to their 
communities (Walsh 1991a: 135). For example, purchaser-provider arrangements 
have been proposed as a means of achieving greater community control over 
Aboriginal health care as community consumer organisations improve their capacity 
to define outcomes (Tsey and Scrimgeour 1997). In addition, the split provides the 
opportunity for agencies to better clarify user needs by reducing the possibility of 
client capture and through the process of contract specification (Aulich et al 1999; 
Burrows and Moravec 1997). Moreover, since the chief accountability tool under the 
purchaser-provider model is the contract, written contracts between minister and 
chief executives are relied upon for allocating resources, maintaining accountability, 
specifying organisational responsibilities and delivering services (Aulich et al 1999). 
The goal is to replicate the arms-length relationship between buyers and sellers found 
in competitive markets (William 1997). 
Other proponents of the purchaser-provider split point to its favourable impact on 
organisational structures and coherence. They posit that purchaser-provider 
arrangements can develop networks with the same organisational advantages as 
integrated firms (Hurley 1993), while others suggest that purchaser-provider delivery 
systems are more decentralised and pluralistic (Hokenstad and Johnson 1996). 
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Finally, the purchaser-provider split is advanced as a policy option to reduce the 
costs of providing services. For example, Gerdtham et al (1999) argue that the shift 
from a budget-based allocation of resources to the type of output-based allocation 
associated with the purchaser-provider split would produce savings of almost 10 
percent. 
Arguments against the purchaser-provider split in particular and contractual 
arrangements in general, point to the high transaction costs. Writing, monitoring, 
evaluating and enforcing the performance agreements, purchase agreements and 
other contracts entail substantial transaction costs. Evans (1990) cautions that 
competitive systems may lower the direct cost of providing a service, but the 
administrative and surveillance costs may be high. Propper and Soderlund (1998), 
for example, note that any effect of competition in the National Health Service is 
also likely to be attenuated by the heavy management of its internal market. This 
certainly seems to be the case with the reorganisation of health services in New 
Zealand. The costs of administering and monitoring the internal market were visible, 
explicit and seemingly high (2 to 10 percent of the total annual health budget). 
Secondly, the purchaser-provider split leaves elected officials with less direct 
influence on internal agency operations. Thirdly, separating policy and delivery can 
make policy coordination trickier (William 1997). 
A theme that is sometimes cited as a justification for the adoption of the purchaser-
provider reform is the impact on power relationships. Policy agencies are believed to 
be empowered to be more independent and demanding purchasers (Aulich 1999a; 
Shepherd et al 1996), whereas practitioners are thought to benefit from increased 
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autonomy in determining the type of services delivered (Corney 1996; Ham 1994). 
However, one study indicated the limited influence of purchasers on service delivery 
systems, in favour of the short term and organisational objectives pursued by 
providers (Rosen and Mays 1998). Siverbo (2004) also disputes the exalted position 
of the client when he notes that purchasers in the healthcare delivery sector in 
Sweden lacked the competence to negotiate healthcare well (due to lack of 
specialised medical knowledge). Here the inadequacy of purchaser's competence has 
been used as an explanation of why providers do not trust purchasers. Providers 
blame the inability of purchasers to specify what they want to order on lack of 
specialised medical knowledge. Similar sentiments are expressed for the failure of 
attempts to reform the health system in New Zealand. Easton (1997) argues that the 
purchaser-provider split model, which formed the basis of the health reform was 
predicated on the assumption that generic managerial skill rather than detailed 
knowledge about health, were crucial to health system managers. He contends that 
the lack of health-specific expertise on the part of managers contributed to the failure 
of the reforms. 
The impact of the purchaser-provider split on competition is also questioned. 
Competition is often seen as an instrument for improving the responsiveness of 
services and the costs of their provision (Lewis et al 1996; Dunleavey et al 2006). 
However, the extent to which purchaser-provider split increases competition remains 
in doubt. For example, a study of market concentration in healthcare indicated that 
the purchaser-provider split had little impact on increasing market competition 
(Ashton and Press 1997). Others argue that competitive markets cannot exist in some 
areas of social services (Shackley and Healey 1993). 
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Some commentators have insisted that services such as health care should be based 
on cooperation between delivery stakeholders rather than competition since 
competition tends to increase the cost of providing services and require extensive 
regulation (Coile 1994). Siverbo (2004) agrees, stating that by the middle of the 
1990s cooperation and trust became important qualities in purchaser-provider 
arrangements in Sweden. 'These are qualities that were not emphasised in the same 
way in early rhetoric about the purchaser-provider split' (Siverbo 2004: 13). 
Conceptual frameworks of the purchaser-provider split 
Public choice theory, agency theory and the new public management (which have 
been discussed in the previous chapter) are the conceptual frameworks on which the 
purchaser-provider split is based. Agency theory is concerned with the economic 
costs of contracting. These are the problems of getting managers and employees of 
organisations to pursue the interests of their principals (Arrow 1985; Barney and 
Ouchi 1986; Ormsby 1998; Wright et al 2001; Wright et al 1996). Public choice 
theory applies economic analysis to the behaviour of voters, legislators, public 
servants and the dynamics of the voting system (Boyne 1998a; Ormsby 1998: 362; 
Shaw 2002). Both agency and public choice theories stipulate that politicians, 
bureaucrats and contractors will act in self-serving ways and will have divergent 
goals (Aulich et al 1999). Decoupling of purchaser and provider roles constrains the 
parties' behaviours and compels them to operate in defined ways consistent with 
differing goals (Aulich et al 1999: 4; Alford and O'Neil 1994;; Ryan et al 2000)). 
The new public management (NPM) advocates the use of public choice theory and 
agency theory's principles to undergird public sector reform in order to increase that 
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sector's efficiency and overcome agency failure (Dunleavy et al 2006; Witherby et al 
1997). One organisational form proposed by the NPM doctrine for achieving this is 
the purchaser-provider split. The NPM is predicated on themes of disaggregation, 
competition and incentivisation (Dunleavy et al 2006; Barzelay 2000; Hughes 
2003). Disaggregation entails splitting up large public sector hierarchies in the same 
manner that large private corporations earlier moved from U-form to M-form 
(multifirm) structures; achieving wider, flatter hierarchies internally; and 
respecifying information and managerial systems to facilitate this different pattern of 
control (Dunleavy et al 2006: 470). This implies a strong flexibility of previous 
government-wide practices in personnel, information technology, procurement, and 
other functions (Barzelay 2000), in addition to the establishment of management 
information systems needed to sustain different practices (Dunleavy et al 2006). 
Competition involves introducing purchaser-provider separation into public 
structures so as to allow multiple different forms of provision to be developed and to 
create (more) competition among potential providers (Dunleavy et al 1996; Bailey 
and Davidson 1999). It is argued that by applying competitive processes public 
agencies would be able to allocate resources and provide services much more 
efficiently. The implementation of competition has led to the shrinking of core areas 
of public provision, and suppliers have been diversified. 
Incentivisation implies shifting away from involving managers and staffs and 
rewarding performance in terms of a diffuse public service or professional ethos, and 
embracing instead a greater emphasis on pecuniary-based, specific performance 
incentives. This change means a movement "down grid and down group", in 
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Douglas's cultural theory terms (Dunleavy and Hood 1993). Its impact has been 
particularly marked for professional groups (Kirkpatrick et al 2004). 
All these changes imply major structural reform in the public sector to achieve 
identifiable and manageable units with clearly defined objectives. This structure 
makes it easier to devolve managerial responsibility and establish clear lines of 
accountability. Agents can then be held accountable to single principals, resources 
can be matched to defined tasks, and agency failure can be addressed by shifting 
from control of inputs to monitoring outputs (Witherby et al 1997: 112). The concept 
of contractualism, in which contracts define relationships, terms of trade, and 
specified outputs of managers and agencies, is embedded in this structure (Dunleavy 
et al 2006; Witherby et al 1997). Several of these principles of the public choice 
tradition, agency theory and the NPM have been drawn to form the building blocks 
of the model of the purchaser-provider split. 
Purchaser-provider split: economic theory 
The purchaser-provider split provides the theoretical justification for the separation 
of state agencies providing goods and services from agencies which purchase those 
services on behalf of government. This institutional disaggregation is argued to be a 
better means of meeting the needs of public service customers and achieving better 
value for money (Ormsby 1998). The purchaser is supposed to act on behalf of 
service users, with the main concern of identifying need for service. Purchasers 
specify the services to be delivered by the provider within a determined budget. 
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While the purchaser-provider split formally connotes a contractual arrangement, non 
competitive contracting regimes may be used where there are no guarantees that the 
successful contractor would not default on his obligations by sacrificing quality 
and/or level of service in order to reap a higher rate of return (Bailey and Davidson 
1999). One of the fundamental postulates of mainstream economic theory of markets 
and public choice theory on bureaucracy is that both efficiency and quality of service 
will be maximised if rival agencies submit bids to deliver a specified quantity and 
quality of service (competitive contracting) (Boyne 1998a). These value 
characteristics would not be enhanced or may even be sacrificed if non-competitive 
contracting regimes are chosen instead. The rationale here is simply that if monopoly 
results in budgetary growth and reduced quality of service, then a consequence of 
competition should be lower expenditure and enhanced quality than would otherwise 
occur (Boyne 1998a). 
Competitive tendering for public sector contracts is reminiscent of a quasi market in 
that service users do not pay for the service at the point of consumption. Moreover, 
the purchaser, who ultimately retains responsibility of the services in terms of control 
of the total budget, articulates preferences on behalf of service users, and may in turn 
be subject to control by central government. The market may also operate under a 
non profit rule. These characteristics imply that the market is a managed rather than a 
free market (Le Grand 1990; Akehurst and Ferguson 1993; Le Grand and Bartett 
1993; Maynard 1993; Walsh 1995; Barker et al 1997; Propper and Bartlett 1997; 
Flynn and Williams 1997; Siverbo 2004). 
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Despite the managed nature of such competition, it will in theory result in cost 
savings and/or improved quality of service so long as it embraces competition for 
service contracts (that is, the right to provide the service). This does not mean that 
transferring responsibility for a publicly funded service to a private organisation is 
sufficient to increase efficiency: it is competition in the market which is important, 
not whether production is public or private. In theory it is competition rather than 
ownership of the enterprise that promotes efficiency (Bishop and Kay 1988). This 
characteristic of public choice theory can be contrasted with the literature on 
property rights which suggests that ownership does affect performance (Vining and 
Boardman 1992). 
Competitive pressures can still eventuate without the requirement of a large number 
of providers of a given service or potential rival agencies bidding for the right to 
provide the service. In reality, it is the threat of competition rather than the number 
of bids which creates the incentive for increased efficiency (Batunol et al 1982). 
Evidence shows that the more efficient the incumbent service provider, the fewer the 
number of rival bids for those contracts in situations where there are no restrictions 
on the ability of agencies to compete for service contracts. This is because potential 
providers who cannot tender alternative lower cost bids than the incumbent 
provider's estimates discern that they will not win the contract. Hence, competitive 
conditions may not be the direct equivalent of those of the economist's classic model 
of perfect competition (created by many providers) but may instead be determined by 
the threat of competition (Bailey and Davidson 1999: 16). 
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It can be stated then that a competitive market depicts a situation where, even though 
there are no restrictions on entry and exit, only one or a few new providers may 
eventually venture into it (Sorensen 1993). Statutory barriers to entry into a public 
service market are reminiscent of protective trade barriers which reduction or 
scraping will undoubtedly enhance contestability and thereby compel the incumbent 
service provider to lift up his game through focusing on the benefits made by 
'stimulating organisational improvements' or X-efficiency (Wolf 1989:18). This, the 
incumbent provider must do if he is to maintain his grip on the contract at the next 
round of tendering. In theory, the greater the degree of contestability the greater the 
cost savings and improvements in service quality (Ellwood 1996). 
The application of the classic market theory to the public sector should be bounded 
for the reason that the provider competes for the service contract, that is, for the 
market not for the service user. Although competitive tendering can be expected to 
improve technical efficiency, it has no necessary impact on allocative efficiency — 
the responsiveness of outputs to public preferences and needs. First, there may be no 
release of funds from any efficiency gains for use elsewhere in the economy. Second, 
decisions on the nature and distribution of the services remain the responsibility of 
politicians and officials. Competitive tendering does not enhance the power of 
consumers, local taxpayers or the general public (Boyne 1998a: 697). In other words, 
'there may still be exploitation of service users by the purchaser, even if any 
exploitation by the provider is eliminated as a result of competitive tendering' 
(Randall 1995; Street 1994; Bailey and Davidson 1999: 163; Timothy and Ghatak 
2002). 
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Nevertheless, the wishes of service users may still be reflected because of the 
remoteness of the service provider from the specification of the services. It is most 
likely that those specifications will correspond to the service user's (rather than the 
provider's) needs under either or both of the following conditions: first, if there is 
competition in supply so that service users have the opportunity to choose between 
rival suppliers; second, if purchasers fully reflect the needs and wants of service 
users. In the first case, 'exit' from the service is facilitated and in the second case, 
opportunity needs to be afforded for the expression of 'voice' by the service user 
through improvement in administrative arrangements (Bailey and Davidson 1999: 
163). In theory, 'voice' is more effective than exit the greater the degree of market 
failure (Hirschman 1970; Paul 1992; Timothy and Ghatak 2000). 
Increased latitude either or both for voice and exit catalyses the transition from a 
service-led to a needs led approach to service delivery. Such a shift would not come 
about if the purchaser puts its own self-interest over and above those of the service 
user. The change to a needs-led service is predicated on a fiscal exchange framework 
of government where provision of services is traded-off for willingness to pay taxes 
(Bailey and Davidson 1999). Enhancing the efficiency of the public sector by market 
tactics while mindful not to sacrifice its community service obligations is a twin 
imperative which government must promote. It pursues this public interest by 
authoritatively determining the need for service as purchaser, on behalf of the service 
user after taking account of wider social benefits and costs. This way of pursuing the 
public interest is the framework which is conventionally adopted by economic 
theory. It can be argued then that the extent to which users' needs are captured in 
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service specification will vary as a function of the model or type of government 
(Dunleavy 1991). 
Important caveats about competition as a panacea for the problems of bureaucratic 
service provision should be sounded. It is true that in some circumstances hierarchies 
may be more efficient than markets. The literature on organisational economics 
suggests that even if the self-interest argument is not attacked, the classic public 
choice perspective on the benefits of competition is overemphasised. Indeed 
competitive tendering may generate additional costs which are absent in the 
traditional form of service provision. 
Williamson (1975) points to a number of transaction costs that are associated with 
writing contracts, monitoring performance and controlling behaviour of contractors. 
These costs vary with the characteristics of the human decision makers who are 
involved with the transaction on the one hand, and the objective properties of the 
market on the other (Williamson 1975: 8). For instance, internal production may be 
more efficient when asset specificity is high, contractors have incentives to behave 
opportunistically, the number of potential external suppliers is small and future 
production requirements are uncertain (Boyne 1998a: 699). The latitude of autonomy 
of private firms affords them the ability to minimise transaction costs because 
exchanges can occur within or across organisational boundaries, subject to the 
relative efficiency of these arrangements. The same cannot be said of public 
organisations where the achievement of this dynamism may be blocked by the 
imposition of competitive tendering. 
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The literature on organisational economics cites a number of problems associated 
with policing opportunistic behaviour by contractors. According to principal-agent 
theory, all contractual relations have two essential characteristics (Barrow 1996; Moe 
1984). First, agents pursue their own interest rather than that of the principal; and 
second, information asymmetries confer power on agents. There is no assumption in 
the theoretical perspective that market forces are sufficient to ensure that agents 
comply with the stated objectives of principals (Klein and Lefter 1981; Wright et al 
2001). Although a competitive bidding process may reveal alternative estimates of 
service cost, information on the quality of service actually delivered remains 
asymmetrical (Boyne 1998a: 700). Moreover, it may be argued that the incentive to 
'shirk' on quality is greater for private than for public agencies. It cannot be 
guaranteed that once the contract price is determined the private service provider 
would not default on his obligation by sacrificing quality and/or level of service in 
order to reap a higher rate of return (Domberger and Hensher 1993). The same is not 
expected from public agencies whose managers are unlikely to benefit monetarily by 
indulging in such practice. 
Mutual trust between principals and agents rather than legal contracts and rigorous 
monitoring regimes has long characterised the many exchanges that take place in the 
public sector. The advent of competition for public service provision has imposed 
some level of trust cost on public agencies. Wintrobe and Breton (1986: 153) argue 
that when trust is present, 'subordinates attempt to achieve the objectives of their 
superior more effectively, in exchange for promises from the superior of greater 
rewards from the resources at his disposal'. Mutual trust between principals and 
agents can enhance productivity and obviates the need for close scrutiny of 
104 
performance (Boyne 1998a). According to Frey (1993) principal-agent theory has 
traditionally assumed that rigorous monitoring leads to higher efficiency. The agent 
however, may interpret rigorous scrutiny by the principal as a sign of distrust, or as a 
complete affront on the contract built on trust. This may create incentive for the 
agent to act in an opportunistic fashion (Frey 1993). 
The implication of these arguments is that competition or the threat of competition 
implied in the purchaser-provider split may add new costs to the production of local 
services. The theoretical impact of competition is therefore indeterminate and should 
be empirically established. 
Purchaser-provider split: organisational theory 
The prevailing view is that the purchaser-provider split clarifies roles and improves 
the efficiency of production and quality of product. The purchaser undertakes client 
side functions such as planning the service, defining the work to be undertaken by 
the provider (agent), contract preparation, tendering process, tender evaluation, and 
letting and managing the contract. The responsibilities of the provider embrace 
obtaining contracts to provide services, providing services to meet agreed cost and 
quality specifications and reporting to the purchaser. The role may be assumed by in-
house units or by external public, not-for-profit or private sector organisations. Local 
politicians supposedly redirect their attention to core strategic issues as part of the 
enabling role, while divesting themselves of operational matters. 
Before the ethos of competition became fashionable in the public sector, local 
governments were the direct providers of services now subject to compulsory 
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competitive tendering and voluntary competitive tendering. They were concerned 
with all stages of service production: inputs, processes, outputs and outcomes. 
Processes denote standard operating procedures in conformance with any statutory 
requirement (for instance, health and safety in sports facilities or impact assessment 
for environmental protection), professional management standards (for example, use 
of the BS5750 (ISO 9000) quality management system by architects, solicitors, and 
housing managers), and good practice guidelines, just to mention a few. Examples of 
outputs include number of lane miles resurfaced or the tons of refuse collected; 
reports, data, records just to mention a few. Standards relate to their 
comprehensiveness, reliability, availability, accuracy, relevance, timeliness and so 
on. Outcomes refer to the results, effects, or benefits derived from the service output, 
which will be of most concern to users of services (Abraham Group 2001; Bailey and 
Davidson 1999). 
With the advent of the purchaser-provider split, local governments are supposedly 
formally divested of the responsibility for inputs and processes, these being assumed 
by the private contractor or in-house units holding service contracts. In the steering 
rather than rowing role (Osborne and Gaebler 1993), local governments are 
theoretically focused on controlling outputs and outcomes. The purchaser buys the 
service output for the purpose of deriving the expected outcome, which is in 
congruence with its strategic policy objectives. It is important to state that the 
purchaser retains the responsibility for ensuring that the expected outcome is derived 
from the output at the lowest cost. This separation of roles supposedly reconfigures 
the public organisation from a production-oriented entity to a consumption-oriented 
regulatory body (Bailey and Davidson 1999). 
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The assessment of the impact of the purchaser-provider split in many studies is 
skewed to the provider side, especially the in-house unit and its operating efficiency, 
especially cost savings. The changes on the client side are minimal. Competition may 
lead directly to improved efficiency on the provider side but will not necessarily 
have any effect (whether direct or indirect) on the client side governance structures 
(Bailey and Davidson 1999: 165). The client side management structure may be 
highly centralised (taking the form of a single specialist unit in the chief executive 
officer's, treasurer's, or human resource department). For example, the City Services 
Unit of the Hobart City Council is a specialist unit responsible for designing, 
documenting, tendering and managing the contract process of the civil and 
environmental construction and maintenance work that are undertaken by council's 
corporatised provider side, Civic Solutions (HCC Interviews 2004). Some 
metropolitan councils in Victoria have also established several specialist units to 
manage the contract process (Applied Economics 2004; Aulich 1997). 
The client-side management structure may also be highly decentralised (individual 
service departments responsible for their own contract) as in the case of the health 
sector in Western Australia where purchaser roles may be fragmented by the creation 
of separate purchasing agents responsible to the purchasing department and where 
these purchasing agents are responsible for purchasing services for particular regions 
(DoFA 1995). A third form the client-side management structure may take is the 
partially decentralised case of the 'lead client' department (for example, an education 
department taking on the client role for all building, cleaning, education and welfare, 
catering or ground maintenance work). 
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The variant of the purchaser-provider split with popular application appeal in UK 
local government is a multifunctional provider side where stand-alone in-house 
business units manage multiple contracts (DOE 1991). The near equivalent of this 
variant of the model in Australia at the local level is the health service model, which 
has created internal or 'quasi markets' in situations where genuine markets do not 
exit. Service purchasers coordinate the mix of services they feel necessary to achieve 
desired outcomes: they may purchase different services from different providers, 
both public and private (DoFA 1995; APSC 2003). 
The expression of the purchaser -provider split in local government 
The model of the purchaser-provider split is used here to explain the predicted 
budgetary effects of municipal service delivery. Here a purchaser (principal), the 
council's chief executive officer (CEO), seeks to fulfil specific policy goals through 
the actions of his/her providers (agents) — who may be internal department heads, 
heads of external public organisations, managers of private firms, and managers of 
not-for-profit organisations. The budget and its formulation is the object of this 
relationship and provide a means for examining the interaction between these actors. 
The CEO, whether this person is an elected mayor or a city manager, has a strong 
preference for not increasing the council's current level of taxation. Municipal 
officials may be electorally advantaged by increasing spending, but this advantage is 
lost or at least diminished by rising taxes and tax burden. Internal and external 
providers have budgetary preferences which are potentially at odds with the CEO's 
desire to maintain tax rates. As maximisers of their own departmental budgets in the 
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case of internal providers and external public suppliers, and profits in respect of 
external private providers, department heads and managers of external firms are less 
concerned with maintaining tax rates than maximising their department's share of the 
total budget, and firm's profits respectively. This preference makes the provider 
(agent) indifferent to, and even potentially a supporter of, tax increases. As a 
behavioural consequence of these preferences, bureau heads, and managers of 
external firms respectively have little incentive to reveal their "true" policy needs, 
and "true" costs of delivery of services to the CEO. 
Given a provider's (agent's) monopoly of information (Arrow 1985; Niskanen 
1971), he/she is in a strong position to extract budgetary outlays from the CEOs in 
excess of the minimum cost of producing a service (that is, slack resources) (Stein 
1990). In other words, every dealing here is tainted by information asymmetries or 
what Arrow (1985) calls "hidden information". Information asymmetries can give 
rise to opportunism which is perceived as self-interest with guile (Arrow 1971; 
Williamson 1975; Shapiro 2005). Thus, it is expected that agents may disguise, 
mislead, distort or cheat as they partner in an exchange (Wright eta! 2001: 415). 
Because this behaviour is repeated in each agency, its cumulative effects represent a 
threat to the CEOs goal of maintaining tax levels. Since agents are distant from the 
direct political consequences of their budgetary avarice, they are not likely to adjust 
their budget requests downwards to reflect their real costs of service production. 
Where bureau heads are appointed by the CEO, there is still an incentive for these 
agents to use their informational advantage to promote their agency's interests and 
spending programs (Stein 1990). Even in instances where the CEO has mandated 
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spending cuts, bureau heads are expected to minimise budget cut using their 
informational advantage in negotiations with the CEO (Stein 1990). 
Even when the budget matters are settled and the agent is asked to produce and 
deliver the services, the purchaser (principal) may not know (because of knowledge 
asymmetries) whether the provider (agent) has procured the right inputs, has the 
requisite professional staff to execute the work, has appropriate equipment, is mixing 
the inputs in the right proportions, and is actually doing a good job, if at all. In other 
words, there is opportunity for the agent to engage in opportunistic behaviour 
[pursuing self-interest with "guile" (Arrow 1971; Williamson 1975)]. 
To minimise these agency problems measures such as competitive tendering and 
contracting, incentive (and sanction) structures, and monitoring regimes are 
established. Competitive tendering is used to screen potential providers in order to 
select the best-qualified agents. This is justified as using rivalry in service delivery 
lowers costs and improves standards (Hood 1991; Hughes 2003; Dunleavy et al 
2006). Contracts are then applied to govern the relationships between the CEO 
(principal) and the successful providers (both internal and external suppliers) to 
ensure that the behaviour of the parties is constrained. This constraint forces them to 
operate in defined ways consistent with their differing goals (Alford and O'Neill 
1994). Incentives (and sanctions) are employed to encourage or force providers 
(agents) to engage in efficient policy behaviour and to reveal their true budgetary 
need (Stein 1990; Shapiro 2005; Dunleavy et al 2006). Monitoring of the actions of 
the provider (agent) by the purchaser (principal) ensures that the former provides the 
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services or carries out the tasks according to specification, and does so in an efficient 
and timely fashion. 
These mechanisms are not perfect and need to be regularly reviewed and refined to 
overcome shortcomings in order to achieve efficient outcomes. This is the reason 
why scholars are continually researching and paying salience to the efficacy of 
contracts, incentive structures, and appropriate monitoring regimes for agents. The 
impact of efficient contracts that can be used to align the behaviours and actions of 
agents has been examined, among others, by Guth et al (1998), Mukerji (1998), 
Indjejikian and Nanda (1999), and Jambulingam and Nevin (1999). Similarly, the 
designing of appropriate incentive and compensation structures in order to ensure 
that agents align their interests with those of the principal have been studied by 
Chakraborty et al (1999), Kraft and Niedrprum (1999), and Pendergast (1999). Bartel 
(1999) and Vafeas (1999) have researched systems, frameworks, and mechanisms to 
monitor agents. Each of theses groups of researchers has examined different aspects 
of agency problems in a continued effort to develop and refine contracts, incentives, 
and monitoring systems for agents (Wright et al 2001). 
However hard purchasers (principals) try to minimise them all purchaser-provider 
(principal-agent) relationships experience costs; about this all agency scholars agree. 
Agency costs derive from many sources: the costs of recruitment, adverse selection, 
specifying and discerning preferences, providing incentives, moral hazards, 
corruption, shirking, stealing, self-dealing, providing incentives, monitoring and 
policing, self-regulation, bonding and insurance, agents who oversee agents who 
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monitor agents, as well as failures in these costly remedial measures (Shapiro 2005: 
280). 
The challenge of purchasers (principals) is the enormous effort required to undertake 
on-going investigation of new ways to minimise agency costs, and learn lessons from 
the measures that are already in place (both successful and unsuccessful ones) to 
inform future decisions. This is a tricky exercise that demands diligence and 
patience. Innovative measures from other jurisdictions should be emulated and 
current international best practice directed at minimising agency cost needs to be 
taken on board. 
Australian National Competition Policy 
The Australian National Competition Policy (NCP) forms the basis of the 
Competition Principle Agreement (CPA) which was reached by the Council of 
Australian Governments (COAG) in April 1995. The goals of the NCP, according to 
Willet, include the following: 
Improve Australia's consumer protection laws by extending the reach of Part 
IV of the Trade Practices Act (TPA) to apply to all businesses in Australia. 
Part IV of the Act contains rules to limit the abuse of market power by 
businesses, promote fair-trading and efficient industry practices, and protect 
consumers. 
Improve the quality of Australia's infrastructure through reform packages in 
electricity, gas, water and road transport industries; and by establishing third 
party access arrangements for the services of nationally significant monopoly 
infrastructure such as electricity grids and railway lines. 
Review and, where appropriate ensure that any new restrictions provide net 
community benefit. 
Improve the performance of government business through structural reform 
and introducing competitive neutrality so that government businesses do not 
enjoy unfair advantages when competing with private businesses (Willet 
2000: 1). 
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• The above tenets of the NCP have implications for all levels of governments in 
Australia. The consequences of the policy for local government are hereby 
examined. 
Implications of NCP for local government 
The implementation of NCP has had significant consequences for business 
enterprises in general, and local government enterprises in particular. The oversight 
of prices for local government is now under the jurisdiction of the individual state 
mechanisms. The consequences this has had are broadly two. First, it has made local 
government pricing cost reflective where this has not been the case. Second, it has 
guaranteed an appropriate form of price discounting for disadvantage and disability. 
The application of competitive neutrality for local government business undertaking 
implied: the removal of taxation advantages through taxation equivalents; the 
removal of debt guarantees; and resolution of the question regarding cross-
subsidisation of certain business activities from other components of local 
government enterprise (Felmingham and Page 1996). The playing field has been 
levelled to prevent government businesses from gaining a net advantage over private 
sector competitors (that is, firms compete on their inherent strengths and weaknesses 
irrespective of ownership) (Felmingham and Page 1996; Dollery et al 2000). The 
NCP has also promoted practices such as compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) 
and cross border tendering (CBT). 
The review of anti-competitive legislation was aimed at removing legislation 
(deregulation) in some jurisdictions, while in others it entailed uniform or revised 
regulation (re-regulation). The objective of this element of NCP was to eliminate 
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barriers to effective competition, in particular those barriers that represented 
additional cost (Felmingham and Page 1996). The NCP took into account the 
substantial community service obligations of local government in comparison with 
federal and state spheres of governments. This recognition permitted local 
government to carry out public interest test that distinguished unwarranted from 
warranted protective legislation (Tasmanian Government 1996; Felmingham and 
Page 1996; Willet 2000). With regard to the issue of access to publicly owned assets, 
the effect on local government is different from that experienced at Commonwealth 
and state government levels. At the local sphere of government this is confined to a 
limited set of applications such as capital assets required for road and sewerage 
works (Felminghm and Page 1996). 
Clause 7 (1) of the CPA indicated that the principles set out in the agreement were to 
apply to local government, notwithstanding that local government was not a 
signatory to that agreement. Each state and territory government was made 
responsible for actually applying these principles to local government. The CPA 
incorporates the corporatisation and the full cost attribution (FCA) models, which are 
set out respectively in clause 3 (4) and clause 3 (5) (a) of the CPA. Corporatisation 
involves 'the establishment of a separate legal entity to run a commercial business 
with the relevant government as its sole shareholder or owner. It does not necessarily 
involves incorporation under Corporation Law' (Tasmanian Government 1996: 4). 
Under the FCA model, significant business activities are required to calculate the tax 
and guarantee fees payable, and the cost that complying with regulations applying to 
the private sector would impose and reflect those costs in pricing the goods and 
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services provided (Tasmanian Government 1996; Willet 2000). In addition, costs 
needs to take into account of full indirect as well as direct wage costs; overheads 
such as corporate services and a notional rent for accommodation; and a component 
for return on capital. The business activity will not necessarily be required to pass 
this full cost onto its customers, if the local government (or the government in 
question) decides to provide a subsidy to offset some of the cost of providing a 
service (Tasmanian Government 1996: 3; Willet 2000). However, any subsidy 
provided by that government would need to be explicitly reported and accounted for. 
In applying the corporatisation and FCA models, all governments, including local 
government were required to separate policy, regulatory and contract management 
functions from operational or service delivery responsibilities. In other words, all 
governments were required to introduce some of the tenets of the purchaser-provider 
split — role clarification, output-based budget, transparent pricing, accountability 
mechanisms, efficient use of resources, and competitiveness. 
The NCP and compulsory competitive tendering 
The misunderstanding surrounding the NCP agenda stems from the wide range of 
reform initiatives it dictates. For the sake of clarity, it is important to state that the 
NCP does not require privatisation, competitive tendering or cuts in government 
services (Willet 2000). The NCP reforms is concerned with the removal of barriers 
that traditionally protected various businesses and industries from providing goods 
and services at competitive prices. The object is to make better use of the nation's 
resources and ensure that Australian industries can compete vigorously in the 
globalised economic environment (Felmingham and Page 1996; APSC 2003; 
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Tasmanian Government 1996; Willet 2000). While globalisation brings benefits such 
as opening up new or wider markets, these benefits are only attainable if Australia's 
industries are competitive. 
What NCP requires is competitive neutrality reform, where this yields a net public 
benefit. Competitive neutrality requires that governments review how their 
businesses engage in commercial activities to ensure fair competition between public 
and private businesses. This means optimal use can be made of resources 
(Felmingham and Page 1996; Tasmanian Government 1996; Willet 2000). 
As noted earlier, NCP does not mandate competition or competitive tendering in 
public provision of services, but there are important ways in which it helps in 
sharpening public sector competitiveness. These include reduction of costs of inputs, 
improving the efficiency of government businesses and raising the productivity of 
infrastructure (Willet 200Q). Evidence has indicated these benefits have started to 
accrue to the Australian Government reform agenda. For example, Australia's annual 
productivity (multi-factor) growth averaged 2.4 percent over the last ten years, a rate 
matched only by Norway among the world's developed nations (Parham 1999). 
Reports of the IMF and OECD have also linked the strength and resilience of the 
Australian economy — including several years of sustained economic growth and 
declining unemployment, with structural reform policies like the NCP (Willet 2000). 
Sometimes governments have applied competitive tendering as a means of 
implementing competitive neutrality, but it is not the only way. Other approaches to 
competitive neutrality include commercialisation and more rigorous accounting 
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procedures (Willet 2000). Where governments choose to use competitive tendering, 
it can bring benefits if it is properly applied. It needs to be said however, that the 
goodness of the outcomes are a function of the efficacy of the process employed. The 
concerns that are expressed relate to the inability of small service providers in the 
bush to compete with big service providers located in larger markets — implying job 
losses in the local area. For example, there have been 'cases of road work being 
tendered out to fly-in-fly-out operators from the city, who cannot provide an on-
going service, but put local people out of work in the meantime' (Willet 2000: 5). 
It should be emphasised that NCP is not a 'one size fit all' approach. The policy 
takes account of the great diversity in Australian local government units — in terms of 
size, organisational structure and service responsibilities, as to how reform should be 
implemented in the best interest of the community. 
In Victoria, for example, compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) preceded the 
NCP. It mandated a phased shift toward 50 percent of all local government 
expenditure being subject to competitive arrangement. The approach in Queensland 
has been gradual, with shifts towards commercial principles matched by measures to 
restrict the erosion of jobs and community capital in local areas. This is a particularly 
important issue for Queensland, where local governments are responsible for more 
services than they are elsewhere in Australia (Dollery and Worthington 2000; Willet 
2000). Queensland has in place an approach reminiscent of commercialisation of 
local government business activities with in-house service providers receiving 
training and skills upgrades to put them in a competitive position with external 
contractors prior to the use of tendering processes. This strategy is improving the 
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efficiency of service provision, and promoting the retention of jobs. Funding for 
these initiatives comes as part of a series of targeted transfers from the state 
government over five years, totalling S150 million (Willet 2000:6). 
In Tasmania and the other states and territories, competitive tendering by local 
government is not compulsory. This partly reflects concerns about its 
implementation particularly in rural areas. The Productivity Commission Inquiry 
identified the key concerns of rural and remote communities as, 
a loss of employment and income within the region; 
a transfer out of the region of equipment, workers and their families; 
the erosion of service quality; and 
a reduction in the ability of local government to meet civil emergencies 
(Productivity Commission 1996: 239). 
The issue of service quality and preference for local suppliers can be specified in 
tender documents. In its submission to the inquiry, the Shire of Yarra Ranges in 
Victoria reported that it managed to balance the benefits of competition with the 
advantages of local supplier preferences. Because of public interest concerns, a road 
maintenance tender of each of two regions in the shire, which was originally awarded 
to an external contractor was reconsidered with the result that the external contractor 
was awarded one region and the in-house team the other (Productivity Commission 
1996: 241). These examples suggest that local governments can and do use 
competitive tendering and contracting. 
Tasmanian local governments have applied NCP principles to varying extends. The 
use of competitive tendering remains voluntary for councils but some municipal 
authorities have sought to employ it as a means to enhance efficiency of service 
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delivery. It is reasonable to believe that those councils who have applied the tenets of 
the NCP to greater extents, and have adopted competition in order to diversify their 
sources of supply, will be the ones that will have favourable environments for the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split. This is because the goals and principles 
preached by the NCP such as separation of policy advice from operational matters, 
and competitive processes, cohere in many respects with those of the purchaser-
provider split. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the purchaser-provider split in respect of its principles, 
goals and the theories and ideas that underpin it. The theoretical benefits of the 
model and the practical limitations of its adoption have been explicated. Essentially, 
the purchaser-provider split advocates the separation of government policy advice 
from its operational responsibilities, and adoption of multiple different forms of 
public service provision through competitive arrangements. These shifts enable the 
devolution of managerial responsibility, establishment of clearer lines of 
responsibility and accountability, matching of resources to defined tasks, and 
assessing agencies on the basis of outputs they produce. Contracts are used not only 
to define relationships between purchasers and providers but also compel the parties 
to act within constrains of the contracts consistent with their differing goals (Street 
1994,; Ryan et al 2000). These changes, the model predicts, will lead to increased 
productivity and quality of product as well as give public service customers value for 
money. 
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These ideas are drawn from public choice theory and agency theory which both 
stipulate that self-interest motivates the behaviour of politicians, bureaucrats and 
contractors, who have divergent goals. Separation between purchaser and provider 
and establishing the rules of engagement realign behaviours for the mutual benefit of 
the parties. The NPM advocates the use of public choice theory and agency theory's 
principles to undergird public sector reform in order to increase that sector's 
efficiency and overcome agency failure. One organisational form of achieving this, 
as suggested by the NPM doctrine, is the purchaser-provider split. 
However, some commentators have questioned the appropriateness of the purchaser-
provider split for the conduct of public business (Street 1994; Ryan et al 2000; 
Siverbo 2004; Dunleavy et al 2006). Although in theory freeing decision-making 
from provider influence, there is little reason to believe that purchasers will be able 
to resolve the question of priority setting. Indeed not to subject decision-making to 
due political process may lead to some unpalatable consequences. Similarly, it is not 
clear whether a purchaser can ever be adequately responsive to its constituents who 
have neither chosen it as a representative nor are able to seek alternative 
representation (Street 1994: 10). The benefits of contractual arrangements remains 
unproven and may not justify the administrative and, perhaps qualitative, costs of 
their adoption. Finally, while technical and allocative efficiency reasons are often 
cited in promotion of the purchaser-provider split, this prediction hardly materialises 
in practice. This is demonstrated by the phasing out of the split's quasi market 
mechanisms in the Italian National Health Service due to fiscal stress (Anessi-
Pessina et al 2004) and the failure to reduce waiting list in healthcare system in the 
UK (Street 1994; Dunleavy eta! 2006). 
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The purchaser-provider model in local government has been illustrated to show the 
conflict of interests that may exist between budget maximising departmental heads, 
and profit maximising private contractors on the one hand, and budget constraining 
council chief executive officer on the other. The mechanisms used to minimise 
agency costs and align agents' interests with those of the principal such as contracts, 
incentive structures and monitoring regimes have been highlighted. 
The main tenets of the NCP have been sketched and their implications for local 
government have been explicated. It has been made clear that the NCP does not 
mandate competition, privatisation or the contracting out of government services. 
What the NCP requires is competitive neutrality which involves governments 
reviewing how their businesses engage in commercial activities to ensure fair 
competition between public and private businesses (Tasmanian Government 1996; 
Felmingham and Page 1996; Wallet 2000). This implies optimum use can be made of 
scarce resources, bringing benefits to both councils and ratepayers. 
The implementation of the NCP in local government has created a favourable 
environment for the introduction of the purchaser-provider split. This is because 
some of the principles and goals of the NCP cohere with those of the purchaser-
provider split such as role clarification, clear lines of accountability, transparent 




LOCAL GOVERNMNT REFORM IN AUSTRALIA 
The broadening of the responsibilities of municipal government to include a far 
wider range of roles and functions in supporting and servicing its communities, 
epitomises the significant changes and challenges that that sphere of government has 
been subjected to during the past two decades. This period has seen the most 
significant change in almost one and a half centuries of formal local government in 
the Australian political system. Traditionally, the Commonwealth and state 
governments have tended to treat local government as a vehicle from which they 
could deliver some of their services to local residents without fully appreciating or 
recognising its accountability to the communities it serves. There was hesitancy by 
federal and, particularly state governments, to share power and authority with local 
government. The restrictive nature of local government's revenue base and the 
uncertainty of specific payments from upper tiers of government have served as a 
disincentive or deterrent for many councils to broaden their responsibilities beyond 
their traditional property-related services. Local governments have frequently 
complained of a lack of consultation by central governments during the development 
of policies and programs as well as during the actual implementation of a program 
within the community. This has generally been seen as the imposition of central 
control over the aspirations of local communities. 
Arguably, however, local government has much to offer federal and state 
governments. It is a stable, established and fully accountable organisational structure, 
which covers virtually all permanently, settled parts of the nation. It offers flexibility 
to local needs, all of which are essential ingredients in the implementation of national 
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and state policies. The Commonwealth and state governments have realised that 
virtually no activity could be carried out successfully in the communities without the 
involvement of local government. Local government reforms have therefore been 
compelled from the centre (specifically by the states) for two reasons. First, upper 
levels of governments discovered that local authorities were keen to assume 
leadership roles and responsibility for the overall development of the local areas. 
Second, they realised that a well functioning and effective local government system 
was inextricably linked to the good performances of national and state governments. 
The Commonwealth government encouraged the changes because it saw it as an 
opportunity to implement some of the elements of its microeconomic reform agenda 
at the local level. The national microeconomic reform, which was already being 
implemented at the upper levels of government, was aimed at ensuring the highest 
possible levels of efficiency through programs of management reform, targeting 
better use of resources, and productivity increases to enable more to be done with 
less. Many states instigated reform programs or processes for local government 
reforms in part because they were considered important in improving the dismal 
nature of state government finances. Local governments were receptive to the 
reforms because they were regarded as necessary to overcome the problems of 
limited autonomy and a lack of power of general competence that were hampering 
the efficient and effective discharge of their responsibilities. 
This chapter first looks at the wider context of public sector reform and then reviews 
the changes that have taken place in Australian local government. It notes the 
varying degrees to which the individual aspects of the reform agenda (legislative, 
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structural, managerial, and microeconomic) have been applied across states, as well 
as the differing levels of successes and failures that attended them. This analysis is 
done to indicate the complexity of issues now confronting local government, 
including the many difficulties it faces in not only supporting its local communities 
but also establishing a wider role for itself as distinct from responding to the role 
which central governments pass to it. 
Public sector reform initiatives in Australia 
Since the early to mid 1980s, the quest for smarter as well as smaller governments 
has prompted many countries to institute major public sector reforms. In Britain, the 
"Next Step" initiative has profoundly overhauled the structure and operations of 
much of the civil service. In Australia, far reaching financial management reforms 
have been promulgated and machinery of government changes have occurred at the 
federal, state and local government levels. And in the US, the Clinton administration 
had made the quest for a government that 'works better and costs less' one of its 
highest-ranking public policy agendas (Boston et al 1997). Although the rhetoric 
might have varied around the world, most of the contemporary efforts at 
governmental re-invention, restructuring, and renewal have shared similar goals - 
improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the public sector, enhance the 
responsiveness of public agencies to their clients and customers, reduce public 
expenditure, and improve managerial accountability. The choice of policy 
instruments had also been remarkably similar: commercialisation, corporatisation, 
and privatisation, the devolution of management responsibilities; a shift from input 
controls to output and outcome measures, tighter performance specification; and 
more extensive contracting out. The one label that is used to describe all these 
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processes of change is "New Public Management" (Osborne and Gaebler 1993; 
Aucoin 1996; Hood 1991; Lane 2000). 
The Australian model of public sector reform is informed by the ideas, principles and 
practices underpinning "managerialism" or the new public management. The reform 
program was heralded by numerous inquiries in the mid 1970s into the whole 
operations of the public service. These rounds of inquiries commenced with the 
South Australian inquiry (Corbett) from 1973 to 1975. It was followed by state 
inquiries in New South Wales (Wilenski), Victoria (Bland), Tasmania (Cartland) 
and, at the Commonwealth level, by the Royal Commission into Australian 
Government Administration (RCAGA), usually referred to as the Coombs 
Commission, the most thorough of all (see Appendix 1 for a list of the inquiries). It 
was set up by the Whitlam government but did not report until 1976, by which time 
the government had changed. The Fraser government instituted its own inquiries, 
notably the Review of Commonwealth Administration (Hughes 1998: 374). 
At the Commonwealth level, the various inquiries had different points of focus. The 
Coombs Commission examined almost every aspect of public administration, and 
was well funded, with a large research staff. Its focus was more on the social and 
political dimensions of administration, but this was perhaps a function of the 
particular reformist times. The Fraser government's Reid Report was of a totally 
different kind. It was a narrow report which had to be completed quickly, and 
concentrated on the managerial aspects of the administration. Although described as 
rather pallid (Brugger and Jaensch 1985), the Reid Report contained numerous 
prescriptions which were subsequently implemented by the Hawke government. 
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Even though the inquiries occurred in the 1970s, substantial reforms did not take 
place until the 1980s. 
Reasons for reform 
Four factors explain why the 1980s has been described as the decade of change in 
public administration in Australia (Hughes 1998: 374). First, government 
experienced severe resource constraint in the late 1970s, as tax revenue declined in 
relative terms. Good political judgement dictated that no cuts should be made in 
actual service delivery to the public. That in turn meant that the public service had to 
be rationalised in an attempt to manage the sector, or even expand the range of 
functions, with less money and fewer staff (Hughes 1998: 374). 
Second, the 1980s witnessed greater changes of government. Unprecedented in the 
history of Australia the government of every state and commonwealth changed hands 
at least once. The new governments unleashed numerous ideas on how to change the 
public service. One of the features of the impulse towards public sector reform was 
that the imperative emanated from the political leadership, rather than the public 
service itself. While there may be some differences of detail, the new governments, 
irrespective of party-and in indeed, parties in opposition - have generally agreed on 
the kinds of changes to be effected (Hughes 1998: 374). Third, and most obvious at 
the commonwealth level, was an explicit connection between the improvements of 
public sector management and re-structuring the national economy. The last point is 
that the concern with the big size and continuous growth of government made the 
case for re-structuring and reform compelling (Hughes 1998). Today, the impulse 
towards the standard bureaucratic solution to problems is less appealing. Australian 
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governments have shown commitment to experiment with other solutions, such as 
down sizing the public service, privatising, corporatising, or the elaborate application 
of contracts for government work. The general distaste for bureaucratic inertia has 
implied less political costs in cutting back on the size and role of the public service. 
The above reasons motivated or rather compelled, the Commonwealth Government 
along with some states to implement various managerial reforms. The aim of these 
changes was to improve the management of the public service and bring it in line 
with international best practice, which was in vogue at the same time. On the 
occasion of the establishment of the Reid Inquiry in 1982, Prime Minister Fraser 
noted, the 'government believes there is a question whether the public service, as 
presently organised, has the management tools, the flexibility and the capacities to 
meet the challenges that presently exist and that lie ahead'. He added that, 
'Departments and authorities must be able not only to meet the demands of today, 
but also to anticipate the demands of tomorrow' (Australian Government 1983: 131). 
Similar views coloured the reflections of Peter Reith, the Minister Assisting the 
Prime Minister for the Public Service when he observed that despite improvements 
over the years, the challenge of public service reform still remained substantial and 
urgent. He explained that the shortcomings were immediately apparent in the 
complex army of outdated, rigid and cumbersome regulations, which were not the 
making of the public servants. The root of the problem, he identified, was systemic. 
The culture of the Australian public service, he said, did not sufficiently promote 
high performance or drive innovation, and the important contributions of individual 
public servants were often overlooked or stifled by process and unnecessary 
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regulations. He added that there was evidence of a lack of collective vision amongst 
its leadership. Reith concluded that management remained cautious and conservative 
(Reith 1981). 
In 1987, Prime Minister Hawke stated that reforms to the public service had two 
objectives. First, it was envisioned to enhance ministerial control over day-to-day 
management. Second, with greater freedom to manage, departments are in a better 
position to demonstrate their success in achieving the dual aims of increased 
efficiency and financial savings (Australia Parliament 1987). 
On his part, Prime Minister Howard in presenting the Garan Oration to the Institute 
of Public Administration, Australia, in November 1997 reiterated the necessity of the 
ongoing reforms and his government's commitment to stay the course. He said 'the 
public sector must continue its progress towards being a modern, flexible institution 
whose administrative practices measure up to the best in the nation and the world' 
(Howard 1997: 4). Mr Howard added that: 
Already it can claim success in implementing reform at a pace, and with a 
substance, that compare with the public sectors of many western 
democracies. This is not a particularly recent trend. Change did not start in 
March 1996 (when the Howard government came to office). I have 
commented on several occasions that the public service I found in 1996 was, 
in many of its operations, markedly improved on the service I had known in 
the 1970s and early 1980s. The budgetary and financial systems have been 
streamlined, and there is a greater emphasis on results in place of the past 
concentration on process and inputs. Central agencies exercise far less control 
over the staffing and finances of other agencies, so that the public servants 
managing programs are clearly responsible for performance. There is more 
competition in the delivery of programs both within the public service and 
outside. And there is vastly more interest shown in delivering high quality 
service to the public (Howard 1997: 4). 
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Prime Minister Howard's statement is instructive in two important respects. First, he 
observed that many of the reforms adopted over the years enjoyed bipartisan support; 
he is impressed with the reforms, which have brought about greater flexibility and 
more emphasis on results, although he conceded many reforms still have some way 
to go, and to push them through, he pledged his government's commitment. Second, 
he is concerned to represent the various initiatives as an integrated package of 
reforms enabling new public management to develop. 
The managerial paradigm embodies, according to Hood seven main ideas. These 
include hands-on professional management in the public sector; explicit standards of 
performance; greater emphasis on output controls; shift to disaggregation of units in 
the public sector; shift to greater competition; stress on private sector styles of 
management practice; and emphasis on greater discipline and parsimony in resource 
use (Hood 1991: 3-19). 
Since the political leadership initiated the change it was not difficult to spread the 
gospel of reform among the three levels of government. As a political reform agenda, 
the Commonwealth and most state governments redesigned cabinet processes to 
reinstate ministerial control, and reconstituted the senior levels of the public service 
as executive service. This political agenda was often intertwined with a managerial 
agenda, which demanded the modernisation of public services through improvements 
in organisational design and management practice. Hence, the congruence of the 
Australian reform effort with the tenets of the new public management as put 
forward by Hood (1991). The reform process had the ambition of taking on board all 
the aspects of the new public management even though implementation started with 
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the move to disaggregation and the shift to contracting. But as the reform gathered 
momentum, all the various elements have to some degree been applied in Australia. 
Hands-on professional management means senior managers would themselves be 
responsible for the achievement of results rather than being administrators following 
someone else's instructions. Several nations, particularly the UK, Canada and 
Denmark, in line with hands-on professional management, are experimenting with a 
new definition of a government 'agency' by giving managers more operating 
flexibility in exchange for greater accountability to performance (Kettl 1996). In 
Australia this took the form of the devolution of more managerial powers to 
departmental heads. The one effect this has had is that the relationship between the 
politician and the manager has become more fluid and closer than before. Public 
managers are now involved in matters of policy and will pay with their jobs if 
something went terribly wrong. Public management has become a form of political 
management and the relationship with political leaders has changed. Of course, 
politicians still have the final say, but the unrealistic separation of policy-making 
from administration has been finally discarded. Some of the elements of the 
management reform that occurred in Australia are examined in turn below. They 
include workplace changes, institutional disaggregation, new contractualism and 
financial management changes 
Workplace changes —position reclassification 
At the Commonwealth government level, the title "permanent head" was replaced by 
"departmental secretary" and has become "Chief Executive Officer" under the 
Howard government. The shifts in title signalled the dawn of new realities of life at 
the top. In Victoria all but three of the individuals holding these offices were 
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replaced in the first four years of the Cain government (Laffin 1987) and the same 
happened when the Kennett government gained power in 1992. At the 
Commonwealth level the inception of the Howard government witnessed the 
dismissal of six departmental secretaries and the resignation of seven others. The 
shake up at the top is a clear indication that the tenure of departmental secretaries is 
no longer a permanent phenomenon. Today high-profile managers are often 
appointed to head departments or agencies. They are usually appointed on short-term 
contracts, have management backgrounds and are employed to get results. They are 
also public figures in a way not previously considered normal for public servants. 
Frequently they seem to prefer working for one party. 
The managerial revolution has also brought about a clear shift away from position 
classification at the next layer of senior management towards flexibility in 
arrangements for filling senior positions. The Senior Executive Service (SES) has 
replaced the former second division. This implies more than a mere change of name. 
The SES concept is aimed at developing a pool of senior managers who can be 
transferred readily between positions and departments, who are trained for senior 
management and who can develop an SES identity rather than a departmental one 
(Hughes 1998). All positions are advertised and open to applicants from outside the 
service. For example, Senior Executive Service (SES) vacancies in 1992/93 included 
17 percent that were filled by outside appointments. And of the new Senior Officer 
Grade Cs in 1991/92, twenty one percent were outside appointments, compared with 
8 percent in 1986/87 (Public Service Commission 1994: 12). 
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The proclamation of the Public Service Reform Act 1984 (Pusey 1991) reduced the 
number of job classifications, and gave managers the power to hire and fire 
(Schwartz 1994). This was Prime Minister Fraser's initiated legislation that curtailed 
union power, reduced appeal rights, weakened tenure and, inter alia, initiated a 
process which ended the separate public sector industrial relation jurisdiction. The 
Hawke government, especially in its streamlining legislation of 1986, sealed this 
policy shift (Nethercote 1996). Inefficient staff is now dismissed quickly, with 
protection against arbitrary or politically motivated dismissal. In 1983/84, only 0.2 
percent of those leaving the public service were retrenchments; in 1992/93 it was 34 
percent (DoFA 1993). 
Institutional disaggregation 
Institutional disaggregation was not pursued vigorously in the earlier managerial 
reforms in Australia but it pervaded forcefully as the reform process went underway. 
It is likely that future public service in Australia will be very different from the past, 
with a relatively small public sector for contracting. The United Kingdom has 
uncoupled three-fourths of its civil service, while in New Zealand the percentage is 
about 90 percent (United Kingdom 1998). The report that proposed the executive 
agency model and led to the restructuring of the British system continued in this 
vein, arguing for an increasing separation of responsibilities as necessary to improve 
the management of government operations (United Kingdom 1998). This has been 
emulated by Australia, as institutional disaggregation is now a feature of public 
administration. For example, in 1997 the Commonwealth Service Delivery Agency 
began operating on a contractual basis to deliver services for the Departments of 
Social Security, Health and Family services, and Employment, Educational Training 
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and Youth Affairs. Disaggregation also resulted in the gradual hiving off of some 
operational activities of departments to separate agencies. 
This institutional disaggregation also saw Treasury lose a large part of its influence 
over other departments. The 1976 split of Treasury into Treasury and the Department 
of Finance meant that monitoring of departmental programs is now the role of 
Finance. Departments are expected to be more managerially responsible subject to 
Finance oversight. Treasury is now concerned less with departments and more with 
macro-economy, although it does have the productivity and Australian Competition 
and Consumer Commission within its ambit (Hughes 1998). For the most part, 
however, the operating assumption under successive Labor Governments (1983 — 
1996) was 'where there is considerable discretion at the operational level and the 
success of the policy depends heavily on how it is implemented, it is most desirable 
that policy advice and programme delivery be integrated' (Keating 1993: 11). 
New contractual ism 
The "new contractualism" became more fashionable in Australia in the 1990s, 
particularly following the election of the Howard government. Contractualism 
espouses that almost any conceivable government service can be provided by 
contract, either externally through private or voluntary sector providers, or internally 
with other parts of government. An integral part of this arrangement is the emphasis 
placed on individual performance contracts for staff, contracts with the minister and 
the government as a whole, and contracts in the form of "charters" with clients and 
the public as a whole (Hughes 1998: 387). Contractual relationships in the 
management of public services are not novel, especially in the case of the 
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relationships between government and the commercial private sector (Purchase and 
Hirshhorn 1994; Trebilock 1994). What is relatively new however, is the extent to 
which contractual relationships have been extended across government in order to 
establish service standards, to apply performance measures, and to impose 
demanding and transparent reporting and accountability regimes (OECD 1994). 
It was common for most of the last century for roads for example, to be built by the 
government through the use of government day labour. It was the tradition in the 
1970s for roads to be actually built by contractors under the supervision of 
government engineers. While this is still the case, it is also becoming common for 
the private sector to manage an entire project — referred to sometimes as "BOOT", 
meaning 'build, own, operate, transfer' — paid for by tolls (for example, the Sydney 
Habour tunnel, other freeways in Sydney and the City Link project in Melbourne). 
Private operators do everything under explicit contracts with the government and 
recoup their costs and profits over a lengthy period, more than 30 years in the case of 
City Link (Hughes 1998). Today contracts are commonplace with suppliers of 
services, contracts with staff, contracts between agencies, service agreements. 
Financial management changes 
In 1984, the implementation of the Financial Management Improvement program 
and its subsidiary, Running Costs System and Program Budgeting (Schwartz 1994), 
would appear to be a direct result of the new emphasis on 'management for results', 
with the focus on outputs and outcomes rather than inputs and procedures (Hughes 
1998). The Commonwealth government annually publishes a nineteen-volume set of 
lengthy and detailed program performance statements that relate expenditures with 
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program performance (Breul 1996). Breul (1996) observes that Australian program 
officials are accountable for the performance of their programs as the annual work 
plans link program objectives and the performance agreements on which ministry 
officials are evaluated. 
In a testimony before the US Senate Governmental Affairs Committee on 5 May 
1992, the Deputy Director for Management of the US Office of Management and 
Budget (OMB) judged Australia to be 'at the leading-edge in performance 
management' (Breul 1996: 77). He noted that Australia had a well-developed system 
that encompassed strategic or corporate planning, annual work plans and 
performance reporting as well as program evaluation. Program objectives were 
defined, along with strategies for achieving them. Performance indicators were used 
in assessing how well the strategies had achieved the objectives (Breul 1996). 
However, as Shand (1990) pointed out, spurious output or performance indicators are 
easy to obtain; good ones are much more difficult. This difficulty explains why there 
is a tendency to favour easily quantifiable measures such as output, or workload, or 
process indicators to the neglect of the real, less tangible goals of public policy, such 
as effectiveness indicators, those that measure the degree of success in attaining 
program objectives (Corbett 1996). At least two Australian examples of bias 
produced by indicators can be cited. Kellow observes that, 
the tendency for public housing agencies to measure success in terms of 
housing units constructed, completely ignoring the fact that, since these 
dwellings are often on ill-chosen sites and of designs as inappropriate as the 
high-rise ghettoes which litter Melbourne, the real, rather less tangible goals 
of public housing policies might have been harmed rather than advanced 
(Kellow 1990: 70). 
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Another example is the inadequacy of the 'tax gap ratio' used by the Australian 
Taxation Office in the measurement of compliance by taxpayers. By concentrating 
on this indicator it loses track of the more subtle dimensions of the changes its long-
range strategy seeks to bring about, that is attitudinal changes in communities, which 
are not all to be gauged by monitoring simple indicators (Corbett 1996: 175). 
Allocating funds and staff to programs gives a better indication of cost-effectiveness 
and, in times of resource shortage, which programs can be cut. This gives the higher 
levels in the department and the ministry better information on what government is 
actually spending its money on and where the costs fall, and it allows for more 
precision in deciding where to make cuts (Hughes 1998). The previous system of 
budgeting was precise in a control sense but, in practice, government had little 
information on actual program delivery. 
Microeconomic reform 
Microeconomic reform has also been launched to go in tandem with managerial 
reform. Indeed microeconomic reform has now become an important part of public 
policy-making in Australia and its effect has touched on virtually all aspects of 
contemporary Australian life. Fosyth (1992: 5) referred to it as increasing real 
income from available inputs to allow higher consumption and a raised standard of 
living. He contends that higher incomes can increase the range, quality and quantity 
of goods to better meet people wants. This implies microeconomic reform is 
primarily concerned with efficient production and efficient distribution. 
For Felmingham and Page (1996: 26) microeconomic reform is a process of 
restructuring the economy's institutions so that competitive market principles are 
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applied to the utilisation of the resource base. In general the ownership of the 
resource base does not matter and the principles of microeconomic reform apply 
equally to government enterprises (GBEs) or related services at all levels and also to 
private enterprise subject to government competition or regulation. The object is 
always to increase output and improve quality in a cost-effective manner. According 
to Felmingham and Page (1996) the goals of microeconomic reform are realised 
through: 
• the maximasation of productive efficiency via internal reorganisation or 
exposing current activities to competition; 
• pricing reforms which bring prices closer to cost structures (allocative 
efficiency); and 
• regulatory reform which reduces regulation to a necessary minimum. 
The above goals of microeconomic reform and the strategies for achieving them are 
the very ones the tenets of the Hilmer report and the National Competition Policy 
(NCP) seek to promote. The Hilmer report issued from the proceedings of the 
Independent Committee of Inquiry, National Competition Policy Review and the 
report was entitled National Competition Policy. The Hilmer recommendations were 
adopted by the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) on 11 April 1995. These 
recommendations then formed the basis of the NCP based on Hilmer findings. 
It is important to summarise the elements of the Hilmer Report and the tenets of the 
NCP in order to determine their implications for Australian governments. The 
Hilmer Report focused on six aspects: the extension of the gamut of Trade Practices 
Act; reform of regulations which restrict competition; removing or limiting the 
137 
exercise of public sector monopoly power; allowing access to infrastructure; 
fostering competitive pricing; and achieving a "level playing field" in competition 
between government and private sector business (Felmingham and Page 1996: 27). 
The key elements of the NCP reduce to the following: 
• there should be provision for prices oversight of GBE's pricing strategies; 
• competitive neutrality should be the cornerstone of competition between 
GBEs and private competition; 
• public sector monopolies should be reformed; 
• legislation should be reviewed to remove barriers in competition; 
• third parties should be allowed access to public sector infrastructure 
(Felmingham and Page 1996: 28) . 
As noted in chapter three, there are several important implications of the Hilmer 
recommendations and the NCP for all levels of government. The oversight of prices 
is now under the jurisdiction of the Commonwealth and the individual state 
mechanisms. The consequences this has had are broadly two. First, it has made 
pricing cost reflective where this has not been the case. Second, it has guaranteed an 
appropriate form of price discounting for disadvantage and disability. The 
application of competitive neutrality for government business undertaking implied: 
the removal of taxation advantages through taxation equivalents; the removal of debt 
guarantees; and resolution of the question regarding cross-subsidisation of certain 
business activities from other components of government enterprise. The in-house 
tenderer is now in equal competitive standing, at least in theory, against the private 
competitor for government programs (Felmingham and Page 1996). The NCP has 
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promoted practices such as compulsory competitive tendering (CCT) and cross 
border tendering. 
The review of anti-competitive legislation was to remove legislation (deregulation) 
in some jurisdictions, while in others it entailed uniform or revised regulation (re-
regulation). The motive of this aspect of NCP was to eliminate barriers to effective 
competition, in particular those barriers that represented additional cost (Felmingham 
and Page 1996). The NCP took into account the substantial community service 
obligations of local government in comparison with federal and state tiers of 
governments. This recognition allowed local government to carry out public interest 
test that distinguished unwarranted from warranted protective legislation. With 
regard to the issue of access to publicly owned assets, the effect is much wider at the 
levels of state and Commonwealth governments than at the sphere of local 
government. 
Much of microeconomic reform places emphasis on the efficiency of government 
organisations, not only because they constitute a significant proportion of the 
national economy, but also because government charges and taxes are a substantial 
part of business costs. The concern with the efficiency of government has prompted 
many policy analysts and theorists to prescribe antidotes to agency failure in the 
form of an interlocking pattern of principal-agent relationships. Three types of 
enterprise reform have been launched to deal with agency failure. These embrace 
changing ownership (including privatisation), increasing competition, and 
overhauling performance guidelines and controls (Domberger 1992: 168). All these 
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entailed major governmental re-structuring to split large bureaucratic institutions into 
single-mission, identifiable and manageable entities. 
This reorganisation allows for swift devolution of managerial responsibility and the 
establishment of clear lines of accountability. Providers of services can then be held 
accountable to single principals, resources can be matched to defined tasks, and 
agency failure can be addressed by shifting from control of inputs to monitoring 
outputs. The concept of contractualism, in which contracts define relationships, 
terms of trade, and specified outputs of managers and agencies, is embedded in this 
structure (Dollery eta! 1997). 
Microeconomic reforms that occurred in Australia conform to international practice 
and the prescriptions of the NCP. For example, there have been improvements in the 
efficiency of the general government sector, the introduction of new standards of 
performance and accountability for government business enterprises, and a greater 
effort to reduce overlaps between the three levels of government in areas such as 
electricity, rail transport and communication (Filmer and Dao 1994: 3). Other 
significant changes that occurred from 1983 to 1993 included: deregulation of the 
financial markets, the abolition of interest rates and exchange controls, and opening 
banking to new entry; reductions in tariff levels and other forms of assistance; broad 
ranging reform of the transport and communication industries; rationalisation of 
business regulation, and reductions in company tax; and labour market reforms, such 
as moves towards enterprise-bargaining (Filmer and Dao 1994: 3). 
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The most benefit from public sector reform will be derived from the Commonwealth 
and state government sectors, because they are much larger than local government. 
The reforms to date have largely focused on Commonwealth and state government. 
Local government, however, has not been immune, and it is the changes that have 
occurred at this sphere that are examined in the subsequent sections. 
Reform in the local government sector 
Local government has not been exempt from the pressures that have driven and are 
driving change at the commonwealth and state government levels. Over the past 
decade or more Australian local government has been subjected to drastic policy-
induced changes which have substantially changed its nature and form. Caddick 
(1996: 8-12) identified seven substantial "pressures for change" operating on local 
government in Australia. 
First, national competition policy has had a significant impact on local government. 
It has witnessed statutory appointments removed and more importantly, competitive 
neutrality introduced, which sought to generate "a level playing field" when public 
sector organisations compete with private sector firms. 
Second, wider scope of responsibilities brought to the fore the imperative for cutting 
edge managerial skills. In general both the National Review of Local Government 
Labour Markets and the Hilmer Report signalled the need for the professional bodies 
to review their working relationships, accreditation standards, membership categories 
and professional development activities (Caddick 1996: 10). 
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Third, renewed national focus on the meaning of governance has led to a re-
evaluation of the aims and functions of local government and its relationship to 
citizens. One result of this has been an emphasis on improved service delivery to 
local government's constituents. 
Fourth, there is an associated trend that is related to the changing nature of 
citizenship in contemporary Australia. This new view has generated a debate about 
participation in governance generally and participation in local government in 
particular. Although no consensus has yet been reached, it is clear that the 
relationship between local government and its citizens is still in a state of evolution. 
Fifth, devolving additional responsibilities to local government profoundly changed 
the role of elected representatives in local government. Councillors must now 
function in a much more complex and demanding environment, which calls for more 
sophisticated policy forming and decision-making skills. 
Sixth, Caddick (1996) identified the emergence of the concept of a particular 
purchaser-provider split. In essence, this separates the co-located roles of 
government as provider of services from its role as producer/purchaser of services. 
The split still leaves the overall responsibility for public service provision in the 
hands of government, with options to outsource or invite external agencies to 
compete with in-house units for their delivery. One often cited advantage of this split 
is that it enables the management of the organisation to focus more on key strategic 
issues of determining the mix and standard of services they wish to provide for their 
communities (Walsh 1991a: 135). 
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Compulsory competitive tendering (CCT), even though not a mandatory policy tool 
for local governments under the NCP, has by force of law been embraced by some 
councils and voluntarily and cautiously applied by others. Benchmarking and 
performance measures have also been devised to assess implementation processes 
and outcomes of the purchaser-provider split. These measures aimed at identifying 
the capacities of local government in order that they may be compared with "best 
practice". This is envisioned to guide practitioners in policy-making capacities in 
local government in the targeting of problem areas and the fashioning out of 
workable solutions to them. Caddick sees municipal amalgamation or "restructure" 
as an additional reform measure for achieving efficient and effective conduct of local 
government business. 
Two waves of reform 
Gerritsen (1996: 33) distinguished two waves of reform within local government 
over the past three decades. The first wave was ushered in 1973 and some of its 
aspects are still at various stages of implementation. Gerritsen (1996: 33) summarises 
the first wave of local government reform as consisting of myriad of structural, 
economic, legislative and industrial shifts that were embarked upon in the 1970s and 
still working through. The reform embraced: changes in the public and private 
sectors (award restructuring, enterprise bargaining and national training reform); the 
consideration of constitutional reforms at both national and state levels; the 
introduction of new local government legislation at the state, territory and federal 
levels; commercialisation; and boundary changes and amalgamation. For Australian 
local governments this first wave of innovation set out to reshape their internal 
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practices, their modes of service delivery and their jurisdictional boundaries 
(Gerritsen 1996: 33). 
Gerritsen discerned that the first wave of reform did not deliver on all of the 
expectations of the increasingly demanding public service customers, citizens and 
stakeholders. He therefore looked to a second wave to fill the void. The second wave 
had emphasis on the following: 
• a stronger emphasis on regionalism, and cooperation between agencies at this 
level. Such cooperation is important, he notes, for improving outcomes in 
economic development, social justice and environmental quality; 
• an increased capacity of local and regional agencies, primarily by improving 
the strategic management and human resource capacity of those agencies; 
• an increased focus on ethical governance and the effectiveness of policy 
making; and 
• adequate financial and information resources to implement the first three 
(Gerritsen 1996: 34). 
From the above distinction, it is reasonable to characterise the first wave changes as 
reactive and service-oriented, while the second wave of reform can be described as 
more dynamic and anticipatory in their approach to effecting a transformation of the 
economy, society and the environment. In addition, the second wave will enfold 
'new trans-jurisdictional approaches to problem solving and an holistic analytical 
policy-making culture' (Gerritsen (1996: 34). 
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Commonwealth governments of whatever complexion encouraged, while the state 
governments instigated local government reform because of the belief that there is 
virtually no aspect of modern society that can be tackled without involving local 
government. For example, not long after it assumed office, the new Howard 
government sought to give fresh impetus to the ongoing reform of Australian local 
government. The statement of the sector minister put the point being made here into 
perspective. The then Commonwealth Minister for Local Government, Mr Warwick 
Smith indicated in his address to the National General Assembly of the Australian 
Local Government Association on 3 December 1996 that all governments must 
'anticipate and react to continual change and respond to rising pressures from the 
community, business and government sectors to improve efficiency and effectiveness 
of their services. Local government is no exception' (Smith 1996: 1). 
The Minister went further to identify the nature of the reforms envisaged by the 
Commonwealth government. These included regulatory reform, benclunarking and 
performance indicators, competitive tendering and contracting, competition policy, 
and restructuring. Not only has the Commonwealth government pursued these 
policies vigorously, but it has also added significant new reform programs such as 
workplace reform. 
The major reforms that have occurred at the local government level included 
legislative, managerial, structural and organisational, as well as microeconomic. 
These reforms in many respects echo attempts to improve federal and state 
government services and represent a response to federal and states initiatives. These 
reforms are now examined in turn. 
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Competitive tendering and competitive neutrality 
The national microeconomic reform program, an element of the first wave of reform, 
has had significant consequences for local government, and councils are now 
undergoing unprecedented change in an effort to become more efficient. The reforms 
were informed by the Hilmer recommendations and the NCP and their 
implementation has had significant consequences for business enterprises in general, 
and local government enterprises in particular. 
Compulsory Competitive Tendering (CCT) emerged and first found expression in 
Victoria local government. Essentially, CCT seeks to expose municipal services to 
market-based competition in order to enhance their efficiency. The pace of the 
adoption and implementation of the principles outlined in the Competition Principles 
Agreement (CPA), which the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) adopted 
on 11 April 1995, vary across states. Even though NCP and CPA do not make the 
adoption of CCT mandatory, more state governments throughout Australia are bent 
on encouraging or even compelling local governments to apply it. Enabling acts have 
facilitated the adoption and implementation of CCT in Victoria. Issuing from the 
various acts, targets for the introduction of CCT, whereby agencies are required to 
introduce CCT to specified services or specified expenditure, and competitive 
neutrality has been mandated. For the former, compulsory targets for expenditure, 
subject to competitive tender were set at 20 percent in 1994/95, 30 percent in 
1995/96, and 50 percent in 1996/97 (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 6). Out of a 
total of 78 councils in Victoria, 88 percent achieved the 1995/96 benchmarks with 
around 37 percent of aggregate operating expenditure (or $940 million) exposed to 
competitive tender. For the latter, councils were required to abide by competitive 
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pricing principles from July 1997. Guidelines on pricing for assisting municipal 
authorities in implementing this policy were issued in May 1997 (NOLG 1997). 
The picture in other states was quite different from the experience of Victoria. The 
reform process was less radical and pressures for the degree of prescription more 
relaxed (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 8; NOLG 1997: 150). According to Kiss 
(1997: 51) Victorian reform experience was unparalleled because the state 
government was 'unconstrained by institutional or political barriers', an advantage 
that accrued from the recent program of structural reform. Local government in New 
South Wales enjoys considerable flexibility and autonomy in applying competition 
policy. Councils however, will be expected to embark upon some reforms in line 
with the practices and operation of private businesses. For example, the power of the 
Independent Pricing and Regulatory Tribunal (IPART) is unambiguously marked out 
to review the pricing practices of local government business activities that can be 
declared monopolies under the separate IPART legislation (New South Wales 
Government 1997; IPART 1998). 
The aspect of competition policy that is stressed in Queensland is significant 
business activities of larger urban councils. The policy at the same time respects the 
autonomy of local government in that it leaves the implementation of reforms in the 
hands of individual councils (Committee for the Economic Development of Australia 
1996). Western Australia on the other hand, puts emphasis on the costs and benefits 
of restrictive legislation at the local level (NOLG 1997: 157). Applying a phased 
review process to year 2000, local laws are reviewed to account for the costs and 
benefits of lack of competition. A public benefit test is also being used to large 
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business activities. Compulsory competitive tendering has not found taste in Western 
Australian government for the reason that it is inappropriate for many of the state's 
rural areas. A scheduled timetable in Tasmania for the application of full cost 
attribution to all business activities was instituted (NOLG 1997: 159). 
The impacts of compulsory competitive tendering on local government are a mixed 
bag. Evidence gathered in Australia such as that of the Evatt Research Centre (1990: 
62) found that 'there is tentative evidence to suggest that lower cost may be achieved 
in many cases at the expense of service quality'. Aulich (1997) however, observed 
that the potential costs savings in CCT were not as large as expected due to 
transactions costs involved in implementing the reforms. Research evidence from 
Victoria indicated that local authorities found that nearly half of respondents had 
intimated that quality had improved with tendering, with only 22 percent suggesting 
it had not (NOLG 1999). 
While some councils are leaders and others are laggards in the adoption and 
implementation of competitive tendering, local authorities across Australia have 
sought to apply it where practicable. Less obvious or certain is the proposition that 
cost savings and improvements in service quality have accrued from the regime 
(Dollery and Worthington 2000a). The problem is partly blamed on the nature of the 
market in question in terms of the degree of competition and contestability, agency 
costs required to clarify and specify standards of services, and to monitor the 
standards of services delivered, and benefits attributable to other reforms such as 
amalgamation — and part due to limitations in the empirical studies intended to 
measure the extent of efficiency gain (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 9). 
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The inability of CCT to deliver on all its promises has led governments in some 
jurisdiction to conclude that it was no longer the most appropriate tool for delivering 
services economically, efficiently and effectively and so needed to be removed 
(Rogers, 1999: 35). The shift draws attention to a pluralist system of service delivery, 
with some of the options proposed to replace or go in tandem with CCT enfolding 
Best Value regime, Private Finance Initiative (PFI) and Public-Private Partnership 
(PPP) program. For example, the Labour Government of Britain introduced Best 
Value, a performance management tool in the Local Government Act 1999. The Best 
Value regime is concerned with continuous service improvement within local 
authorities. This continuous improvement is to be achieved through: the setting of 
local authority objectives and associated performance measures; the selection of a 
number of service areas to undergo fundamental performance review in that financial 
year; and the publication of those service areas in local performance plan and the 
independent assessment of the process and the outcomes by a designated external 
body (Sullivan, 2002). At the heart of Best Value is the fundamental performance 
review which subjects services to rigorous assessment based on predetermined 
criteria. 
Contracting-out 
Contractual relationships in the management of public services are not new. 
Governments traditionally have used contracting out as a tool for arranging certain 
rather simple services such as catering and cleaning. The new public management 
not only vastly extended the application of contracting out, using this tool in new 
areas such as many kinds of infrastructure as well as education and health care and 
on a much larger scale. The new public management in addition deals with 
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contracting in that is, a practical theory about how government can improve its 
operation through contracting whether the provision is in-house or out-house (Lane 
2000). 
Prior to the advent of competition policy, an appreciable number of Australian 
councils applied contracting out in one form or another (Industry Commission, 1996: 
63). The following information buttresses this point. In 1989 eighty seven percent of 
councils contracted at least one service, with 52 percent contracting out more than 
four. In New South Wales between 70 and 85 percent of councils used contracting 
for refuse collection, sanitation and road and bridge maintenance, and had already 
been doing so in 1988/89, compared to around 50 percent in 1960/61 (Dollery and 
Worthington 2000a: 8). It is revealed in some studies that by the early 1990s some 
10 to 20 percent of total aggregate council expenditure was contracted out, without 
the force of law (Industry Commission 1996: 63). In a 1990 survey, the Evatt 
Research Centre (1990) found that most commonly contracted services (with 
percentage of councils contracting out the selected service in brackets) to be: (i) 
recycling (60%), (ii) household garbage collection (55%), (iii) cleaning of 
kindergarten (42%), (iv) community centres (35%), v) drainage (21%), (vi) road, 
bridge and footpath maintenance (17%), (vii) operation of child care centres (5%), 
(viii) elderly care services (4%), and (ix) social workers (1%). 
Data on the Victoria local government experience under the first year of CCT is 
available. In 1994/95 over half of CCT expenditure was on public works and services 
(roads, drainage and public facilities), followed by approved purchasing schemes, 
environmental services (garbage collection, recycling and street cleaning), 
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administrative and financial services, recreation facilities, and health and welfare 
services (Dollery and Worthington 2000a). The type of services contracted by 
councils however, varies. Evidence indicates that rural councils typically contract out 
professional services such as valuation, engineering and planning services, whilst 
urban councils are more likely to contract out recycling, construction and road 
maintenance (Evatt Research Centre 1990; Industry Commission 1996). 
At the heart of the management challenge associated with contracting out is the fact 
that public servants in the first instance and minister ultimately are expected to be 
accountable for the exercise of public authority, the expenditure of public funds and 
ultimate results of public action. At the same time, public managers are required to 
share considerable discretionary authority over the operation of a public program 
with one or more third parties over whom they have only limited, indirect control. 
Also if contracting activity is too tied down by bureaucratic red tape and procedure, 
the efficiency and effectiveness gains, which are the primary rationales behind the 
activity, may be compromised or undermined in the process. 
Finding the appropriate balance between control and accountability versus autonomy 
and efficiency is made more difficult by the absence of careful case studies of the 
contracting process. In particular, our understanding of how to manage the 
contracting process would benefit enormously from a series of intensive case studies 
of positive experiences with the process. While there is a danger of too easy 
generalisations about "best practices" being drawn from a limited number of 
apparent successes, there is also the opposite problem that available studies tend to 
focus on what has gone wrong. Like all changes introduced into the public sector, 
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contracting out is not a panacea and there is a need to present a balanced picture of 
its benefits and costs. 
Legislative reform 
Australian states have all embarked upon reviews of their local government acts. 
According to Wensing the following features were a common thread until the most 
recent wave of reforms to local government acts: 
• the acts were highly prescriptive about local government's roles and 
functions; 
• local councils were not perceived as the local 'government' of a particular 
defined area, but rather as a vehicle from which various statutory functions 
could be conducted; 
• the acts reflected a state government's view that local government was a 
convenient administrative arrangement to which the state could delegate part 
of its functions; and 
• local governments' strengths and weaknesses derived from the range of 
functions they acquired (and lost) and the extent to which their structures 
remained stable over time (Wensing 1997: 26). 
The role of local government was nothing more than a regulator and steward of 
certain public assets. Local authorities were not seen as bodies with the overall 
responsibility for policy development, strategic planning and direction for 
sustainable social and economic development at the local level. 
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The world is dynamic and so in recent decades the pace and nature of social and 
economic changes have been overwhelming and local government's structures and 
operations were simply outdated. The local government acts were unduly restrictive 
and were inhibiting effective local government. The substantial reviews of states' 
local government acts between 1990 and 1997 were therefore envisioned to enhance 
the power, means and competence of local government to assume a more strategic 
role in local governance in line with the changing times. 
In general, the main objectives of the new local government acts are to reform the 
essential elements of councils' operations: granting them wider general competence 
powers, improving accountability mechanisms, reducing the detailed prescriptions, 
changing council boundaries either by choice or by force of law, and changing 
planning and other delegated powers. The acts generally do not seek to detail the 
day-to-day operations of council organisations (Wensing 1997). 
The legislative changes have also provided the necessary framework for the program 
of microeconomic reform in local government, to improve its performance standards, 
its accountability, and its relation with other spheres of government. The changes 
have also fostered or required a whole-of-community and whole of government 
approach to the governing of local communities (Wensing 1997; Dollery and 
Worthington 2000a). 
The direction and timing of the new acts, and the tenure of existing legislation, are 
not uniform across states. In Victoria, a new local government act was enacted in 
1989 which replaced existing legislation dating back to 1958. Significant _ 
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amendments were subsequently made with the Local Government (Amendment) Act 
1996 and the Local Government (Further Amendment) Act 1997. The former act 
aimed at increasing council accountability through a statement of performance 
targets and attainment, whilst the latter was intended to clarify the roles and powers 
of the chief executive officer in relation to the establishment of an appropriate 
organisational structure and employment arrangement for council staff. New local 
government acts substituted old and obsolete ones in New South Wales, Queensland, 
Western Australia and Tasmania, which had been amended since 1919, 1936, 1960, 
and 1962 respectively. In South Australia a new act superseded the existing 
legislation which had not been changed since 1934 (Dollery and Worthington 
2000a). 
However, it is premature to account for the extent to which the reforms have yielded 
the desired outcomes. The states do not seem to have been very successful in 
coordinating the changes to either the local government acts or the planning systems 
and statutes. In New South Wales, for example, the then president of the NSW 
Division of the Royal Australian Planning Institute publicly expressed regret that in 
introducing a new Local Government Act of 1993, the NSW state government had 
lost an important opportunity to establish a single piece of legislation to control 
development in NSW (Kettle 1993: 7). Some states, indeed have in recent times 
made or are proposing significant changes to their planning statutes, changes that are 




An aspect of the Australian local government reform agenda that has been hotly 
debated is the restructuring or amalgamation of local government jurisdictions. Apart 
from New South Wales, all states have either completed, or were in the process of 
completing, boundary changes during the period of the 1990s. With the notable 
exception of New South Wales and Western Australia, where the numbers of 
councils have marginally increased (by 0.5 and 2.9 percent respectively), this has 
generally entailed reduction in the number of individual local government units in 
each state. The number of municipal authorities in Victoria has reduced by 62.8 
percent since 1990, with reductions of 6.7 percent in Queensland, 41.8 percent in 
South Australia, and 36.9 percent in Tasmania over the same period (Dollery and 
Worthington 2000a). Table 4.1 details the changes in the number of local councils in 
each state from 1910 to 2005. Almost all the process of structural reform has been 
prompted by the state governments, and went in tandem with the financial, 
legislative and corporate governance reform pursued over the same period. 
Despite the fact that the stated objectives for structural reform vary across states, a 
common set of social, political and economic conditions necessitated the wave of 
contemporary amalgamations. The first set of factors put forward includes standard 
public finance arguments for consolidation. Beginning with the economic theory of 
'fiscal federalism' (the division of taxation and expenditure powers among different 
levels of government comprising a federation), the 'correspondence principle states 
that the size of a particular government should correspond to the benefit region or the 
area of the benefit flowing from the goods it provides to its citizens' (Dollery 1997: 
10). 
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The 'benefit region' is likely to vary with the type of public good provided, and will 
accordingly correspond to particular levels of government. This implies that services 
which are nationwide in their benefit incidence (such as defence forces) is 
recommended for provision at the national level, while services with regional 
benefits should be delivered at the regional level. 
Table 4.1: Trends in the number of Australian local governments, 1910 — 2005 
State 
1910 1918 1928 1938 1948 1958 1968 1978 1991 1993 2005 
NSW 324 320 319 299 289 230 244 205 176 178 172 
Vic 206 190 195 196 197 205 210 211 210 205 78 
Qld 164 173 152 144 144 133 131 131 134 132 132 
WA 147 141 147 148 148 147 144 138 138 139 139 
SA 175 184 196 142 143 143 142 132 122 119 68 
TAS 51 50 49 49 49 49 49 49 46 29 29 
NT N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 7 7 
1067 1058 1058 978 970 907 900 866 826 701 625 
Total 
Sources: ABS Commonwealth Year Book; Commonwealth Office of Local Government Financial 
Assistance Database; DOTARS: NOLG: 200-2001-Local Government National Report; Barnes 
(2002) 
Notes: Totals exclude the 104 community, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander and other local 
governing bodies receiving Commonwealth Financial Assistance Grants — 62 in the Northern 
Territory, 32 in Queensland, 6 in South Australia and 3 in NSW; N/A — not applicable. 
Likewise services with local benefits (such as street lights and pavements) should be 
provided at the local level (Dollery 1997: 449). This concept of benefit region 
therefore provides the basis of an optimal community size in the provision of local 
public services. Pressures for amalgamation may therefore spring from the notion 
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that these benefit regions extend or 'spill-over' into the jurisdictions of adjacent local 
councils, combined with arguments concerning the economies of scale and scope 
resulting from large multifunctional jurisdictions Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 
10). However, such spill overs 'do not necessarily provide a case for amalgamation, 
the primary limitation being that local public services vary greatly in their economic 
characteristics, like economies of scale and benefit region' (Dollery and Worthington 
2000a: 10). 
The second set of conditions are concerned largely with the specific context within 
which Australian local government is conducted. Obviously significant changes in 
the demography, employment and infrastructure of local government area have 
rendered many geographically based boundaries increasingly anachronistic (Vince 
1997). Technological and transportation improvements also imply that larger local 
government units are theoretically feasible (Jones 1993). Moreover, the changing 
nature of Australian society has witnessed increased community demands and 
expectations of local government to provide a broader range of community facilities 
and human related services (Vince 1997). Aside these, an appreciable number of 
other factors purported to be adding to the pressures for amalgamation have been put 
forward. These embrace the desire for administrative simplicity accruing from a 
smaller number of councils in the states; bureaucratic attempts at maximising 
perquisites in larger councils; lower costs of representation; access to more diverse 
funding bases; and public choice models of behaviour by both federal and state 
politicians (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 12; Jones 1995; Smith 1996; Vince 
1997; Dollery 1997). 
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The forces driving structural reform in Australian local government, though sporadic, 
are pervasive. The process has been vigorous in the 1990s in line with the general 
program of legislative and microeconomic reform, and cannot be decoupled from the 
pressures for accountability, transparency, effectiveness and efficiency found in this 
program. Pressures for reform have calmed down somewhat in Victoria, South 
Australia and Tasmania after what had been some eighty to ninety years of stubborn 
resistance to reports and recommendations advocating for structural change (Dollery 
and Worthington 2000a). The pressures to amalgamate might exert strongest in 
Western Australia where local government jurisdictions per unit of area and 
population are clearly inconsistent with other states. For example, the total area of 
Western Australia represents a third of the country's land surface; it has 23 percent 
of Australia's councils; but has only 9.6 percent of Australia's population (Dollery 
and Worthington 2000a). However, amalgamations are not likely to yield the 
desirable outcomes for sparsely populated councils in remote areas of Western 
Australia, as well as north- western New South Wales, Western Queensland, and the 
Northern Territory. These caveats notwithstanding, the pervasiveness of the 
amalgamation movement in Australia seems to indicate that objective assessment of 
the benefits of mergers alone did not influence policy development in this direction. 
Other factors including political imperatives were equally or more important 
considerations. 
Three themes are discernible from structural reform agenda in Australian local 
government. First, economies of scale argument for structural reform were advanced 
in all the states. This argument was the main trigger for Victorian reform (Vince 
1997). However, despite the popular literature on the benefits claimed to accrue from 
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council consolidations, some writers observe that, 'economies of scale in 
administrative costs may be achieved up to a point, though there is no consensus on 
when the point of diminishing returns is reached' (Dollery et al 1997: 118). 
Similarly, it is argued that economies of scale may vary across the range of services 
provided at the local level. Burnham et al (1993: 54) for example, contend that larger 
authorities in the case of some services or parts of services, appear to secure 
provision at lower costs than smaller ones, while in other services, smaller authorities 
yielded more cost-effectiveness. They concluded that size may be an important factor 
for some services or parts of services, but not in a way that systematically answered 
the question 'what is the right size of authority to provide a particular service?' 
A second theme is the concept of 'community of interest' that has transcended state 
inquiries during their deliberations. Although recommended in a number of inquiries, 
especially in Queensland, Haward and Zwart (2000) and Witherby and Dollery 
(1997: 119) maintain its validity is open to questioning because it is always possible 
to identify communities of interest that conform to preferred boundary reforms. 
The last theme relate to the scant attention that has been paid to alternatives to 
mergers in structural inquiries (Vince 1997). It is observed for example, that only in 
few states has the concept of "resource sharing" been widely promoted in the course 
of contemporary reform processes (Dollery et al 1997; Dollery 1997) and only in 
New South Wales has regional cooperation been largely embraced. Some writers 
lend support to the adoption of alternatives to mergers. Some of these alternatives 
include inter-authority contracting (Jones 1995; Vince 1997), informal staff and 
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equipment substitution (Vince 1997), resource sharing (Dollery 1997), special 
purpose joint authorities, local area integration just to mention some. 
Managerial reform 
Management reforms in Australia prescribe the modernisation of public services 
through improvements in organisational design and management practices. The 
management paradigm insists that public organisations shift their focus from process 
towards purpose, reorganise their structures around programs and strategy, adopt the 
financial and human resource management approaches of the private sector and the 
de-bureaucratised forms of organisation emanating from there. It is argued that 
modernising the technical skills of the management stratum would thereby transform 
public administration into public 'management' (Ryan 1997). 
Management reforms have taken place in Australian local government following the 
lead of the Commonwealth and the states governments. For example, the Local 
Government Act 1993 of Queensland, informed by the examples of New South 
Wales and Victorian legislation in particular, required Queensland councils to 
appoint a chief executive officer (CEO) (Section 703 of the new statute). This 
necessarily changed the role of the mayor from that of elected CEO to one of 
monitoring the appointed CEO's performance and clarifying as necessary council 
policies and wishes (section 179). Similar changes have also occurred in the other 
states where the appointed general managers' performances are monitored by 
mayors. 
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Some councils nation-wide have restructured by introducing a purchaser-provider or 
funder-provider split designated as either providers of goods and services or 
purchasers of goods and services. Still others have lifted the restrictions as to how 
and to whom services and goods will be provided or how and from whom they will 
be purchased (Aulich 1997; Applied Economics 2004) For example, in Victoria 
councils have adopted the model even though the extent of separation varies 
significantly. At one extreme, one rural council has not only developed strong 
separation processes but has enhanced separation by locating the purchaser side of 
the operations and the provide side in different towns some 40 kilometres apart. By 
contrast, the metropolitan councils have established several specialist units to 
manage the contract process (purchaser side) and to support in-house tenderers 
(provider side), but in most other parts of the organisation the purchaser and provider 
roles are often interchangeable (Aulich 1997:) 142). In Tasmania some councils 
have pursued the purchaser-provider model to the extent that there is now a complete 
disjunction between the client divisions and service delivery — a complete and formal 
separation of policy and implementation (for example, Hobart City Council). Others 
such as the Glenorchy Council have made a more systematic attempt to create a 
program-oriented structure with linkages to the constituent departments and this is to 
be maintained in the new structure. Provider functions will apparently be formally 
integrated within programs; their purpose and rationale will be their contribution to 
the council's overall goals (Ryan 1997). 
Workplace reform 
The imperative for workplace reform emanated from the 1989 National Review of 
Local Government Labour Markets (Dollery and Worthington 2000a). The main 
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objectives of this review embraced: the recommendation of steps to improve the 
supply of skilled labour to meet the needs of local government; identify ways in 
which local government can improve its employment practices so that there are 
better career opportunities; and more meaningful and rewarding jobs and higher 
productivity. The review noted that there were several barriers to employment 
flexibility and efficient personnel management in local government. Major issues 
identified by the review included: lack of training opportunities and a planned 
approach to human resource development; outmoded recruitment, staff development 
and equal employment opportunity practices; inappropriate internal organisation 
structures within local government; few clear career paths due to a large range of job 
classifications and barriers preventing mobility; lack of portability of superannuation 
and other benefits; and government regulation of occupations, in particular, 
legislative requirements for statutory positions. 
According to Martin (1997: 217) the review affected the process of workplace 
reform in local government in two main ways. First, it 'legitimised action by state 
departments of local government for developing strategies concerning human 
resource development, recruitment and staff development process...and determining 
new ways of designing local government organisations away from professional or 
occupational-based structures'. In New South Wales for example, where the pace of 
workplace reform has been most pronounced, a new four-level award for local 
government employees based on skill categories replaced existing awards dealing 
with job classifications. Second, Martin (1997: 217) contends that review of local 
government labour markets 'represents the last national attempt to develop an 
industry level, strategic approach to human resource management'. The long-term 
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goal of this plan, and as agreed by all state and territory ministers for local 
government, is to provide a benchmark with which to assess the extent of workplace 
reform in local government. 
In local government deregulation of labour market occurred in a number of ways. 
First, many restrictive employment strategies have been removed (Dollery and 
Worthington 2000a) and allowed managerial positions to become increasingly 
accessible to professionals other than previously prescribed in statutory positions 
(that is, clerk, engineer, planner, health surveyor). This has led to an increase in 
cross-disciplinary employment within local government, and an increase in the 
number of CEOs from the private sector taking up positions in local government. 
The change however, has not been far reaching as some of the new CEOs have 
stayed for only one term (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 18). Second, the tenure of 
local government employees has altered. For example, in New South Wales, senior 
management staff must be employed under contract with a maximum length of five 
years (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 18). These changes have not only disturbed 
the status quo of security of tenure but it has also drawn a steep learning curve for 
many senior staff of the hitherto life long career local government service. 
Financial reform 
Financial reform is the final component of the reforms in Australian local 
government. Change in the financial sector proceeded in line with the requirements 
of the Australian Accounting Standard, AAS27 Financial Reporting by Local 
Government (1990). This standard was introduced in order to afford local 
governments the opportunity to move from heavily regulated reporting system, based 
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on traditional fund accounting, with emphasis on cash outlays, to a more business-
oriented model grounded in the principles of accrual accounting (Dollery and 
Worthington 2000a; Hughes 2003). 
The prescriptions of the new model are that councils value all assets, account for 
potential expenditures and liabilities, provide for depreciation charges, and 
appropriate adequate funds for the maintenance of assets (NOLG 1992). This has 
entailed the identification, classification, assessment and valuation of all community 
infrastructure and resources by councils. The argument in favour of the adoption of 
AAS27 point to: an expanded concept of accountability (as specified in the general 
program of microeconomic reform); effectiveness in asset management; and 
availability of meaningful information on the full cost of a council's individual 
activities and programs (Bishop 1997: 174). The new accounting system, according 
to Hughes (2003), enables the government's full financial position to be determined, 
and provides a more meaningful comparison of financial inputs to policy outcomes. 
Similarly, the OECD argues that such accounting reforms are 'an important part of 
the process of transforming spenders into managers'; a manager needs to be 
accountable for costs (OECD 1997: 25). In NSW for example, councils are obliged 
to 'report on the condition of physical assets, gaps between that and satisfactory 
levels, how the gaps will be bridged, and how the asset will be maintained at 
satisfactory levels' (Dollery and Worthington 2000a: 19). 
These advantages notwithstanding, the new model has some limitations. Difficulty 
with asset valuation has often been mentioned as one of the impediments to the 
adoption of full-scale accrual accounting. It has also been argued that financial 
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reform and accountability enhancement will be far from complete if measures in a 
concerted fashion are not taken to thoroughly examine financial management 
practices and management processes in local government (Bishop 1997: 188) It is 
also contended that the new accounting model is 'difficult to bring about and, if 
implemented badly, could impose similar rigidity as the traditional model' (Hughes 
2003: 174-5). 
The managerial revolution according to Gyford (1993) represents a fundamental 
challenge to the operation of political judgment in local government decision-
making. His concern is with the potential effect new public management's 'apparent 
rationality' and apolitical nature might have on the autonomy of politicians and their 
relationship with citizens. He contends that local authorities could not be run on 
rational grounds because the nature of resource allocation was inherently political 
and required the ability to operate within and between ranges of interests. Day and 
Klein (1987: 245), argue that the special relationship that exists between politicians 
and citizens can only be achieved through the 'construction of a ...common 
vocabulary', which according to Stewart and Ramson (1988) is provided by 
politicians who speak the common language of citizenship and manifest itself in a 
relationship built on accountability. 
Doogan (1999) and Travers (1993) suggest that local authority officers are actually 
very accomplished at acknowledging the politicised nature of government reform 
and have been effective at constructing their responses in order to adopt to change 
but also to protect certain key interests and values of local government. This is 
supported by Keen and Scase (1998) in their discussion of how far managerialist 
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changes resulted in the 'transformation' of local authority culture. For Pratchett and 
Wingfield (1994) what new public management has done is challenge the operation 
of a public service ethos in guiding decision-making. Their study of local 
government officers revealed that those most exposed to new public management 
modes of operation were more inclined to consider non-traditional values in 
decision-making, such as the prioritisation of outputs over bureaucratic processes. 
However, this change was not universal and nor were 'traditional' values associated 
with local government decision making disregarded by those studied. 
The above exposition on the impacts of new public management should represent a 
learning curve for Australian local governments. For new public management may 
affect the relationship between elected representatives of councils and citizens 
negatively since the common language of citizenship that the elected leaders used to 
assist local people articulate their views and wants and thereafter ventilate them in 
council chambers may be compromised under the management changes. This is 
because the communication and accountability loop which hitherto connected 
citizens directly to political decision makers now positions the contracted CEO and 
their agency in the middle, who may not adequately identify with citizens, and who 
may or may not pass grievances up the chain depending on the implications these 
may have on their business. Moreover, service providers may not be well imbued 
with public service values and norms including ethics in the administration of public 
services. Mechanism should therefore be put in place such that while new public 
management will still be a defining feature of local administration, elected 
representatives can reclaim legitimacy in their relationship with citizens. 
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Further, it should be understood that a new local authority culture grounded in new 
public management doctrine will not emerge overnight, and not all traditional 
practices that do not fall in line with new public management stifling to good 
governance. The right mixes of international best practices modelled to suit local 
context, with traditional practices that still speak the truth to good community 
governance should be adopted. 
Assessing the changes 
Federal/state level 
The good performance of the Australian economy is largely due to the reforms it 
introduced since the 1980s to date. Its economy continues to be buoyant, growing 
strongly during the 1990s, with an annual average real GDP growth of 3.4 percent 
over the decade (APSC 2003). Productivity increases occurred in a range of 
industries. For example, multi-factor productivity (MFP) growth in electricity, gas 
and water jumped by 60 percent in the 1980s; and the MFP growth rate in 
transport/storage and communications doubled in the 1990s (Banks 2005). Empirical 
analysis by the Productivity Commission indicated that the price reductions and 
productivity gains in the infrastructure sector alone led to a 2.5 percent increase in 
GDP. The reform program also contributed, indirectly, to sharp productivity 
improvement in wholesale trade and finance and insurance industries, where 
business re-organisation involving the innovative use of ICT was driven by 
heightened competitive pressures on customers as well as within the industries 
themselves, facilitated by a more receptive industrial relations framework (Johnston 
et al 2000; Parham 2004). 
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At the aggregate level, Australia experienced a surge in MFP growth during the 
1990s, averaging 2 percent, more than double its previous rate (Banks 2005). 
Australia's MFP performance was also among the best in the OECD and its labour 
productivity growth exceeded even that of the United States (OECD 2004). Followed 
by rising labour utilisation, this translated into annual growth in per capita incomes 
of around 2.5 percent in that decade, well above the precious average and that for the 
OECD as a whole (1.7 percent). As a consequence, Australia has witnessed its rank 
on the international per capita GDP scale rise again from 15 th  to 8 th over the past 
decade or so (Banks 2005: 8). Over the same period, microeconomic reforms brought 
about low inflation and greater stability, and tax reforms reduced distortions and 
improved business incentives (Banks 2005). These reforms played an important role 
in their own right as well as complementing structural reforms. 
This strong economic performance persisted during the 1997 Asian financial crisis 
and the 2001 global downturn (APSC 2003). While good macroeconomic policy 
environment and workforce skills and education were important, there is general 
consensus that microeconomic policy reforms have played a pivotal role in 
Australia's productivity increases and good economic performance generally, 
through three sources. First, incentives to be more productive have been sharpened, 
chiefly by strengthening competition. Second, the economy has been opened to trade, 
investment and technologies developed overseas. Finally, less regulatory restriction 
in labour markets has given businesses the flexibility to adjust production processes 
and the structure of their organisations to improve productivity (APSC 2003: 13) 
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There is considerable evidence of increased productivity in the public sector also 
over the last decade or more, notwithstanding the difficulties encountered in the 
measurement of the outcomes. The Economic Planning and Advisory Council's 
(1990) report entitled The Size and Efficiency of the Public Sector, conceded that 
there were difficulties in valuing or measuring the output of public administration in 
objective terms, but found that meaningful measures of performance and efficiency 
are more readily available for government business enterprises. The council after 
some careful economic analysis and caveats concluded that in the second half of the 
1980s there was a marked improvement in productivity in many areas of the public 
sector. The data indicated that growth in productivity had been at a higher rate than 
in the private sector, it was estimated at 3 percent per annum from 1987 to 1990, and 
that there had been substantial productivity increases in telecommunications and 
electricity supply. The report concluded that the intensive, expenditure reviews, 
program budgeting and efficiency dividends, and considerable management reforms 
have led, in general, to substantial gains, while maintaining the quality of services. 
During the period from 1984 to 1994 government trading enterprise profitability 
increased by 23 percent, real price levels fell by 3 percent while productivity rose by 
67 percent (APSC 2003). A report that was later produced by the Productivity 
Commission covering 1994/95 to 1998/99 suggested that the financial management 
of trading enterprises has continued to improve over recent years, culminating in 
higher returns to the community. However, performance is not uniform across 
industries, because many sectors are still not achieving an adequate rate of return — 
despite a decade or more of reform. 
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Since 1995, the Steering Committee for the Review of Commonwealth/State Service 
Provision has published information on the performance of Commonwealth, state 
and territory governments in delivering specific government services not normally 
subject to competition, including education, justice, emergency management, health, 
community services, and housing. The work of the steering committee is assisting 
governments in all jurisdictions to identify better ways of delivering services. 
Evidence also exists of improved effectiveness in areas such as employment services 
provided by Job Network, and health outcomes through clinical and pharmaceutical 
programs as well as preventive programs (APSC 2003). 
Despite the successes chalked, there are some downsides to the reforms. In the 
Australian economy as a whole the costs of reform are concentrated on particular 
groups whereas the benefits are more diffuse. Many of the policies and regulations 
that have efficiency costs also have pronounced distributional effects. 'Reform (by 
definition), is intended to benefit the wider community. But in so doing it typically 
threatens the privileges of a minority, the members of which individually have more 
at stake' (Banks 2005: 14). For example, while many Australians have benefited 
from strong growth in household incomes over the past dozen years, it would be 
difficult to argue that the current disparities between indigenous and other 
Australians are satisfactory. 
When it comes to investigating reforms to improve the performance of Australia's 
social infrastructure — its schools, hospitals, and community services — the effort is 
nothing more than tinkering at the margins. Social infrastructure is a large and 
growing part of the economy — some 10 percent of GDP. Research by the 
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Productivity Commission shows wide disparities in performance across and within 
jurisdictions (Banks 1999). 
Improving the performance of Australia's social infrastructure will arguably be 
harder than in the areas that received much attention in the 1980s and 1990s (Banks 
1999: 11). Access and equity considerations are central and social sensitivities are 
greater. This makes the prioritisation of processes that will assist government and the 
community work their way through the complex issues and design appropriate 
courses of action, urgent. 
In the public sector in Australia and other western democracies today, most elements 
of the competition theme of the new public management (NPM) have stalled rather 
than reversed. However, it will be problematic to argue that they have been more 
successful. Some changes, such as the almost complete out-sourcing of government 
IT functions to private sector integrator firms in Australia, the UK and New Zealand 
are effectively irreversible (Dunleavy et al 2006). Marketisation of government 
services is still extending in Australia and other advanced countries. 'But few serious 
voices now believe that this is or should be anything more than a pragmatic response 
to immediate problems or opportunities for improvement' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 
472). The large scale cost reductions and quality enhancements of the planning and 
management functions anticipated by privatisation enthusiasts in the 1980s and 
1990s are no longer anticipated (Dunleavy et al 2006). 
The incentivisation components show the highest proportion of still developing NPM 
trends. However, critics argue that under the NPM a flawed but still working and 
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powerful public sector ethos was broken up by the piecemeal implementation of 
pecuniary and performance-based systems, with inherently lesser capacity to 
adequately cover the range of processes and problems here (Hughes 2003; DunLeavy 
et al 2006). 
Increased pay differentiation inside public agencies is evident in the United States, 
United Kingdom and Australia. 'But expectations that performance-related pay 
would significantly improve the performance of agency staffs has been greatly 
down-rated' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 473). This mechanism promises to make public 
organisations streamlined and focused, and more business-like. However, evidence 
from Sweden contradicts this claim. Here `INIPM creates heterogeneous, conflicting 
and fluid organisational identities, rather than uniform and stable business identities 
it is supposed to' (Skalen 2004: 251). 
Some elements of the reform purported at 'increasing transparency have ended up 
instead creating bizarre new layers of impenetrability, as with accrual accounting' 
(Dunleavy et al 2006: 476). According to Barton (2004: 281) the impressive 
financial statements of the Australian Defence Forces make it 'appear to be the most 
profitable enterprise in the nation', whose 'profits and dividends far exceeds those of 
...the largest private companies', a position achieved with 'negligible direct 
government investment in military equipment as they have been largely funded from 
accumulated surpluses accruing over many years'. Barton questions, 'How can this 
be, given that the Department is almost entirely dependent upon an annual budget 
appropriation for its defence services?' Not surprisingly, then that although a few 
NPM countries led the way in accrual budgeting, many OECD countries remain 
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content with older cash-based systems. Similarly, layering 'new incentivisation 
initiatives on top, but in partial conflict with, public interest ethos devices (such as 
lifelong career paths for civil servants) created more complex systems than had 
existed heretofore' (Dunleavy et al 2006: 477). 
These shortcomings notwithstanding, it is fair to suggest that Australia's 
microeconomic and management reforms of the last two decades — emphasising 
managing for results and entailing considerable devolution, have had considerable 
positive impact on the budget and on the clients of the public sector. The reforms 
have led to improvement in business and corporate planning, better performance 
management, increased use of competition, and better management of people as well 
as finances. 
Local government level 
Two phases of contemporary local government reform are identifiable. The first 
phase focused on a more precise definition of the role of local government and the 
relationship within the systems, especially in relation to state-local government 
nexus, although the management improvement agenda was also given considerable 
attention (Aulich 1999; Chapman 1997). The second phase concentrated on efforts at 
introducing NCP tenets and efficiency reforms, which were already underway at the 
upper levels of government, into local government. There was convergence in the 
first stage in relation to the objectives, strategies and, in some cases outcomes, of 
legislative, managerial and structural reforms, notwithstanding that separate 
programs of reform were embarked upon independently by the different states and 
territories. 
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All states and territories reviewed and reformed their local government acts to 
remove their detailed prescriptions and restrictiveness, in order to give local 
governments enhanced powers of autonomy and general competence to 'provide for 
the peace, order and good government of the municipal area'. Examples are Section 
21, Tasmanian Local Government Act 1993; Section 6, Victoria Local Government 
Act 1989; Section 3, Queensland Local Government Act 1993; Section 8, New South 
Wales Local Government Act 1993; Section 3.1, Western Australian Local 
Government Amendment Act 1995. Wensing (1997: 43) argues that the changes to 
the local government acts 'have improved local government's capacity to steer rather 
than row'. Under previous local government acts, local government was regarded 
more as the administrative agent of the state for delivering services to property 
owners, rather than as a sphere of government that was capable of being a partner of 
federal and state governments in the overall development of the local community. In 
most cases the states have granted more autonomy and responsibility to councils to 
do whatever is necessary to better meet local community needs and aspirations. As 
Chapman (1997: 21) rightly observes, local government is responsible for 
'governing' not just 'managing'. 
Legislative reforms have also engendered more accountability of councils' decision-
making in relation to how they use their resources to meet their obligations. Councils 
have achieved this by developing and publishing strategic plans, preparing annual or 
rolling corporate and/or operational plans, and publishing annual reports and 
summaries of financial statements (Wensing 1997). 
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The changes brought about by the new local government acts have required local 
authorities to introduce contractual and competitive processes into their operations, 
especially in relation to the delivery of services. The roles of actors within local 
government have also been redefined with elected members being ultimately 
responsible for decision-making, while appointed officers handle the operational 
matters. Senior managers and staff now report to council through a general manager 
or chief executive. Senior staffs are now appointed on performance-based renewable 
contracts, while for other staff, award restructuring and enterprise bargaining are 
affecting the conditions of work (Wensing 1997). All these changes are evident 
across local government systems in Australia hence, the pattern of convergence 
across jurisdictions. These changes are intended to refocus local councils on their 
mission. 
Managerial reforms have forced local governments to make attempts to shift their 
focus from process towards purpose, re-organise their structures around programs 
and strategy, adopt the financial and human management approaches of the private 
sector and the de-bureaucratised forms of organisation emanating from there (Ryan 
1997). 
Some commentators argue that the reforms have not gone far enough in granting 
local government that constitutional independence that a sovereign government 
ultimately needs to exercise its authority to govern (Wensing 1997: 44; Aulich 
1999). Councils need to realise that their state governments can dissolve them and 
substitute them with an administration if there is reason to doubt their competence to 
carry out their responsibilities. 
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The broadening of municipal management to include a wider range of roles and 
responsibilities for local government in providing for the needs of its communities 
has encountered some obstacles. For its part, local government perceives problems 
with its new role, while upper levels of government face difficulties in their new 
relationship with local government. From a central government perspective, there has 
been some hesitancy in encouraging a more significant role for local government in 
the social development of communities. The concerns Commonwealth and state 
governments often cite about local government include the latter's diversity; its 
limited professionalism and hence capacity to undertake greater responsibilities; the 
need to maintain uniform standards, policies and quality of service provision; the 
inadequacy of links between community groups and local government; and the 
difficulty of dealing with too many small units (Roberts 1989: 47; NOLG 2001b; 
Dollery and Worthington 2000b). 
It certainly seems to be the diversity concern that is most troubling for central 
governments (Commonwealth and state governments). This diversity is not only seen 
to manifest itself in the varying size, financial resources and perceived needs for 
services by local councils but also in the discretionary nature of local government 
involvement in the human service provision and the changing priorities and policies 
of local councils if membership changes in elections (Robert 1989: 47; NOLG 1992; 
Dollery and Worthington 2000b). 
Local government on the other hand, points to a number of problems (despite the 
reforms) in relation to its new role, and interactions with the upper tiers of 
government. The main problems embrace the restrictiveness of its limited revenue 
176 
base and the uncertainty in the levels of funding from central governments; the lack 
of recognition as a genuine sphere of government; the imposition of central 
government policies and programs at the local level without consultation; and the 
lack of defined roles and responsibilities for all parties involved in service provision 
(Roberts 1989: 47; Kane 2006). Given that local government often contributes 
substantial resources to national and state programs, councils believe that they 
"should be treated as a genuine sphere of government with arrangements between 
each sphere based on the concept of partnership' (Roberts 1989: 47; Kane 2006). 
This would entail defining specific roles and responsibilities for each party involved 
in a particular program to minimise duplication of administrative procedures and 
improve the cost effectiveness of service provision at the local level. 
In the second phase of the reform, differences in emphasis with respect to the 
implementation of the NCP culminated in divergence between local government 
systems. This produced a dichotomy between New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia, which continued to apply collaborative approaches with local 
government with stress on the promotion of local democracy, and Victoria, South 
Australia and Tasmania, where economic efficiency initiatives assumed prominence 
over local democracy objectives (Aulich 1999). This dichotomy is not helpful 
because without a simultaneous pursuit of local democracy and efficiency objectives 
the goals of local development will be difficult to achieve. This subject is treated in 
detail in the next chapter. 
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Conclusion 
The foregoing discussion has revealed that the reform of Australian local 
government is unprecedented and ongoing. The change process has been prompted 
by state governments with the blessing and staunch support of the Commonwealth 
government. Though no local authority nation-wide has been left untouched by the 
currents of change, it is important to state that the process has been far from even. 
For example, whereas Victoria local government has been subjected to large scale 
compulsory consolidation with the resultant cut back on the number of councils, 
amalgamation in NSW is still voluntary with much greater autonomy for individual 
local authorities, and very minimal consolidation has been achieved. Differences are 
also discernible in the reach of other aspects of the reform. The pace of adoption and 
implementation of microeconomic reform vary across states. Whereas in Victoria 
councils were compelled to introduce CCT to specified services and expenditure, and 
competitive neutrality was mandated, in the other states local governments enjoyed 
considerable flexibility and autonomy in the application of competition policy. 
Despite the varying responses to the microeconomic reform agenda there is no 
denying that virtually everywhere these responses have compelled efforts to improve 
the conduct of council business by drawing attention to ownership, outputs, costs, 
structures and systems; and locating public provision in some areas in relation to 
markets. 
Notwithstanding that the direction and timing of the new Local Government Acts and 
the tenure of existing legislation are not uniform across states, the very ability to 
institute legislative review is commendable. Workplace reform has produced at least 
two effects. First, it has legitimised action by state departments of local government 
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for developing strategies concerning human resource development and associated 
personnel matters. Second, it has ushered in the last phase of the national attempt to 
develop an industry level strategic approach to human resource management. The 
shift from cash accounting to accrual accounting has forced municipal authorities to 
attempt to improve effectiveness in asset management and make meaningful 
information available on the full cost of councils' activities and programs (Bishop 
1997: 174). On the whole, managerial reform has produced significant and ongoing 
change in local government in terms of its functional responsibilities, in the level of 
expenditure not covered by rates and borrowing and in the demands placed on its 
professional officers, and in the need for elected representatives to be abreast and 
change attitudes to their work. 
It is premature to state whether the reform program has met all of its intended 
objectives even though the signs so far are somewhat promising. This is because 
local government still faces two challenges: the need to make the transition from 
internal modernisation to the development of strategic management; and the need to 
redefine the interface between local administration and politics, society and the 
economy. Other areas of concern relate to the failure of managerial reform to reach 
the 'shop floor' and the issue of distributive justice, where the reforms had resulted 
in winners and losers — frequently benefiting white-collar groups at the expense of 
blue-collar workers. These concerns need to be addressed in order to expand the 
benefits of reform. The issues and pressures, as well as the programs and processes 
of reform, together with their outcomes at all levels of government in Australia that 
have been examined generally in this chapter, provide the backdrop against which 
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THE MODERNISATION OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TASMANIA 
In no decade since its formation has Tasmanian local government been subjected to 
greater changes than in the 1990s, and this trend, shows little or no sign of abating. 
Over the past forty years from World War II there were several attempts at reforming 
the system, but these yielded little, the only achievement being the merger of 
Queenstown and Gormanston to create the municipality of Lye11, and the absorption 
of St. Leonards and Lilydale into the city of Launceston during the 1980s. 
The recent reforms have been focused on structural change, legislative change 
affecting the powers local government may exercise, and procedural changes to the 
manner in which it operates. The Modernisation Process was a successful initiative 
based on a highly collaborative and cooperative approach worked out between the 
state government and the Local Government Association of Tasmania. This process 
contrasted sharply with previous and most recent attempts at reforms which adopted 
generally 'top-down' decision-making approaches to the reform process. In 
particular, the proposals in April 1997 as part of the 'Tasmanian Directive Initiative' 
for the further reduction of the number of councils to a figure below the 29 reached 
in the 1990/93 Modernisation Process were regarded as unilateral and non-
consultative in approach. Not surprisingly, the 1997 process collapsed because of 
legal complications and lack of political support. The defeat of the minority Liberal 
Government and election of a majority ALP Government in September 1998 saw the 
demise of the proposals and the birth of partnerships between the incoming ALP 
Government and councils. 
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This chapter examines the Tasmanian local government reforms of the 1990s and 
assesses the outcomes of the 1990/93 Modernisation Process. It contends that any 
attempts at restructuring and reforming local government are bound to yield little or 
no success unless the process elicits local government participation and support, an 
approach which has durable appeal, wider replication and greater effect both within 
and without local government. 
Issues and pressures of local government reform in Tasmania 
An earlier 1960s renaissance and two 1990s periods of Australian local government 
reform together with their associated issues and pressures are identifiable. In this 
section, these three phases of reform are traced and reviewed generally. Then the 
stages of local government reform pertaining to Tasmania, and their associated issues 
and pressures are identified, compared and contrasted with those of other Australian 
states and territories. This exposition then provides a backdrop for examining not 
only the Tasmanian local government modernisation process in general in 
subsequent sections of this chapter, but also the changes that are specific to the two 
study councils in the next chapter. 
Halligan and Wettenhall identify an earlier renaissance in Australian local 
government dating from the 1960s when 'the combination of grassroots participation 
and the rediscovery of the urban problem stimulated interest in its potentiality' 
(Halligan and Wettenhall 1989: 80). In line with broader pressures for social change, 
the reform program enfolded attempts to 'widen the franchise, eliminate multiple 
voting and redraw boundaries to ensure greater adherence to principles of "one 
person-one-vote". Moves to redesign internal processes and practices for the purpose 
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of improving strategic planning and financial management systems as well as 
(generally failed) attempts at council mergers, were also witnessed in this earlier 
period (Aulich 1999b). The pressures for reform in this phase included the 
imperative for enhanced representativeness of local government, and the quest for a 
more robust and flexible management that was capable of efficiently meeting local 
government obligations. Attempts at pursuing these reforms were discernible, but the 
impetus appeared to weaken in the 1970s due to pressures of fiscal austerity and 
inflexible management (Aulich 1999b). These issues and pressures of reform in this 
earlier era were identical in all Australian local governments including Tasmanian 
municipal government. 
The first phase of contemporary local government reform commenced in about the 
early 1990s when it coincided with the second period in Australian history of 
intensive administrative changes in the public sectors, and the agendas have, by and 
large been in tandem with those at the state and federal levels (Gerristsen 1996; 
Aulich 1999b; Dollery et al 2005). Comprehensive changes have occurred at the 
management, legislative and structural levels of local government and have centred 
on mainly two agendas: first, the improved management of resources and, second, 
governance issues, focusing especially on the redefinition of roles and 
responsibilities of the various players in this sphere of government (Aulich 1999b: 
13; Dollery and Worthington 2000a). A pattern of convergence across local 
government systems was witnessed during this period of reform as local authorities 
learnt, adopted and adapted models from counterparts across state boundaries. 
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A central plank of reform during the early stages was the reformation of local 
government legislation between 1989 and 1995. New local government acts were 
introduced in Victoria (1989), Queensland (1993), New South Wales (1993), 
Tasmania (1993), Northern Territory (1993) and Western Australia (1995) (Aulich 
1999b). Power et al (1981: 23) observe that because these local government acts 'are 
usually amongst the longest and most complex of state statutes, no state government 
has tackled the task of reviewing the acts more frequently in a generation'. Hence, 
the almost simultaneous attempts at change in all jurisdictions represents a 
'nationalisation of local government reform processes' ( Aulich 1999b: 14). 
A common feature of legislative reform was the reduction of the detailed 
prescriptions and expansion of autonomy and power of general competence. The old 
local government acts limited councils to the performance of only those activities 
that were specifically stated in the legislation (Wensing 1997; Aulich 1999b; Dollery 
and Worthington 2000). Enterprise powers have also been granted to New South 
Wales and Tasmanian councils and in Queensland the new legislation afforded local 
government the opportunity to engage in entrepreneurial activities and seek 
membership of unlisted companies (Aulich 1999b: 14). In Western Australia, the 
"Better Government Agreement" between state and local government signalled the 
launch of a comprehensive package that agreed on principles inclusive of enhancing 
local government autonomy and its capacity for self-government. Councils were 
enabled to pursue land development as commercial undertakings (Aulich 1999b: 14). 
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Issues of governance were also well placed on the agendas of reform in all state local 
governments. Issues like the clarification of intergovernmental roles, enhancing 
accountability regimes and management improvement were key elements in the 
restructuring of local government (Aulich 1999b; Dollery and Johnson 2005). Apart 
from granting powers of general competence and autonomy, reforms in this phase, 
according to Aulich, 
strengthened the accountability of councils, through increased transparency 
provisions, enabling greater opportunities for community referenda and 
improved reporting provisions to communities. In all states, provisions were 
enacted for councils to develop strategic or management plans (especially to 
be more responsive to community wishes) and stricter reporting both to the 
community and to the state government, making key documentation more 
transparent, completing some of the electoral reforms begun in the 1960s and 
extending Freedom of Information coverage to local government (Aulich 
1999b: 15). 
These initiatives were all fashioned out to strengthen accountability of councils both 
to the community and to the state government, improve management capacity and 
make local government more democratic. 
Aulich and Halligan (1998) identified three primary forces that brought about the 
nationalisation of local government reform. The first is the Commonwealth's 
microeconomic reform agenda, which was supported and embraced by all states. The 
second, relate to the quest of some political leaders either to see through with 
reforms to the federal system or to strengthen levels of government — for example, 
Prime Minister Keating gave priority to the issue in the policy agenda which resulted 
in the creation of the Council of Australian Governments (COAG), that included a 
representative from local government. Finally, there are some signs of greater 
interest in "bottom-up" initiatives from individual councils (Aulich 1999b). 
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The part played by the federal government in this phase of local government reform 
is notable. During the 1980s it established a Financial Grants scheme for local 
government, allocated more than $20 million in grants to enhance management 
practices at the local level, funded the National Review of Local Government Labour 
Markets, and provided support both for the Rationalisation Exercise and the Local 
Approval Review Program, a program designed to improve municipal government's 
efficiency and its management practices (Aulich 1999b). In 1988 the federal 
government took an unprecedented step to seek constitutional recognition for local 
government and, although recognition was rejected in the subsequent referendum, 
the federal government managed to secure for local government representation and 
participation in the special Premiers' Conferences of the late 1980s and early 1990s, 
as part of efforts to progress the implementation of the national microeconomic 
reform strategy (Reynold 1992: 11). The four principles of the Rationalisation 
Exercise subsequently influenced the intergovernmental agreement signed in South 
Australia (ALGA 1990: 21; Bannon and Plumridge 1990). 
The outcomes of this phase of reform were identical and the similarities between 
agendas in the various states quite evident. For example, the submissions from state 
local government associations to the various local government inquiries consistently 
argued that reform should enhance local autonomy, improve the efficient 
management of resources and provide greater access to local democratic processes 
(Aulich 1999b: 16). Hence, the issues and pressures of local government reform in 
Tasmania in this first phase were congruent with those of its counterparts in the other 
states and territories. 
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The modern reform movement may be viewed as two related processes of change 
that occurred in succession. The first stage focused on a more precise definition of 
the role of local government and the relationship within the systems, especially with 
respect to state-local government nexus, even though the management improvement 
agenda also received attention (Aulich 1999b; Chapman 1997). The second stage 
prioritised efforts at extending the national competition policy (NCP) and efficiency 
reforms to municipal government. In this phase, the role and purpose of local 
government has again been re-examined and questioned by stakeholder across 
jurisdictions producing significant divergent system responses (Aulich 1999b). 
The impetus for reform in this second stage came from the agreement of the Council 
of Australian Governments (COAG) in April 1995 to introduce NCP into local 
government as part of the microeconomic reform agenda, which has been a major 
plank of public policies for over a decade. The differences in emphasis with respect 
to the implementation of the policy has led to divergence between local government 
systems, with a consequent dichotomy between New South Wales, Queensland and 
Western Australia, which continue to pursue a collaborative approach with local 
government and put high premium on local democracy, and Victoria, South Australia 
and Tasmania, where economic efficiency has received centre stage status with 
democracy being relegated to the background (Aulich 1999b). However, it should be 
noted that in most recent times the partnership agreements between state and local 
governments in Tasmania has recovered, even if modestly, some of the lost ground 
of local democracy. 
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As an affront on its "local democracy state" label, New South Wales has recently 
launched a program of compulsory amalgamation, and substantial municipal reform 
that could involve further structural adjustments is currently underway or imminent 
in Queensland and Western Australia (Dollery et al 2005). The amalgamation drive 
has now gained momentum in Queensland with Premier Peter Beattie announcing 
that the planned mergers would go ahead despite the growing opposition to the 
reform (Beattie 2007). This prompted Prime Minister Howard to change election 
laws to override the Queensland Government's laws that allow councils to be sacked 
if they hold referendums on amalgamations. The law will 'provide that any state law, 
such as the law in Queensland that penalises, discriminates against or interferes with 
local councils or other people being involved in plebiscites, is invalid' (Howard 
2007: 1). Mr Howard accused the Beattie Government of trampling on basic 
democratic rights. He stressed, 'We're just intervening to uphold a very simple 
principle', implying 'if people want to express a view on something a government's 
doing, it is outrageous that any level of government should punish people for 
wanting to express a view' (Howard 2007: 1). 
The amalgamation saga in Queensland has raised at least two issues. First, local 
government's vulnerability as a creature that can be manipulated to satisfy the whims 
and caprices of state government has again been underscored. And that local 
democratic expression can be blocked by state government if it is left unchecked by 
the federal government. Second, it has provoked thought about the nature and health 
of intergovernmental relations in Australia. The move by the federal government is 
the latest in a series of high profile Commonwealth Government interventions in 
state affairs. The Commonwealth Government recently took over the Mersey 
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Hospital in the north of Tasmania from the state government. Prime Minister 
Howard justified the interventions, saying the Commonwealth Government is 
prepared to work in a cooperative fashion with state governments to resolve 
problems facing the people. However, in some cases the Commonwealth 
Government would not hesitate to deal directly with the communities if there is lack 
of initiative on the part of the state in addressing pressing problems. 
As noted earlier, all local governments across state jurisdictions have embraced the 
NCP but the difference lies in interpretation, which manifest in two main areas: 
approaches to service delivery and municipal amalgamation (Aulich 1999b). The 
"local democracy states" do not treat amalgamation as a salient component of reform 
(although voluntary amalgamations have been encouraged and supported by most 
state governments), and competitive tendering has been recommended rather than 
forced. The adoption of performance management techniques (like state-wide 
performance indicators and benchmarking) has also occurred in a voluntary fashion 
(Aulich 1999b). Put differently, the state governments continue to regard reform as a 
necessary process, especially with respect to management efficiency and 
performance, but it would leave the initiative to individual councils rather than 
centrally impose them. These states have put in place measures to support and 
encourage local government efforts. 
The Victorian reforms have been most profound with amalgamations resulting in the 
reduction of the number of councils from 210 to 78. Compulsory competitive 
tendering was introduced into all councils, rates were capped and local government 
budgets were slashed by 20 percent across the board. Yet that was not all, as some 
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might have wished, political and community opposition was weakened by the 
suspension of elected councillors who were replaced by state appointed 
commissioners for two years. In addition, the state government in an attempt to 
garner support in the communities for its reform also appointed new chief executive 
officers to man the 78 councils (Aulich 1999b; Dollery and Worthington 2000). The 
notion held by the "local democracy states" like New South Wales that, municipal 
government changes should be initiated from within councils themselves, was not 
subscribed to by "technical efficiency states" such as Victoria. Not surprisingly, 
when it embarked on its brand of local government reforms it was uncompromising 
(Kiss 1997). 
The hitherto collaborative approach to local government reforms in South Australia 
was undermined by the establishment of a new state government agency to be 
responsible for local government services. This decision marked a 'return to the era 
when state governments assumed overall responsibility for their local government 
system' (Aulich 1999b: 17). The 1995 Ministerial Advisory Group (MAG 1995) not 
only recommended the adoption of the Victoria approach to, and targets for, 
compulsory competitive tendering but also suggested that an extensive program of 
amalgamation be introduced. Even though the South Australian government has not 
yet implemented the report's recommendations, the MAG suggestions have certainly 
influenced subsequent local government policy. This includes the policy of 
encouraging voluntary amalgamations with formal threat tags attached, to indicate 
recourse to mandatory means if local government failed to achieve merger 
voluntarily. A two year rate freeze has been introduced, performance benchmarks 
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have also been set for councils, and increased obligations required for reporting to 
local government (Aulich 1999b: 17). 
Following the widely successful bottom-up process of local government 
modernisation of 1990/93, the state government of Tasmania signalled there was no 
respite yet when in 1997 it unilaterally announced a second round of amalgamations 
to reduce the number of councils to a figure below the 29 reached in the 1990/93 
modernisation process (Haward and Zwart 2000; Aulich 1999; Vince 1997; Dollery 
and Worthington 2000). Some commentators view this as a move designed to 
engender broader electoral reforms at state government level (including proposals to 
move to a unicameral legislature in both houses of parliament) (Aulich 1999b: 17), 
while others argue it reflects the prioritisation of economies of scale objectives in 
service delivery over considerations of local democracy (Aulich 1999b; LGAB 1992; 
Dollery and Worthington 2000). Also that it represents a shift away from the 
traditional collaborative reform approach epitomised by the modernisation process to 
one dominated by state government priorities (Aulich 1999b). 
The rhetoric that followed these recent reforms in the "structural efficiency states" 
was strikingly identical and related to the dismal condition of state finances (Aulich 
1999b; Davis 1993). For example, in Victoria the Minister of Local Government in 
arguing for the reforms stated they would yield aggregate savings to the tune of $500 
million, lower rates, increase debt retirement, generate employment, streamline 
planning approval processes and provide greater capacity for strategic decision-
making (Hallam 1994). In Tasmania reforms were justified on the basis that they 
would generate cash surpluses to improve asset management, reduce the levels of 
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existing debt, improve the range and quality of service. It was also anticipated that 
real reductions in the levels of rates and charges would be possible (LGAB 1997). 
Strikingly, neither mentions the impact on traditional local governance issues and 
values (Aulich 1999b). 
Public sector reform in Tasmania 
Public sector reforms in Tasmania reflect the doctrine of the new public management 
(NPM) which swept through Commonwealth and state governments around 
Australia with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of 
public business. Public sector reform in member countries of the Organisation for 
Economic Corporation and Development (OECD) in the 1980s and 1990s had been 
partly driven by the need for governments to respond to fiscal stresses in their macro-
economies. Policy responses at all levels of government universally included budget 
restraint and downsizing of public services (Aulich 1997: 133). This certainly 
seemed to be the case in Tasmania where government reform initiatives represented 
responses to the dismal position of state finances, even though the federal 
microeconomic agenda and the reforms of the Greiner Government in New South 
Wales provided what Davis describes as a 'persuasive framework for broader action' 
(Davis 1993: 30). The changes introduced by the State Government embraced among 
others, reform of state authorities, a restructuring of state service, budgetary and 
management reform, and changes in policy process and the statutory framework 
within which the state public sector operates (Davis 1993: 32). 
To reduce duplication and overlap between agencies, the State Service Restructure 
measure resulted in the reduction of the number of departments from 50 to 19 (Davis 
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1993: 32) and the downsizing of the State Government's workforce by 17.5 percent 
from 1989 to 1994 (LGB 1997: 14). The reform of the statutory framework entailed 
the imposition of annual reporting requirements on all departments, whereas the 
'Management Improvement Program' effected integration in key management 
processes. These incorporated the following elements: 
• Policy development and review; 
• Priorities determination, introducing the notion of whole-of-state; 
• Whole-of-government policy coordination; 
• Strategic planning; 
• Budget and resource allocation; 
• Program management; and 
• Performance monitoring and reporting (Davis 1993: 32) 
Similar changes were occurring at the federal and other state government levels, and 
pressure on local government to also reform was mounting. In Tasmania one of such 
demands emanated from the Curran Report which called for a reduction of local 
authorities to not more than twenty. 1 The reduction in federal grants to state and local 
governments compelled the rationalisation of public finances that was instigated by 
such reviews as the Independent Commission Review of Public Sector Finances in 
Tasmania' (see appendix 2 for a list of inquiries into Tasmanian local government 
reform). Yet this is not where the wave ends, as some might prefer. The Minister of 
Environment and Planning, the Hon. Michael Aird, called for an investigation into 
local government in Tasmania on 22 August 1990 (LGAB 1990a: 2). This 
investigation culminated in a report by the Local Government Advisory Board that 
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subsequently formed the basis of the local government reform agenda — The 
Modernisation Process. 
The Tasmanian State Government envisaged the modernisation of local government 
would echo attempts to improve state government services and represent a response 
to state initiatives. This was publicly declared at the 1990 annual conference of the 
Tasmanian Local Government Association, where the Minister Michael Aird stated 
that the need to restructure and modernise local government had to be seen as part of 
a 'total renewal and revitalisation of the Tasmanian public sector' (Aird 1990: 1). 
The Modernisation Process 
Prior to the Modernisation Agreement, a Local Government Advisory Board 
(LGAB) was constituted under the Local Government Amendment (Local 
Government Advisory Board) Act 1987 (LGAB, 1991a: 6). This legislation enabled 
the Minister for Environment and Planning to make special references to the board 
involving 'whole of state' inquiries into local government. The board, which 
consisted of representatives from both levels of government (Roodenrys 1995: 29) 
was charged with the responsibility in August 1990 of investigating and reporting 
on2 : 'Measures, inclusive of territorial restructuring, appropriate and desirable to 
effect the modernisation of the present system of local government in Tasmania and 
to enable local authorities to achieve an enhanced capacity for efficient and effective 
discharge of municipal functions and services to the communities which they serve' 
(LGAB 1991a: 6). 
Specifically, the Minister tasked the board to investigate the following: 
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1. The desirability of achieving the integrated management of the natural, 
physical and economic resources of an area; 
2. The desirability of municipal districts incorporating as far as possible those 
areas with common links and interest and minimising the artificial division of 
like communities; 
3. The desirability of determining municipal boundaries to accord as far as 
possible with readily recognisable geographic features; 
4. The need for future local authorities to have the on-going capacity and 
flexibility of action to discharge their responsibility through managed use of 
available resources and the utilisation of advantages of economies of scale; 
5. The desirability of ensuring that the needs and aspirations of local 
communities are appropriately considered in representative processes and the 
planning and delivery of community services; and 
6. The need for local authorities to have competent managerial, financial and 
professional and technical expertise (LGAB 1991a: 6-7). 
Using the above terms of reference as a backdrop, the board drew out a list of 
objectives. These embraced a system of local government that was stronger, capable 
of accessing benefits afforded by scale economies, and provide adequate and 
appropriate opportunity for local input and influence at the political level (LGAB 
1992: 30). In pursuit of its objectives, the board carried out an extensive six-phase 
inquiry process that subsequently informed its final report published in July 1992. 
Phase One was launched in the form of a preliminary inquiry, followed by a series of 
discussion papers, opportunities for submissions and public hearing in all mainland 
regions of the state (LGAB 1992: 31-4) 3 . The final report of the board was produced 
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in June 1992 1 (LGAB 1992). The final report was submitted to a Liberal Government 
which defeated the incumbent Labor Government in the February 1992 state 
government election. The new government accepted the recommendations of the 
report, which culminated in the promulgation and subsequent implementation of the 
modernisation process. The four key elements of the modernisation process 
embodied: 
1. A total review and agreed outcome of the financial relationship between the 
state and local government; 
2. The provision of modern local government legislation based on the granting 
of general competence powers; 
3. A total review of the functions performed by state and local governments, 
with the objective of rationalising functions and eliminating as far as 
practicable, duplication and overlap in the delivery of services; and 
4. The restructuring of local government into units, which as far as is 
practicable, have the capacity and resources to be part of a system of local 
government recognised and treated as a partner in the federal system of 
government (LGAB 1992: 35). 
These elements of the modernisation process are examined in depth to determine the 
outputs and outcomes they have produced and especially how these results impinge 
on notions of efficiency and community (democracy) which have formed an 
orthodoxy in local government (Dearlove 1979). Before doing this it is important to 
explicate the concepts of efficiency and community which will provide a framework 
for the analysis. 
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A framework for the analysis of Tasmanian local government reform 
Evaluation of local government reform cannot simply take account of the stated 
objectives for change (Chapman et al 1997: 208). It is with this in mind that Haward 
and Zwart (2000) in their evaluation of the outcomes of the 1993 Amalgamation of 
Tasmanian Local Government developed four criteria which were namely, 
economies of scale, community of interest, and representation and participation to 
guide their analysis. In this discussion, the concept of economies of scale find 
location in the broader efficiency domain while the notion of community of interest, 
representation and participation, as well as accountability and responsiveness are 
absorbed into the universal set of community. Community in turn feeds democracy 
or it is analogous to it in community government. 
Efficiency 
Efficiency arguments were advanced as a compelling justification for embarking on 
the modernisation process, particularly how this related to economies of scale 
(Chapman 1995: 12). For example, in the Issue Discussion Paper the LGAB agreed 
that it 'is generally accepted in principle, large units are administratively desirable 
and that economies of scale in administrative area is genuine' (LGAB 1990a: 25). 
Efficiency defies a single definition. In one sense it denotes allocative efficiency — 
meaning 'maximising the use of resource at least cost'-which represents the 
economies of scale argument, or by utilising the concept of 'X efficiency' or 
dynamic efficiency (Wolf 1989; Le Grand 1991; Dollery 1994). 
'X efficiency' emphasises the benefits made by 'streamlining organisational 
improvements' (Wolf 1989: 18), meaning 'efficiency is not only gained from 
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economies of scale' (see Chapman 1995: 12). The LGAB nonetheless, was 
convinced that the efficiency gains argument was compelling to warrant embarking 
on amalgamation and the other aspects of the reform program (Haward and Zwart 
2000). The board made effort to develop scale economies yardsticks for determining 
whether or not efficiency gains have accrued from a given council with a given 
population, income and bureaucratic support and capacity. These included a scale of 
10,000 people as a minimum economic size for a council - below which figure 
administrative costs rose; ten thousand people and $6 million annual income — 
population and income sizes that would enable both needed professional staff to be 
employed in a wide range of council activities, and local government to meet the 
needs of its community better; minimum or zero supervision to be imposed by state 
government — since elaborate supervision increased overall government costs 
through duplication (LGAB 1990b: 18;; LGAB 1991b: 22; LGAB 1990a: 24). It is 
important to explain the term 'scale economies' in order to facilitate understanding 
of its usefulness in assessing the outcomes of the modernisation process. 
Economies of scale 
In one sense, as previously indicated, economies of scale refer to 'maximising the 
use of resources at least costs' (allocative efficiency) (see Chapman 1995: 12). This 
interpretation does, however, fails to take into account the gains that result from 
improvements in administration and management (dynamic or X efficiency) through 
managerial reform. Efficiency gains from scale economies can be determined in two 
ways. The first computes it by administrative cost, while the second compares the 
quality and range of services (Haward and Zwart 2000). The first has become 
fashionable as a tool for the measurement of scale economies in local government 
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and has been exemplified in the inquiries of both the LGAB and the Local 
Government Board (LGB). 
Community (democracy) 
The starting point is to conceptualise community in 'pluralistic, associational terms, 
which serve as a mediating institutional structure between legal citizens and 
government' (Fox and Miller 1995: 35). Community entails local control and 
responsible government (Box 1998; King and Stivers 1998). Local government 
reform that is based on the notion of community has better prospects of achieving 
success in that it is closer to Australia's individual unique local political and social 
contexts. And that is why the LGAB in its final report on the Modernisation of 
Tasmanian Local Goverment stated that 'community participation, as a political and 
strategic input to the modernisation/restructuring processes is imperative, if the 
benefits of modernisation are to be understood by, and flow on to, communities 
(LGAB 1992: 58). 
In the US the notion of community emphasises participation and democratic control 
by citizens in affairs that affect them (Greiner 1991; Bellah 1991; Zimmerman 
1999). Starting from the pilgrims and puritans from England, the early town meeting 
was the distinguishing feature of town government, which deliberated on all matters, 
major or trivial, affecting the town (Zimmerman 1999: 35). This meant civic 
activism and participation in local affairs. A process which reflected Jefferson's 
'little republics' and his vision of government for America centred on small local 
governments' (Box 1998: 6). 
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Democracy must begin at the grassroots (community level) where people can realise 
their full potential and dignity as individuals. From this view, the communitarian 
ideal is essential to the understanding of human beings as active social and political 
animals, whose development occur in a well-ordered community (Haruna 2003). 
Driven by the increasing alienation among the working and middle classes in the US, 
there has been a resurgence of the themes of the self and the community aimed at 
recovering the values of local control and small and responsible government (Box 
1998; King and Stivers 1998). Some scholars argue that citizens should be more 
involved in decisions that affect them, not only for the sake of social justice, but also 
for developing their full potential (Haruna 2003). This view is supported by King and 
Stivers (1998) when they assert that in a community based reform, public 
administrators relinquish control, become facilitators, and collaborate with citizens in 
the production and delivery of public services. They also emphasise that public 
administrators should seek greater responsiveness towards building the integrity and 
legitimacy of public institutions. 
Critics of the community model cite its limitations, which often relate to the 
practical, theoretical and philosophical difficulties that such a perspective entails 
(Fox and Miller 1995). Apart from the definitional difficulty of whether community 
should be defined geographically, sociologically or politically, Fox and Miller (1995: 
35-39) point to idealism, 'totalitarian tendencies, and citizen apathy' as some of the 
major obstacles to community democratisation. They contend that existing notions of 
community have little or no relevance 'in the mass societies inexorably created by 
advanced and post-industrial capitalism'. Despite these criticisms Fox and Miller 
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(1995) contend 'that community can be refined to create a communitarian medium 
'where full ethical citizenship flourishes'. Other writers do not disagree when they 
state that anecdotal evidence suggests that community spirit is alive and that citizens 
are ready to collaborate in co-producing and co-delivering public services (Timney 
1998; Foley 1998; Gray and Chapin 1998). 
The implication of the above exposition is that the promotion of community values 
and aspirations enhance community democratisation that are expressed in such 
values as participation, representation, responsiveness and accountability as well as 
community of interest. These elements, which are discussed in turn, go along with 
the efficiency tenet - economies of scale, as yardstick for evaluating the 
modernisation process. 
Community of interest 
Community of interest enjoyed wide and repeated usage throughout the 
investigations of the LGAB, and informed the first guidelines for council mergers. 
The term "community of interest" has become a fashionable notion even though no 
attempt has been made to define it in precise terms. According to the 1997 Local 
Government Board (LGB) there are two basic elements that should be incorporated 
in any notion of "community of interest". These are a common geographic area 
(although not necessary limited to size), and at least one common interest 
substantially shared between the residents of the area' (LGAB 1997: 24). This 
definition find favour with Hillery, who catalogued 94 different definitions of the 
term "community" (Hillery 1968). Cope et al indicated that nearly all of Hillery's 
definitions suggest that community 'consists of persons in social interaction within a 
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geographic area and having one or more additional common ties' (Cope et al 1997: 
50). 
Representation and participation 
Representation aims at creating a forum at the local level where a team of 
development agents, the representatives of the people and other agencies will agree 
on the development problems of the locality or area, their underlying causative 
factors and decide on the combined actions necessary to deal with them (MLGRD 
1996). For Chapman (1995:20), 'representation of local community views and their 
incorporation into policies at the local sphere is an essential part of recognising 
councils as government bodies'. Many councils prior to the modernisation process 
were concerned not to lose adequate or fair representation, and an attempt has been 
made to determine whether their fears have been allayed following the modernisation 
process. It has been assessed whether opportunities have been afforded for 
community participation in local government as a result of modernisation process. 
Participation is one of the building blocks of local governance and democracy. 
Bowman and Hampton (1983:16) share this view when they assert that 'the strongest 
argument for local government as a democratic institution is on grounds of 
participation'. Other indicators of participation are expressed in such activities and 
values as more elections, more elected members and more political choices 
(Bowman and Hampton 1983: 10). 
A number of approaches can be used to determine the participation levels of people 
in local government. These embrace voter turnout at elections, the number of people 
seeking election and the number of people taking part in council events and activities 
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such as committee work. Each of these indicators of participation is applied, where 
appropriate and possible, to determine any change in the level of participation or 
interest since the modernisation process was launched. 
Accountability and responsiveness 
Accountability denotes a relationship in which one party, the holder of accountability 
has the right to seek information about, to investigate and scrutinise the actions of 
another party, the giver of accountability. In its fullest sense, accountability also 
implies the right to impose remedies and sanctions, though sometimes that function 
may belong to some other party (for example, an ombudsman may hold an official 
accountable but may have no power to impose a remedy, that function being left to a 
minister or court) (Scott 2000). 
Following the above definition, the community to which council delivers services 
becomes the holder of accountability while council represents the giver of 
accountability. Local residents now have the right under the new Local Government 
Act 1993 to probe and scrutinise the actions of councils. Councils are required by the 
act to provide the public with information on the extent to which they have used the 
resources at their disposal to meet their obligations. The public can seek remedy by 
not renewing the mandate of elected members for sub-optimal performance. They 
can also sanction council by petitioning the Minister of Local Government when they 
can substantiate allegations of gross incompetence and mal-administration on the 
part of council. 
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Accountability is not the same as responsiveness, which refers to the willingness of 
agents to meet the wishes of principals (Mulgan 2002). It does not entail the 
imposition of sanctions, as in the case of accountability. In this sense, councils may 
be responsive to the communities they serve not only as a hedge against sanctions 
and criticisms, but also doing so gives them a good public image, which in turn feeds 
their integrity and legitimacy. In other words, by being responsive councils are 
seeking to build integrity and legitimacy in public institutions (King and Stivers 
1998). 
Evaluation of the Modernisation process 
Modernisation is a continuing process as a result of which local government, both as 
a system and as a collection of individual democratically elected units, is always able 
to respond in the most appropriate and cost effective manner to the needs of its 
electors (MAT n.d: 3). This definition implies that local government should have the 
approved and needed level of autonomy and power of general competence to 
continually change its administrative, management and operational practices in line 
with changing circumstances. This is necessary if local government is to better meet 
the needs of the communities its serves. In other words, local government reform 
should feed goals such as efficiency, effectiveness and economy. It should also 
promote democratic values such as participation, representation and community of 
interest as well as accountability and responsiveness. The thrust of the evaluation of 




The antiquated legislation, under which councils have been operating since 1962, 
was replaced following the launch of the Modernisation process, with contemporary 
legislation which recognised the changes in communities, communications, 
technology and modern management system. The Local Government Act 1962 was 
prescriptive in nature, which implied that councils could only do those things which 
the act permitted. 
The legislation, the Local Government Act 1993, sought to provide councils with 
much wider powers of general competence, flexibility and autonomy to enable them 
to more appropriately respond to the needs of their communities, and remove the 
necessity for continuation of the Hobart and Launceston Corporation Acts (LGAB 
1992: 37). The Local Government Act 1993 came into effect on 1 January 1994. A 
gamut of several other acts dealing with the land use planning system and 
environmental protection as well as building development have also been enacted. 
The Local Government Act 1993 provides the constitution under which councils 
operate (Balmer 1996). It removed the distinction between Hobart and Launceston 
(which formerly operated under their own legislation) and all other councils by 
making all councils subject to the same act. Subjecting all councils to the same act 
has the advantage of applying a uniform set of laws across the state which facilitates 
benchmarking and other performance comparisons. Such standardisation has enabled 
the Key Performance Indicators Committee (KPIC), Local Government Division, 
Department of Premier and Cabinet, to produce seven consecutive reports (1999/00- 
2005/06) on local government performance (IU'IC 2006). These reports in turn are 
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proving useful for the Local Government Board in conducting general reviews of 
councils. Perhaps the greatest beneficiaries of such standardisation are the residents 
of the local communities who can now compare the performance of their councils 
with those of others in the state. Such comparisons by residents enhances 
accountability of councils to the communities they serve in that citizens now demand 
explanation for sub-optimal performance. The Local Government Act 1993, while 
generally continuing the rating powers of the previous act, also provides a power to 
set differential rates. The result of this is the increased flexibility which now enables 
councils to apply their revenue raising powers in more sensitive and effective ways 
than was previously the case. For example, councils are now able to differentiate 
between classes of property that are of similar value but that benefit 
disproportionately from council services. 
Councils are also enabled by the act to delegate matters to local communities at their 
discretion. For instance, Southern Midlands council now has many special purpose 
committees which operate facilities such as recreation grounds, halls or forest 
reserves. They manage these facilities with financial support from the council. 
Likewise, Huon Valley council has retained various special purpose committees 
following merger, which are considered the best way to involve the community 
(Zwart 1997). The creation and delegation of authority to committees are particularly 
relevant for councils which are large in area (such as Northern Midlands) or 
otherwise have distinct local areas (as is the case of Kingborough which now 
incorporates Bruny Island) (Balmer 1996). The delegation of authority to committees 
has engendered representation and involvement of communities in council activities 
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and has thus allayed fears they might experience loss of opportunity to participate as 
a result of mergers. 
Councils may also under the new act join with other councils to create joint 
authorities when they deem such arrangements more efficient and effective than 
other alternative modes of delivering particular services to their communities. The 
first joint authority has been established by four councils in the north of the state to 
provide waste disposal services (Balmer 1996). Similar arrangements have 
developed between Sore11 and Clarence Councils for landfill and waste disposal 
services. The provision of immunisation services to the residents of Sore11 and 
Tasman council areas are also transmitted through joint authority agreements (Sore11 
Council interviews 2004). Sore11 Council has intimated that joint authority 
arrangements have enabled it to deliver the aforementioned services in a cost-
effective manner than would have been the case if it had solely delivered these 
services (Sore11 Council interviews 2004). 
The Environment Management and Pollution Control Act 1994 empowers councils 
to control activities that could adversely impact on the environment. It classifies 
functional activities into three groups, with local government being responsible for 
assessing those falling into level one (Balmer 1996). Councils consider these 
planning and environment management acts critical to their power to control the 
development and management of the local areas, a role which has become an integral 
part of their core functional responsibilities. 
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One of the more far reaching changes following the modernisation process was the 
decision to conduct elections by post. All residents who are listed on House of 
Assembly electoral roll automatically receives ballot papers (and a reply paid 
envelope) for the municipal area in which they live. Thus they are enabled to vote in 
the council elections without going to a poling booth, if they wish. This system is 
expected to include property owners who are resident in another municipal area 
elsewhere in Tasmania. The effect of this change was the increase in the average 
voter-return rate from less than 20 percent at earlier elections to almost 60 percent 
(Chapman 1997). 
Councils are required under the Local Government Act 1993 to develop strategic 
plans covering the forthcoming five years, and to consult with the local communities 
both in determining the contents of the plan, and in relation to the annual report 
outlining the year's events. Through this means, and others of similar nature, the act 
effectively makes councils responsible directly to the communities they serve, rather 
than to the Minister for Local Government and the State Government. As a 
demonstration of their commitment to be accountable to the communities they serve, 
councils' annual reports now include summaries of their financial positions, 
indications of outcomes against the proposals in the annual plans, and advises to 
communities of the standard being achieved by councils in areas such as water 
quality, effluent standards, waste disposal and environmental management (LGAB 
1992). 
These demanding reporting and accountability requirements to which councils are 
now subjected reflect Box's (1998), and King and Stiver's (1998) views that 
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community-based reform entails home rule, local control and responsible 
government. Communities now rule because they partake in the drawing of the 
strategic plans as well as in the monitoring of the performance of the council in the 
attainment of objectives. They exercise some amount of control because they can 
demand explanation for sub-optimal performance and seek remedy through the 
exercise of their power of mandate renewal. They ensure responsible government in 
that they can sanction council by petitioning the Minister of Local Government if 
they can substantiate allegations of mal-administration and gross incompetence on 
the part of council. The reporting and accountability regimes have also stemmed Fox 
and Miller's (1995: 35) criticisms of 'totalitarian tendencies and citizen apathy' 
associated with the community model of government, in that councils have now 
relinquished some control to citizens and collaborate with them in the drawing up of 
the development vision as well as in the shaping of service content and delivery. 
Financial relationship 
The LGAB in its final report on the Local Government Modernisation Process 
recognised the necessity for a comprehensive review of the financial relationship 
between the state and local government (LGAB 1992: 36). Broad agreement was 
worked out with the government that this would proceed, in conjunction with the 
Municipal Association of Tasmania, after the special premier's conference scheduled 
for October 1991 at which it was expected a review would be initiated for a 
rationalisation of functions and funding arrangements between the Commonwealth 
and state governments. This conference, unfortunately, did not eventuate, and this 
factor, coupled with impending state elections and resulting new government, had 
meant that this important element has not yet been pursued vigorously. 
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There is currently a complex set of financial arrangements that underpin state and 
local government financial relations. Many of these arrangements could be 
considered a product of history, rather than the result of deliberate public policy 
decisions. These include: 
• Levies and charges on local government to fund services provided by the 
state, in which local government has little, if any, input; 
• Various fees and charging arrangements which are not commercially based 
and therefore considered to distort decision-making; and 
• Various taxation exemptions, concessions, specific purpose grants and 
subsidies which reduce accountability and distort decision-making 
(Tasmaanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
It is important to summarise the nature of the existing state -local financial 
arrangements in order to determine their impact on local government's capacity to 
raise the revenue needed to meet its obligations. The state government subsidies 
council costs by providing recurrent subsidies on the annual cost of water and 
sewerage and by reimbursing pensioner concessions. The total cost of reimbursing 
pensioner concessions came up to a maximum of $318 in 2003/04 on individual 
property rates. In 2001/02, state water subsidies amounted to $20,037, sewerage 
subsidies stood at $300,517, while the cost of pensioner remission rates totalled 
$12.8 million (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
Local government is exempt from the payment of state government taxes. State 
government agencies, statutory authorities and a number of government business 
enterprises are currently exempt from local government rates on crown land, 
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although service rates for water and sewerage are generally paid (Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). Such exemptions occur 
disproportionately in favour of state government in many instances. For example, 
whilst legislation protects state and federal governments from taxation, local 
government is required to pay Fringe Benefits Tax (FBT) and GST on many 
operations without any compensation for either the cost of administering these taxes 
or their impact on local services and employment opportunities. 
The Tasmanian Government provides library services and seeks contribution from 
local government towards this cost. In all other states, local government provides the 
services and receives a contribution from the state government towards the cost. 
Each municipality in Tasmania makes a contribution to library services. It is 
equivalent to 0.35 percent per dollar of the adjusted assessed annual value of all 
leviable land, less a prescribed amount (collection fee) which is a maximum of 1.5 
percent of the gross assessed contribution. In 2001/02, the library contribution was 
$6.2 million, which represented about 36 percent of total expenditure on library 
services by the state (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003) 5 . 
The state is responsible for the provision of fire services through the Tasmanian State 
Fire Commission and in accordance with the Fire Services Act 1979 6. In 200/-02, the 
State Fire Commission received $18.7 million from a levy imposed on Local 
Government, which was equivalent to approximately 49 percent of the commission's 
expenditure7 (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
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The State Government has involvement in the operation of local government through 
the Department of Primary Industries, Water and Environment, which both have 
policy, regulatory and advisory roles. Local government contributes to the cost of 
providing these services through a planning and local government levy equal to 0.15 
percent per dollar of the total adjusted assessed annual value of all rateable (non-
exempt) land in their municipality. In 2001/02, local government contribution was 
$2.7 million (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
The state government provides recurrent assistance to local government for specific 
purposes8 (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). These grants may 
be seen as a measure intended to assist local government defray part of the costs 
imposed on it by the state government through various levies, fees and charges. 
These local-state financial relations have implications for local government's 
finances and its ability to meet the needs of the communities it serves. Unlike other 
taxation revenue, rates and charges imposed by local government do not have any 
direct correlation with household or business income and therefore the capacity of 
the community to pay. In small rural councils the greater proportion of income is 
from grants or contributions that are not tied to movements in the costs of goods, 
services or labour. Consequently, rate increases to fund the full range of council 
services must inevitably be higher than inflation if service levels are maintained and 
grants are not increased. This scenario has implications for the ability of councils to 
meet their community service obligations, and maintain their service levels and 
standards. 
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For example, at King Island Council, the total of all rate revenue including general 
rates, water and sewerage is estimated at $1.5 million and this is less than the total of 
employee costs estimated to be $1.7 million (King Island Council n.d) The 
predominant source of revenue to fund this shortfall, as well as the combined cost of 
goods and services provided by the council, is made up from general and specific 
grants to the council. Such grants do not have the capacity to grow with inflation and 
in many cases are fixed, requiring council to make up any inflationary cost from 
other sources or cut backs to services in other areas. This scenario could only have 
hindered the council from efficiently and effectively meeting the needs of the 
community it serves. There are still several examples of unfunded mandates, despite 
the reforms, that have impacted and are impacting on local government. Councils are 
required to contribute to libraries, fire services, hospitals and emergency services and 
yet have little, if any say, on their operations. 
The State Government has compelled councils to implement National Competition 
Guidelines in respect to major trading activities, most notably water supply. It has 
also established a number of agencies and regulatory bodies to ensure that local 
government is delivering the required outcomes. One such agency, the Government 
Prices Oversight Commission is charged with the responsibility for determining 
whether local council are complying with Tasmania's National Competition Policy 
(NCP) Water Reform obligations. Councils are concerned that with all this 
regulation, inspection audit and controls, NCP payments to the state have not been 
passed onto local councils in recognition of their achievement. Instead a large 
portion of the money appears to have been allocated to audit functions (King Island 
Council n.d]) A review of NCP payments to address council concerns will raise 
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additional revenue for councils to more efficiently and effectively meet their 
obligations. 
The formula used to disburse state grants among councils embeds a distributional 
injustice. It often offends equity criteria in that it tends to favour larger organisations 
with big budgets that have the resources and the financial capacity to absorb a 
significantly higher proportion of the cost than smaller organisations. Some councils, 
especially the smaller and financially distressed ones, argue that account should be 
taken of the capacity of the organisation to raise any required contribution towards 
the project under consideration (King Island Council n.d). The Pay As You Earn 
(PAYE) taxation system is structured so that those on low incomes pay little, if any 
tax, whilst those on higher incomes pay proportionally more. These councils are of 
the view that grants to local government follow similar contribution regime (King 
Island Council n.d) 
Rationalisation of roles and functions 
The LGAB in its final report on the Modernisation of Local Government indicated 
that there was a potential for a redistribution of functions within the administrative 
responsibility of 17 state agencies which could possibly be performed by local 
government by way of devolution of responsibility, or by contractual arrangements 
(LGAB 1992). 
The greatest potential for immediate transfer of responsibilities were to be found in 
the area of physical services which virtually duplicated the current activities 
performed by council workforces. In particular, this related to maintenance of roads, 
bridge structures, national parks and protected areas including day use facilities, 
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grounds for schools, public libraries, hospitals, and regional health centres (LGAB 
1992: 14). The overlap and duplication of functions between the two levels of 
government produce inefficiencies as it raises democratic concerns in the conduct of 
public business. The rendering of the following services are a few examples where 
overlap and duplication have generated diseconomies and democratic deficits. 
There are instances where local government regulations overlap those of the state 
government. For example, the State Department of Housing Services administers the 
Substandard Control Act which overlaps with public health provisions and Local 
Government building regulation. In relation to building approvals, current provisions 
of the Local Government Act 1993 do not provide for council approval of Crown 
projects. The state is required to duplicate this process by a form of self-certification 
(using consultants) (DCHS 1996). These overlaps and duplications do not only create 
confusion for public service customers as to which level of government to refer to in 
matters relating to the provision of these services, but also diseconomies in their 
delivery. Efficiency gains would be achieved if one level of government were made 
responsible for the provision of these services. 
The provision of library services, although having received a great deal of attention 
and controversy over the past few years, is likely to provide some opportunities for 
local government through a variation to current service delivery in the area of branch 
libraries. As noted earlier, the Tasmanian Government provides library services and 
seeks a contribution from local government towards the cost. In all other states, local 
government provides the service and receives a contribution from the state 
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government towards the cost (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 
2003). 
The creation of a two-tiered library system with the state responsible for regional 
libraries and state administration will provide an opportunity for local communities 
to play a much greater role in the provision of services and the structuring of those 
services to community requirement. A shift in this direction will undoubtedly reflect 
the aspirations enshrined in community-based reform to local government which 
emphasises effective government at the grass roots (Box 1998). 
Fire services protection throughout the state also provides some opportunities for 
improvement. The state government is currently responsible for the provision of fire 
services through the State Fire Commission and in accordance with the Fire Service 
Act 1979. However, before 1979, the responsibility for fire protection was shared 
between two statutory bodies and 22 individual fire brigades (Tasmanian Department 
of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
The ability to re-emphasise the volunteer and community nature of urban, country 
and rural brigades through a complete or partial devolution of responsibility to local 
government will not only appreciably address the current cross-subsidisation 
between the two tiers of government, but also elicit community input as to the best 
way to tackle the problem of recurrent fire outbreaks. A step in this direction will 
enhance mass grassroots participation in fire protection, meaning civic activism and 
readiness of citizens to co-deliver an important community service (Timney 1998; 
Foley 1998; Gray and Chapin 1998). 
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Proposal for a reform of the Tasmanian Water, Sewerage and Drainage services to 
remove duplication and overlap were mapped out under the modernisation process. 
Even when the modernisation process got underway four state-owned Regional 
Water Boards still supplied bulk water to councils in particular regions of the state. 
However, individual councils were responsible for water treatment and reticulation. 
All sewage reticulation and treatment were controlled by local councils, as were all 
drainage services. 
In order to assess whether water and drainage services were being delivered in a 
cost-efficient fashion under the Regional Water Boards, London Economics, a 
consulting firm, was appointed by the Government-commissioned Local 
Government Roles and Functions Committee. The performance of Tasmanian 
councils in delivering water and drainage services was assessed against the 
efficiency yardsticks. London Economics found no inefficiencies in the provision of 
drainage services by local government. However, in relation to the water and 
sewerage industries they found inefficiencies costing ratepayers somewhere between 
$7 million to $18 million annually, or $40 to $107 per annum per ratepayer 
(Felmingham and Page 1996: 31). These inefficiencies included scale and scope 
economies which remained unexploited in water and sewerage delivery as well as 
managerial diseconomies. Scale diseconomies were evident in particular in sewerage 
treatment. The sizes of plants were too small in relation to the scale required to 
minimise the cost of sewage treatment. Scope economies refer to the total cost 
savings which results from the spreading of fixed costs across a range of services, 
such as the various vertical stages of water and sewerage delivery, for example, 
reticulation (Felmingham and Page 1996: 31). 
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One of the recommendations of the London Economics' inquiry was the privatisation 
of the water and sewerage industry in Tasmania. London Economics recommended 
that the assets and infrastructure of individual councils be transferred to three 
independent regional water and sewerage companies (denationalisation) which were 
to have a highly centralised corporate structure and operate along profit maximising 
principles (Felmingham and Page 1996). 
However, research by Felmingham and Page (1996) at the behest of the Local 
Government Association of Tasmania into the recommendations of the London 
Economics from an individual council perspective revealed findings9 that made the 
proposed privatisation less feasible. The research found that work services of local 
councils were horizontally integrated (Felmingham and Page 1996: 31). According 
to Felmingham and Page, London Economics' privatisation proposal which divorced 
water and sewerage from other local government operations would come at a cost: 
the loss of benefits from the existing horizontal integration of local government 
services. These lost benefits must be matched against the scale and scope economies 
gleaned from vertical integration (Felmingham and Page 1996). The research also 
found several examples of cross subsidisation which assisted particular regional 
industries to remain located in Tasmania's rural centres. These cross-subsidies 
included reduced water and waste/sewerage levies. Despite some scale and scope 
economies as well as community service obligation benefits which accrued from the 
water and drainage services even under the Regional Water Boards, local 
government still complained that funds which the boards raised came from the 
constituent councils, yet the councils did not have a majority voice on the boards. 
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Councils charged that while decisions made by the boards had wide ranging 
implications accountability to the electorate was a missing link (LGAT 1995). 
In addition, councils argued that the extension of water supplies was often a strategic 
planning exercise but councils had only an indirect input into these decisions. And 
that despite the fact that the Water Boards derived their entire income from councils 
(and in a few cases from bulk-users) the boards were treated as State Authorities for 
the purposes of the State Authorities Financial Management Act and this thereby 
imposed a further financial burden on councils and ratepayers (LGAT 1995). 
Perhaps it was to exploit the remaining scope and scale economies which were 
revealed by the London Economics and Felmingham and Page inquiries into the 
water and sewerage industry, as well as the criticisms by local govertunent in relation 
to its remoteness from the Regional Water Boards' activities that the Water Reform 
Program was launched in 1997. Under the 1997 Water Reform Program the Hobart 
Regional Water Board was transferred from state government ownership and 
established under the Local Government Act as a joint authority, the Hobart Regional 
Water Authority. In addition, the State Government's North Esk Regional and West 
Tamar Water Supply Schemes were also transferred to local government and, 
together with Launceston City Council's water supply scheme, re-established in 
1997 under the Local Government Act as joint authority entitled the Esk Water 
Authority. On 10 August 1999, the North West Water Authority was the last bulk 
water authority to be transferred to local government and now operates as Cradle 
Coast Water (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). The transfer of 
these water boards from the state to local government has thus retained the scope and 
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scale economies gains, as well as cross-subsidisation and community service 
obligation benefits that would have been lost from the London Economics 
privatisation proposals, and continued ownership of the water boards by the state 
government. 
These joint authorities were established in accordance with the NCP corporatisation 
model and are subject to full taxation equivalent, dividend and loan guarantee fee 
regimes (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). Among other 
things, the Strategic Framework for the Water industry requires the implementation 
of two-part (volumetric) pricing for urban water schemes where it is shown to be 
cost-effective 10. Similar assessment by the Government Prices Oversight 
Commission also revealed cost-efficiency in both water and wastewater pricing 
(Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003) 11 . 
The above exposition has shown that efficiency gains have accrued from the 
rationalisation of the water, sewerage and drainage industry. The 1997 Water Reform 
program in particular, closed the chapter on the London Economics privatisation 
proposals and its associated inefficiencies, as well as the community service 
obligation and cross-subsidisation losses which its implementation would have 
entailed. It has also addressed local government's concerns in relation to democratic 
deficit that had been embedded in the administrative and operational arrangements of 
the Regional Water Boards. 
Amalgamations in the 1990s 
Five inquiries into Tasmanian local government occurred between 1939 and 1990 
(see Appendix 2). Even though all of the inquiries recommended for some boundary 
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changes and the reduction of the number of councils (ACIR n.d.: 45-50) the 
proposals did not materialise. The exceptions were, as noted earlier, the merger of 
Queenstown and Gormanston to form the municipality of Lyell and the absorption of 
St. Leonards and Lilydale into the city of Launceston in 1986 and 1985 respectively. 
The unilateral approach that was adopted by the state government was responsible 
for the failure of these attempts to achieve reform in local government in Tasmania. 
In contrast, the 1992 inquiry into the Modernisation of Tasmanian Local Government 
did succeed because the two levels of government jointly worked out the modalities 
for reforming the local government system (Vince 1997: 160). Chapman (1997b: 
150) agrees with Vince's view when he states that 'whereas Tasmanian structural 
reform has been as comprehensive as that found in Victoria, it has been pursued in a 
much more cooperative atmosphere and over a longer period of time'. Vince (1997: 
161) states further the Tasmanian experience of 'structural reform succeeded because 
of the willingness of existing councils to be involved in the process and the offer of 
the state government to fund transitional costs arising from the process of 
amalgamation'. 
The outcomes of the amalgamations of 1993 are now appraised in respect of 
efficiency gains and democratic benefits. Few studies have been carried out on the 
outcomes of amalgamations in Tasmania. The works of Chapman (1995), the Local 
Government Board (1997a) and Haward and Zwart (2000) are instructive on this 
topic. 
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The Local Government Board (LGB) reviewed the outcomes of the amalgamations. 
It obtained comprehensive financial data from five of the amalgamated councils and, 
after analysing the three years after amalgamation, claimed to have found substantial 
savings on administrative costs, reduced levels of debt, and increased revenue 
(Chapman et al 1997). It then extrapolated this scenario to the remaining 15 
restructured councils and suggested that a gain of $65 million a year could be 
recognised as having been achieved — not might have been achieved, but actually 
achieved (Chapman et al 1997). No empirical research has yet tested the LGB's 
assertions about savings or whether they would apply across all councils. 
Lijphart (1971: 685) argued that 'intensive analysis of few cases may be a more 
rewarding exercise than a more superficial analysis of many cases'. Haward and 
Zwart 2000) also contend that the instructive character of few case studies underlies 
the use of this line of inquiry in many studies in local government 12 . This approach 
was therefore adopted in their evaluation of the outcomes of the 1993 amalgamations 
of councils in Tasmania. Their study appears to be one of the instructive materials on 
the topic. They studied four cases which are namely, Southern Midlands, Huon 
Valley, Kinborough and Tasman councils 13 . It is worthwhile to summarise their 
findings in order to determine whether amalgamations have achieved the desired 
outcomes for Tasmanian local government as envisaged by the Modernisation 
Procss. 
On economies of scale their study indicated that fairly predictable outcomes were 
achieved in relation to administrative cost figures as a percentage of current 
payments, and in dollars per elector (Haward and Zwart 2000: 38). For example, they 
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found that Southern Midlands and Huon Valley councils reduced their administrative 
costs appreciably following amalgamation, from around 18 percent to 12 percent of 
current payments, followed by considerable reductions as a measure per capita 
(Haward and Zwart 2000: 38). Kingborough and Tasman councils did not record 
reductions in administrative costs. The administrative costs of the former remained at 
around 14 percent of current payments since merger with Bruny Island, while the 
latter's figure stood at around 20 percent until a massive increase in 1996/97. The 
figure for administrative costs per capita, however, revealed that Tasman council has 
struggled to maintain its administrative costs at 1990 levels (Haward and Zwart 
2000: 38). 
The study also indicated that almost all of the councils witnessed improvements in 
service delivery to the communities they served. Southern Midlands and Huon 
Valley councils particularly demonstrated capacity in sewerage and water treatment, 
with the execution of major projects. Improvements occurred in community services 
in particular, and supply services which the Cygnet and Huon councils were 
previously unable to provide (Haward and Zwart 2000: 38). 
Amalgamation has also enabled a much greater range of professional staff to be 
employed in Southern Midlands and Huon councils. Thus while there was not a great 
reduction in actual staff numbers more professional staff with the requisite skills, 
knowledge and experience not previously held by councils were engaged. This was 
not the case for the Tasman Council where the lack of such professional staff 
obviously created difficulties (Haward and Zwart 2000). 
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Another interesting finding of the investigation was the increased rate revenue on a 
per capita basis between 1990/91 and 1996/97 for all councils. The increases were 5 
percent for Southern Midlands, 11 percent for Kingborough, 43 percent for Huon 
Valley and 53 percent for Tasman (Haward and Zwart 2000). 
Community of interest is defined to incorporate two core elements: a common 
geographic area, and having at least one interest substantially shared by residents of 
that area (LGAB 1997: 24). Going by this definition, two of the three cases where 
amalgamation took place represent areas that share a community of interest. The two 
councils — Southern Midlands and Huon Valley, both occupy a common geographic 
area, having been created out of the merger of adjacent former councils. And even 
though each council manifested several different communities within their 
boundaries, a country lifestyle appeared to be their shared attribute (Zwart 1997). 
The Huon Valley seemed to fit into either of the above categories specified in the 
definition of community of interest. The establishment of the council brought 
together areas with many common characteristics. Huon existed long before the 
amalgamations however, the sense of 'we-ness' among the people was latent until 
the advent of the merger when it manifested saliently and awakened the residents to 
rediscover a new pride in the label 'Huon Valley' (Haward and Zwart 2000). The 
creation of the Southern Midlands Council has engendered similar sense of 
community and territorial identity. Residents now have a broader conception of the 
Southern Midlands as not only a label for the council but also a name for the region 
(Haward and Zwart 2000). 
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Community of interest did not eventuate following the merger of Bruny with 
Kingborough. The merger of the two areas could be likened to the marriage of 
unwilling partners in that Bruny being an island was incompatible with any other 
part of the mainland. It was therefore questionable from the onset whether residents 
of the two areas would share one common interest. It is not unreasonable to suggest 
that a community of interest would have been maintained if Bruny Island had 
constituted a council on its own. 
In terms of representation and participation the findings are a mixed bag. The three 
case studies of amalgamated councils all showed a significant decrease in the 
numbers of electors per representative following amalgamation. However, this was 
compensated for by the good calibre of representatives who were chosen from a 
larger pool of candidates, a strength, which previous councils lacked (Haward and 
Zwart 2000). Effective representation of different communities within council area 
was not a problem in the Southern Midlands Council, as the even spread of 
population meant representatives were drafted from all over the municipality. A 
similar situation occurred following the disbanding of Huon Valley transitional 
council, with three councillors coming from each of the former areas following the 
1996 elections (Haward and Zwart 2000). The only concern regarding representation 
came from Bruny Island, as it is not guaranteed a representative on the council 
(Haward and Zwart 2000: 39). 
Participation rates in all of the councils studied showed a significant increase 
following amalgamation. The average response rate has increased around 40 percent 
or threefold since amalgamation has taken place, from a figure quite consistently 
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around 20 percent to around 60 percent (Haward and Zwart 2000: 39). This has been 
attributed to the introduction of postal voting although this should be matched 
against the much smaller number of uncontested seats that resulted from the abolition 
of the ward system (Haward and Zwart 2000). The impact of amalgamation on voter 
response rate and the number of candidates standing for election is not clear. This is 
because Tasman, the only non-amalgamated council, increased its voter participation 
and the number of candidates more than the amalgamated councils, meaning 
amalgamation may have reduced the increase in response rate and candidate numbers 
in the other councils. However, the participation rate of Tasman fell to around 74 
percent in 1996 (TEO 1996), which was much closer to the response rate of the other 
councils. 
The evidence from the case studies about the effect of amalgamation on participation 
and people's involvement in the activities of their councils is not conclusive. Apart 
from the fact that the study examined on a limited number of cases, other yardsticks 
for measuring participation such as citizens' attendance at council meetings or 
involvement in council's special events and committees could not be considered. 
Even if statistics on these aspects of participation were available conclusion about 
their effects would not have been instructive given that poor 'active' participation 
and general apathy towards local government activities have been noted as the main 
barriers to community democratisation. 
The amalgamations of 1993 did not produce all the desired outcomes and as the 
LGAB itself conceded, 'on-going monitoring will bring about further structural 
adjustments where found necessary' (LGAB 1992: 46). The Rundle Goverrunent in 
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1997 found further structural adjustments necessary when it declared its intentions to 
further reduce the number of councils to 'no more than fifteen' (LGAB 1997: 4) in a 
proposal as part of the 'Direction Statement of Tasmania'. The process collapsed 
mainly because of the top-down approach to the reform, which had failed also in past 
attempts at reforms and was in sharp contrast to the largely successful reforms of the 
early 1990s. 
The 1997 amalgamation proposals 
Councils were adjusting to the 1993 boundary changes when the Rundle 
Government's 'Directions Statement' signalled that there was no respite yet. The 
Directions Statement proposed a further reduction of the number of councils to 'no 
more than fifteen' (LGB 1997: 4). 
The strong objection to further amalgamation precipitated a legal challenge which 
together with a lack of political support for the government's reform agenda led to 
the defeat of the majority Rundle Government in the September 1998 election. The 
defeat of the minority Liberal Government and the election of the majority ALP 
Government witnessed the closure of the chapter of the proposed amalgamations and 
the creation of partnership between the incoming ALP Government and councils. 
The 1997 amalgamation proposal collapsed mainly because of its top-down approach 
to the process, which had failed also in earlier attempts at reform, and stood in sharp 
contrast to the largely successful reforms of the early 1990s. 
Despite the evidence of far reaching structural reform in the UK, New Zealand, 
Canada, and several Australian states, surprisingly little empirical research has been 
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collected and collated in these countries on the question of whether small or large 
local government units are preferable in terms of the economic efficiency with which 
they deliver goods and services; or on the democratic values that have been fostered 
through such a reform thrust. In reference to the UK, Boyne has argued that an 
'empirical vacuum' surrounds local government reorganisation in that country since 
'hardly anything is known about the consequences of structural change' (Boyne 
1992: 355). Sancton (1996: 285) made similar comments when he attacked the 
limited empirical academic evidence, and localised, and non-comparative nature of 
such inquiries in Canada. 
A reappraisal of the modernisation process 
The four components of the modernisation process have not been given equal 
attention at the implementation stage. Legislative and structural reforms have been 
pursued to greater extents, with vigour and over longer lengths of time than the 
rationalisation of roles and functions, and financial reforms. Despite the granting of 
general competence powers and expansion of the autonomy of councils of a sort, 
there is no evidence that the modernised act has affected significant changes to the 
state-local government power nexus. Reserve powers remain with the state 
government. For example, the state government reserves the power to dissolve a 
council, or replace elected representatives with appointed commissioners (as 
occurred in the state of Victoria). The state can still issue an order that a council may 
issue (as in the provision of the Tasmanian and NSW 1993 legislation), and is 
empowered to refuse approval to by-laws, overturn existing gazetted by-laws and in 
some cases can overturn council resolutions (as happened in Queensland but that 
power also exists in Tasmania), and set ceilings beyond which rates cannot rise 
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(Aulich 1999; Dollery and Johnson 2005; Dollery et al 2006; Kane 2006; Murray 
and Dollery 2006). 
Even under the reformed local government act, local government remains a creature 
of state governments (Wensing 1997; Aulich 1999b; Dollery and Worthington 2000). 
Unlike the developments at state and federal spheres of government, there is little 
evidence of increased executive power at local government level in Tasmania and in 
the other states and territories. Almost all states have given encouragement to a 
clearer distinction between policy and operational responsibilities within councils, 
and have strived to liken councils and their elected officials to a company's board of 
directors and its shareholders. This initiative represents efforts to refocus councillors 
on more strategic issues. However, this is happening against the backdrop of 
measures that are being taken by the state government to retain and even tighten 
control over local government activities via legislative and regulatory changes 
(Aulich 1999b: 15). 
To reduce vulnerability, many councils and mayors are calling for the question of 
constitutional recognition of local government to be revisited (constitutional 
recognition of local government was rejected in a 1988 referendum). This issue was 
high on the agenda of the ninth annual National General Assembly of Local 
Government in Canberra in November 2005. The benefits expected to accrue to 
constitutional recognition of local government include increased revenue to be 
brought about by cutting out the state's middleman's role in the financial transactions 
between local and federal governments and greater direct association with the 
Commonwealth which can bring some beneficial uniformity to the regulation of 
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local government, which at present differs markedly from state to state (Kane 2006: 
25). A third advantage to be derived from constitutional recognition is that 'a secure 
foundation of independent authority, as well as addressing such failures of power, 
might also enhance the ability of councils to coordinate their activities in 
strategically important areas like water resources and environmental management' 
(Kane 2006: 25). This point is particularly important for Queensland councils which 
have mandate for water management in their jurisdictions but which are now being 
threatened by the state's quest to bring that resource under the control of single 
regional authorities in geographical regions under state aegis (Kane 2006). 
As regards the rationalisation of roles and functions, little has been achieved. As 
indicated earlier, the Local Government Advisory Board's (LGAB) final Report on 
the Modernisation of Local Government acknowledged that there was a potential for 
redistribution of functions within the administrative responsibility of 17 state 
agencies which could possibly be performed by local government by way of 
devolution of responsibility or on contract basis (LGAB 1992). The area where the 
greatest potential exists for the immediate transfer of responsibilities is physical 
services which virtually duplicate the current activities performed by councils. In 
particular, this include maintenance of roads, bridge structures, national parks and 
protected areas including day use facilities, grounds for schools, public libraries, 
hospitals, and regional health centres (LGAB 1992: 14). Following the new act and 
the boundary changes, further consultations were undertaken to consider the state-
local government nexus, unfortunately this yielded only minor adjustment of the 
respective powers and functions of the two spheres of government (Aulich 1999b). 
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The only area where rationalisation of roles and functions occurred is water services 
(under the Water reform program of 1997). The water reform witnessed the 
reconstitution and transfers of ownership and operations of the hitherto state-owned 
and operated three regional water boards to local government. The three 
reconstituted councils-owned joint water authorities are the Hobart Regional Water 
Authority, Esk Water Authority and North West Water Authority (Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). The transfer of these water boards from 
state to local government has thus retained the scope and scale economies, as well as 
cross-subsidisation and community service obligation benefits that would have been 
lost from the continued ownership of the water boards by the state government. 
Clarification of roles and functions is a tenet well espoused by the purchaser-
provider split to not only minimise goal conflict but also enhance efficiency and 
effectiveness in the conduct of public business (Bailey and Davidson 1999; Ormsby 
1998; Siverbo 2004). More needs to done to seriously rationalise the roles and 
function that have duplicating and overlapping mandates, especially the physical 
services area identified by the LGAB. 
Perhaps it is to progress the role and function reform that partnership agreements 
have been established between the state and councils. The state government argues 
that the partnership agreements are a key mechanism for strengthening working 
relations with local government. The state government insists that the promotion of 
economic growth, social justice and community development are the government's 
strategic objectives for partnership agreements (Tasmanian Department of Treasury 
and Finance 2003: 2). For example, the state and the HCC signed a Capital City 
Partnership Agreement on 11 December 2001 to jointly progress a number of 
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initiatives that will provide benefits to the community of Hobart and the state of 
Tasmania (HCC 2001). The agreement which clearly spells out the part each party is 
expected to play covers a range of economic, social and environmental initiatives 
(HCC 2001; 2005). 
Rationalisation of roles and functions between councils themselves, especially 
between small size ones has received scant attention in the reform discourse. 
However, reform in this direction may serve as a hedge against forced 
amalgamations, which over a decade or so has been pursued as a policy option to 
drive local government efficiency. Now with the great ambivalence about the 
efficacy of amalgamation to produce efficiency and other gains (Dollery and Johnson 
2005; Allan 2003; Byrnes and Dollery 2002; Dollery and Crase 2004; Bishop 2000), 
alternative models that will rationalise the roles and functions between councils are 
advocated. These include ad hoc resource sharing (Johnson 2003), regional 
organisations of councils (Dollery and Marshall 2003; Marshall et al 2003), area 
integration or joint boards (Shire Association of NSW 2004), virtual local 
government (Allan 2001; 2003; Dollery 2003a; May 2003), and agency 
arrangements (Dollery and Johnson 2005). 
These alternative models, especially the resource sharing arrangements will enable 
councils (particularly small ones) to share resources such as specialised employees 
like environmental experts, town planners and skilled consultants, capital equipment 
such as earth-moving machines and mainframe computer facilities, administrative 
services, like information IT systems and entire operational services like domestic 
garbage removal and disposal (Dollery and Johnson 2005). The model that has the 
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potential to promote the introduction of the purchaser-provider split's key tenet of 
separation between government policy advice and operational matters into councils 
is Allan's (2003) 'virtual local governments'. He contends that if 'cost efficiency 
improves for some tasks, but policy appropriateness and service effectiveness 
deteriorates the bigger a municipality becomes, then an obvious solution is to 
separate council decision-making from council administration' (Allan 2003: 27). 
Perhaps the financial reform component of the modernisation process has received 
the least attention at the implementation stage. It has already been mentioned that 
despite the reforms the current arrangements that undergird state —local government 
financial relations produces inefficiencies as it distorts decision-making. Such 
inefficiencies and decision distortions stem from levies and charges on local 
government to fund services provided by the state, in which local government has 
little, if any, input; various fees and charging arrangements which are not 
commercially based and subsidies which reduce accountability (Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
This state of affairs puts Tasmanian local government in a financially stressed 
situation. The fiscal crisis is worsened by reduced state and Commonwealth financial 
assistance to councils, and the dwindling own source municipal revenue base. This 
problem is not peculiar to Tasmanian local government as other councils across 
Australia are also bedevilled by financial crisis. As Dollery et al (2006: 340) observe 
a notable feature of contemporary Australian local government is the on-going 
financially straitened environment in which it operates'. They contend that two 
aspects of this problem are central. First, local government revenue as a proportion 
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of national income has been declining relative to the upper spheres of Australian 
government for the past 30 years (Johnson 2003). For example, Access Economics 
has computed that the share of the national tax take accruing to local government has 
fallen from just over 6 percent in 1970/71 to 4.8 percent in 2003/04. 
Similarly, as a proportion of total Commonwealth tax revenue, the value of 
Commonwealth Financial Assistance Grants (FAGS) will have declined from 1.18 
percent in 1993/94 to just over 0.77 percent in 2007/08 on current estimates (Spokes 
2005). In addition, there is evidence that suggests that both state and Commonwealth 
governments remain reluctant to increase the revenue of local government through 
intergovernmental grants, other transfer payments or tax-sharing arrangements. This 
unwillingness to commit growth funds to local government was demonstrated vividly 
when in response to the Final Report of the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration (2003), entitled Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local 
Government, made no offer of additional funding, and instead urged local 
government to put in extra effort at resolving its own problems (Australian 
Government 2005). 
Second, property rates still stand as the only taxing revenue source for local 
government however, this income source is subject sometimes to regulation by state 
and territory governments. A good example of this is the ongoing imposition of "rate 
pegging" in New South Wales (Dollery et al 2006). Even in situations where state 
governments allow for determination of rate levels, councils are reluctant to take 
advantage of it to significantly raise rates in order to substantially boost revenue, due 
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largely to political pressure (Dollery et al 2006). Furthermore, the recent independent 
South Australian local government inquiry into financial sustainability sounded a 
caveat that 'ramping up rate revenue should be the last resort' (Financial 
Sustainability Review Board 2005: 5). The implication of all this is that upper tiers 
of government are unwilling to extend more financial assistance to local government, 
and councils themselves hesitate to apply their only taxing power to arrest the fiscal 
crisis confronting them (Dollery et al 2006). In the meantime something needs to be 
done and quickly too, in order to prevent (local) government failure, which is defined 
as the 'inability of a public agency (agencies) in a given tier of government in a 
multi-tiered system of government to achieve its intended economic efficiency and 
equity objectives' (Dollery et al 2006: 342). That is why many councils are 
responding in a variety of ways including the adoption of a host of organisational 
forms such as the purchaser-provider split, competitive tendering and contracting, 
and resource sharing just to mention a few, in order to reduce the costs of their 
operations, while increasing or maintaining service levels and quality. 
Council amalgamations represent the most vigorously pursued aspect of the 
modernisation process resulting in significant boundary changes and the reduction of 
the number of councils from 49 to 29. Case studies conducted by Chapman (1997), 
LGAB (1997) and Haward and Zwart (2000) indicate that efficiency gains in service 
delivery, administrative cost reductions, enhanced representation and community of 
interest, as well as the engagement of needed professional staff, were realised in 
majority of the cases. However, it is indeterminate whether these efficiency and 
democratic dividends are replicated throughout the amalgamated councils. 
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There is much ambivalence about the efficacy of amalgamation, despite its appeal, to 
increase efficiency and enhance democratic values. Both proponents and opponents 
of council consolidations are quick to stress their points. Proponents argue that 
amalgamation can enable councils to deliver services more efficiently and this will 
entail only a negligible trade-off in terms of less efficacious political representation. 
Katsuyama (2003: 2) presents a straightforward case for amalgamation. 'Proponents 
of consolidation argue that fewer and larger local governments will be more efficient 
and effective than many small governments {because} costs can be held down and 
perhaps reduced through the elimination of duplicative services, personnel, and 
equipment'. Moreover, 'larger govenunents may also be able to take advantage of 
'economies of scale or lower per unit cost for government services'. Further, 'a 
single unified government will be able to coordinate policies and decisions for 
activities, such as regional planning and economic development, than several 
independent governments'. 
The existence of numerous fragmented councils will mean that 'some services may 
benefit citizens in adjoining areas who neither pay for the service nor share in the 
effort involved in its delivery'. Accordingly, 'spill-over effects like this will be 
eliminated when the boundaries of the service area are the same as the boundaries of 
the taxing jurisdiction', and thus 'the tax burden within communities can be 
equalised through the creation of governments that more clearly match area needs'. 
Another point that is also important but missed by Katsuyama (2003) is the relevance 
of a notion that is central to the current New South Wales amalgamation debate, that 
is, representational costs decline in larger councils since there are fewer elected 
councillors for a given population (see Dollery and Johnson 2005; Vaden 2003). 
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Australian and international literature arguing against amalgamation abound. In 
Australia the subject has been dealt with by Dollery and Crase (2004) and its 
historical application has also received treatment by among others, Vince (1997) and 
May (2003). Critics attack the proposition that attributes significant economies of 
scale, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, to the application of amalgamation 
in councils (Byrnes and Dollery 2002). Sancton (2000: 74) makes his point against 
amalgamation clearly in his book entitled Merger Mania. He argues that 'there is no 
functional optimal size for municipal government because different municipal 
activities have quite different optimal areas'. In addition, it is contended that 'while 
economies of scope may be gained, there are cheaper alternative methods of 
capturing scope economies like regional organisations of councils' (Dollery and 
Johnson 2005: 83). 
Furthermore, although amalgamation may well enhance administrative capacity, it 
can also be realised by other arrangements at lower cost. Arguments that draw from 
public choice literature insist that effective representation characteristic of small 
councils enhances information flows between constituents and voters and thus 
exposes municipal expenditure to more intense scrutiny by ratepayers (Dollery and 
Johnson 2005: 83). The end result, they argue, 'small councils typically produce 
services at lower per capita costs'. Notwithstanding numerous exceptions, this 
viewpoint is supported by compelling evidence. For example, after examining the 
American evidence on amalgamation, Boyne (1998b: 252) concluded that 'the broad 
pattern of evidence suggests that lower spending is a feature of fragmented and 
deconcentrated local government systems', whereas 'consolidated and concentrated 
tend to be associated with higher spending'. This means that 'the technical benefits 
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of large units with big market shares, such as economies of scale and scope, are 
outweighed by competitive and political costs, such as disincentives toward fiscal 
migration and problems of scrutiny'. Similarly, Sancton (200: 75) argues that 'the 
public choice perspective shows us that it is no longer obvious that the existence of 
many municipalities within the same city — region causes wasteful overlap and 
duplication'. Finally, critics insist that amalgamation may undercut the vibrancy of 
local democracy and reduce participation by citizenry (Allan 2003; Dollery and 
Johnson 2005). 
As Dollery and Johnson (2005) contend, and judging by the case both for and against 
amalgamation, it appears the points on the cons side outweigh those on the pros side. 
Because there are many cases of local government failures in Australia in recent 
times, it may be difficult to establish a relationship between council size and council 
efficiency. 
The relevance of the amalgamation discussion to this thesis stems from the fact that 
its proponents claim, among other reasons, that it can enhance the efficiency of 
municipal service delivery, and make a larger pool of professional staff that is 
needed for effective discharge of council business available. Since the objective of 
this project is to investigate the impact of the purchaser-provider split on service 
delivery and employment in two Tasmanian local government areas — Hobart and 
Sore11, it will inevitably examine whether amalgamation is a co-determinant of the 
efficiency and effectiveness of municipal service delivery, and employment. 
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The modernisation process and the purchaser-provider split 
The modernisation process has provided an enabling environment for the purchaser-
provider split to be introduced into Tasmanian local government. The process has 
been influenced to some extent by the new public management (of which the 
purchaser-provider split is a part) and the outcomes of its implementation have 
helped progress some of the tenets and goals of the purchaser-provider split. For 
example, the reforms have advocated the separation of government policy advice 
from its operational responsibilities, enhanced reporting and accountability regimes, 
transparent pricing of goods and services, efficient resource allocation and 
introduction of competitive processes into public provision (LGB 2002; Aulich 
1999b). 
In terms of management of resources the reforms have sought to make Tasmanian 
councils more businesslike and more accountable for their resources and have 
required the provision of high quality services. This has entailed a deliberate effort to 
discipline public expenditure and enhance accountability of councils more to the 
communities they serve than to the state government (HCC 2005; LGB 2002; LGAB 
1992). Financial management improvement, devolution, clearer and stronger 
accountability regimes, performance evaluation and strategic management have been 
steadily ingrained into the local government culture through the reforms (Aulich 
1999b; HCC 2005; LOB 2002). 
For the purpose of delivering services more efficiently, local government has 
employed multiple different forms of provision like resource sharing, competitive 
tendering and contracting, increasing market influence on pricing of their goods and 
239 
• services, municipal amalgamation and updating technology to facilitate delivery for 
example, one-stop shops, online programs, quality accreditations (Aulich 1999b, 
HCC 2005; LGB 2002). All these shifts cohere in many respects with the reform 
which new public management and particularly the purchaser-provider split 
advocates. Some of the key tenets and goals of the purchaser-provider split include 
improved efficiency through competition in service delivery, efficient resource 
allocation, transparent and commercial pricing of goods and services, stronger 
accountability mechanisms by means of more transparent decision-making and 
clearer division of roles and reporting regimes (DoFA 1995; Aulich et al 1999; 
Ormsby 1998; Siverbo 2004), which all cohere with the dictums and the outcomes of 
the implementation of the modernisation process. 
As regards the governance issue, the modernisation process has focused on the role 
of local government, particularly through the reform of state local government acts 
(Wensing 1997; Aulich 1999b; Dollery and Worthington 2000). These acts have 
sought to clarify the respective roles of state and local government. It has also 
tackled the question of redefining the roles of councillors and staff with the result 
that elected members are clearly responsible for decision making, while senior 
managers and staff report to council through a general manager or chief executive 
officer (Wensing 1997; LGAB 1997; HCC 2005; Dollery and Worthington 2000a). 
Accompanying this effort at role clarification has been the use of benchmarking and 
performance measures aimed at identifying the capacities of local government and 
comparing them against "best practice". This, at least in theory, enables local 
government decision-makers to target problems and take remedial measure 
(Witherby et al 1997). Senior staffs are now appointed on the basis of merit and are 
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put on fixed-term performance —based contracts. For staff at other levels award 
restructuring and enterprise bargaining are impacting on working conditions 
(Wensing 1997). 
The rationalisation of roles and functions particularly in relation to the various actors 
within a council has helped at least to progress the implementation of, or create the 
enabling environment for, the adoption of one of the key principles of the purchaser-
provider split which advocates the separation of council's policy, regulatory and 
contract management functions from its operational responsibilities (Allan 2001; 
2003). The separation, it is argued, will enable the government agency to focus more 
on the key strategic issues of determining the mix and standard of services it wishes 
to provide to its community (Walsh 1991a: 135). 
It can be argued, based on the above exposition that, the launch of the modernisation 
process has assisted in the implementation of some of the tenets of the purchaser-
provider split in Tasmanian councils. To have the full repertoire of purchaser-
provider split's tenets operational in councils will then require extra efforts on the 
part of individual municipal authorities since applying the model is not mandated by 
legislation. Hence, there are differences between councils with respect to the number 
of the principles of the purchaser-provider split adopted, and the extent of their 
implementation and the attendant outcomes. For example, the two study councils — 
Hobart and Sore!!, are evaluated against the number of the principles of the 
purchaser-provider split they have adopted and the extent to which they have been 
implemented. 
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The HCC has introduced corporatisation and competitive tendering principles of the 
NCP. It established on the provider side Civic Solutions as a single entity to 
undertake civil and environmental construction and maintenance works in full 
competition with the private sector (Noga 1997; Ryan 1997). On the client side the 
council created City Services to handle all client functions in respect of Civic 
Solutions' works and services. Even though Civic Solution reverted to being treated 
as a division of the council following a decision of the council in 1998, and 
henceforth would not overtly compete in the market, it would continue as a 
controlling authority (LGB 2002). Civic Solutions provides services on the basis of 
contracts with City Services (HCC 2005; LGB 2002). All other provider divisions 
render services on the basis of quasi contracts or service level agreements with the 
council. The HCC has appointed a general manager on a five-year contract term 
which renewal is subject to good performance. Divisional heads in turn have five-. 
year performance contracts with the general manager. For staff at all other levels, 
award restructuring and enterprise bargaining have impacted on working conditions 
(HCC 2004; 2005; LGB 2002). 
Sore11 Council has appointed a general manager but it has not achieved the structural 
and cultural changes implied by the purchaser-provider split. No corporatised units 
have been created and separation of purchaser and provider sides have not occurred 
as it still has a program-oriented structure, implying an integrated approach to 
meeting its obligations. Achievement of its overall strategic objectives is realised 
through the contribution each functional area makes (Sore11 Council 2004). 
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Thus, the HCC has adopted a pure separation version of the purchaser-provider split 
in the case of Civic Solution, while for other divisions a partial separation variant is 
evident. In contrast, Sore11 Council has embraced neither the pure nor partial 
separation versions of the purchaser-provider split. 
Conclusion 
It can be concluded from the above discussion that the four components of the 
modernisation process have not been implemented to the same extent, with the same 
vigour and over the same length of time. The rationalisation of roles and functions 
assigned to the two levels of government, and the review of the relative revenue 
capacities available to each level, have not been comprehensive, and have lagged 
behind legislative and boundary changes. 
The review of the relative revenue capacities available in each sphere of government 
has not yet been vigorously pursued. There are still several examples of unfunded 
mandates, despite the reforms, that have impacted and are impacting on local 
government. Councils, for example, are required to contribute to library services, fire 
services and hospital as well as emergency services and yet have little, if any say, on 
their operations. This has implications for not only local government finances but 
also community democratisation. Various taxation exemptions, concessions, specific 
purpose grants and subsidies still characterise state-local government financial 
relationship, and this reduces accountability and distorts decision-making. State and 
Commonwealth governments have reduced their financial assistance to local 
government and local government is hesitant in significantly applying its only taxing 
source — property rate, to substantially raise own source revenue. Hence, local 
government is operating in a financially straitened environment and this could lead to 
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government failure if nothing is done as a matter of urgency to lift councils out Of the 
financial doldrums. 
Of the reforms foreshadowed when the modernisation process commenced in 1990, 
one that remains incomplete is the rationalisation of roles and functions. A review 
process with this as its goal gave priority to physical infrastructure services. Here, 
the water, sewerage and drainage services have been the only areas where major 
rationalisation has occurred. The rationalisation removed inefficiencies which 
hitherto cost the ratepayer somewhere between $7 million to $18 million annually, or 
$40 to $107 per annum per ratepayer (Felmingham and Page 1996). These 
inefficiencies included unexploited scale and scope economies as well as managerial 
diseconomies. The 1997 Water Reform Program exploited the remaining scale and 
scope economies and consolidated efficiency gains that had already been achieved. 
The democratic deficits concerns of local government have also been addressed 
following the transfer of ownership of the Regional Water Boards from state to local 
government. 
Despite these changes, overlap and duplication of functions and roles still occur 
between the two levels of government in many areas. This generates inefficiencies as 
it raises democratic concerns. Notable areas of overlap and duplication are library 
services, fire services, hospital services, emergency services, and regulatory matters. 
Legislative reforms have increased the autonomy of councils and granted them 
general competence power to appropriately respond to the needs of their 
communities. Legislative reforms have also improved accountability mechanisms, 
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reduced prescription, and changed council boundaries. The enactments of the 
environment, planning and building acts have enabled councils to control the 
development and management of the local areas, a role which has become an integral 
part of their core functional responsibilities. One of the far-reaching changes 
introduced by the new Local Government Act 1993 was a system of postal voting. 
The effect of this change was the increase in the average voter-return rate from less 
than 20 percent at earlier elections to almost 60 percent (Chapman 1997). However, 
reserve powers still remain with the state government which makes local government 
vulnerable — council resolution can still be overturned, by-laws can be disapproved, 
rates can be capped and councils can be dissolved, just to mention a few. 
Changes in boundaries of councils have been the most comprehensive, occurring 
over the longest period of time. The number of councils has been reduced from 46 to 
29. The driving force behind amalgamation was the attainment of greater efficiency 
through economies of scale, an aim which seems to have been achieved in the 
majority of cases. A secondary consideration was fostering some sense of 
community or community of interest in the new councils, which was largely 
accomplished. Other yardsticks for appraising the mergers were representation and 
participation and the cases that have been presented have not demonstrated these 
values have been sacrificed. However, because these findings were gleaned from a 
limited number of cases it would be difficult to generalise about savings and 
community democratisation across all councils. What is certain is that the 1990/93 
amalgamations were highly successful due to the cooperative and collaborative 
approach to the reform process. The failure of the 1997 amalgamation proposals and 
other earlier attempts at reform were attributed to the state government's unilateral 
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and non-consultative approach to the change processes. The efficiency gains from 
amalgamations are still unproven, as both positive and negative evidences have been 
reported. The loss of local democratic values is said to have occurred following 
amalgamation. 
Today, Tasmanian local government enjoys a positive working relationship with the 
state government. This has been demonstrated by the numerous bilateral, regional 
and state wide protocols or partnership agreements the state has signed with local 
government. These agreements have sought to guarantee the completion of the 




REFORM IN HOBART AND SORELL COUNCILS 
Three components of Australian local government reform are identifiable which are 
namely legislative, managerial and microeconomic. These policy-induced changes 
have substantially altered the nature and form of local government. Legislative 
reforms have changed the essential elements of councils' operations: granted them 
wider competence powers, reduced detailed prescriptions and changed planning and 
other delegated powers, and improved accountability mechanisms. Managerial 
reforms saw the major and continuous change for local government in its functional 
responsibilities, in the demands placed on its professional officers, and the need for 
councillors to be adaptable and change attitudes to their tasks. Microeconomic 
reform demanded economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the conduct of council 
business; it drew attention to ownership, outputs, costs, structures and systems; and it 
located public provision in relation to markets. 
These reforms are wide ranging and ongoing and a meaningful strategy to track and 
_evaluate these shifts is to conduct a few case studies since this approach is seen as a 
more rewarding exercise than a more superficial analysis of many cases (Lijphart 
1971). Lijphart's view is supported by the use of specific case studies of local 
government (for example, Chapman 1995; LGB 1997; Ryan 1997; Aulich 1997; 
Haward and Zwart 2000). For this reason, two Tasmanian cases, Hobart City Council 
(HCC) and Sore11 Council are used to evaluate in detail the outcomes of the three 
broad categories of reforms identified above. In Tasmania these three broad 
categories of reforms are relabelled as the modernisation process. This chapter 
evaluates the outcomes of the modernisation process in the two study councils — 
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Hobart and Sore11. It then compares and contrasts the outcomes in the (HCC) with 
similar effects in Sore!! Council. The evaluation of the outcomes of the reforms, as in 
the previous chapter, focuses on key concepts of efficiency, democracy and 
accountability. 
Background on Hobart and Sorell Councils 
Hobart City Council 
The city of Hobart is located on the shores of the Derwent Estuary, and in the 
shadow of Mount Wellington. Greater Hobart consists of five local government 
areas: Hobart City, Glenorchy City, Clearance City, Brighton and Kingborough. The 
Hobart City Council covers a total area of 78 sq km with a population of 46,181 
residing in eleven suburbs (see Figure 6.1). These suburbs are Battery Point, Fern 
Tree, Hobart Central Business District, Lenah Valley, Mount Nelson, Mount Stuart, 
New Town, North Hobart, Sandy Bay, South Hobart and West Hobart (KPIC 2000). 
The density of the population is 592.8 persons per sq km. The age distribution of the 
population is such that 15.8 percent is in the range of 0 and 14 years, while 18.8 
percent is in the 15 and 24 years bracket. Those aged between 24 and 64 years 
constitute 51.2 percent of the population while those in the category of 65 years and 
above make up the remaining 14.2 percent (KPIC 2000). 
The rate of economic growth in Tasmania is below that of the rest of Australia and 
this is linked to a wide range of factors, including low population growth, isolation, 
and the nature of the Tasmanian industry (HCC n.d). These factors similarly account 
for the low economic activity and growth rate of the HCC. The unemployment rate 




........... 	MIIIIIII CITY Or NOMAIRT Lowman OW 1 
with Greater Hobart, the HCC has a lower overall unemployment rate, yet has a 
higher youth unemployment rate (HCC n.d). 
Figure 6.1: Map of Hobart City Council 
Hobart boasts of a wide range of educational facilities including the University of 
Tasmania, 1 TAFE campus, 2 senior secondary colleges, 6 catholic schools, 4 private 
schools, 2 gender specific state secondary schools, 8 state primary schools, 4 
kindergarten, 1 alternative high school, and 3 special schools (HCC n.d). 
The city of Hobart is the focus of the Southern Region of the state and particularly of 
the urban spread that now effectively stretches from New Norfolk to Sorell and from 
Brighton to Huonville. It is an important factor in Hobart's daily life that its 
shopping centre, government buildings and retail business activities attract a 
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considerable number of the conurbation's 130,000 people each working day. This 
brings benefits to the city, but also strains its infrastructure. This has already 
prompted the council to join with neighbouring councils in a series of joint 
undertakings to infrastructure development (LGB 2002). It is expected that these 
arrangements will continue into the future. Older cities generally experience 
problems with aging infrastructure but the HCC is not confronted with this problem 
because it did not witness the level of post-war infrastructure expansion which 
occurred elsewhere (LGB 2002). Over recent years its assets have been managed 
well and it is unlikely the council will face the crisis, common throughout the state, 
of high renewal costs as assets constructed during the "baby boom" years reach the 
end of their lives (LGB 2002). 
The HCC provides numerous services across nine functional areas for its community. 
Some of these functional areas are public order and safety; health; welfare; 
community amenities; parking; transport; economic; water supply; sewerage; and 
recreation and culture. 
Sorell Council 
Sorell Council is located 25 kilometres east of Hobart and extends from the 
Fingerpost road on the Tasman Highway to approximately two kilometers south of 
the Dunalley Hotel at Dunalley (see Figure 6.2). In recent times the town of Sorell 
has expanded significantly due to its status as a regional, commercial and business 
centre for the southeast of the state. For the past twelve years the area has witnessed 
the fastest rate of growth in Tasmania and currently has a population of 11,072, with 
an average annual growth rate of 2.5 percent in the past ten years (Sorell Council 
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Figure 6.1: Map of Sore!! Council 
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2002). The median age in the municipality is 36.2 years. Included in the 50 percent 
of the population that considers itself of Australian ancestry, 3 percent are 
indigenous Australians. The other 50 percent is made up primarily of those who 
consider their ancestry English (Sore11 Council 2002). The main population centres 
for the municipal area are Midway Point, Sore11, southern beaches areas of 
Lewisham, Dodges Ferry and Carlton, as well as Primrose Sands and Dunalley, with 
a number of smaller communities in the rural hinterlands. 
Sore11 Council provides many services for its community. These services are 
provided across nine functional areas: public order and safety, health, welfare, 
community amenities, recreation and culture, transport, economic services, sewerage 
services, and water services. 
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Comparison of characteristics of Hobart and Sore11 Councils 
With a population of 11,072 and an area of 584 sq km, Sore11 Council is 7.5 times 
bigger than the HCC, but has 4.3 times less its population. The HCC generated on 
average, annual revenue of $65.4 million from 1994 to 2004; and has net assets of 
$596.054 million. The number of rateable properties in the municipality is 22,069, 
with on average, a total per capita rate of $1,033.5 from 1999/00 to 2002/03. For the 
above said period the council generated on average 69 percent of its revenue from 
rates, while grants made up only 6 percent (KPIC 2000). The total workforce of the 
HCC is 584 (HCC 2005) and this relatively large workforce enables it to be better 
served by the requisite professional staff than almost all the other councils in the 
State of Tasmania — an advantage that has enabled it to adapt more quickly to 
managerial and microeconomic reform notions such as commercialisation, 
corporation and the purchaser-provider split. 
The average revenue generated by Sore11 council from 1994 to 2004 was $9.6 
million. It has net assets of $47.683 million, with 7,146 rateable properties, and a 
total per capita rate of $525.5 (KPIC 2000). This suggests that Soren Council raises 
almost 7 times less the revenue of the HCC, has 12.5 times less the net assets of the 
HCC, and 3.1 times less the number of rateable properties of the former. Twenty 
three percent of its revenue comes from grants, while 60 percent derives from rates. 
Compared with the 6 percent and 69 percent respectively for grants and rates in the 
case of the HCC, it can be concluded that the HCC has greater capacity for own-
source revenue generation than Sorell Council. Sorell Council employs 66 people 
and lacks many of the requisite professional staff for the efficient discharge of its 
responsibilities (Sorell Council 2004). 
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The population structures of the two councils are fairly similar with half of the 
population in each council in the 25 to 64 years bracket. Sore11 Council has a slightly 
younger population than the HCC, since 36.78 percent of its population is aged 
between 0 and 24 years. This compares with the 34.66 percent falling under that 
bracket in the HCC. 
The modernisation process in Hobart and Sore11 Councils 
The extent to which councils have implemented the tenets of the modernisation 
process is affected by the requirements of legislation, the willingness of state and 
local governments to make mutual adjustments to their financial relationships, and 
the level of bureaucratic support and capacity available to councils to push through 
with the reforms. This section explores the extent to which the HCC and Sore11 
Council have implemented the modernisation agenda and the outcomes they have 
produced. 
Legislative reform 
The aim of legislative reform in local government is to ensure that councils and the 
Tasmanian community are provided with the most effective and efficient framework 
in which local government can function. When the Local Government Act 1993 came 
into force on 1 December 1994, it was seen as a framework document for the 
conduct of local government with much greater emphasis on accountability by 
councils towards the community and less towards the government (LGO 1997). The 
legislation was developed after extensive consultation with local government and 
gave recognition to the increasing demand for a more modem approach to the 
provision of local government administration and services. An undertaking was 
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given that the new local government act would be reviewed after reasonable period 
of operation in practice (LGO 1997). In recent times, a specific impulse towards the 
review of the act has stemmed from the need• to consider the requirements of 
National Competition Policy (NCP) principles on how councils can arrange to 
perform their operations and deliver services. 
The Local Government Act 1993 and subsequent legislative reviews have had 
significant impact on local government autonomy, level of general competence and 
structure as well as management and operational practices. The Local Government 
Act 1993 provides the constitution under which councils operate (Balmer 1996). It 
removed the distinction between Hobart and Launceston (which formerly operated 
under their own legislation) and all other councils by making all councils subject to 
the same act. This has had the advantage of applying a uniform set of laws across the 
state which facilitates benchmarking and other performance comparisons. For 
instance, it enables users of local government services and local communities to 
compare their council's performance with other councils and ensures the 
transparency and accountability of public funds. Further, it provides major funding 
bodies, such as federal and state governments with an analytical tool for the 
examination of the relationships between program funding and outcomes achieved. 
Finally, it is utilised by councils to benchmark service delivery and operational 
efficiency against similar councils in order that improved practices might be 
identified and adopted. 
As noted in chapter five, such standardisation has already enabled the Key 
Performance Indicators Committee (KPIC), Local Government Division, Department 
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of Premier and Cabinet, to produce seven consecutive reports (1990/00 to 2005/06) 
on local government performance (KPIC 2006). As a result of this standardisation 
the performance of the HCC across many areas of its activity for example, revenues 
raised from general and special rates or expenditures on roads, footpaths and traffic 
maintenance, or waste management, can be compared with similar revenues and 
expenditures of other councils. So for example, the HCC raised $27 million and 
$507,000 from general and special rates respectively in 2001/02, and incurred 
expenditures of $9.8 million (excluding depreciation) and $25.6 million (excluding 
training) respectively on roads, footpaths and traffic maintenance put together; and 
employees for the same period (KPIC 2002). The corresponding figures for 
Launceston City Council (LCC) for the same period in terms of revenues were $23.8 
million and $294,000, while the expenditure figures stood at $6.1 million and $21.8 
million (KPIC 2002). Based on the above statistics, it can be concluded that the HCC 
has stronger general and special rate revenue bases than the LCC. It is also 
discernible from the figures that the HCC spent more on roads, footpath and traffic 
maintenance put together; and employee wages and salaries than did the LCC in 
2001/02. 
The KPIC reports are in turn proving useful for the Local Government Board (LOB) 
in conducting general reviews of councils. A report on the general review of the 
HCC by the LOB for 2002 was presented to the then Premier Jim Bacon on 10 April 
2002. The standardisation has also provided the basis for the Commonwealth 
Government Minister for Local Government to provide to the Federal Parliament 
assessments, using comparable national data, of the performance of local government 
including its efficiency (NOLG 2003). Providing reports on local government to the 
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Federal Parliament is a requirement under the Local Government (Financial 
Assistance) Act 1995. Others changes introduced by the legislative reform included 
performance contracts for senior managers, accrual accounting, postal voting, 
strategic planning, and requirement for the publication of detailed annual reports on 
council activities. These elements are examined in turn below. 
Employment contracts 
One of the important requirements of the new Local Government Act 1993 is that 
local government emulate managerial reform initiatives that were already underway 
at the Commonwealth and State government levels. A significant element of this 
requirement was the decision to introduce a corporate management system into local 
government. This system included a general manager responsible to the council for 
the daily management and implementation of its policies, and a shift to accrual 
accounting (Chapman et al 1997: 208-9). The managerial reform in the HCC and 
Sore11 Council went in tandem with these legislative requirements, with the general 
managers in each council now employed on a five-year contract basis. The tenure of 
the general manager is now depended on performance and will not be renewed if the 
performance is found to be unsatisfactory. This renewal of tenure provides the 
opportunity for councillors to review the performance of the general manager on an 
annual basis. The review process is augmented by the informal quarterly briefings 
the general manager holds with elected representatives. This forum grants the elected 
representatives the opportunity to comment on any matters of concern in regard to 
the general manager's performance (LGB 2002). Divisional directors in the case of 
the HCC sign renewal five-year performance contracts with the general manager 
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(HCC 2004). For staff at other levels, award restructuring and enterprise bargaining 
are impacting on working conditions (Wesing 1997). 
Accrual accounting 
Reform directed by the Local government Act 1993 in the financial sector brought 
about a shift from cash accounting to accrual accounting. The act incorporated 
accrual accounting as a standard form for financial reporting by local government. 
The new accounting regime was meant to relief councils of the demands of the 
heavily regulated reporting system centred on traditional cash accounting with a 
stress on cash flow and required councils to adopt a more business-oriented model to 
their operations based on accrual accounting. The new accounting system requires 
that councils value all assets, account for potential expenditures and liabilities, 
provide for depreciation changes, and appropriate adequate funds for maintenance of 
assets (NOLG 2001a). 
The financial reports of the HCC and Sore11 Council are now prepared in accordance 
with applicable accounting concepts and standards. Except for certain assets, 
including infrastructure assets, which are disclosed in the notes forming part of the 
accounts for the year, the reports are now prepared on accrual accounting basis. 
Where necessary, comparative information are reclassified to achieve consistency in 
presentation with current financial year amounts and other disclosures (Sore11 
Council 1999: 57) The benefits that are predicted to accrue to the introduction of 
accrual accounting in both the HCC and Sore11 Council, like all other local 
governments in Australia, are: an expanded concept of accountability (as specified in 
the general program of microeconomic reform), effectiveness in asset management 
and availability of meaningful information on the full cost of activities and programs 
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(Bishop 1997: 174). In other words, the accrual regime has forced Australian local 
governments to adopt some market approaches in the conduct of their operations. 
Postal voting 
One of the significant shifts that were introduced by the new Local Government Act 
1993 was the decision to conduct councils' elections by postal voting. All residents 
who are listed on the State's House of Assembly electoral roll automatically received 
ballot papers (and a reply paid envelope) for the municipal area in which they live. 
They are thus are able to vote in the council election without going to a poling booth. 
The effect of this change was the increase in the average voter return rate from less 
than 20 percent at earlier elections to almost 60 percent (Chapman 1997). The 
Tasmanian Electoral Office (TEO 2002) reported that the state — wide response rate 
improved over the years in part as a result of the introduction of the postal voting 
system in 1994. In 2002 the state-wide response rate was 57.86 percent. This was 
higher than the 55 percent in 1994; 54.48 percent in 1996; 55.66 percent in 1999 and 
57.78 percent in 2000 (TEO 2002). 
Aside from the postal voting system, other factors that might have influenced the 
response rate over the years included the number of positions that were vacant, the 
number of candidates who contested the election, and the local issues at the time 
(TEO 2002). The introduction of the postal voting system has also affected voter 
turnout in the HCC and Sorell Council. In the HCC voter turnout increased to 55.5 
percent in 2000 from 49.9 percent in 1999. For the 2002 election the response rate 
was 51.59 percent (TEO 2002). For Sorell Council even though voter turnout fell 
from 56.61 percent in 1996 to 53.63 in 1999, it improved above its 1996 position to 
59.32 percent in 2000 before it decreased to 58.51 percent in 2002 (TEO 1996; 1999; 
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2000; 2002). It can be concluded from the response rates that voter apathy is higher 
in the HCC than Sore!! Council. 
Strategic plans 
Councils are required under the Local Government Act 1993 to develop strategic 
plans covering the forthcoming five years, and to consult with local communities 
both in determining the contents of the plans, and in relation to the annual report 
outlining the year's event. Through this means and others of similar nature, the act 
effectively makes councils responsible directly to the communities they serve, rather 
than to the Minister of Local Government and the State Government. The act also 
requires councils to provide the public with annual reports of their activities. These 
reports include summaries of their financial positions, indications of outcomes 
against the proposals in the annual plans, and advise to communities of the standard 
being achieved in areas such as water quality, effluent standards, waste disposal and 
environmental management (LGAB 1992). 
The HCC and Sore!! Council prepare operating plans each year as part of a gamut of 
planning documents including the Budget, Capital Works Program and Divisional 
Unit Plans. As Controlling Authorities in the HCC, Civic Solutions and the 
Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre (THAC) prepare corporate plans that are 
consistent with council's strategies and policies (HCC 2002). In 2001 the council 
adopted a new strategic plan based on citywide community consultation through a 
household survey and a series of workshops with employees and Aldermen. The 
resulting strategic plan, "The City of Hobart Strategic Plan 2001-2005" came into 
effect on 1 July 2001 and is available in two formats, a condensed version outlining 
the broad outcomes and strategies to be achieved and a comprehensive version 
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including actions and responsible council functions (HCC 2002). The comprehensive 
plan is also available on the council's Internet homepage. In parallel with the 
development of the new strategic plan a review was undertaken of the relationship 
and linkages between the strategic, operational and unit plans. The review brought 
about the realignment of the documents to reinforce the logical cascading of long-
term strategy to short term individual performance (HCC 2002). Accountability links 
and budget links were also defined in the process. 
In Sore11 Council the strategic plan provides an indication of the direction that the 
council and the community wish to take over the next five years. The plan is a rolling 
process which is reviewed regularly (Sore11 Council 2002). The first strategic plan of 
Sore11 Council was developed in 1995 and reviewed in 1999 after community 
consultation and stakeholder surveys and staff input. For the first time since the plan 
was developed, this document in the 1999 review became the focus of public 
meeting in council areas such as Midway Point, Sore11, Nugent, Dodges Ferry, 
Primrose and Dunalley (Sore11 Council 2002). Whilst attendance at the meetings 
were sometimes less impressive, the shades of opinions and ideas that were gathered 
proved invaluable. 
Undoubtedly the operational and strategic planning processes in the HCC and Sore11 
Council have several advantages. The planning processes are well integrated with 
original input from elected members, members of the public and the advisory groups 
translating into five year and annual plans. These are then linked to a series of unit 
plans that set more specific targets. It can be deduced from this new approach to 
planning in the HCC and Sore11 Council that the processes are now sensitive to 
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community aspirations and opportunities for local level development initiatives. 
They facilitate integrated analysis, synthesis and action and represent a wider 
approach to solving development problems. The plans now explores the interactive 
nature of planning as they clearly identify political and bureaucratic bodies and 
assign them with authority, responsibility and roles in ways that promote partnership 
in planning, identify functions, decentralise the planning system and effect 
integration and effectiveness in the formulation and implementation of development 
policies and programs at the district and sectoral levels. 
Community participation, inter-sectoral and inter-disciplinary collaboration are 
integral parts of the planning processes in the two councils, and they involve 
continuous monitoring and evaluation of implementation to provide effective 
feedback (MLGRD 1996). From the above exposition on the Councils' new 
planning approaches, it would not be out of place to posit that the planning process in 
the HCC and Sorell Council are in consonance with community based reform which 
emphasises participation and democratic control by citizens in affairs that affect 
them (Gardner 1991; Bellah 1991; Zimmerman 1999). 
Annual reports 
Councils are required by the Local Government Act 1993 to furnish the public with 
information on the extent to which they have used the resources at their disposal to 
meet their obligations. This information is mainly provided through the annual 
report. At the HCC the annual report is produced prior to the Annual General 
Meeting (AGM) and 21,000 copies are distributed to all households and businesses 
across the city (HCC 2002). Availability is also advertised to the public at large 
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through the AGM notification and copies are distributed to various government 
agencies, associations and councils. Sufficient copies of the report are retained for 
distribution to all new residents as part of a "new residents kit" of information. The 
report is also available on the council's Internet homepage (HCC 2002). 
The report relates performance of individual council functions against the strategies 
and actions contained in the strategic and operational plans. Performance measures 
have recently been built into the report. The 1998/99 report provided a five-year 
summary in the areas of operational expenditure, capital expenditure, borrowings, 
and employee numbers. The 1999/00 and 2000/01 reports provided a summary of 
key performance indicators relevant to the five major categories in the strategic plan: 
economic development, urban enhancement, environmental conservation, 
community well being, and quality management and customer services. The annual 
report for 2001/02 was restructured to reflect the new strategic plan introduced in 
July 2001 (HCC 2002). In addition to the commentary on activities the reports also 
contain the audited financial statements and listing of all grants and donations 
provided in the year of the report. 
Primarily the annual reports of Sorell Council furnish information on operational 
expenditure, capital expenditure, borrowings and employee costs. They also 
summarise the performance indicators relating to the five major headings under the 
strategic plan: social strategies, economic strategies, environmental strategies, 
financial strategies, and corporate strategies (Sorell Council 1999; 2002). Apart from 
the commentary on activities the reports also include the audited financial statements 
and listing of all grants and donations in the year of the report. 
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It has been made clear from above that the requirements for the presentation of the 
annual reports in both the HCC and Sore11 Council, as well as all other councils, are 
demanding and reflect Box's (1998) and King and Stivers's (1998) views that 
community based reform should be built on home rule, local control and responsible 
government. They are also a pointer to the notion of community government centred 
on values of citizen participation and democratic control (Gardner 1991; Zimmerman 
1999). Residents of the HCC and Sore11 Council could now be considered to rule 
because they and their elected representatives are drafted into the drawing of the 
strategic and operational plans, and they monitor the performance of their councils in 
the attainment of objectives. They exercise some amount of control in that they can 
demand explanation for sub optimal performance, and push reform via their exercise 
of the power of mandate renewal. They ensure responsible government in that they 
can sanction council by petitioning the Minister of Local Government if they have 
credible charge to the effect that council is grossly incompetent of carrying out its 
obligations. 
The demanding reporting and accountability regimes have also stemmed Fox and 
Miller's (1995: 35) criticisms of 'totalitarian tendency and citizen apathy' associated 
with the community model of government, in that the HCC and Soren Council have 
now symbolically relinquished some control to residents and collaborate with them 
in the drawing up of the strategic direction and vision as well as in the shaping of 




The current financial relationship between the state and local government puts the 
latter at a disadvantaged position. Although rate exemption for state properties is one 
of the major reasons for this situation, the problem is heightened by the state 
requirement that local authorities act as "tax collection agents" on behalf of the state 
in the provision of fire, library and other services. As noted in the previous chapter, 
even though local government is exempt from the payment of state government 
taxes, while it receives grants and subsidies from the state, these relief and assistance 
are negated by the rate exemptions local government also grants to state government 
agencies, statutory authorities and a number of government enterprises on crown 
land. Although service rates for water and sewerage are generally paid (Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). Moreover, while legislation protects 
state and federal governments from taxation, local government is required to pay 
Fringe Benefit Tax (FBT) and GST on many operations without any compensation 
for either the cost of administering these taxes or their impact on local services and 
employment opportunities (King Island n.d). 
Rate exemption for state properties granted by local government in 1993/94 was 
estimated to be about $5 million (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 
1994). Local government is exempt from the payment of state taxes, most notably 
payroll tax, land tax and stamp duties. The value of these exemptions in 1993/94 was 
estimated at $12.4 million (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 1994). 
The state government subsidises council costs by providing recurrent subsidies on 
the annual cost of water and sewerage schemes and by reimbursing pensioner 
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concessions up to a maximum of $318 in 2003/04 on individual rates. In 2001/02, 
state water subsidies amounted to $20,037, sewerage subsidies stood at $300,517, 
while the cost of pensioner rate remissions reached $12.8 million (Tasmanian 
Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
The cost to local government on its own is clearly far in excess of the benefits and 
exemptions granted to local government by way of payroll tax exemptions, valuation 
and audit subsidies and motor tax exemptions. The trend between 1979/80 and 
1982/83 indicates the gap between this benefit given to the state government and the 
benefits and exemptions received in return, has been increasing. In 1979/80, for 
example, the benefits and exemptions were equivalent to 93.8 percent of the potential 
forsaken as a result of state property exemptions (MAT 1984). By 1982/83, those 
same benefits received by local government were equivalent to only 63.8 percent of 
the benefits accruing to the state government from the rate exemptions for its 
properties (MAT 1984). This trend has not altered significantly to date even though 
total benefit to local government received from the state government including 
exemptions, subsidies and grants stood at $22.1 million in 1999/00, while total 
benefit to the state government received by local government for the said period was 
$12.8 million (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 1994). From the 
above statistics it can be concluded that in the financial relationship between the 
State, and the HCC and Sore!! Council, the latter are disproportionately 
disadvantaged. 
There are a number of advantages inherent in reciprocal taxation and that explains 
why some advocate its introduction into the financial relationship between the state 
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and local governments. Reciprocal taxation would result in the simplification of 
administrative arrangements through a reduction in the number of exempt entities, 
which assists in ensuring that the decision-making takes more account of the full cost 
of providing government services. The application of reciprocal taxation would also 
effect a closer alignment between the revenue and expenditure responsibilities of 
state and local governments, as well as facing them with charges that fully reflect 
costs, which will enhance the efficiency of resource management (SLGFRWG 
2002). 
Better resource allocation outcomes are therefore more likely if all government 
activity faces prices that are fully cost reflective, including taxation. Reciprocal 
taxation arrangements will also serve to improve the transparency and accountability 
of intergovernmental taxation. The application of the general rates to state properties 
would provide local councils with revenue in relation to properties that they service 
within their municipal area, thereby producing a closer alignment between council 
revenue and expenditure responsibilities. By making the property holding more 
transparent, it would encourage better asset management by state government 
agencies. 
This seemed to have eventuated with the HCC having to report that a major change 
has come into effect in the financial relationship between local government and State 
Government in the 2003/04 Financial Year. The parties have reviewed their financial 
exchanges with the result that the State Government now pays full rates for its 
properties and councils pay payroll and land tax (HCC 2004). 
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Library levy 
As mentioned earlier in chapter five, the Tasmanian Government provides library 
services and seeks a contribution from local government towards this cost annually 
in accordance with section 10 of the Libraries Act 1984. Each municipality in 
Tasmania makes a contribution to library services. It is equivalent to 0.35 percent per 
dollar of the adjusted assessed annual value of all leviable land, less a prescribed 
amount (collection fee) which is a maximum of 1.5 percent of the gross assessed 
contribution (Tasmanian Department of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
Table 6.1: Library contributions of HCC and Sore!! Council 
Year Contribution 
{S} 
HCC Sore11 Council 
1998/99 1 054 000 122 282 
1999/00 1 058 000 124 000 
2000/01 1 075000 125 526 
2001/02 1 102 000 124 647 
2002/03 1 119 000 421 793 
2003/04 1 118 000 441 170 
Sources: Annual reports of HCC and Sorel! Council from 1999899 to 2004/04 
Table 6.1 above shows the library contributions of the HCC and Soren Council from 
1998-/99 to 2003/04. The table indicates that the HCC's library contribution of 
$1.054 million in 1998/99 increased to almost $1.120 million in 2003/04, 
representing a 6.3 percent increase. Sorell Council paid $122,282 in 19998/99 and in 
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2003/04 its contribution had risen to $441,170 which is equivalent to a 261 percent 
increase. 
Even if these percentages were discounted for inflation the resulting figures would 
still be appreciable increases in contribution to library services by the councils over 
the said period. The equivalent of 2 percent of the HCC's rate revenue was paid to 
the State towards the provision of library services in 1998/99. The percentage 
contribution remained at 2 percent of the equivalent of rate revenue for 2000/01 and 
2001/02. Sore11 Council also paid the equivalent of an even 2 percent of its total rate 
revenue on the library levy in 2001/02 and 2002/03. 
The contributions to library services represent a financial impost to the councils 
when considered against the backdrop that the revenue base of local government has 
not been expanding appreciably over the years and the Commonwealth and State 
Governments have made cut backs to funding to councils. 
The HCC and Sore11 Council, like all Tasmanian local governments, pay fire levy to 
the state government. Table 6.2 below summaries the fire service levy payments of 
the HCC Sore11 Council to the State Fire Commission from 1998/99 to 2003/04. 
From 1998/99 to 2002/03 the contribution of the HCC to the provision of fire 
services rose from $4.054 million to $4.738 million representing 16.9 percent 
increase. Even if this percentage were adjusted for inflation it would still represent a 
significant increase in contribution by the council to fire services provision. In 
2003/04 the HCC raised total revenue of $82.2 million and paid $4.887 million out 
of this amount as fire services levy to the state government. This levy represented 5.9 
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percent of the revenue earned for that year (HCC 2003). The contribution of Sorell 
Council increased from $194,556 in 19998/99 to $225,274 in 2001/02, representing 
15.8 percent increase. 





HCC Sore11 Council 
1998/99 4 054 000 194 556 
1999/00 4197000 219 064 
2000/01 4 560 000 221 506 
2001/02 4 718 000 225 274 
2002/03 4 738 000 233 496 
2003/04 4 887 000 233 496 
Sources: Annual report of the HCC and Sorell Council from 1998/99 to 2004/05 
It is the view of majority of councils including the HCC and Sorell Council that the 
imposition of the fire services levy does have financial implications for local 
government in that as the collecting body, there may exist reduced rating capacity for 
local councils' own needs, through public perception created about which level of 
government imposes the levy (SLGFRWG 2002). A further concern of councils is 
that the levy is payable by them irrespective of whether or not the corresponding 
rates are collected. This can create financial difficulties for councils when a 
significant proportion of rates are effectively uncollectable, due to circumstances 
such as abandoned lands or chronic problems with bad debtors (SLGFRWG 2002). 
Under current arrangements there exists no mechanisms by which the inability to 
pass on the cost of the levy can be compensated for. 
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Planning and local government levy 
As noted in the previous chapter, the state government has involvement in the 
operation of local government through the Department of Primary Industries, Water 
and Environment, which both have policy, regulatory and advisory roles. Local 
government contributes to the cost of providing these services through a planning 
and local government levy equal to 0.15 percent per dollar of the total adjusted 
assessed value of all rateable (non-exempt) land in their municipality. 
Table 6.3: Planning and local government levy paid by HCC and Sore11 Council 
Year Contribution ($) 
HCC Sore11 Council 
1998/99 458000 53205 
1999/00 460000 53229 
2000/01 471000 53870 
2001/02 472000 54246 
2002/03 479000 68634 
2003/04 506000 74778 
Source: Annual reports of HCC and Sore!! Council from 1998/99 to 2004/05 
Local government paid the state government $2.6 million in planning and local 
government levy in 1999/00, while in 2001/02 it paid $2.7 million. The contributions 
of the HCC and Sorell Council to the planning and local government levy from 
1998/99 to 2003/04 are shown above on Table 6.3. The table indicates that from 
1998/99 to 2001/02 the HCC's levy increased from $458,000 to $472,000, 
representing 3.1 percent increase. It then increased to $479,000 in 2002/03 and again 
to $506,000 in 2003/04, representing 1.0 percent and 5.6 percent increase 
respectively. The planning levy of Sorell Council increased from $53,205 in 1998/99 
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to $54, 246 in 2001/02, an equivalent of 2 percent increase. It increased further from 
$68,634 in 2002/03 to $74,778 in 2003/04, representing almost a 9 percent increase. 
The impact of this levy is very similar to the library levy. Both levies represent a 
direct financial impost on local government, as these two levies are not explicitly 
levied against individual ratepayers. In both cases councils have little input into how 
funds are expended. This is undemocratic as it precludes local democratic structures 
from participating in all affairs that affect them, a trend at loggerheads with 
community based reform, which advocates the full involvement of local people and 
institutions in all the processes at the local level (Zimmerman 1999; Gyasi 1979). It 
is also an example of vertical fiscal imbalance. As with the library levy there is an 
argument for the removal of this levy on accountability, responsibility and 
transparency grounds, to align funding responsibilities with those associated with 
service delivery (SLGFRWG 2002). 
Rationalisation of roles and functions 
There are many areas of public service delivery where state and local governments 
have duplicating and overlapping roles and responsibilities. As reported in chapter 
five, the Local Government Advisory Board (LGAB) (1992) in its final report on the 
Modernisation Process, revealed that there was a potential for a distribution of 
functions within the administrative responsibility of 17 state agencies which could 
possibly be performed by local government through the devolution of responsibility, 
or by contractual arrangements (LAGB 1992). The area that was identified to have 
the greatest promise for the immediate transfer of responsibilities was physical 
service, which virtually duplicated the current activities performed by councils. In 
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particular, this related to maintenance of roads, bridges, national parks and protected 
areas including day use facilities, grounds for schools, public libraries, hospitals and 
regional health centres (LGAB 1992: 14). The overlap and duplication of functions 
between the state and local governments come in for criticism on efficiency and 
democracy grounds. For the HCC and Sore11 Council the following services are a 
few examples where overlapping and duplicating mandates have generated 
diseconomies and democratic deficits. 
Provision of library and fire services 
As noted earlier, the Tasmanian Government currently provides library and fire 
services and seeks a contribution from local government toward the cost. Local 
governments in all other Australian states and territories render library services and 
receive a contribution from the state to meet the cost (Tasmanian Department of 
Treasury and Finance 2003). 
The creation of a two-tiered library system with the state responsible for regional 
libraries and state administration will not only afford an opportunity for local 
communities to play a much greater role in the provision of services but also enable 
them to tailor those services to community preferences and expectations. The ability 
to re-emphasise the volunteer and community nature of urban, country and rural 
brigades through the partial devolution of responsibility to local government will 
entice greater community involvement in fire protection. The co-provision of fire 
protection is also reasonable because members of any neighbourhood for reason of 
proximity are most likely to arrive first at a fire outbreak scene in that neighbourhood 
before the State Fire Commission. If this suggestion is adopted it would enhance 
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civic activism and participation on the part of local people in their community affairs 
(Timney 1998; Foley 1998; Gray and Chapin 1998). 
Provision of planning services 
The state government acts as a watchdog over the way in which local authorities 
carry out their planning activities. This is to ensure that council decisions do not 
result in adverse impacts on other councils or the provision of state government and 
certain private sector services. The HCC has legislative responsibility to plan and 
manage the sustainable growth, use and development of the city and its natural and 
physical resources together with maintenance of the public health of its residents and 
visitors (LGB 2002). The council's Development and Environmental Services 
Division is a multi-disciplinary team-structured division with the following principal 
functional responsibilities arising directly from legislature and a number of the key 
areas of the city of Hobart strategic plan 2001/05: development appraisal, structure 
planning and scheme review, urban design (strategic), heritage and conservation, 
public health and environmental health services. All of the above functional activities 
are carried out and paid for fully by the council, yet it has to still pay the planning 
and local government levy to the state government. Sorell Council, like the HCC 
undertakes and pays for its planning activities but it is still obligated to make 
payment of the planning levy to the state government. Arguably this levy acts to 
confuse the responsibilities between the councils and the state government for the 
funding and provision of services. 
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Provision of water services 
As mentioned in the preceding chapter, findings of London Economics and 
Felmingham and Page studies were influential in the Water Reform Program of 
1997. Under the 1997 Water Reform Program the Hobart Regional Water Board was 
transferred from state government ownership and established pursuant to section 38 
of the Local Government Act 1993 as a joint authority — Hobart Regional Water 
Authority, and trading under the name of Hobart Water. Eight councils in and around 
the greater Hobart area own Hobart Water. These councils include Hobart City, 
Glenorchy, Kingborough, Brighton, Derwent Valley, Sorell, and Southern Midlands. 
The Hobart City Council's ownership interest in the equity of the joint authority on 
30 June 2001 was 28.94 percent, with a voting power of 4 out of a total of 20 votes 
(HCC 2001). 
Sorell Council's equity in the said year was 2.003 percent (or $2,533,325 of a total of 
$126,475,557 in net assets). The council's voting power in the joint authority is 1 of 
20 votes (Sorell Council 2002). The council's share of the equity was recognised as 
an asset in the accounts during 1998/99, and is revalued every five years in 
accordance with the Revaluation of Non Current Asset Policy (Sorell Council 2002). 
It is clear from the figures that the Hobart City Council's ownership interest in the 
joint authority is bigger than that of Sorell Council, so too is its voting power. The 
differential voting powers is equitable when viewed against the backdrop of the 
councils' respective equity in the joint authority. The voting powers the councils now 
hold have stemmed their remoteness from important water services decisions, a 
democratic deficit, which they resented under the erstwhile Regional Water Board. 
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Amalgamation 
Neither the HCC nor Sore!! Council were affected by the 1993 restructuring of 
council boundaries. However, both councils were recommended as candidates for 
amalgamation with other councils in the 1997 amalgamation proposals. In reference 
to the Greater Hobart Council the Local Government Board (LGB) had considered 
three main options for local government structures. In addition to Greater Hobart 
Council to replace the present urban areas of the Hobart, Glenorchy and Clarance 
City Councils, the LGB had considered a two council model involving an Eastern 
Shore and a Western Shore council. It had also considered the alternative of largely 
retaining three urban councils for the area encompassed by the Greater Hobart 
Council (LGB 1998). 
The LGB in its Principal Recommendations, the Exposure Draft and Final Reports 
preferred the Greater Hobart Council alternative to the other two options. Giving 
reasons for its preference, the LGB contended that the financial efficiencies that 
could be generated by the Greater Hobart Council were clear and had been estimated 
to be $14 million (LGB 1998). At the same time, the LGB continued to be of the 
firm view that concerns about the capacity of the Greater Hobart Council to deliver 
effective, responsive and timely services were unjustified. 
In relation to the two council option for the greater Hobart area, the LGB financial 
modelling revealed that the division of the greater Hobart urban area into Western 
shore and Eastern shore councils would generate significant efficiencies, although 
not to the same extent as could be expected from a Greater Hobart Council. In the 
absence of effective regional body arrangements, 'it would also produce inferior 
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outcomes in respect of improved coordination and integration of issues of regional 
significance' (LGB 1998: 4). 
The third option, which was the preferred option of the three metropolitan Hobart 
councils, involved a three council model under which three separate councils within 
the greater Hobart urban area would be retained and which would see the 
establishment of a joint authority and the implementation of the other efficiency 
measures to realise the savings available under other options (LGB 1998). In essence 
the proposal of the metropolitan councils assumed that the joint authority would 
produce the "external" outcomes in the form of improved coordination and 
integration of strategic objectives and policy development and implementation (LGB 
1998). The "internal" efficiencies would be gained by promoting what is described 
as competitive behaviour, including extensive competitive tendering and contracting, 
on the part of the three councils in lieu of more conventional measures to generate 
economies of scale. The councils believed that this approach could produce 
efficiency gains at least the equal of the Greater Hobart Council, and that it would 
also result in better governance arrangements and greater effectiveness in other 
respects (LGB 1998: 5). 
In rejecting the argument of the Hobart councils for their preferred boundary option, 
the LGB contended that its financial modelling suggested that the efficiency gains 
which they attributed to the three council/joint authority model were also available to 
the Greater Hobart Council and to the two council models. It also suggested that the 
economies of scale available to the other models were not available to a significant 
degree under the three councils model (LGB 1998: 5). Based on this argument the 
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LGB concluded that the proposal of the Hobart councils did not provide a viable 
alternative to its preferred Greater Hobart Council. The metropolitan councils could 
not hide their frustration and disappointment at the rejection of their proposal. 
The recommendation of the LGB for the creation of a Greater Hobart Council in its 
final report to the government was not only resented by the Hobart metropolitan 
councils but it generally also received a negative reaction from local government 
over the process by which the LGB arrived at this recommendation. Opinion polling 
and elector polls conducted by several councils revealed the opposition and 
resentment towards further restructuring. Elected members of local government did 
not understand why further restructuring was being forced upon councils while 
proposals for comprehensive parliamentary reform at State Government level was 
receiving little or no attention (Haward and Zwart 2000). 
The 1997 amalgamation proposals directed the merger of Sorell Council with 
Tasman, Glamorgan/Spring Bay and parts of the Southern Midlands and Clarence 
councils. Following the release of the Premier's Direction Statement a series of 
discussions occurred between representatives of the Tasman, Sorell and 
Glamorgan/Spring Bay Councils which led to a submission to the Local Government 
Board. During these discussions it was obvious that each council preferred to remain 
as a separate entity but judging this was unlikely, alternative proposals had to be 
developed to reduce the number of councils in the South East from five to two 
(Sorell Council 1999). 
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When the 1997 amalgamation could not materialise the councils in the South East 
lamented the considerable effort and time they had invested in the preparatory work 
to embrace the mergers. They however, could point to a number of benefits that 
accrued to the networking at the preparatory stage towards the amalgamation. The 
liaison, friendship and corporation that developed between staff and elected members 
of the councils while working in committees, group discussions, and meetings on the 
proposed mergers, would otherwise have remained inaccessible. Another benefit was 
the creation of closer links and understanding between people in the region which 
certainly was of enormous value in enhancing the development of partnership 
agreements between the councils and the state (Sorell Council 2002). 
The growing resistance to the 1997 proposals for the further restructuring of local 
government reached a head when legal complications and lack of political support 
for the government's reform agenda precipitated a defeat of the minority Rundle 
Government in the September 1998 elections. The defeat of the minority Liberal 
Government and the election of the majority ALP Government saw the demise of the 
proposed amalgamations and the birth of partnership between the incoming ALP 
Government and councils. The reform proposal did not succeed due mainly to the 
top-down approach to the process, which had suffered similar fates in past attempts 
at reforms and therefore stood in sharp contrast to the impressively successful 
reforms of the early 1990s. 
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Significant business activities 
The HCC and Sore!! Council, like most other councils, introduced some elements of 
the NCP into their operations in line with the Tasmanian Government's Application 
Statement. The HCC has demonstrated commitment to the implementation of the 
NCP principles. The council has applied a gamut of commercial principles to its 
operations. These include a restructuring to create two controlling authorities to 
manage in a commercial fashion, the major business activities of Civic Solutions and 
the Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre (THAC). As entities with commercial focus, 
both authorities operate on strong business principles and employ contemporary 
practices to achieve efficiency and effectiveness (LGB 2002). In addition to the two 
controlling authorities where the reconfiguration on the basis of a client — provider 
separation and the use of contracts to define relationships of parties is marked, other 
provider sides now operate on the basis of service level agreements with the client 
side. These contracts and agreements specify the targets, standards, performance 
expectations and timelines to be complied with by the service providers. 
Sore!! Council is gradually adopting commercial principles in relation to its 
operations. A number of corporate expenses are now being attributed to activities 
(significant business activities and others) in line with the tenets of full cost 
attribution. This has facilitated better understanding of the true costs of providing 
services (Sore!! Council 1998; 1999). Occasionally prices are tested through public 
tendering of works. 
The annual reports of the HCC and Sorell Council contain financial information on 
their significant business activities (SBAs), including the notional competitive 
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neutrality costs. Pursuant to section 84 (2) (da) of the Local Government Act 1993, 
the HCC has identified water supply and sewerage as significant business activities. 
It has also identified parking and the Tatesall's Hobart Aquatic Centre as 
commercial-like undertakings (HCC 2002). Sore11 Council has listed road and 
transport together with the trading activities of water and sewerage as significant 
business activities. Details of these SBAs of both councils are set out below. Since 
water and sewerage occur as SBAs in both councils they are presented in composite 
forms as Tables 6.4 and 6.5 indicate. 
Water services involve the purchase of bulk water, water reticulation and water 
quality control. Table 6.4 shows that in the 2001/02 financial year, the revenue and 
expenditure figures for water services of the HCC were respectively $9.456 million 
and $8.131 million, which earned a profit of $1.325 million. In 2002/03 the water 
services revenue was $8.97 million, while the expenditure stood at $9.03 million, 
resulting in a loss of $58,000 loss. The competitive neutrality costs for water services 
for 2001/02 and 2002/03 were $10.194 million and $8.438 million respectively. In 
2004/05 the revenue for water was $11 million while the expenditure reached $10.1 
million, with a profit margin of $0.851 million and competitive neutrality costs of 
$6.5 million. 
The table also shows that Sore11 Council earned water revenue of $0.868 million and 
incurred expenditure of $0.680 million in 1999/00, which resulted in a profit of 
$196,139. The competitive neutrality cost for water services that year was $60,748. 
For 2001/02 the revenue and expenditure figures were respectively $0.715 million 
and $0.666 million, with a profit margin of $49,717. The competitive neutrality cost 
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reached $98,383. The revenue, expenditure, profit/loss as well as competitive 
neutrality cost for 2002/03 reveal similar pattern of revenue over expenditure, and 
profit rather than loss as bottom line. 
Table 6.4: Financial information on Water suvlv of HCC and Sorell Council 










1999/00 HCC 7589000 8028000 -439000 18062000 
Sore!! 868120 671981 49717 60748 
2001/02 HCC 9456000 8131000 1325000 10194000 
Sore!! 715276 665559 49717 98383 
2002/03 HCC 8972000 9030000 -58000 8438000 
Sore!! 872426 710556 161870 117437 
2004/05 HCC 11000000 10149000 851000 6488000 
Sore!! 966000 977195 -10912 94748 
Source: Annual reports of HCC and Sorell Council from 1999/00 to 2004/05 
The revenue, expenditure and profit figures for that year were $0.872 million, $0.710 
million and $11,437 respectively. For 2004/05 the revenue and expenditure figures 
were respectively $0.966 million and $0.977 million. This resulted in a loss of 
$10,912. The competitive neutrality cost was $94,748. 
Sewerage services 
Sewerage services that are delivered by the HCC and Sorel! Council embrace 
reticulation, treatment and discharge of sewage effluent. Table 6.5 sets out the 
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financial details of sewerage services of both councils from 1999/00 to 2004/05. The 
table indicates that the HCC generated sewerage revenue of $5. 013 million and 
incurred expenditure of $6.250 million in the 1999/00 financial year, with an 
operating loss of $1.237 million. In the 2001/02 financial year the revenue and 
expenditure amounts were respectively $6.083 million and $5.789 million, with an 
operating profit of nearly a third of a million. For 2002/03 the revenue and 
expenditure figures were respectively $7.658 million and $6.648 million, which 
resulted in an operating profit of about $1 million. The competitive neutrality costs in 
respect of sewerage services from 1999/00 to 2002/03 were $12.760 million, $7.101 
million and $6.458 million respectively. In 2004/05 sewerage services earned 
revenue of $7.395million and incurred expenditure of $7.225 million, which resulted 
in a profit of $140 000, with competitive neutrality costs of $6.934 million. 
The table also indicates that Sore11 Council earned in 1999/00 of $0.622 million in 
sewerage revenue, while it incurred expenditure of $0.359 million. The bigger 
revenue over expenditure brought in a profit of $262,887; with competitive neutrality 
cost that stood at $94,622. For 2001/02 the revenue and expenditure figures were 
$0.825 million and $0.560 million respectively. The profit was $264,297, while the 
competitive neutrality cost reached $17,963. The picture for 2002/03 is not different 
from the previous years. Revenue for that year was also bigger than the expenditure. 
The revenue was $0.856 million, while the expenditure amounted to $0.564 million, 
resulting in a profit of $291,639. The competitive neutrality cost reached $257,288. 
The revenue, expenditure and loss for 2004/05 were $0.754 million, $0.846 million 
and $91,176 respectively. The competitive neutrality cost was $229,953. 
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Table 6.5: Financial information on Sewera e services of HCC and Sorell Council 










1999/00 HCC 5013000 6250000 -1237000 12760000 
Sore!! 62010 359123 262887 94622 
2001/02 HCC 6083000 5789000 294000 7101000 
Sore11 824575 560278 264297 17963 
2002/03 HCC 7658000 6648000 1010000 6458000 
Sore!! 855704 564065 291639 257288 
2004/05 HCC 7395000 7225000 140000 6934000 
Sore11 753785 845546 -91761 229953 
Source: Annual reports of HCC and Sorell Council from 1999/00 to 2004/05 
The HCC has gone beyond what is required under the NCP by publishing the 
revenues and costs of other activities which are not SBAs. These activities are the 
Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre (THAC) and Parking Activities. The council from 
2001/02 onwards has separated parking into On-Street and Off-Street in the annual 
report (LGB 2002; HCC 2002). Details of these activities are set out below on Tables 
6.6, 6.7 and 6.8. 
Table 6.6 below shows the revenues, expenditures and profit/loss as well as the 
competitive neutrality costs in respect of THAC from 2000/01 to 2003/04. The table 
indicates that the Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre's (THAC) revenue and 
expenditure for the 2000/01 financial year were respectively $2.2 million and $2.4 
million approximately, which resulted in an operating loss of $162 000. In the 
2001/02 financial year, THAC earned revenue of nearly $2.4 million and incurred 
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expenditure of approximately $2.6 million, culminating in an operating loss of 
$269,000 (HCC 2002; 2003). In the 2002/03 financial year THAC's revenue and 
expenditure figures were respectively $2.80 million and $2.98 million, which 
resulted in an operating loss of $183,000. For 2003/04 the Centre's revenue 
amounted to $3.3 million whilst the expenditure stood at $3.7 million, resulting in an 
operating loss of over a third of a million, and competitive neutrality costs of $1.6 
million. 
Table 6.6: Financial details of Tattersall 's Hobart Aquatic Centre 
Year Revenue Expenditure Profit/Loss Competitive 
{$} {$} {$} Neutrality 
cost 
IS) 
2000/01 2 193 000 2 355 000 -162 000 1 711 000 
2001/02 2 379 000 2 648 000 -269 000 1 355 000 
2002/03 2 792 000 2 975 000 -183 000 1 383 000 
2003/04 3 336 000 3 667 000 -331 000 1 618 000 
Sources: Annual reports of the HCC from 2000/01 to 2003/04 
According to the HCC, THAC's poor financial performance for the past four years is 
blamed on a fire that occurred on 4 April 2001, closing the centre. The centre re-
opened on 14 September 2001. Accordingly the above figures include approximately 
nine months of operating revenue and expenses for 2001/02 and 2000/01 and 
insurance claims recoveries relating to lost revenue. The total amount received from 
council's insurers is $4.99 million (HCC 2002: 54; HCC 2003: 58). 
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Off-Street Parking 
In respect of off-street parking, the HCC's revenue, expenditure and profit/loss as 
well as competitive neutrality costs from 2000/01 to 2003/04 are displayed on Table 
6.7 below. The table indicates that in the 2000/01 financial year off-street parking 
brought in revenue to the tune of $2.67 million, while it incurred expenditure of 
$2.46 million approximately.. 
Table 6.7: Financial details of off-street parking operations of HCC 
Year Revenue Expenditure Profit/loss Competitive 
($) {$} {$} Neutrality 
cost 
{$} 
2000/01 2 665 000 2 459 000 206 000 2 726 000 
2001/02 2 717 000 2 713 000 4 000 2 804 000 
2002/03 2 711 000 2 704 000 7 000 2 786 000 
2003/04 2 894 000 2 566 000 -328000 2 975 000 
Sources: Annual reports of HCC from 2000/01 to 2003/04 
This resulted in a profit of $206,000. For the 2001/02 financial year the revenue and 
expenditure figures were respectively $2.72 million and $2.71 million, which yielded 
a profit of $4000. In the 2002/03 financial year the revenue and expenditure figures 
stood at respectively $2.71 million and $2.70 million, earning a profit of $7000. The 
competitive neutrality costs of off-street parking from 200/01 to 2002/03 were 
$2.726 million, $2.804 million and $2.786 million respectively. For 2003/04 off-
street parking brought in revenue of nearly $2.9 million and incurred expenditure of 
almost $2.6 million, which resulted in an operating profit of a little over a third of a 
million, with competitive neutrality costs of almost $3 million. 
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On-Street Parking 
Table 6.8 shows the financial standing in relation to on-street parking. It is clear from 
the table that for the 2000/01 financial year the HCC's on-street parking activity 
brought in revenue of nearly $3.6 million, while it incurred expenditure to the tune of 
$2.5 million, which resulted in a profit of $1.04 million. For the 2001/02 and 
2002/03 financial years the revenue figures were $3.331 million and $3.787 million 
respectively. 
Table 6.8: Financial details of on-street parking operations of HCC 
Year Revenue Expenditure Profit/Loss Competitive 
{$} {$} {$} Neutrality 
costs 
{$} 
2000/01 3 571 000 2 531 000 1 040 000 492 000 
2001/02 3 331 000 2 437 000 894 000 443 000 
2002/03 3 787 000 2 577 000 1 210 000 545 000 
2003/04 4 622 000 3 003 0000 1 619 000 716 000 
Source: Annual reports of HCC from 2000/01 to 2003/04 
The expenditure figures for the said periods were $2.4 million and $2.6 million 
respectively. The operating profits for the two periods were $0.9 million, and $1.2 
million respectively. The competitive neutrality costs for on-street parking for 
2000/01 and 2001/02 stood at $492,000 and $443,000 respectively. In the 2002/03 
financial year the competitive neutrality costs was $545,000. In 2003/04 on-street 
parking raised revenue of $4.6 million and incurred expenditure of $3.0 million, 
which brought in a profit of $1.6 million, with competitive neutrality costs of $0.7 
million. 
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The SBAs of roads and transport services of Sore!! Council are shown on Table 6.9 
below. It is shown on the table that in 19999/00 roads and transport services earned 
Sore!! Council revenue of $1.837 million but it incurred expenditure to the tune of 
$2.512 million, resulting in an operating loss of $677,034. The competitive neutrality 
was $2201. 
Table 6.9: Financial information on roads and transport services of Sorell Council 
Year Revenue Expenditure Profit/loss Competitive 
neutrality 
{$} {$} {$} cost 
($) 
1999/00 1837092 2511925 -674034 2201 
2001/02 1765478 2336587 -601109 2299764 
2002/03 1762506 4472661 -2710155 8352007 
Source: Annual reports of Sorel! Council from 1999/00 to 2002/03 
For 2001/02 the revenue was $1.765 million, while the expenditure was $2.337 
million, which resulted in well over three-fifths of a million operating loss. The 
competitive neutrality cost was $2.3 million. The picture for 2002/03 revealed a 
similar pattern of excess expenditure over revenue. Revenue earned that year was 
$1.762 million, while expenditure incurred stood at $4.472 million, culminating in an 
operating loss of $2.710 million. The competitive neutrality cost was $8.352 million. 
Assessing the changes 
The legislative and managerial reform components of the modernisation process in 
the HCC and Sore!! Council, as in all Tasmanian councils, have been implemented to 
greater extents than the rationalisation of finances and roles and functions between 
287 
the state and local• government. Structural reform has not entailed amalgamations in 
either council and internal re-organisation in terms of the purchaser-provider 
separation has occurred only in the HCC. In that sense, it can be argued that 
organisational change has had greater expression in the HCC than Sore11 Council. 
As noted in the preceding chapter, the modernisation process has led to the pursuit of 
at least two agendas: first, the improved management of resources and, second, 
governance issues and especially the redefinition of roles and responsibilities of the 
various actors in local government. The first agenda has been seen as initiatives 
aimed at making councils more business-like and more accountable for their 
resources and has required the delivery of high quality services at reduced costs. All 
Tasmanian councils, including the HCC and Sore!! Council, can be considered to 
have embraced the language of the new public management. Like most local 
governments across Australia, municipal reforms in Tasmania (modernisation 
process), have brought about financial management improvement, devolution, 
clearer and stronger accountability regimes, performance evaluation and strategic 
management (Aulich 1997). To ensure that services are delivered in a more efficient 
fashion, councils have employed an array of models such as resource sharing, 
competitive tendering and contracting, increasing market influences on pricing of 
their goods and services, municipal amalgamation and updating technology to 
facilitate delivery for example, one-stop shops, online programs, and quality 
accreditation. 
These changes are certainly discernible in the HCC and Sore11 Council following the 
launch of the modernisation process. For example, the HCC has established a distinct 
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management stratum, expected managers to update their technical skills, and has 
adopted a strong customer-focus, setting up a one-stop customer centre (Ryan 1997; 
LGB 2002; HCC 2004). Sore11 Council has complimented consultation and 
participative processes with a customer-service culture at the point of service 
delivery (Sore11 Council 2004). Both councils publish financial information on their 
SBAs, including the notional competitive neutrality costs. That information is 
available at anytime to demonstrate the full cost of any activity with all overheads 
attributed on justifiable bases (LGB 2002; Sore11 Council 2005). A number of 
corporate expenses in both councils have been attributed to activities (SBAs and 
others) in line with the principle of full cost attribution. This affords a better 
understanding of the true cost of providing a particular service (LOB 2002; Sore11 
Council 2004). 
The HCC has restructured to create two controlling authorities to manage in a 
commercial fashion, the major business activities of Civic Solutions and the 
Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre. As commercial entities both operate on strong 
business principles and employ contemporary practices to achieve efficiency and 
effectiveness outcomes (LGB 2002; HCC 2005). In addition to the two controlling 
authorities the council has been structured to achieve a client-provider separation 
operating on service level approach for operational work, and specifications and 
drawings for project work (LGB 2002; HCC 2004). This method attempts to ensure 
that service standards are specified and delivered at the best price. Testing of pricing 
is undertaken by the occasional public tendering of works, by competing for external 
contracts on full cost basis and through price comparisons between council's internal 
provider and external quantity surveyor (LGB 2002). 
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The second agenda has sought to clarify the respective roles of state and local 
government, increase devolution and local capacity, mandate consultation and 
reporting as part of the strategic management process, and enhance provisions for 
referenda to ensure that councils are more accountable and responsive to the 
communities they serve (Aulich 1999). 
Both the HCC and Sore11 Council have embraced all these changes. For example, 
they have developed 5-year strategic plans, publish comprehensive annual reports on 
their activities and finances, and use a variety of mechanisms to consult with their 
communities, including targeted consultation programs, and the provision of 
opportunities for input into the development and planning for projects and events 
(LGB 2002; Sore!! Council 2004). In the HCC for example, extensive consultation 
programs are undertaken for all major developments such as the North Hobart 
Cultural Park and Skate Park, the Sandy Bay Beach Redevelopment Plan, and the 
redevelopment of the "50 and Better Centre" (LGB 2002). To reduce functional 
overlap and duplication, the HCC and Sore!! Council have signed partnership 
agreements with the state. These agreements cover a range of social, economic and 
environmental initiatives that will bring benefits to the councils and Tasmania as a 
whole. The agreements spell out the part to be played by each party in progressing 
the range of initiatives. 
Despite these accomplishments, the modernisation process has not brought in all the 
desired outcomes. Notwithstanding the granting of general competence powers and 
expansion of councils' autonomy of a sort, there is no evidence that the modernised 
local government act has affected significant changes to the state — HCC and Sore11 
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Council power nexus. As noted in the previous chapter, reserve powers remain in the 
hands of the state. For example, the state government has power to dissolve any 
council (including the HCC and Sore11 Council), or replace elected representatives 
with appointed commissioners (as occurred in Victoria in the 1990s) (Aulich 1999). 
The state can still issue an order that the HCC or Sore11 Council may issue, and is 
empowered to refuse approval of their by-laws, overturn their existing gazetted by-
laws and in some cases can overturn their resolutions (as happened in Queensland), 
and can cap rates (Aulich 1999; Dollery et al 2006; Kane 2006; Murray and Dollery 
2006; Dollery and Johnson 2006). 
Even under the reformed local government act, local government remains a creature 
of the state government (Aulich 1999; Wesing 1997). In contrast to the development 
at state and federal spheres, there is little evidence of increased executive power at 
the local level in Tasmania and in the other states and territories. Local governments 
are encouraged by the states to make clearer distinction between policy matters and 
operational responsibilities; they have attempted to liken councils and their elected 
officials to a company's board of directors and its shareholders. This move can be 
viewed as an attempt to focus councillors on more strategic issues. However, this is 
coming at a time when state government political executives are taking measures to 
retain and even have tighter control over local government activities through 
legislative and regulatory changes (Aulich 1999: 15). To reduce such power 
vulnerability, councils and mayors are calling for constitutional recognition of local 
government. 
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The rationalisation of roles and functions between the HCC and Sore11 Council, like 
all other councils, and the state, has received little attention. Following the new local 
government act and boundary changes, further consultations were conducted to 
consider the state-local government nexus, unfortunately this yielded only minor 
adjustment of the respective powers and functions of the two spheres of government 
(Aulich 1999). More needs to be done to comprehensively rationalise the roles and 
functions of the state and local government, especially in the physical services area 
identified by the Local Government Advisory Board (LGAB 1992). 
Rationalisation of roles and functions between councils themselves, especially 
between small ones, may represent a hedge against forced amalgamation, which for 
the past decade or so has been justified as a means to improve efficiency of local 
government operations. However, much ambivalence surrounds the efficacy of 
amalgamations (Dollery and Johnson 2005; Allan 2003; Brynes and Dollery 2003; 
Dollery and Crase 2004). Rationalisation of roles and functions between the HCC 
and Sore11 Council will afford opportunity for the former (which has relatively bigger 
resources base) to share these resources with the latter that lacks in many respects. 
For example, the HCC can share resources such as specialised employees like 
environmental experts, town planners and skilled consultants, capital equipment like 
earth-moving machinery, with Sore11 Council. Because both councils were 
untouched by the 1990/93 amalgamations and for the reason that the 1997 Directive 
Statement's proposal that they be merged with other councils in their respective 
surroundings failed, resource sharing between them may stem any future decision to 
force consolidation on them. This is because efficiency gains that are expected from 
mergers could also be achieved by resource sharing. 
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The financial reform element of the modernisation process has received the scantest 
attention at the implementation stage. It has already been stated that despite the 
launch of the modernisation process the current arrangement that underpins state and 
local government financial relationship generates inefficiencies as it distorts 
decision-making. Inefficiencies of these sorts derive from levies and charges on local 
government to fund services provided by the state in which local government has 
little, if any, input; various fees and charging arrangements which are not 
commercially based and therefore distort decision-making (Tasmanian Department 
of Treasury and Finance 2003). 
This situation puts Tasmanian councils in a financially distressed position, a state of 
affairs exacerbated by reduced state and Commonwealth financial assistance to local 
government. Property rates which are the only taxing revenue source of local 
government is sometimes subject to regulation by the state, and councils are 
reluctant, even if permitted to determine rate levels, to substantially raise rates in 
order to significantly boost revenue, due to political pressure (Dollery et al 2006). In 
the meantime something has to be done to bring councils out of the financial 
doldrums and to prevent local government failure. That is the reason why councils 
are responding by introducing a host of organisational forms and measures such as 
the purchaser-provider split, competitive tendering and contracting, and resource 
sharing, just to mention a few. These measures can help local governments reduce 
the costs of their operations and increase or at least maintain service levels and 
quality. 
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The purchaser-provider split and the reforms in the HCC and Sore11 Council 
The doctrine of the new public management (NPM) has influenced in many respects 
the Tasmanian local government modernisation process. The launch of this reform 
agenda has brought about some of the managerial and economic reforms advocated 
by the NPM in councils including the HCC and Sore!! Council. Management 
practices such as strategic planning and program management, financial, human 
resource and IT management as well as monitoring and evaluation have been 
mandated and effected in councils. For example, the HCC has developed an 
Executive Information System as an aid to the monitoring of its critical functions and 
in identifying potential problems at the earliest opportunity (LGB 2002). Flexible 
organisational forms and the devolution of authority and responsibility, with 
increased scrutiny and accountability has occurred in both councils, especially in the 
HCC where divisional heads are free to use the resources at their disposal, as they 
think fit, to meet their obligations (HCC 2004). A customer-focused organisational 
culture and responsive forms of service delivery have been suffused into both 
councils, particularly in the HCC where a one-stop customer service has been 
established; online option for the delivery of some services are available in both 
councils (HCC 2005; Sore!! Council 2004). 
The two councils have now become conscious of the costs of their operations, 
demonstrating this by market-testing their pricing, introducing competitive tendering 
and contracting to diversify their sources of supply, and attributing a number of 
corporate expenses to activities in tandem with the principle of full cost attribution 
(LGB 2002; Sore!! Council 2004). The HCC has corporatised units such as Civic 
Solutions and introduced the purchaser-provider model of service provision, with the 
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relationships between the purchaser and provider sides being governed by contracts 
and service level agreements. The changes in the HCC cohere in several important 
respects with the tenets of the purchaser-provider split: separation between council's 
policy advice and operational matters, introduction of competitive processes, 
commercialisation, corporatisation, stricter accountability and reporting regimes, 
efficient resource utilisation, the use of contracts to define relationships, and 
performance monitoring and evaluation. 
Sore11 Council apart from appointing a general manager has not pursued the 
structural and cultural changes implied by the purchaser-provider split. No 
corporatised units have been established as most services are provided in-house in an 
integrated manner, with no separation between purchaser and provider sides. The 
council has a program-oriented structure and its aims and objectives are achieved 
through the contributions that individual units can make. The HCC and Sore11 
Council are therefore suitable cases for study in relation to the impact of the 
purchaser-provider split on service delivery in Tasmanian local government since the 
latter will provide a counterfactual of the former. 
Conclusion 
The modernisation process and the NCP have played complimentary roles in altering 
the structure, operations and management practices of the HCC and Sorell Council. 
They have also pushed the councils' boundaries of democracy, efficiency and 
effectiveness further. Legislative reform has shifted accountability of both councils 
away from the state government and towards their communities. It has also subjected 
all councils to the same act by removing the distinction between Hobart and 
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Launceston (which formerly operated under their own legislation) and all other 
councils by making all councils subject to same act. This has facilitated 
benchmarking and other performance comparisons between the HCC and LCC as 
well as other councils, both intra — and interstate. 
Legislative reform has also imposed demanding reporting and accountability regimes 
on the HCC Sore11 Council, and elevated planning to an exercise predicated on 
integrated analysis, synthesis and action that represented a wider approach to solving 
development problems. Planning at the HCC and Sore11 Council now identifies 
community participation as an integral part of the process. A significant achievement 
of legislative reform was the decision to conduct election by post. This has pushed 
the boundaries of democracy in the two councils further. Voter turnouts in the HCC 
and Sorell Council have increased following the introduction of the postal voting 
system (TEO 2000). 
The financial relationship between the two councils and the State Government still 
operates disproportionately in favour of the latter. The continues imposition of a fire 
service levy on local government has implications for the both councils in that as 
collecting agents, there might exist reduced rating capacity for their own needs, 
through public perception created about which level government imposes the levy. 
The impact of the planning and local government levy is very similar to the library 
levy. Both levies represent a direct financial impost on the two councils, as these two 
levies are not explicitly levied on ratepayers. In both cases councils have little input 
into how funds are expended. This has implications for democracy as it precludes 
local democratic structures from participating in affairs that affect them, a trend at 
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odds with community approach to government. It is good news though, that for the 
2003/04 financial year the State Government and local government have reviewed 
the financial exchanges between them. As a result, the former now pays full rates for 
its properties and the latter pays payroll and land tax. 
The implication of this for the HCC and Sore11 Council is that it will enhance better 
resource allocation outcomes because their activities will now face prices that are 
fully cost reflective, including taxation. Reciprocal taxation arrangements will also 
serve to improve the transparency and accountability of intergovernmental taxation. 
The application of the general rates to state properties would provide the councils 
with revenue in relation to properties that they service within their municipal areas, 
thereby producing a closer alignment between council revenue and expenditure 
responsibilities. On the other hand, the benefit of this review to the State government 
is that by making the property holding more transparent, it would encourage better 
asset management by state government agencies. 
There are still many instances of functional overlap and duplication between the 
HCC and Sorell Council on the one hand, and the state government on the other, 
such as the provision of fire, library and planning as well as health and emergencies 
services. For the HCC and Sorell Council, the creation of a two-tiered library system 
with the state responsible for the regional libraries and administration would enable 
them to take charge of the lower tier to enhance efficiency and effectiveness in 
service delivery as well as customise those services to community requirements. The 
co-delivery of fire services by the councils and the state government will re-
emphasise the volunteer and community nature of brigades, while the removal of the 
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planning and local government levy will eradicate the confusion that currently 
surrounds the responsibilities between the councils and the state for the funding and 
provision of services. 
The creation of a joint water authority, Hobart Regional Water Authority has 
retained the scope and scale economies gains, as well as the cross-subsidisation and 
community service obligation benefits that would have been lost from the London 
Economics privatisation proposal and continued ownership of the water board by the 
state government. It has also stemmed the HCC and Sore11 Council's remoteness 
from important water services decisions because they now have voting powers of 1 
and 4 respectively out of 20 votes. Under the former Regional Hobart Water Board 
both councils, like all other constituent councils, had no vote. 
The HCC and Sore11 Council have demonstrated commitment to the implementation 
of NCP. They have applied a gamut of commercial principles to their operations. For 
the HCC this has entailed restructuring to create two controlling authorities: Civic 
Solutions and Hobart Aquatic Centre, and a client/provider separation. Other 
initiatives of competitive natures in operation in the council include competitive 
tendering, competitive neutrality and full cost attribution. These measures have 
located public provisions in relation to markets, but as the LGB has pointed out, the 
issue of NCP has generated significant expectation on the part of commercial and 
property owners and interest to the extent that the council would continue to receive 
much public pressure to go beyond a narrow application of NCP principles (LGB 
2002). Sorell Council applies a range of commercial principles to its operations 
especially its significant business activities. It has not embraced the purchaser- 
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provider split as services are still provided in-house in an integrated fashion. No 
corporatised units have been established. The council has a program-oriented 
structure with its mission being fulfilled by the contributions each unit makes. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
INSTITUTIONAL CHANGES IN HOBART AND SORELL COUNCILS 
During the last decade, the federal government had increasingly involved other 
sectors in the delivery of government services and implementing policy through 
contractual arrangements involving a wide range of providers. As a result Australia 
has shifted away from having little interest in any widespread adoption of the 
purchaser-provider split under successive Labor Governments to an elaborate 
application of the model under a Liberal led Coalition Government. For some 
departments this has become the standard way that many services are delivered. For 
example, the Department of Family and Community Services, one of the largest 
Commonwealth portfolios, responsible for family and social welfare policies, 
currently spends $730 million on partnership agreements with 1500 non-government 
organisations (APSC 2003). The agreement between the Department and Centrelink 
to provide income support payment is claimed to be the largest purchasing agreement 
of its kind in the southern hemisphere and one of the largest in the world (APSC 
2003). 
This chapter reviews the traditional organisational structures and practices of the 
HCC and Sore11 Council. It then sketches changes that have resulted from the 
introduction of the NCP and the purchaser-provider split into the councils. The 
analysis seeks to demonstrate that the NCP and purchaser-provider split have 
changed the councils' organisational structures, culture and practices. 
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The Purchaser-provider split in Hobart and Sore11 Councils 
Until recently most council structures were based on technical and functional 
differentiation. The HCC's prevailing structure a decade ago was fairly traditional 
for local government. It was based on five autonomous departments whose heads and 
deputy heads were directly and permanently appointed by the council as a whole. 
The Town Clerk, as the overall head of the council, had little real authority over the 
departments, given that termination of the department head or his or her deputy 
required majority vote in the council (Noga 1997: 80). Subsumed under the 
departments were a raft of input and process units, including road, hydraulic, waste 
and traffic engineering, development planning, environmental planning, community 
development, parks and landscape, sport facilities, human and financial services, 
public and environmental health, asset construction and maintenance, just to mention 
a few. 
Middle management was essentially task-oriented, and promotion was based on 
acquiescence and obedience of rules and regulations rather than merit. By this time 
the tenets of managerialism, including corporate planning, objective setting, business 
planning, program budgeting and performance monitoring, were well established in 
other levels of government, but not in the HCC (Noga 1997). 
A similar traditional structure was discernible in Sore11 Council. Under a Town Clerk 
and Deputy Town Clerk, there were divisions belonging to the Manager of 
Engineering, Chief Health Inspector, City Treasurer, Corporate Affairs coordinator, 
City Architect and Town Planner (Sore11 Council 2004). Under these appeared a 
broad range of input and process units including road, footpaths/streets lighting, 
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water, sewers, community development, public and environmental health, financial 
services and development planning, among others. 
National Competition Policy in local government 
With the advent of National Competition Policy (NCP) a new institutional 
framework was introduced which required councils to separate their non-business 
activities from their business activities. While this policy did not mandate the use of 
the purchaser-provider split in councils, it did provide a favourable environment for 
its adoption. The policy's emphasis on the need for governments to be more 
conscious of the cost and quality of services they provide; its preference for 
competitive practices; its stress on accountability; and its keenness for results, meant 
its goals cohered in many respects with those of the purchaser-provider split. The use 
of the purchaser-provider split means that those who set policy represent purchasers, 
while providers are in-house divisions or units, or external community, public or 
private sector organisations. The purchaser's functions include contributing advice 
on, developing of, policy; managing the council's assets; undertaking regulatory 
functions; or monitoring the services provided for council. The provider's functions 
embrace: delivering services to the community; delivering services to other 
organisations or individuals on commercial basis; or delivering internal support 
services to other council employees or units (Ryan 1997: 170). 
In accordance with the tenets of NCP the relationship between the non-business 
purchaser side and the business provider side is to be mediated by contracts or 
agreements, which specify the level of service required for a negotiated price. It is 
incumbent upon councils to furnish the clients or purchasers with a policy framework 
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with agreed goals, and purchasers are to be accountable to councils for their 
performance in achieving these goals. Councils are also expected to set up provider 
businesses through an agreed statement of corporate intent and rules of operation, but 
they are to operate at arm's length from providers. Providers will be governed on a 
day-to-day basis by the terms of the contract or service level agreements and will be 
accountable for meeting these terms (including reporting on-going performance to 
clients) (Ryan 1997). 
The NCP regime has not made competitive tendering compulsory although it does 
encourage councils to employ competition to affect savings and enhance the quality 
of services. Corporatisation of councils' significant business activities and the 
adoption of full cost attribution are encouraged by the NCP. The NCP dictates that if 
councils corporatise their significant business activities they will become legal 
entities (corporatised units or controlling authorities) with sole ownership by the 
parent council. They will have a board which will be responsible for appointing a 
general manager. Full costs will henceforth include equivalent taxes and debt 
guarantees to effect competitive neutrality. Councils however, will be free to apply 
competitive neutrality more stringently than suggested under NCP. 
Councils can also establish non-significant business activities as in-house business 
units. These will constitute separate accounting entities with business plans which 
will be required to pay tax and debt guarantee equivalents to council. They will not 
run as legal entities independent of the council, nor will they have boards of 
directors, although they may appoint a manager who will be responsible to the 
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general manager. Under the NCP internal services are considered as non-business 
client activities (Tasmanian Government 1996; Ryan 1997). 
New structure of HCC under NCP 
The HCC and Sore11 Council have both responded to the NCP agenda even though 
their pathways reveal important dissimilarities. It can even be said that their 
responses constitute two different transformation approaches. Informed by the 
experiences of councils in New Zealand and Victoria, Aldermen and management of 
the HCC were determined to push through similar changes in their council. They 
were convinced that competitive pressures from providers both within and without 
Hobart (including interstate and international providers) would impact upon the 
council and its operation even in the short-term. The prevailing view indicated that 
adopting full-scale corporatisation and competitive tendering was important for 
survival. 
In line with this thinking, the HCC in mid 1996 established on the provider side, 
Hobart City Council Enterprises, a Holding Authority, to connect the full council and 
the Controlling Authorities and Joint Authority. Civic Solutions, a Controlling 
Authority was set up under section 37 of the Local Government Act 1993 as a single 
entity to undertake civil and environmental construction and maintenance works in 
full competition with the private sector (Noga 1997; Ryan 1997). Tecton Consulting 
and Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre, Controlling Authorities, and a Joint 
Authority, Greater Hobart Regional Nursery were also established under section 37 
and 39 respectively of the Local Government Act 1993. An overview of these 
authorities is in order. 
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Hobart City Council Enterprises 
The Hobart City Council Enterprises operates under the registered name Hobart City 
Council Enterprises (HCCE). It links the full council as a body politic with the 
various authorities. The HCCE is governed by a board of six aldermen and operates 
according to a statement of corporate intent and operating rules set down by the full 
council. The authority's primary role is to approve of directions being pursued by the 
other authorities and to monitor their performance (Noga 1997). 
Tattersall 's Hobart Aquatic Centre 
The Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre operates under the registered name 
Tattersall 's Hobart Aquatic Centre, which was established to operate the new 
international aquatic centre. The authority is governed by a board of four, two of 
whom are to be drawn from the private sector, the centre's chief executive and a 
representative of council's general manager. It will function according to a statement 
of corporate intent and operating rules set down by the full council and monitored by 
the holding authority (Noga 1997). 
Civic Solutions 
Civic Solutions was established as a Controlling Authority under section 37 of the 
Local Government Act 1993. It operates under the registered name Civic Solutions. It 
was established as a single entity to compete with the private sector in civil and 
environmental construction and maintenance works. Its operations extend across 
parks and bush land management, waste-water treatment, water and sewerage 
reticulation, stormwater and drainage works, waste management and landfill sites, 
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and highway construction and maintenance. A board of four, three of who are drawn 
from the private sector, and council's general manager, governs Civic Solutions. The 
authority functions according to a statement of corporate intent and operating rules 
set down by the full council and monitored by the holding authority (Noga 
1997:185). The original intention was for Civic Solution to compete in the open 
market however, this decision was reviewed in late 1998 when the council upheld 
that Civic Solutions would revert to being treated as a Division of the council 
provided that the efficiency and effectiveness gains achieved over the previous three 
years were maintained and/or improved (LGB 2002). It was agreed that Civic 
Solutions would continue as a Controlling Authority but it would be recognised as an 
entity of the council. It was also resolved that the entity's core work and community 
service obligation functions would not be placed on the market. In addition, the 
council upheld that Civic Solutions was not overtly compete in the market (LGB 
2002). Since then external work has been executed on request from external 
organisations. 
The HCC revised the structure of Civic Solutions Advisory Board in May 2001 by 
not re-appointing the external representatives and substituting the Board for an 
Advisory Group made up of the Director of City Services and Director of Parks and 
Customer Services, representing the clients; the Director of Civic Solutions 
representing the provider; and the Director of Financial Services and the General 
Manager assuming the position of chairmen (LGB 2002). Civic Solutions continues 
to operate along commercial lines and employs a full cost attribution approach to its 
financial management and costing systems. Civic Solutions provides works and 
services on contract basis with the council. A specialist unit of the council, City 
306 
Services handles all client side functions in respect of the works and services that are 
provided by Civic Solutions. All other provider divisions render services on the basis 
of service level agreements or quasi-contracts with the council. 
Tecton Projects Group 
Even though the intention was to corporatise the design and project management 
unit, Tecton Projects Group, this to date has not materialised due to its strategic 
importance to the council. The Group provides internal consulting services to all 
council divisions in architectural projects, engineering projects and tender and 
contract management. Tecton Projects Group does not compete for external contracts 
(LGB 2002). 
Although the application of the NCP agenda, especially corporatisation, in the HCC 
has not been total and far reaching, it is undeniable that these changes have brought 
about considerable restructuring of the HCC (see Figure 7.1). The striking feature 
about the new structure of the council is the clear separation of the 'client and 
corporatised provider functions into sides of the organisation, so much that there is 
now a complete disjunction between the client divisions and service delivery — a 
complete and formal separation of policy and implementation (Ryan 1997: 173). The 
shift of the council away from the traditional bureaucratic organisational frameworks 
to structures that are reminiscent of models found in the private sector organisations 
has raised the problem of balancing the now emphasised economic objectives against 
other social and environmental imperatives. The ability of the council to perform 
this balancing act effectively will continue to be tested for sometime to come since 
the economic theories which underpin the NCP are coached only in the language of 
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the market. The new directors of the business units are appointed by the general 
manager on five-year performance based contracts. By implementing some of the 
tenets of the NCP the HCC has oriented itself toward a market future. 
The boundaries of independence, freedom and purpose of council's corporatised 
units have been pushed further, thus giving them the competitive edge in the service 
market of the future irrespective of the type and extent of the competition that may 
arise. To that extent the council's adoption of this new organisational format may be 
seen as providing for the commercial possibilities of the NCP agenda to be realised 
to the maximum extent (Ryan 1997). Even before the introduction of the NCP 
agenda, however, management had already been grappling with the problem of 
integration and coordination across divisions in relation to its policy goals and 
strategic directions. This separation has further fragmented the council, an outcome 
which is contrary to the prevailing expectation of achieving integration through 
contracts and service level agreements. Storch (1996) also raised this concern when 
he acknowledged that a lack of skill amongst managers in contract specification and 
monitoring has made effective integration trickier. 
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Executive Corporate Financial City Services Civic Development & Community Park & Customer 
Management Services Services Solutions Environmental Development Services 
Services 
Corporatised Provider Side 	 Non Corporatised Provider 
Sources: Interviews; Annual reports 
s.0 
New structure of Sore11 Council under NCP 
Sore!! Council's responses to the NCP are not in tandem with those of the HCC. 
Sore!! Council's approach to NCP is more circumspect. To date, no corporatised 
units have been created, even though it is on the agenda to do so in the course of 
time. When this intention materialises in the medium to distant future, minimum 
NCP requirement will be exceeded in that even non-business service provision may 
be commercialised and subjected to competitive tendering, although not compulsory 
competitive tendering (Sore!! Council Interview 2004). 
The changes in Sore!! Council are minimal and point toward a program-oriented 
structure, with linkages to the constituent departments. Provider functions will 
apparently be integrated within programs; their purpose and rationale will be their 
contribution to the council's overall strategic goals (Sore!! Council Interview 2004). 
The organisational restructuring has led to the abolition of the six previous 
departments of Corporate; Finance; Engineering; Building; Planning and 
Environmental Services. In their place three new departments that are namely 
Corporate and Community Services; Engineering Services; and Environment and 
Development have been created (see Figure 7.2). The three departments are headed 
by managers who are answerable to, and may sign individual performance 
agreements with the general manager (Sore!! Council 2002, 2004). The General 
Manager in turn has a five-year performance contract with the council, which is 
renewable subject to performance. Although the council has appointed a general 
manager, it has not achieved the structural and cultural change implied by the 
purchaser-provider split; and has continued to follow something close to the pre-
1993 model. 
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Source: Interviews, Annual Reports 
However, some relationships in the council are now governed by contracts and 
service level agreements, and to that extent, the council's model will confront the 
same difficulties as the HCC's model. It is true that the success of contractualism in 
terms of directing providers' efforts toward the achievement of council goals will 
hinge on how these are articulated in the contracts and service level agreements, and 
how effectively managers can prescribe and monitor service delivery outcomes. 
From the outset, it appears that the Sorell Council's model has more potential to do 
so than the HCC in that it gives priority to a policy or program orientation over a 
market orientation in the organisational structure. 
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It is reasonable to suggest that the program-orientation of the council might represent 
a commercial downside in a market-oriented future. This is because the NCP 
prescriptions portray provider units in the public sector in the light of their private 
sector counterparts: commercial focus, opportunistic behaviour, commercial rate of 
return, competitive edge, cross-border tendering, mergers and takeovers (all accepted 
acts under the NCP). Such private sector organisations have no obligation or are not 
keen in balancing economic outcomes against social ones. In other words, the pursuit 
of collective interest and policy goals, which characterise the huge efforts in the 
public sector, are not universal values of private organisations. To that extent it is 
likely that the Sore11 Council model will be shaken to its foundation should some 
areas of service delivery in the corporatised future become highly competitive. In 
sum, the HCC's model is poised for the marketised future with optimism, while the 
Sore11 Council's model, which gradually attempts to integrate the competing 
imperative of policy and market into the organisational structure, seems to be facing 
problems doing so. If it can overcome the barriers to this end, its model will 
represent the appropriate framework for a truly 'public organisation', even though it 
will be less suited than the Hobart model for the corporatised market of tomorrow. 
Conclusion 
Undoubtedly, major changes have occurred in local governments across Australia 
following the introduction of the NCP (Ryan 1997). The changes in the HCC and 
Sorell Council that have been reported in this chapter are probably fairly typical in 
that regard. 
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The salient feature of this analysis, however, relates to the fact that managerial 
reforms — strictly defined and differentiated from other types of reforms — 'drive 
organisatonal structures towards a program orientation and encourage high level 
activity aggregation and integration, and the prioritising of policy goals' (Ryan 1997: 
177). The economic reforms that are espoused by the NCP imply an opposing logic. 
Following this approach, 'organisations seem more likely to move towards activity 
disaggregation and organisational fragmentation, with priority placed on commercial 
goals for the corporatised units' (Ryan 1997: 177). 
Both the HCC and Sore!! Council have adopted and implemented the tenets of the 
NCP to varying extents and in dissimilar fashions. The HCC has corporatised units 
such as Civic Solutions, and introduced the purchaser-provider model of service 
provision, with the relationships between the purchaser and provider sides being 
governed by contracts and service level agreements. It has become far more 
conscious of the costs of its operation by market-testing its pricing, introducing 
competitive tendering and contracting, and attributing a number of corporate 
expenses to activities. By this changes, the HCC appears to be operating with the 
commercial logic of the NCP and advertently or otherwise, is subsuming a program 
orientation within it (Ryan 1997). The creation by the council of two controlling 
authorities and a joint authority has markedly changed its structure and lifted it onto 
the platform of a market-oriented future. This reconfiguration is likely to provide 
maximum level of independence and freedom for the corporatised units to enter the 
competitive market of the future with optimism irrespective of the type and extent of 
competition that may eventuate. 
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Sore!! Council on the other hand, is attempting to strike a balance between the two 
logics: by adopting the market orientation of the NCP to the substantive logic of a 
program orientation — one of the key components of the managerial reform agenda. 
Sorel! Council has not followed the footsteps of the HCC, as no corporatised units 
have yet been created, and most services are provided in-house in an integrated 
manner, with no separation between purchaser and provider sides. The council has a 
structure that is program oriented, implying an integrated approach to the conduct of 
its business and the achievement of its strategic objectives must come from the 
contributions each functional area can make. However, a gamut of commercial 
principles, including full cost attribution and competitive neutrality has been applied 
to some of its operations, especially its significant business activities. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
PURCHASER-PROVIDER SPLIT: THEORY AND EVIDENCE FROM 
HOBART AND SORELL COUNCILS 
In Australia, state and territory governments have led the way in the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider arrangements. Market forces have been introduced into the 
health care and other areas of the public sector. Fundamental to the introduction of 
market approaches was the need to distinguish between the roles of purchaser and 
provider. It is immaterial whether the provider is a public or private vendor. What is 
crucial is that the purchaser outlines expectations, in the form of outputs, outcomes 
and performance, which the provider must comply with, in order to receive payment 
(Stewart 1999). The `Casemix' initiative, designed to provide health services, was 
first applied by the Victorian Government and subsequently adopted by the other 
Australian states and territories to varying extents. This initiative was predicated on a 
certain version of the purchaser-provider split (APSC 2003). 
The Department of Urban services of the Australian Capital Territory Government 
introduced the purchaser-provider split that progressively increased the degree of 
organisational separation (Aulich et al 1999). It was able to quickly embrace the 
model because it already had responsibility for municipal services that had long been 
characterised by private sector competition and provision (Aulich et al 1999). At the 
federal government sphere, the purchaser-provider split has been implemented where 
services are delivered directly (for example, the relationship between Family and 
Community Services and Centrelink) (Stewart 1999: 105; Halligan 2004; APSC 
2003). The 'introduction of accrual-based portfolio Budget Statements in the 
1999/00 budget, implements what is essentially (although not yet formally) a 
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purchaser-provider management and reporting framework' (Stewart 1999: 105). 
Australian local governments have also sought to employ competitive processes and 
the purchaser-provider split as a means to diversify their sources of supply in order to 
enhance efficiency and effectiveness in service delivery (Aulich 1997; Ryan 1997; 
Applied Economics 2004)). 
This chapter assesses the impact of the purchaser-provider split on service delivery, 
employment and organisational culture and practices of two Tasmanian local 
government areas — Hobart and Sore11. Although two Tasmanian local government 
areas have been chosen, the investigation makes comparison with the experiences of 
other Australian councils with the purchaser-provider split. In particular, the impact 
on service spending as a result of realignment into purchaser and provider sides and 
competitive tendering in the Council of Sydney and Mornington Peninsula Council 
in NSW and Victoria respectively has been examined across a range of services such 
as property management, parks maintenance, light fleet management, street cleaning, 
road construction, toilet cleaning, and maintenance of physical infrastructure. The 
study also draws on research literature on the impact of the purchaser-provider split 
on municipal governments in the UK and New Zealand. A service specific approach 
to the evaluation of the impact of the purchaser-provider split has not been 
attempted. Rather all services which organisation has been affected, in terms of 
policy and delivery, by the purchaser-provider split have been considered. 
Impact of the purchaser-provider split: A framework of analysis 
Evidence suggests that the purchaser-provider split has clarified roles and improved 
the efficiency of production and quality of product. Aulich (1997: 153) posits that 
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underpinning the split, 'compulsory competitive tendering appears to have improved 
the performance aspect of service provision'. A similar claim is made by Ormsby 
(1998: 384)) when he asserts that 'the balance of evidence to date is that the theory 
of the purchaser-provider split has empirical support'. Other studies have also 
assessed the impact of the purchaser-provider split on the organisation of particular 
services located within the operational and policy settings of those services. In 
particular, public health care and social care services have been examined and, in the 
UK context, the interaction between the National Health Service and social care 
provided by local authorities (see Flynn et al 1995; Ham 1997; Mackintosh 1997; 
Smyth 1997). This section examines the evidence of the purchaser-provider split in 
Hobart and Sore11 councils to determine whether it matches the predicted effects of 
the model. 
Appraisal of the outcomes of the implementation of the purchaser-provider split in 
Hobart and Sore11 Councils cannot simply focus on the stated objectives for change. 
In embarking upon an evaluation exercise guidelines or relevant criteria are needed 
in order to prevent aimless search through huge volumes of data. For this reason, 
four criteria have been developed which are namely efficiency, effectiveness, quality 
and organisational behaviour. The first three criteria fit the category of the often-
cited theoretical benefits of the purchaser-provider split. The fourth principle coheres 
with the category of organisational culture and practices. 
Benefits of the client-contractor model 
The prevailing notion is that the introduction of the purchaser-provider split into the 
public sector will lead to reduction in the costs of operations of agencies, especially 
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their service delivery costs. By reconfiguring hierarchical organisations on the basis 
of a purchaser-provider model and introducing contracts, purchasers will presumably 
be able to elicit from providers much more accurate information about costs: first, by 
subjecting suppliers to competition (or the threat of it); second, by benchmarking 
contractors against each other; and third, by forcing providers to specify the exact 
nature of the goods and services they will supply for a specified price (Stewart 1999: 
106). Production and quality of product together with the effectiveness of service 
delivery are also postulated to improve considerably under a client-contractor 
regime. One of the main objectives of introducing compulsory competitive tendering 
and the purchaser-provider arrangement into Victoria local government was that both 
cost savings and enhanced quality of services could be achieved. This argument was 
also the compelling reason behind the rearrangement of local councils in New 
Zealand into purchaser and provider groups that brought about a complete shift from 
the traditional bureaucratic format of municipal government organisational structure 
(Aulich 1997). The evaluation of the outcomes of the implementation of the 
purchaser-provider split in Hobart and Sorell Councils is to determine whether these 
objectives have been achieved. 
Organisational culture and practices 
Public organisations are established to meet multiple objectives; implying individual 
units of the same agency may be entrusted with the achievement of different and 
often conflicting dimensions of organisational goals. For example, the policy unit 
may be trading proposals to expand the range of goods and services the agency 
provides to public service customers, while the treasury department may be working 
towards controlling and disciplining public expenditure. The city services division 
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and the community development division may both have roles in community 
development initiatives, which may bring their functions and responsibilities into 
conflict. Despite these conflicting objectives the various units of the public agency 
are expected to hang together to achieve the mission of the organisation — quite a 
formidable goal to attain indeed. Another often cited criticism of the public sector is 
that it provides standardised services to passive recipients (citizens who have no 
roles in the shaping of service content and delivery). 
Adoption of the purchaser-provider split by public organisations is argued to 
minimise such conflicts and tensions between the multiple and conflicting roles of 
agencies. It is also envisioned that implementation of the purchaser-provider split by 
the public sector will give public service customers greater 'user say' in the design 
and delivery of services as well as customise those services to meet their tastes, 
preferences and expectations. The application of the model will also make pubic 
organisations more accountable in the management of public resources. Most 
importantly, it is argued that separation of purchaser and provider roles in public 
organisations will force these agencies to focus more on the key strategic issues of 
determining the mix and standard of services they wish to provide to their 
communities (Walsh 1991a: 135). The appraisal of the effects of the purchaser-
provider split in Hobart and Sore11 Councils has been undertaken to determine 
whether these predictions match the evidence. 
Inputs 
Input indicators include monetary and non-monetary resources such as operating and 
capital dollars, full-time equivalents, equipment and direct labour hours (Abraham 
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Group 2001). Personnel and costs of services are the principal inputs of most of the 
services rendered by local government, including the HCC and Sore11 Council. Other 
inputs include consumable materials, equipment and other facilities. Greater 
efficiency is achieved by decreasing inputs while maintaining service levels and 
quality. 
Part of the efficiency gains that are expected from minimising conflict and tension 
between multiple and conflicting roles of agencies, as implied by the purchaser-
provider split, is that only those employees with the relevant skills and talents would 
be retained. Those who are redundant and those who are not contributing would be 
asked to look for new opportunities elsewhere. The separation of policy from 
operational activities and the use of competitive processes, it is argued, will reduce 
the costs of providing services. Capital dollars expended on municipal services 
represent a major part of municipal input costs. Reducing services and employee 
costs will significantly enhance the efficiency of local governments. This section 
assesses the impact of the purchaser-provider split on service spending and 
employment of the HCC and compares and contrasts this with the behaviour of these 
variables in Sorell Council (which has not adopted the purchaser-provider split). 
Differences and similarities in the behaviours of these two variables in the two 
councils will provide the basis for assessing part of the impact of the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider split. 
Service responsibilities of HCC and Sorell Council 
The 58 functional areas on which data were collected cover nine traditional 
categories of municipal services: public order and safety, health, welfare, community 
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amenities, recreation and culture, economic services, transport, water supply, and 
sewerage. These functional areas were determined after examining the services that 
are provided by most of the 29 councils in Tasmania. The services the HCC and 
Sore11 Council set themselves to provide for their communities were also taken into 
consideration in determining the functional responsibilities. Uncommon service 
categories for which only one council has service responsibility were excluded (for 
example, parking — especially off-street, provided by the HCC only). Also excluded 
were administrative services such as IT and human resource management, legal 
services, financial services like strategic financial planning, corporate services as 
well as other internal support services. 
The number of services provided by the purchaser-provider arrangement is a 
function of the number of goods and services for which a council has responsibility. 
Thus the incidence of the purchaser-provider split, expressed as the total number of 
services provided by a council is a misleading measure of this policy activity. The 
appropriate measure is one that examines services supplied under the purchaser-
provider split as a proportion of all services provided by a municipality. This study 
uses this approach in the analysis of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC and 
Sorell Council. 
The nine service categories identified above are used as the classification to assign 
each of the 58 functional responsibilities to one category (see Table 8.1). The 
empirical analysis examines the service spending and employment effects of the 
purchaser-provider split. It also evaluates the impact of the split on outputs and 
outcomes, quality of services and organisational culture and practices. 
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Table 8.1: Municipal service categories and responsibilities 
Service category 













Aged care services 
Solid waste management 





Administration of the planning scheme 
City cleansing 




Economic services Salmanca market* 
Tourism promotion 
Recreation and culture Maintenance of public halls 
Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre* 
Recreation centre 








Table 8.1 (continued) 
Transport 
Functional responsibility  
Construction & maintenance of roads 
Construction & maintenance of 
footpaths 
Construction & maintenance of bridges 
Traffic signs 
Hot Mix Plant* 
Purchaser of bulk water 
Water reticulation 
Water quality control 
Sewage reticulation 
Sewage treatment 
Discharge of sewage affluent 
Water supply 
Sewerage 
Source: Annual reports of HCC and Sorell Council 
* Service provided in HCC only 
Estimates for the effects of the purchaser-provider split on service spending and 
employment are obtained from several variables. These variables and their 
operational measures are explicated below and reported on Table 8.2. Tax burden 
measures the ratio between per capita municipal taxes paid I4 and per capita personal 
income. 'As an indicator of fiscal effort, this measure is expected  to be positively 
related to the level of municipal spending and employment' (Stein 1990: 482). 
Higher mean per capita income and greater revenue dependency on federal and state 
intergovernmental aid transfers should be positively related to the level of municipal 
policy outputs. Population size provides a measure of congestion associated with 
public service responsibility. A positive relationship between population size and 
policy outputs is hypothesised as evidence of contestable goods and services (Stein 
1990). 
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Table 8.2: Operational measures and sources 
Concept Operationalisation Council Mean 
Per capita income' 
(PCIN)* 
Mean 1989 per capita 











State and federal aid as a 













Average monthly gross 






Per capita rates paid as a 











Proportion of council 











Source: 1. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Australian National Accounts. State Accounts: 5220.0 — 
2003/04 
2. Annual reports of the HCC and Sorel! Council from 1989/90 to 2004/05 and interviews of 
management of both councils in March 2004 
3. Australian Bureau of Statistics: Australian National Accounts. State Accounts: 5220.0, 1998/99, 
1999/00, 2003/04 
4. Tasmanian Year Book from 1989/90 to 2004/05 
* Per capita family (household) income for Tasmania is used hence the figures are the same 
for both councils 
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The scope of municipal functional responsibility is predicted to be positively related 
to levels of spending and employment (Dye and Garcia 1979; Stein 1981; Liebert 
1976). 'Increased scope of functional responsibility is associated with a different mix 
of services, one which includes a greater responsibility for expensive redistributive 
social services' (Stein 1990: 482). The result is that as a council expands its 
functional scope, it assumes responsibility for goods and services that have a higher 
per unit cost of service arrangement (Stein 1990). 
Estimates of employment levels include gross wages and salaries paid municipal 
employees. It is expected that this relationship will be negative, reflecting the 
operation of a budget constraint between the size of municipal labour force and the 
average monthly wage and salary. Given a fixed municipal budget, an increase in the 
workforce must be balanced by a smaller per worker wage rate (Stein 1990). Apart 
from municipal wage and salary rate the proportion of municipal workforce 
unionised could also be a partial determinant of the size of the municipal labour 
force. The effect of unionisation on the municipal workforce size is ambiguous. 
Assuming the operation of a budget constraint between employment levels and wage 
rates, union representation should be negatively related to level of public 
employment (Stein 1990). However, it is possible that union representation could 
serve both to expand the municipal workforce size and increase wage rates. Union 
representation was not included as a variable for estimating municipal employment 
because of unavailability of data. 
Since Sore11 Council has not pursued the structural and cultural changes implied by 
the purchaser-provider split, it provides a case (counterfactual) against which the 
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effects of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC are partially tested. Specifically, a 
cross-sectional design cannot test the hypothesised effects that the purchaser-
provider split has on successive budget request of and allocation to individual service 
categories. It is proposed that agencies making savings from services provided 
competitively under the purchaser-provider split reduce their budget requests rather 
than cut spending. Savings accruing from the implementation of the purchaser-
provider split precede a reduction in the agencies' budget requests and the 
cumulative impact this has on total municipal service spending. Obviously, this 
hypothesis cannot be tested without a time series on agency-level (service category-
level) experience with the purchaser-provider split and spending. A cross-sectional 
confirmation of the principal-agent (purchaser-provider) explanation is necessary, 
but not sufficient to confirm this proposition. That is why a final test is undertaken 
based on data collected and analysed on a time series basis. 
Service category -level effects of the purchaser-provider split 
As hypothesised, the incidence of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC is 
generally unrelated to the spending levels of a significant number of individual 
functional responsibilities as Table 8.3 shows 15 (see also appendixes 4 to 12 for 
regression estimates and net effects of the purchaser-provider split). This is 
consistent with the proposition made earlier that an agency's retention of savings 
from competitive contracting processes implied by the purchaser-provider split 
should not alter its total level of spending (Stein 1990). Supposing that agencies are 
not penalised for innovative and cost reduction practices, an agency's budget share 
of municipal revenues should not decline as a result of efficiency gains from its 
operations. Any savings accruing from the purchaser-provider mode of service 
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• provision will be internalised by the agency. It is not unlikely for expenditure 
changes to occur within categories of the agency's budget but the net effect on total 
agency (service category level) spending should be zero (Stein 1990). 
Table 8.3: Effects of purchaser-provider split on service category level spending of 
the HCC -value 
Service category Spending 
PPS 






Community amenities 1.993 
(0.864)* 




Economic services 0.193 
(0.082)* 




Note: Regression estimates for service category-level expenditures were derived from an 
equation that included functional scope, population, per capita personal income, tax burden, 
monthly wages and salaries for municipal employees, and dependency on intergovernmental 
aid 
*Beta weight or beta coefficient 
P< 0.05, one-tailed test 
The purchaser-provider split is significantly related to lower spending levels for two 
functional responsibilities (that is, public order and safety, water supply) and 
negatively but insignificantly associated with the provision costs of services for one 
functional responsibility (that is, transport). Put differently, an increase of one 
standard deviation in the proportion of public order and safety services provided 
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under the purchaser-provider arrangement results in a decrease of 0.397 standard 
deviations in spending for those services. While one standard deviation increase in 
the proportion of water services provided under the purchaser-provider split leads to 
a reduction in spending for those services by 0.359 standard deviations. Similarly, 
one standard deviation increase in the proportion of transport services delivered 
through the purchaser-provider split decreases spending for those services by 0.018 
standard deviations (see also Appendix 14 for the calculation of the beta weights). 
From this evidence it can be concluded that the purchaser-provider split has a greater 
effect, in terms of reduction in service spending, on public order and safety services 
than water services and transport services. The effect of the split in reducing service 
cost is greater for water services than transport services. 
The critical value of t in a left tailed test from the t-distribution table (0.05 
significance level and 15 degrees of freedom) is -1.753, which is far less than the 
positive t-values of the purchaser-provider split for each of the other service 
categories. Hence, it can be concluded that the purchaser-provider split has not led to 
expenditure reductions in HCC's health services, welfare services, recreation and _ 
culture services, economic services, community amenities, and sewerage services. 
Aggregate policy effects of the purchaser -provider split 
The combined effects of the factors that influence total municipal service spending 
and employment are estimated by regression analysis and reported on Table 8.4 (see 
Appendixes 13, 15, 16 and 17 for regression estimates and calculation of the beta 
weights). As the table indicates (see Appendix 13 for regression statistics), the 
coefficient of determination (R square) of total municipal service spending is very 
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high at 0.99 percent, implying the variations in the HCC's total service spending is 
mostly accounted for by the combined effects of per capita income, functional scope, 
dependency on intergovernmental aid transfers, municipal workforce, monthly wages 
and salaries for municipal employees, tax burden, population of municipality, and the 
purchaser-provider split. The coefficient of determination (R square) of total HCC 
employment is 0.78 percent, meaning 0.22 percent of the variations in the HCC's 
total employment is not explained by the identified variables. 
Apart from municipal wage and salary rate which has been identified as influencing 
municipal employment levels, the proportion of municipal workforce unionised 
could also be a partial determinant of the size of the municipal labour force. The 
effect of unionisation on the municipal workforce size is ambiguous. Assuming the 
operation of a budget constraint between employment levels and wage rates, union 
representation should be negatively related to level of public employment (Stein 
1990). However, union representation may force both the municipal workforce size 
to expand and wage rates to increase. As noted earlier, union representation was 
excluded as a co-determinant of municipal employment because of lack of data. 
Contrary to the hypothesis (see hypotheses section of the introductory chapter), the 
purchaser-provider split is not associated with lower levels of spending on HCC's 
services as indicated by the positive t-value (1.233) of the purchaser-provider split. 
Hence, it can be concluded, contrary to the hypothesis, that the purchaser-provider 
split has not led to reductions in the HCC's total service spending. 
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This evidence is not invalidated by views of respondents because while majority of 
them indicated that the council has become far more conscious of the costs and 
quality of services it provides with the incidence of the purchaser-provider split, they 
could neither confirm nor deny that service expenditure has decreased. 
Table8.4: Regression estimates for total service spending and employment of the 
HCC -value 
Variable Purchaser-provider split 
MUWF TOTEXP 
Intercept 0.89 -0.207 
PCIN 4.0 -0.604 
(1.029)* (0.668)* 
FUNCT -0.946 1.8 
(-0.250)* (1.8)* 
AID -1.6 -1.4 
(0.091)* (0.22)* 
MUWF -0.362 - 
(0.028)* 
PUBPAY -0.178 -1.5 
(0.066)* (-2.149)* 
TAXB 0.197 -1.6 
(0.015)* (0.477)* 
POP 0.953 0.515 
(0.108)* (0.258)* 
PPS 1.233 -0.040 
(0.237) (0.036)* 
0.990 0.777 
Note: Regression estimates for total service expenditure was derived from an equation that 
included functional scope, population, per capita personal income, tax burden, monthly 
wages and salaries for municipal employees, and dependency on intergovernmental aid. The 
equation for employment included the monthly wage and salary rate for municipal workers 
*Beta weight or beta coefficient 
P < 0.05, one-tailed test 
This finding is inconsistent with the experience of some councils in Victoria and 
NSW. For example, the Council of Sydney which realigned into purchaser and 
provider groups and separated asset management from asset ownership 
responsibilities introduced competitive tenders, for the provision of some services. 
Services such as property management, parks maintenance and light fleet 
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management were competitively tendered and won by external providers, while 
street cleaning was won by an in-house team. The council reported that savings of $7 
million per annum were achieved (Applied Economics 2004). In Victoria, the 
Mornington Peninsula Council restructured itself by separating out the purchaser and 
provider functions in relation to the maintenance of physical infrastructure. It created 
a Contract Management Unit to handle the client functions. An in-house provider 
unit within the Engineering Division was established to compete for contracts. 
External providers won the contracts and provided the services at annual costs 
savings of $ 5 million (Applied Economics 2004). 
The relationship between the purchaser-provider split and total HCC employment is 
negative (see also Appendix 16 for the regression estimates). The use of this service 
delivery mode reduces total municipal spending by reducing the size of the 
municipal labour force. Put differently, one standard deviation increase in the 
proportion of HCC's services provided under the purchaser-provider split results in a 
reduction in the municipal workforce by 0.036 standard deviations (see Appendix 17 
for calculation of the beta weights). Since personnel are one of the most important 
inputs of service production, the reduction of the cost of this input ultimately reduces 
the costs of services provided. This evidence is confirmed by majority of the 
informants. In particular, the Director of Civic Solutions said his Division's 
workforce has decreased by 50 following the introduction of the purchaser-provider 
split. 
The employment reduction brought about by the purchaser-provider split in the HCC 
is consistent with the experience in Victoria where amalgamation, and CCT (and the 
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purchaser-provider split implied by it) reduced employee numbers by 600 in 
Brimenbank Council and an estimated 11,000 reduction in employee numbers across 
all councils in the state (Millar and Dowling 2004). The implication of these statistics 
is that the organisational restructuring that has occurred under the purchaser-provider 
split has in part, enabled the HCC to better tame growth in employee numbers. 
The efficiency gains from competitive processes derive partly from the employment 
of fewer staff (Cutler and Waine 1994). Many of the employees who have been made 
redundant from the HCC are unskilled and most likely would not have found jobs 
elsewhere, especially during a period of considerable unemployment in Tasmania. It 
seems probable, then, that part of the local savings from the implementation of the 
purchaser-provider split is offset by an extra burden on the national social security 
budget. This serves to qualify a broader problem with the introduction of market 
forces into the public sector. As in the private sector, competition or the threat of 
competition can lead to negative externalities which impose costs on other 
organisations. Such indirect effects of imitating market tactics in the public sector 
may be viewed as an example of 'quasi market failure' (Boyne 1998a). 
The estimated elasticities for the purchaser-provider split are significantly (P< 0.05) 
more responsive for employment (in terms of reductions in the costs/levels of the 
input)) (-0.040) than spending levels (1.233). This may be attributable to two 
reasons. First, 'Cities may undervalue their labour, particularly for labour intensive 
goods and services which make up most of a city's functional repertoire' (Stein 
1990: 491). This fosters a tendency for local authorities to indulge in inefficient (that 
is, excessive) employment practices. As Stevens (1984) argues, it is this inefficient 
332 
use of labour that service contracting remedies. 'Contracted labour practices are 
significantly more flexible, providing contractors opportunities for obtaining 
efficiency gains over municipal labour management' (Stein 1990: 491-2). Second 
(closely related to the first point), the value municipal managers attach to non-
unionised council labour force in part explains this tendency. McGuire et al (1987) 
contend that the incidence of contracting is associated with the scope of union 
representation and the frequency of labour turmoil (that is, job actions and strikes). 
Local governments have an inclination, independent of cost savings, to minimise the 
uncertainty and tension caused by union representation of public employees (Stein 
1990: 492). 'This is achieved by replacing unionised public employees with non-
unionised contracted workers' (Stein 1990: 492) 
Contrary to expectation, functional scope is negatively related to spending levels. 
This implies the HCC is either not expanding existing services significantly, if at all, 
or adding only a few new services to its functional repertoire. The positive 
relationship between functional scope and employment may reflect the engagement 
or increase in the number of specialised employees like architects, environmental 
experts, quantity surveyors, town planners and engineers who are needed in some 
critical functional areas. These employees have higher labour costs, and because only 
a modest reduction in the HCC's production labour force has occurred, this has not 
been able to offset the higher labour costs. Since personnel are a major input of 
service production, it causes a net effect in the form of a slight increase in the HCC's 
total service spending under a purchaser-provider arrangement. As predicted, the 
relationship between spending levels and municipal wage and salary level is 
negative, reflecting the operation of a budget constraint between the size of the 
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HCC's labour force and the average monthly wage and salary. Given a fixed 
municipal budget, an increase in the workforce can only be achieved at the expense 
of a higher per employee wage rate (Stein 1990). 
As hypothesised, tax burden is positively (even though modestly) related to spending 
levels. This implies rate increases in the HCC in part are necessitated either to 
expand existing services or add new ones to the repertoire. However, the HCC is 
reluctant to increase rates significantly to boost revenue. From 1991/92 to 2000/01 
the cumulative rate increase was 19.95 percent, considerably less than the consumer 
price index over the same period (LGB 2002). In four of these eleven years, the 
council did not increase rates (LGB 2002). The HCC's rate policy is consistent with 
the practice of many other councils across Australia. As Dollery et al (2006) observe, 
even in situations where state governments allow for the determination of rate levels, 
councils are reluctant to take advantage of it due partly to political pressure. 
The relationship between tax burden and employment is negative because any 
revenues deriving from rates are more likely to be used to expand service levels or 
introduce new ones than increase the labour force. As expected, the relationship 
between population and spending levels is positive. This suggests that there may be 
congestion to some extent in the HCC's service responsibility. In other words, the 
goods and services the council provides are contestable. The council does make 
decisions and does entertain recommendations regarding the invitation of rival bids 
for the provision of services. 
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The effects of other independent variables on spending are mixed. 
Intergovernmental aid transfers are related negatively both to spending levels and 
employment. This is interpreted as a reliance of the HCC largely on own source 
revenue to fund its services. This is especially true now because Commonwealth and 
state governments have reduced their financial assistance to local government. This 
unwillingness to commit growth funds to local government was clearly demonstrated 
when in response to the Final Report of the Commonwealth House of 
Representatives Standing Committee on Economics, Finance and Public 
Administration (2003), entitled Rates and Taxes: A Fair Share for Responsible Local 
Government, the Commonwealth Government made no offer of additional funding, 
and instead urged local government to put in extra effort at resolving its own 
problems (Australian Government 2005). 
Similarly, mean personal income is positively correlated to total municipal service 
spending but negatively related to employment. Higher per capita income may be a 
reflection of the buoyancy of the economy and the stronger purchasing power of not 
only private individuals and organisations but also governments. Hence, as the 
HCC's revenue (income) rises it is able to spend more not only in expanding existing 
services but also introducing new ones. In an era of small government rhetoric, 
governments are less likely to use any increases in revenue in the expansion of their 
labour force than the provision of more services to their citizens. 
The regression estimates for total service spending and employment of Sorell 
Council are discussed in comparison with those of the HCC below and reported on 
Table 8.5 (see also Appendixes 18, 19, 20 and 21 for the regression estimates and 
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calculation of the beta weights). Sore11 Council has not adopted the purchaser-
provider split so the model is not included as an independent variable in the 
estimation. As the table indicates, the coefficient of determination (R square) of total 
municipal service spending and employment are very high at 0.97 and 0.98 
respectively. This means the variations in Sore11 Council's total service spending and 
employment are mostly explained by the combined effects of the independent 
variables including per capita income, intergovernmental aid transfers, municipal 
workforce, gross wages and salaries for municipal employees, tax burden, functional 
scope, and population. 
Two of the independent variables (that is, functional scope and municipal wage and 
salary rate) are negatively (statistically significant) related to spending levels, 
compared with four (that is, municipal workforce, municipal wage and salary rate, 
functional scope, and intergovernmental aid transfers) in the case of the HCC. 
Moreover, as the values indicate, the net effects of most independent variables in the 
HCC (in terms of reducing service spending) are much greater than those of Sorell 
Council. Municipal workforce size in the HCC is negatively related to total service 
spending levels but positively (statistically significant) correlated to total service 
spending in the case of Sorell Council. A possible reason for these findings is that the 
HCC, by separating the provision of goods and services from their production and 
delivery, achieved significant savings from two sources: contestability and 
competition, and scale effects. These gains could not accrue to Sorell Council 
because it has not pursued the structural and cultural changes implied by the 
purchaser-provider split. 
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Table 8.5: Regression estimates for total service spending and employment of Sorel! 
Council --value 
Variable TOTEXP MUWF 
Intercept 2.5 0.147 
PCIN -0.007 7.4 
(0.006)* (1.581) 
FUNCT -0.896 -1.8 
(0.187)* (0.241)* 
AID -0.360 -0.609 
(0.028)* (0.034)* 
MUWF 2.6 - 
(1.180)* 
PUBPAY -2.5 0.271 
(-0.361)* (0.029)* 
TAXB 0.934 -3.5 
(0.192)* (0.345)* 
POP 0.491 -0.771 
(0.119)* (0.133)* 
R2 0.968 0.980 
Note: Regression estimates for total service expenditure was derived from an equation that 
included per capita personal income, functional scope, population, dependency on 
intergovernmental aid transfers, gross monthly wages and salaries for municipal employees, 
and the tax burden. The equation for employment included gross monthly wage and salary 
rate offor municipal workers 
*Beta weight or beta coefficient 
P < 0.05, one-tailed test 
Tax burden has a positive effect on service spending and a negative association with 
employment in both the HCC and Sorell Council. This may be interpreted as greater 
reluctance of the HCC than Sorell Council (because the latter has a greater tax 
burden than the former) to use increases in rates as a means to boost revenues in 
order to expand existing services or introduce new ones. It may also imply that both 
councils desist from using rates revenue to fund the expansion of their labour forces. 
In the HCC population has a positive effect on both total service spending and 
employment. In Sorell Council population is related positively to total service 
spending but negatively to employment. This may be interpreted as greater 
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contestability in the provision of services in the HCC than Sore11 Council (since the 
net effect of the variable is greater in the former than the latter). Even though the 
small Tasmanian market does not afford opportunity for the gains in efficiency in 
competitive supply to be fully realised, the problem is more acute in rural and small 
councils such as Sore11 Council than large and urban municipalities like the HCC. 
Outputs and outcomes 
The ranges of services provided have expanded in both the HCC and Sore11 Council 
following the introduction of the purchaser-provider split. The HCC has completed 
capital works programs that included an international standard aquatic centre, 
sewerage reticulation and treatment works, reconstruction of the central business 
district and other miscellaneous capital works valued at over $40 million (Noga 
1997). The council's wastewater treatment plants at Macquarie and Self Point treat 
22 million litres of wastewater per day. The HCC offers the weekly refuse collection 
equivalent to a 120 litres at a domestic level of service to all properties in the 
municipal area (LGB 2002). Excluding depreciation charges and asset write-downs, 
the council records a large operating surplus annually - $11.3 million to $13.6 
million. Depending on the level of capital expenditure and other investing activities, 
the annual cash position has varied from $1.8 million to $2.1 million (LGB 2002). 
The Capital works program in Sore11 Council has also expanded. Projects here 
include wastewater re-use scheme at Penna, sewerage upgrade to two pump stations, 
water supply projects, especially the Arthur Highway booster pump and other 
miscellaneous capital works worth over $12.14 million (Sore11 Council 2003). 
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Performance indicators-based output and outcome measures 
The more than 700 local governments in Australia provide a wide range of essential 
• services to the public but relatively few studies have been undertaken in relation to 
the measurement of their efficiency and productivity. One possible explanation for 
this is the, difficulty encountered in attempts to measure public sector performance 
(NOLG 2001b; Woodbury et al 2002). The absence of performance measures in 
local government is blamed on several factors: lack of profit seeking or cost 
reduction practices such as suitable monitoring mechanisms; services generally have 
ill-defined and/or multiple outputs; difficulty in apportioning costs over different 
services; and the inconsistent and incomplete nature of some of the data that is 
available (Woodbury et al 2002: 6). 
Performance measures have been recently developed to improve local government 
performance and benchmark service delivery. Many states and territories in order to 
measure performance and assess the efficiencies of councils have required local 
authorities to provide information on key service areas. Despite the varied nature of 
these indicators across state jurisdictions, more detailed and better-defined data 
continues to be collected each year. It was not until 1995 that nation-wide 
performance indicators were first recommended at the Local Government Ministers' 
conference and since then the National Office of local Government has encouraged 
and facilitated a non-mandatory process of developing and using standard 
performance measures and indicators with the states, peak local government industry 
bodies and technical committees (Woodbury et al 2002). There is currently no 
nation-wide comparison of efficiency measures for council services because of lack 
of uniformity in indicators and definitions across states. 
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Each state currently either provides comparative performance information for local 
government on an annual basis or is in the process of doing so. For example, the 
NSW Department of Local Government (1998/99, 1999/00) Comparative 
Performance Information publications contain financial and corporate, planning, 
waste management, libraries, water, sewerage, environmental and health, recreation 
and leisure services, and community services (Woodbury et al 2002) Victoria 
releases information on 29 annual plan indicators and 47 service indicators. A review 
that seeks to improve the system and reduce administrative costs by decreasing the 
total number of indicators has been undertaken. It is recommended that in the future 
only 10 state-wide performance indicators in the areas of affordability/cost of 
government, sustainability, services, infrastructure and governance be produced 
(Woodbury et al 2002: 8) 
Tasmania has developed performance indicators for councils since 1999/00. The Key 
Performance Indicators Committee (KPIC) of the Local Government Division, 
Department of Premier and Cabinet is responsible for the production and distribution 
of this information. The KPIC provides councils with a wide range of indicators to 
measure their performance. Specifically, the measuring system seeks to enhance 
performance measurements by councils; enables benchmarking and identification of 
best practice; establishes performance trends over time; and improves accountability 
to the community (KPIC 2003). 
The performance indicators have afforded the opportunity for the performance of the 
HCC and Sorell Council to be compared across several functional responsibilities. 
The performance of the two councils in selected areas including electronic service 
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delivery, community health and safety, planning and development, water quality, and 
waste management are detailed on Table 8.6 below. The table indicates that the HCC 
on average from 1999/00 to 2004/05 delivered 33.8 percent of services to its 
community electronically, while 26.4 percent of Sore!! Council's services were 
provided online during the same period. 
The factors influencing the level of services delivered electronically include 
provision of electronic service delivery systems; communication of availability of the 
system to residents; community IT take-up; appropriate infrastructure; and age and 
socio-economic profile of the community KPIC 2004; 2006). It is likely that these 
factors were more favourable in the HCC than Sore!! Council and that is the reason 
why its community had greater access to services online than their counterparts in 
Sore!! Council. 
Similarly, the HCC incurred cost on a per capita basis of $18.7, on average from 
1999/00 to 2004/05, in providing community health and safety services, while Sore!! 
Council spent $42 on those services for the same period. Variables such as budgetary 
constraints; education policies; number of premises subject to inspection for their 
health risks; and rural health issues determined the cost in providing community 
health and safety services (KPIC 2004; 2006). Financial discipline and effective 
education policies on how to keep healthy and safe should reduce spending on 
community health and safety services. It is likely that the HCC was better at 
disciplining spending and developing education policies on community health and 
safety than Sore!! Council. The number of premises subject to inspections for their 
health and safety risks is a function of the cost of providing those services. The 
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incidence, prevalence and complexity of rural health issues should be related 
positively to spending on community health and safety services. Rural health issues 
were probably more prevalent in Sore11 Council than in the HCC. All this resulted in 
the HCC being able to provide cheaper community health and safety services than 
did Sore11 Council. 








HCC 29.2% 33.3% 27.8% 33.4% 38.1% 41% 







HCC $14 $18 $18 $20 $20.4 $22 







HCC 18 25 17 23 26 29 




HCC 89.2% 99.8% 95.0% 95.1% 93.8% 93.8% 
Sore11 97.6% 97.9% 97.9% 100% 100% 100% 
Number 
of days of 
water 
restriction 
HCC 48 133 0 88 117 0 




HCC $55 $47 $42 $73 $89 $97 
Sore11 $56 $63 $81 $74 $12 $74 
Source: KPI Committee, Local Government Division, Tasmanian Department of Premier and Cabinet 
* Mean service population of the HCC is 47,956 
* Mean service population of Sore!! Council is 10,974 
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Likewise, waste management services in the HCC were provided, on average during 
the period under review, at a per capita cost of $67 compared with $60 for Sorell 
Council during the same period. The cost determinants of waste management include 
type of and scale of council's disposal facilities; type of recycling services provided; 
frequency and volume allowance for garbage collection; density of population and 
distance from disposal facility; industrial users of waste management facilities; cost 
allocation policies; and amount of waste received from outside the municipal area 
(KPIC 2006). If the disposal facilities and type of recycling services provided are 
technologically advanced and of bigger scales, then benefits from innovation and 
scale effects can be achieved. Frequency of collection and volume of garbage 
available, density of population and distance from disposal facility, as well as big 
number of industrial users of waste management facilities should be related to higher 
cost in delivering waste management services. This explains why the HCC, with a 
relatively bigger population that generates bigger volumes of waste, incurs more cost 
on waste management than Sore!! Council. 
On average during the period under review 98.9 percent of Sore!! Council's water 
tests met accepted environmental standards compared to 94.5 percent for the HCC. 
Water quality is affected by standard of installed infrastructure; major systems 
failures; weather interference; and lack of compliance with regulation (KPIC 2005; 
2006). If these factors are favourable then water quality should be good. It is likely 
that this was not the case in the HCC that is why Sore!! Council was slightly better at 
water quality management and control than the HCC during the period under review. 
The 'HCC imposed on average 64 days of water restriction during the period under 
review compared with zero restrictions for Sore!! Council. The decision to impose 
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water restrictions are influenced by the capacity of the installed water systems; user 
pays metering polices; seasonal population and demand changes; and weather 
patterns (KPIC 2005; 2006). The seasonal upsurge in population and demand puts 
greater stress and strain on the water systems which may lead to system failure. The 
water system may develop faults such as chokes in, and bursts of the lines. To 
remedy such problems water restrictions may be imposed. 
It took the HCC during the period under review an average of 23 days to process 
building approval permits compared to 19 days for Sore11 Council. Factors 
influencing the approval duration include number and experience of planning and 
regulatory staff; number and complexity of applications; level of building and 
development activity within the municipality; council systems and procedures; 
involvement of external bodies and other legislation; and level of delegation (KPIC 
2005; 2006). Fewer staff and bigger number of building permit applications implied 
more time commitment in processing them. Intense building and development 
activities and complex procedure for approval imposes delays in granting permits. 
This certainly seems to be the case in the HCC and that is why Soren Council was 
timelier in the approval of building permits than the HCC. 
Sore11 Council has not adopted the purchaser-provider split but has been able to 
provide some services more efficiently than the HCC, which has embraced the 
model. This implies some local government services are suitable for direct and 
integrated delivery. 
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There are at least three limitations of the performance measurement systems used by 
local governments across Australia. First, performance to date has almost exclusively 
been assessed on the basis of comparison of performance against the 'average 
council' statistic for the state (Woodbury et a/ 2002). For example, the Launceston 
City Council's waste collection is assessed by comparing the cost per capita in 
providing the service with the Tasmanian State average. In the above example, for 
instance, total per capita waste collection cost is the input and total number of 
services is the output. Thus, in the waste collection service area single input/output 
performance indicators can apply to waste disposal, recycling and waste 
management as well as collection. Each measure represents only a partial appraisal 
of the overall performance of the service (Woodbury et al 2002). To achieve a more 
credible comparison of particular council services a method of calculating 
performance indicators that uses multiple inputs and outputs needs to be adopted. 
One such technique is the Data Envelopment Analysis. This method measures 
technical and - scale efficiencies, and productivity changes in council services over 
time (Coelli eta! 1998). 
Second, local government performance indicators are input, process and throughput 
measures but not outcomes indicators. The format identifies the measure 
(input/output relationship), states the objective the council is working to achieve 
(mostly output objective) and details the means by which the objective will be 
measured. For example, the objective of the Community Health and Safety indicator 
for Tasmanian local government is freedom from disease, and clean and safe 
communities (KPIC 2003). What does freedom from disease stand for? Is it zero 
incidence and prevalence of communicable and other diseases in the communities? If 
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so, what does zero incidence and prevalence of diseases mean for residents' health 
status? How does it impact on absenteeism and productivity at the workplace, or the 
health budget? Answers to these questions may represent the unaccounted for 
outcomes in relation to the community and health safety service which ratepayers 
and citizens will be happy to be well informed about. 
Finally, non-efficiency objectives such as access and equity are also important policy 
considerations for governments against which benefits will inevitably be balanced, 
but these have received little, if any, attention in local government performance 
measures. 
While all the above are laudable outputs, there is inadequate measurement and 
reporting of the outcomes they contribute to. As a result, ratepayers, non-ratepayers, 
contractors and the citizens in general are not likely to easily understand, track and 
assess these outcomes, nor are they able to compare current outcomes with previous 
ones. For example, the reconstruction of Hobart's central business district should 
contribute to such outcomes as its appeal to the city's residents, Tasmanians in 
general, interstate and international visitors. It should also indicate the tourism 
dividends that will accrue to that appeal. A sewerage reticulation and treatment 
project should contribute to good air quality free of odours, beautiful and unpolluted 
land and water surfaces and good ground conditions. There should be yardsticks for 
measuring and reporting on these outcomes for the purpose of determining changes 
in environmental quality and health. The above are a few examples of the missing 
links in the measurement of, and reporting on, outcomes by the two councils. These 
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missing links are likely to be the standards or criteria by which ratepayers and 
citizens in general will judge the performance and effectiveness of the two councils. 
Subsequent to the purchaser-provider split, local governments are supposedly no 
longer formally responsible for inputs and processes, these being the responsibility of 
the private companies or in-house units holding service contracts. Instead, local 
governments are supposedly concerned with controlling outputs and outcomes. The 
purchaser buys the service output in order to secure an outcome consistent with its 
policy strategy. It is the purchaser's responsibility to ensure that the output achieves 
the desired outcome at the lowest cost (Bailey and Davidson 1999: 164). These 
prescriptions do not however, speak to the practices in the HCC and Sorell Council, 
since it is the purchaser (councils) rather than the private companies or in-house units 
holding service contracts, which still determine and/or approve appropriations and 
levels of inputs, including employee numbers and costs, service spending, and 
material levels and costs. This suggests that councils are continuing with the 
traditional emphasis on inputs and processes. 
Quality of services 
The concept of service quality is so complex as to defy precise operationalisation. 
Reeves and Bednar (1994) observe that quality has been variously defined as 'value', 
'conformance to specifications', 'conformance to requirements', 'fitness for use', 
and 'meeting and exceeding customer's expectations'. They point out that no one 
definition of quality is best in every situation because each definition has both 
strengths and weakness in relation to criteria such as measurement and 
generalisability, managerial usefulness and customer relevance (Reeves and Bednar 
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1994: 427-8). Furthermore, perceptions of the quality of public services are likely to 
vary between politicians, professionals, taxpayers and consumers, and within each of 
these groups (Walsh 1991b). Thus service quality is multidimensional and there are 
many stakeholders with different perceptions of any single dimension. The 
implication is that the measurement of quality in studies of competitive tendering 
needs to be comprehensive and sophisticated. However, the operationalisation of 
quality is usually narrow and crude (Boyne 1998a). 
In separate interviews with four of the directors of the HCC, the investigator asked 
them: 'who defines and specifies service quality?' All four directors indicated that 
service quality definition and specification were the joint responsibilities of the client 
and the providers. This means that perceptions of quality of services would most 
likely correspond to those of officials in the HCC as purchasers and providers, and 
the councillors who depend on their policy advice, rather than those of service users. 
'Conformance to specifications' and 'meeting or exceeding customer's satisfaction' 
were the most frequent responses about a question in relation to service quality. The 
fact that elements to be included in a definition of service quality did not go beyond a 
narrow band of four items from each respondent, indicate how less comprehensive 
quality has -been conceptualised or defined. This view was strengthened by one of the 
client side directors who said 'contracts and service level agreements between 
purchasers and providers specify the level and quality of services to be provided'. 
All respondents in Sorell Council also confirmed that the definition and specification 
of service quality was done by the client and the provider. In this council the dividing 
line between client and provider is blurred as managers have foot in both camps. 
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Perceptions about the quality of services are articulated on behalf of the service user 
by the purchaser in contracts and service level agreements of the two councils. It is 
most likely that those perceptions will correspond to the service user's expectations 
under either or both of the following conditions: first if there is competition in supply 
so that service users have the opportunity to choose between rival suppliers; second, 
if purchasers fully reflect the needs of service users. In the first case, exit from the 
service is facilitated, and in the second case opportunity needs to be afforded for the 
expression of voice by the service user through improvement in administrative 
arrangements. In theory, voice is more effective than exit the greater the degree of 
market failure (Hirshman 1970; Paul 1992). 
Since a few of the services that are provided by the corporatised provider division, 
Civic Solutions, and all other service provider divisions of the HCC are 
competitively tendered, service users cannot choose between rival suppliers to ensure 
that their needs and expectations about quality of services are met. Virtually all of 
the services of Sorell Council are also not competitively tendered, so service users, 
like their counterparts in the HCC, are remote from the specification of service 
quality. The nature and distribution of services also continue to be the responsibility 
of politicians and officials of the two councils. Nonetheless, both councils have 
mechanisms for soliciting public input into the shaping of service content and 
delivery. The HCC uses a range of methods to consult and solicit input from service 
users and the general public into the shaping of the content and delivery of services. 
These include biennial surveys, community working groups, community surveys and 
market research. Extensive consultation programs are undertaken for all major 
developments, such as the North Hobart Cultural Park and Skate Park, the 
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redevelopment of the "50 and Better Centre", and the Sandy Bay Beach 
redevelopment plan and forums outlining the recently introduced Dog Control 
Policy. Formal consultation programs are also undertaken in the planning phase for 
the introduction of new services such as the proposed alternative refuse collection 
system and the water reform package (LGB 2002). 
Boyne (1998b) argues that the actual level of service quality is not measured in most 
studies. Rather, service standards before competitive tendering are compared with 
the standards enshrined in the new contract. This method raises two problems: first, 
the quality of service produced after competitive tendering is unknown. Syzmanski 
(1996:13) puts this problem into perspective when he asserts that, 'quality may fall 
following the introduction of competitive tendering even if the specification of the 
service is raised...on the other hand, quality may rise even if the contractor defaults 
on the contract specification, because the achieved standard is still better than what 
went before'. In other words, conclusions on efficiency cannot be drawn from studies 
which apply measures of quality obtained from ex-ante service specifications (Boyne 
1998a). A second problem is that only some aspects of services are covered when 
quality is assessed on the basis of the contract specification. For example, Boyne 
(1997) observed that studies of refuse collection in the UK' typically use two 
indicators of quality: the frequency and method of collection (front door or back 
door). However, the Audit Commission of the UK has put forth additional eight 
dimensions of the quality of the refuse collection service (Boyne 1997). 
Some studies attempt to evaluate quality in relation to achievement to the exclusion 
of contract specification (McMaster 1995). In most instances however, the measure 
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of quality after competitive tendering is based solely on the views of service 
managers, whose perceptions of the change in standards may be remote from the 
experience of direct consumers or the views of the wider public (Boyne 1998a). This 
certainly seems to be the case in the HCC and Sorell Council where quality 
performance is measured against the standards specified in the contracts and service 
level agreements. Moreover, the technical knowledge requirements for making 
substantive input into the shaping of the content and delivery of some services 
preclude service users in the first place from the process of quality specification. 
Later they are further made remote from the corridors of quality evaluation after the 
service is produced. 
Processes 
Processes denote methods of accomplishing activities including all of the integral 
steps that are required. A process is how things get done. According to Bailey and 
Davidson (1999: 164) processes may be codified as standard operating procedures in 
conformance with any statutory requirements (for example, for health and safety in 
sports facilities or race relation in housing allocation), professional codes of conduct 
(for example, for chartered surveyors, accountants, or solicitors), professional 
management standards (for example, use of the BS 5750 [ISO 9000] quality 
management system by architects, solicitors, and housing managers) and good 
practice guidelines. 
All operating procedures, processes and practices of councils should conform to the 
Local Government Act 1993 and other statutory requirements. The competence and 
delegated powers local government exercises are set within the limits prescribed by 
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the Local Government Act 1993. The rate setting power for example, cannot be 
exercised beyond a certain predetermined ceiling. The application of competitive 
neutrality to local goverment undertaking implied: the removal of taxation 
advantages through taxation equivalents; the removal of debt guarantees; and the 
resolution of the question regarding cross-subsidisation of certain business activities 
from other components of local government enterprise (Felmingham and Page 1996). 
Requirements of the Federal Industrial Relation Act, Local Area Work Agreements, 
as well as other protective legislation, mean that councils cannot easily lay off 
employees who are redundant and who are not performing. 
The implication of all these rules, regulations and restrictions is that the revenue 
raising ability, and for that matter the expenditure wishes, of councils are affected by 
legislation. And this in turn means that decisions on levels and costs of inputs and the 
outcomes that are derived from these inputs are a function of these statutory 
requirements. It also implies that councils, including the HCC and Sore11 Council, 
cannot relinquish full control over inputs and processes to private companies and in-
house units holding service contracts for fear of breach of the Local Government Act 
1993 and other statutory requirements that are likely to result from their behaviour. 
For this reason, there continues to be emphasis on inputs and processes by the HCC 
and Sore11 Council. 
If local governments were to concentrate their attention on outputs and outcomes, 
they would presumably trust contractors who have external accreditation to work to 
professionally determined industry standards. Such professional codes, standards, 
and guidelines may be enshrined in the contracts let under compulsory competitive 
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tendering and voluntary competitive tendering regimes. Local government could also 
make BS 5750 (ISO 9000) certification a requirement before accepting tenders for 
service contracts. This will ensure that contractors' quality management systems 
guarantee customers a high and consistent quality of goods and services (Bailey and 
Davidson 1999). 
The benefits of a BS 5750 (ISO 9000), or equivalent uncertified systems are many: 
acting as a 'catalyst for change and a mechanism to create a sense of urgency...to 
create a strategic and operational system that works' (Curry and Monagham 1994: 
45). The Audit Commission of the UK notes that 'Certification can be valuable but 
that is not the end of the story, it needs to be placed within a comprehensive contract 
management strategy' (Audit Commission 1993: 39). In-house provider units and 
private contractors appear to attach greater attention and value to certification than 
do the client sides of local government. Few client sides will trust the in-house 
provider unit or the private contractor on the basis of certification alone (Walsh and 
Davis 1993). 
This reservation about the value of certification stems from the limitations which 
critics have catalogued against it. Some attack certification as too rigid and 
mechanistic for services, an inappropriate bureaucratic static straightjacket, quality 
by compulsion rather than by commitment' inspected in' rather than 'managed in', 
abiding by the letter rather than by the spirit of a quality management system, and 
too strong on documentation (Bailey and Davidson 1999:166). The inspector is 
charged with the responsibility of policing deviation from written procedures, not to 
evaluate whether those procedures are appropriate nor, unlike total quality 
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management (TQM) to seek ongoing improvements in standards (Younis et al 1996). 
Bailey and Davidson (1999) argue that certification does not necessarily guarantee 
good quality services because it defines a minimum standard for delivery 
mechanisms rather than outcomes. Moreover, it may lead to overdependence upon 
third-party certification of quality improvement, diverting attention away from the 
organisation's own direct methods for quality improvement. 
Even though the HCC has some quality assurance commitments and certification 
requirements in place, it would not simply trust the in-house provider or the private 
contractor in an arm's length relationship purely on the basis of certification. It has 
established its own internal direct methods for quality improvement. Both its external 
certification requirements and internal quality improvement mechanisms are worth 
mentioning. The management system of the HCC has been developed and 
documented and is maintained to address the specific needs of customers, 
management and employees in accordance with the requirements of AS/NZS ISO 
9000: 2000 Quality Management Systems Requirements, and with reference to 
AS/NZS 1400: 1996 Environmental Management Systems and AS 4801: 2001 
Occupational Health and Safety Management Systems where appropriate within the 
organisation's operations (HCC 2005). 
Civic Solutions and the Tecton Project Group are quality assured to the ISO 9000 
with management and staff committed to a process of continual improvement, 
commitment to sound occupational and safety principles and the continuing skills 
and professional development of its staff and employees (LGB 2002). The quality 
assurance certifications of Civic Solutions and the - Tecton Project Group after some 
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year, are reaching a recognised state of maturity whereby the implemented quality 
management systems are seen as being part of the 'daily business' (HCC 2001). 
Local government legislation, HCC policies and Code of Public Tendering form the 
basis for all tendering handled by the council. The council Contract Management 
Unit operates in strict adherence to the Local Government Act 1993, the HCC Code 
of Public Tendering and various other council policies (LGB 2002). Tender 
evaluation is a Quality Assured, industry standard process designed to yield the most 
attractive tender based on a set of pre-determined criteria and weighting. The 
selected criteria are included in the tender documents (LGB 2002). 
Similarly, the Process Improvement Program (PIP) continues to provide a 
mechanism for process review and improvement within those areas not subject to 
quality assurance (HCC 2001). The HCC has adopted the Australian Quality 
Council's Australian Business Excellence Framework, which has provided a focus 
for the further development of strategies that address identified opportunities for 
improvement within council's operations. 
Sore11 Council has no external quality assurance accreditation but has internal 
mechanisms for quality improvement. Sore11 Council's policies and 'Code of Public 
Tendering' like that of the HCC, form the basis for all tendering handled by the 
council. The council Contract Management Unit also operates in accordance with the 
Local Government Act 1993. Tender evaluation, like in the HCC, is a quality assured 
industry process designed to yield the most attractive tender based on a set of 
predetermined criteria and weighting (Sore11 Council Interviews 2004). 
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The elaborate external certification requirements and internal direct methods of 
quality improvement of the HCC indicate that it places more emphasis on processes 
than Sore11 Council. Sore!! Council has only a limited set of internal quality 
improvement mechanisms, but has no external certification requirement for service 
providers, especially in-house providers. 
Monitoring of service delivery 
In the HCC, monitoring of services is a chain from field inspectors to divisional 
directors to the Client-Provider Advisory Group and then to the council. The Client-
Provider Advisory Group meets monthly to review the performances of provider 
units, Civic Solutions in particular. One director indicated that an Executive 
Information System with the capability of furnishing a snap shot of the relationship 
between performance of council divisions and their set targets was in place. Another 
said the works of Civic Solutions were regularly inspected by the client, City 
Services and Texton Designers to ensure good work. Other bodies that monitor the 
works of Civic Solutions include Works Services Committee (WSC), Project 
Coordinating Meeting (PCM) and Finance Group. The WSC compares Civic 
Solutions' performance against set targets, while the PCM examines the progress of 
work and the associated costs. The Finance Group deals with key detailed fiscal 
reports of Civic Solutions and other council divisions. In Sore11 Council, inspection 
teams of individual departments monitor services delivery under their mandates. For 
example, the Works Services Division of the Engineering Department has a 
monitoring team comprising the Works Engineer and three supervisors (Sore11 
Council Interviews 2004). 
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This evidence from the study councils is consistent with contemporary research 
emanating from the UK (for example, in the Spring 1996 thematic edition of Public 
Administration) which suggests that contracts are often method and input based. The 
research also indicates that contract management demands increased organisational 
formality and high transaction costs (also experienced in the US), as well as 
significant surveillance activities (monitoring). According to Frey (1993) principal-
agent theory has traditionally assumed that rigorous monitoring leads to higher 
efficiency. The agent however, may interpret rigorous scrutiny by the principal as a 
sign of distrust, or as a complete affront of the contract built on trust. This may create 
incentive for the agent to behave in an opportunistic fashion. 
Management and transaction costs 
Most studies have not attempted to separately identify the costs of preparing for 
competitive tendering and contracting such as developing tender specifications and 
performance measurements or the costs of transferring service delivery to external 
contractors. Due to lack of empirical evidence quantifying their effects, it is 
indeterminate whether their omission affects the general conclusion that competitive 
tendering and contracting leads to cost savings. The Industry Commission's report 
does contend that these costs are minimal and even if they were included they would 
not be so large as to be in excess of the savings accrued from competitive tendering 
and contracting.. Nevertheless, 'the lack of any appropriate evidence regarding the 
nature and quantity of these costs, suggests that either current information systems 
do not capture these costs or that identification is not warranted since they are sunk 
costs' (Sciulli 1998: 8). 
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Very few studies have attempted to identify transaction costs separately. Walsh and 
Davis (1993) concluded that the average cost of preparation for 'competition (as a 
percentage of total contract value) was 7.5 percent of the first year costs and about 
1.8 percent of total contract value given the average length of contracts' (p. 145). 
Ascher (1987) accounted for transaction costs, such as severance payments, in the 
analysis of savings attained through contracting by Wandworth Borough Council 
(UK). Once these costs were estimated, savings from contracting-out and market 
testing were estimated to be 30 percent and 23 percent respectively. The City of 
Burnside Council (South Australia) provided the example of a problematic contract 
where administration costs of 11.5 percent were considered to be very high (Industry 
Commission 1996). 
Monitoring costs 
Like the costs of preparation for competitive tendering and contracting, monitoring 
costs of internal and external service delivery are usually not identified. Prager 
(1994: 181) contends that different services require different levels of monitoring. 
For instance, refuse collection, government television and radio and transport 
services can partly be monitored by the general public, and is further enhanced where 
there is a formal complaints resolution mechanism. In other areas which require 
technical (such as those which apply to building standards and specifications) or 
professional (such as health care and education) standards the level of monitoring 
needed, implies that it is more expensive than in the former case. 
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The argument that many studies do not identify and quantify monitoring costs will 
have no utility if there is no difference in the level of monitoring under internal or 
external provision of services. The strength of this criticism is diminished if it turns 
out that the costs of monitoring are the same whether services are provided in-house 
or by private contractors. 
However, there are reasons to believe, argues Prager (1992: 89), that the level of 
monitoring may be higher for external contractors than for internal provision. 
Information asymmetry is one point; another is that employees have less incentive to 
behave opportunistically, since they are on a fixed income. The same cannot be said 
of external contractors whose profit motive may induce them to act opportunistically 
if they realise that the service is not being adequately monitored. It is reasonable, 
since monitoring costs are not separately identified, to treat empirical evidence that 
examine the level of these costs with some caution. Walsh and Davis (1993) 
calculated monitoring costs to be about 6 percent, whereas Savas (1987) estimated 
the costs to be between 2 and 7 percent of the contract cost. Rehfuss (1989) sets the 
monitoring costs in the range of 5 and 10 percent of the contract cost. 
The inability of public agencies to identify the cost of monitoring and other 
transaction costs partly stems from the fact that they are not separate budget line 
items. They are most likely included and spread over a number of programs and a 
number of organisational units (Sciulli 1998). This certainly seems to be the case in 
Hobart and Sore11 Councils where majority of respondents indicated that contract 
administration costs are not separately identified in councils' reporting. They also 
stated that monitoring of program delivery was undertaken as part of the duties of 
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councils' officers and the costs of this activity were not separately identified nor 
quantified. 
In order to determine the full extent of cost savings from competition and 
contracting-out it is important that the management, monitoring and transaction costs 
of municipal services that are subject to competitive tendering and contracting are 
identified, quantified and subtracted from the total cost savings. Only when this is 
done can the postulation that competitive tendering and contracting leads to cost 
savings will have much empirical value. 
Changes in organisational practices and culture 
Views of respondents have been gathered about the impact of the purchaser-provider 
split on the core values, structures and practices of the two councils. The purpose has 
been to determine whether the separation has minimised conflict and tension 
between multiple and conflicting roles in the two councils. It has also been to assess 
whether the powers and autonomy of both the purchaser and provider have been 
strengthened to pursue their respective roles consistent with their differing goals. In 
addition, it has been to find out whether accountability in the management and 
productivity of public resources has been enhanced. Further, it has been to determine 
whether attention has been drawn to addressing the needs and requirements of 
citizens as clients, consumers and customers of government operations. These issues 
are examined in turn below. 
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Disaggregated bureaucracies 
Undoubtedly, the introduction of the purchaser-provider split has resulted in 
significant changes to the organisational structures of the two councils, particularly 
that of the HCC. Both the HCC and Sorell Council have appointed general managers 
on five-year renewable performance contracts to replace the former lifetime-tenure 
Town Clerk. Sorell Council has abolished the six previous departments of Corporate; 
Finance; Engineering; Planning; Building; and Environmental Services. These have 
been replaced with three new departments of Corporate and Community Services; 
Engineering Services; and Environment and Development Services. It is important to 
note that structural reform has not gone beyond the above changes in Sorell Council. 
No corporatised provider units have been created, meaning no contracts mediate 
behaviour of, and relationships between, in-house service departments and council. 
Contracts however, govern the behaviour and relationships between council and 
external contractors to whom council out-source some service delivery (Sorell 
Council Interviews 2004). 
Since the council has not been separated into purchaser and provider sides the two 
roles are integrated or interchangeable, thus perpetuating the conflict and tension 
between the multiple and conflicting roles of council that were already prevalent 
prior to the introduction of the model. Majority of the respondents indicated that 
managers of service departments partake in the planning and appropriation stages of 
services and are also ultimately responsible for their delivery. The conflicting roles 
and objectives of the council are likely to undermine the cost effective discharge of 
the council's operational responsibilities. This problem was identified in the 
argument of the New Zealand Treasury for public sector reform when it asserted that 
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conflicting objectives contributed to the phenomena of internal or producer capture, 
where the departmental interest of the state organisation and its staff skew the advice 
to government and undermine the cost effective discharge of the organisation's 
operational responsibilities (New Zealand Treasury 1987). 
Role separation is clearer in the HCC than in Sorell Council. The creation of City 
Services on the purchaser side which specifies the terms of the contracts of civil and 
environmental construction and maintenance works that are executed by the provider 
side, Civic Solutions has forced both sides to operate in defined ways that are 
consistent with their differing goals. The use of service level agreements or quasi 
contracts to govern the behaviour of other provider divisions has strengthened the 
client's position, allowing purchasers a greater say in what outputs they will 
purchase to achieve desired outcomes. These institutional shifts have produced a new 
organisational structure where the disjunction between the client side and service 
delivery is easily noticeable — a complete separation of policy and service delivery 
(Ryan 1997). The separation has minimised conflict and tension between the 
multiple and conflicting roles of the council as each side of the split is now clearly 
focused on its roles and responsibilities. This was confirmed by majority of the 
respondents. They indicated that the roles and responsibilities of all council divisions 
were now clearly defined so that the client and the providers focus mostly on their 
designated tasks. 
The Director of Civic Solutions added that his division has 26 business units, each 
with clearly defined roles and responsibilities. Civic Solutions as a corporatised 
division for example, has responsibility for executing civil and environmental 
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construction and maintenance works but has no business with the designing, 
documenting and specifications of the work to be carried out. This responsibility is 
being assumed by the client, City Services (HCC Interviews 2004). This clarification 
of roles and objectives has improved service management by Civic Solutions. Noga 
(1997) suggests that efficiency gain of $5 million by Civic Solutions in 1997/98 was 
achieved through a reduction in employee numbers, and that on the whole services 
did not diminish. It was gathered from the interviews however, that the saving was 
more like $12.5 million (HCC Interviews 2004). This evident is consistent with the 
argument of the Treasury of New Zealand which notes that the key to improved 
service management is structural reform that enabled clear unconflicting objectives 
to be set (New Zealand Treasury 1987: 76). 
Role clarification needs however, to be qualified, for Noga (1997) asserts that some 
of the business units continue to engage in both policy and operational matters. The 
directors of some service departments continue to have roles in the planning and 
appropriation stages as well as in the eventual delivery of the services. Moreover, the 
Client-Provider Advisory Group, which appraises the performance of provider 
divisions and coordinates service delivery under the purchaser-provider split, is 
composed of members from both sides of the split. The Director of Civic Solutions, 
on the provider side, sits along the General Manager and the Directors of Corporate 
and Financial Services on the client side, on the Client-Provider Advisory Group. 
This composition cannot guarantee that the comments on performance by provider 
side directors will not be sympathetic to their divisions or departments. Nevertheless, 
the separation represents a major deviation from the traditional bureaucratic model of 
local government organisational structure. 
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While the new structures of the HCC, like all other councils in Australia, generally 
have not proceeded as far as their New Zealand counterparts (local area trading 
enterprise [LATE] many of which are incorporated under company legislation), they 
are such a movement away from normal practices that issues such as accountability, 
control and coordination are being tested (Aulich 1997: 142). 
Scope of managerial autonomy and discretion 
The management pyramid has reduced with the advent of the purchaser-provider 
split, especially in the HCC, and decision-making and accountability have been 
delegated, especially on operational issues. On the provider side in the HCC, the 
three controlling authorities: Civic Solutions, the Tattersaall's Hobart Aquatic Centre 
and Tecton Consulting Group have generally been given increased authority to 
decide on ways they use their resources to meet their obligations. Informants 
unanimously indicated that provider side managers have been given reasonable level 
of freedom, independence and discretion for the effective discharge of their 
responsibilities. For example, the Director of Civic Solutions said that the 'client side 
of the council has not yet worked out precisely the nature of services it wants the 
Hydraulic Services Unit to carry out'. This delay in specifying the service content of 
the unit, he added, has led to the 'exercise of discretion by Civic Solutions in the 
identification of hydraulic service demands and the designing of the appropriate 
steps to meet those demands'. 
Respondents were also unanimous about the enhanced power frontline managers 
enjoy upon the introduction of the purchaser-provider split. Majority of the directors 
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said frontline managers receive management training especially in project 
management, human resource management and financial management. They also 
have delegated authority, which they combine with discretion to determine the right 
combination of strategy and resources in any given context to carry out their 
responsibilities. Majority of the directors intimated that frontline managers have 
reasonable room of discretion in the implementation of policies. The informant also 
said that the suggestions and recommendations of frontline managers about program 
delivery are highly valued and they do inform implementation and policy reforms. 
Managers of provider departments in Sore11 Council do not enjoy the equal of the 
autonomy, freedom and independence, which their counterparts in the HCC enjoy. 
The management pyramid is still relatively hierarchical with purchaser and provider 
roles still integrated in departments, with the general manager having reasonable 
power to regulate and control line departments (Sorell Council Interviews 2004). 
The separation has also strengthened the position of the purchaser side in the HCC 
by allowing managers here greater say in what outputs they will purchase in order to 
achieve desired outcomes. In other words, the separation provides powerful 
incentives for the policy arm of the council to be a more independent and demanding 
purchaser. For example, City Services is a specialist client side unit of the HCC 
responsible for the planning, designing, defining the work to be undertaken by Civic 
Solutions, contract preparation, tendering processes, tender evaluation, and letting 
and management the contract. This enables it to purchase only those outputs from 
Civic Solutions that achieve its desired outcomes (HCC Interviews 2004). 
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Use of contracts to mediate behaviour 
The introduction of the purchaser-provider split into local government has led to the 
establishment of employment contracts for senior officers. Service contracts are 
developed with clients and customers and service delivery is contracted out to in-
house and external providers. The theoretical basis of these reforms is agency theory 
which suggests that social and political life can be programmed by network of 
contracts between principals and agents; and public choice theory with its concern to 
minimise discretion available to budget maximising bureaucrats and politicians 
(Albin 1992). 
Agency theory has informed the shift to short-term employment contracts for senior 
public servants and especially the introduction of new performance agreements and 
program monitoring arrangement. This shift challenges the existing contract of 
employment, with lifelong tenure no longer the norm, instead, short-term contracts 
are now fashionable, and especially a contract with performance criteria (Aulich 
1997). As regards labour market changes, the shift is commonly in respect of more 
labour flexibility, the spread of personal contracts of employment, new performance-
related pay, widened pay relativities, decentralised negotiations and, perhaps, 
derecognition of trade unions (Aulich 1997: 139). 
There is evidence in the HCC and Sorell Council of the adoption of contract 
arrangements for the hiring of senior staff The general managers of both councils are 
engaged on five-year contract bases with the councils and the renewal of the 
contracts is subject to satisfactory performance. The directors of all departments in 
turn, sign individual performance contracts of the same duration with the general 
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manager, in the case of the HCC (HCC Interviews 2004; Sore11 Council Interviews 
2004). 
The relationship between the non-business side and the business provider side and 
other service departments in the HCC are now mediated by contracts and service 
level agreements. Performances of providers are matched against targets. In this way 
provider units are held to account for good work and money expended (HCC 
Interviews 2004). In turn, the client sides of the council, are accountable to the 
council in the achievement of agreed goals set out in the latter's policy framework 
(HCC Interviews 2004). To that extent, it can be argued that the HCC's reliance on 
contracts to mediate behaviour of employees, service providers and service 
purchasers, is greater than that of Sore11 Council, which applies them only to the 
appointment of the general manager and for external providers. So if enhanced 
accountability is expected from rigorous monitoring as required by the contract, then 
the HCC is likely to be more accountable than Sore11 Council. 
Labour market changes have also occurred in the two councils. The labour contracts 
which have been negotiated under the purchaser-provider split have been used as a 
lever to change workplace relations. In the HCC for example, majority of 
employment conditions are contained within awards/enterprise agreements and local 
area work agreements. Enterprise Bargaining Committees have employee 
representation that has been assisted in negotiations by the relevant employee 
organisations (LGB 2002). Local area agreements that have been negotiated by the 
HCC included Tattersall's Hobart Aquatic Centre Local Area Agreement (2 
agreement, 1999/2001), Sports fields Local Area Agreement, Parking Technicians 
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Local Area Agreement, Duty Officers Local Area Agreement and Salamanca Market 
Area Agreement. The rest are Gallery Attendants Agreement, Animal Control Local 
Area Agreement, and Youth Workers Local Area Agreement (LGB 2002). 
Sore11 Council's Enterprise procedures are incorporated within existing agreements 
and conform to the requirement of the Federal Workplace Relations Act (Sore11 
Council Interviews 2004). The purchaser-provider split has engendered the increased 
use of contracts for service specifications, employment contract and industrial 
relations agreements. However, the extension to performance-based contracts below 
the top echelons and the use in service charters with the community has not been as 
widespread as in some other countries. 
Customer centredness 
Subsequent to the purchaser-provider split service contract, benclunarking and a host 
of other mechanisms are applied to measure and meet the needs of public service 
customers. Majority of the respondents in the two councils indicated that 
consciousness of quality and customer satisfaction has increased. That this value 
characteristic has been enhanced has been evident on both the client and provider 
sides of the case study councils. Managers in the councils expressed the view that the 
purchaser-provider split has afforded them the opportunity for the first time to 
understand the extent of their services and of the customer needs that are to be met. 
The new practice of developing tender specifications has proved invaluable to 
Tasmanian councils. Attention has now been drawn to the management and delivery 
of services, with performance measured in terms of outputs instead of inputs; formal 
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decisions about increasing, decreasing or maintaining current service levels have also 
been influenced by the development of tender specifications (HCC Interviews 2004; 
Sore11 Council Interviews 2004). Majority of respondents also said that developing 
tender specifications, on the whole, ensured that standards of service would not 
decline. For example, the HCC in 1999, 2000 and 2001 conducted surveys of 400 
residents and 200 businesses to seek information on service levels, importance and 
performance. The results demonstrated a consistent performance or general 
improvement over the period and by comparison are well above the state average 
(LGB 2002: 89). 
To improve the delivery of services, the HCC established a customer service centre 
in 1995 which was designed to cater for the entire interface between council officers 
and the public. The centre operates with 18 staff, all of whom are multi-skilled and 
equipped to facilitate all customer payments, enquiries and appointments. A total of 
7 customer service officers are located at the front counter, their duties include 
enquiries, and payments of all council's accounts, from development applications to 
parking fines. Each officer has a fully maintained operational manual, which assists 
in facilitating over 400 different questions and enquiries (LGB 2002). 
Sore11 Council has developed an efficient information technology system to assist in 
a more efficient delivery of services to the public. This has enabled the council to 
electronically up-date its data for easy reference. The development of the council's 
web page now allows electronic availability of current reports and information such 
as an electronic version of the questionnaire regarding council's strategic plan during 
the time that input is sought. The upgrade of the Geographic Information System has 
369 
led to greater availability of maps and property data on council computers (Sore11 
Council Interviews 2004). 
Problems of implementation 
Problems relating to the implementation of the purchaser-provider split have been 
compiled from the views expressed by managers on both the client and provider 
sides of both councils. The ability to identify and resolve these problems will 
determine the success or otherwise of the implementation of the policy. 
Lack of expertise 
Majority of the respondents at the HCC agreed that there was a general lack of 
expertise in project management in relation particularly to contract specification, 
costing and administration. This inadequacy weakens the position of the client side 
as the policy arm, to become a more independent and demanding purchaser. In the 
HCC integration and coordination across divisions in relation to council's policy 
goals and strategic direction, under the purchaser-provider split, is supposed to be 
achieved through contracts and service level agreements. But as Storch (1996) 
observed, a number of problems inclusive of a lack of skills amongst managers in 
contract specification and monitoring has made effective integration trickier. Ryan 
(1997) also argues that even before the introduction of the purchaser-provider split 
the HCC management was already grappling with the problem of integration and 
coordination across divisions in terms of council policy goals and strategic 
directions, this separation has pronounced fragmentation. This evidence serves to 
qualify one of the criticisms of the purchaser-provider split that, separating policy 
and delivery can make effective integration unlikely (William 1997). 
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Absence of competition 
The lack of competition in the Tasmanian market for the provision of some services 
is a problem. Garbage collection and maintenance of sports fields have been 
identified by one of the directors of the HCC as examples of services lacking 
competition in provision. This finding is consistent with Noga's (1997) view that the 
small Tasmanian economy may well prevent a marketplace emerging. Contestability 
is less about ownership than competition, or the threat of competition. The prospect 
of competition is intended to act as a spur to enhance productivity and program 
effectiveness, and from the purchaser's perspective, to provide them with greater 
choice of quality goods and services. This spur to higher productivity is therefore 
unlikely to emerge in the Tasmanian situation. 
In the case of garbage collection and sports field maintenance in the HCC the 
prospects or threat of competition is absent hence, the implied efficiency and 
effectiveness gains from competition is unlikely to be realised. Moreover, since no 
services that are provided by the HCC's corporatised division, Civic Solutions have 
as yet been competitively tendered, the only incentive to increased efficiency should 
come from market-testing the entity's works and services, since as Baumol et al 
(1992) notes, it is the threat of competition rather than the number of bids which is 
crucial in creating the incentives for increased efficiency. 
Difficulty of managing role clarification 
Another problem gleaned from the interviews in the HCC about the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider split related to the lack of full understanding on the part of 
both the client and the provider sides of the nature of each other's work. One director 
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noted that the 'client side is always concerned about cost saving whilst the provider 
side always seeks a market incentive to deliver the services at a commercial rate of 
return'. As a result, there is difficulty sometimes in striking a bargain or deal that 
satisfies both parties. This evidence is highlighted by Noga (1997) when he argues 
that in the HCC the provider is concerned with programming work to reduce 
inefficiencies, while the policy arm seeks to meet competing demands from elected 
members to address ratepayer complaints. This situation does not afford opportunity 
for the establishment of effective communication between both sides of the split for 
the resolution of legitimate concerns that are likely to affect strategic policy 
decisions and delivery aspects of council services. Walsh (1995) puts this problem 
into perspective when he asserts that, although the role of the purchaser is to operate 
at a strategic level, the separation of strategy and practice may make strategic 
decisions more difficult to make because of insufficient knowledge. 
Minimum control of contractors 
The autonomy, independence and freedom that are expected to accrue to agencies 
under the purchaser-provider split, can be viewed as a double edge sword. On the 
one hand, those responsible for the management and delivery of services may 
generally be given increased authority to decide on the ways they use their resources 
to meet their obligations. On the other, those responsible for setting policy and 
policing the behaviour of providers may end up with only minimal and indirect 
control of contractors. This certainly seems to be case in the HCC where, according 
to one director, 'the introduction of the purchaser-provider split has resulted in the 
council exercising reduced and indirect control of service providers'. This problem 
straddles William's (1997) concern about the appropriateness of the purchaser- 
372 
provider split for the public sector when he asserts that, the more we 'fragment the 
structure of government by replacing command hierarchies with network of 
contracts, the more we call in question the nature of responsible government by 
attenuating the responsibility of elected representatives' (William 1997: 11). The end 
result, say some critics, is the lost of trust, flexibility and accountability required to 
run government in a democracy. 
The respondents at Sore!! Council were explicit about the problems that have 
bedevilled the implementation of the purchaser-provider split. These included 
scarcity of resources due to reduced state and commonwealth funding, low revenue 
from council own sources, lack of competition in the provision of services and 
minimal and indirect control of contractors. The lack of competition in the provision 
of services, and minimal and indirect control of contractors occur in both the HCC 
and Sore11 Council among the list of problems cited about the implementation of the 
purchaser-provider split. Since Sore!! Council has not pursued the structural and 
cultural changes implied by the purchaser-provider split, it is not surprising that it 
has not encountered problems, unlike the HCC, such as a sense of insecurity within 
divisions and among employees, weak integration and coordination across divisions 
in relation to council's goals and strategic directions, tensions and misunderstanding 
between client and provider sides, and the problem of balancing efficiency and 
equity objectives. These are problems that may inevitably follow the implementation 
of the purchaser-provider split. 
Sore!! Council encountered problems such as lack of competition in the provision of 
services, and minimal and indirect control of contractors only on occasions when it 
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had outsourced or contracted out some service delivery to external providers. The 
HCC on the other hand, encountered these two said problems regardless of whether 
in-house units on contracts and service level agreements or external contractors 
delivered the services. 
The fit of the purchaser-provider split in the Tasmanian context 
Evidence from this study indicates that councils instead of reducing the traditional 
emphasis on inputs and processes have rather strengthened it. This is especially so 
now, under the purchaser-provider split, with its requirement for strict use of 
contracts to specify organisational responsibilities, maintain accountability and 
deliver services. On the whole however, the client side in an attempt to improve 
service delivery outcomes have tended to lend more weight to processes than inputs 
— both supposedly the responsibility of the provider. Evidence of concern with 
outputs is discernible even though this has a weak relation to outcomes. The 
purchaser's attention has been drawn more to achieving outputs than outcomes, even 
though both are supposed to be its responsibility. 
Performance indicators and performance information are at a low level of 
development in most councils in Australia. What is emerging tends to be 
management indicators of activity, throughput and process, rather than program or 
outcome indicators (Ryan 1997: 173). The continuous emphasis on inputs and 
processes by councils is explained by a number of factors. First, councils cannot 
relinquish full control over inputs and processes to private contractors and in-house 
providers holding service contracts for fear of breach of the Local Government Act 
1993 and other statutory requirements that are likely to result from their behaviour. 
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Second, good quality outputs and outcomes are a function of good quality inputs and 
processes and the service delivery approach. If poor quality inputs are procured and a 
sub optimal approach is used to produce and distribute the services, a less efficient 
and effective outcome will result. So councils employ good quality inputs and 
processes in order to secure desirable outputs and outcomes. 
Third, councils may strive to reduce the risk of turning out inferior quality of outputs 
and outcomes due to the social, financial, and political consequences. For this reason, 
they will wish to secure quality inputs and processes in order to minimise that risk. 
The optimal approach to securing the quality and quantity of services required will 
be likely to vary between local governments with different circumstances such as 
size and scope of contracts and service objectives (Bailey and Davidson 1999: 172). 
It is also likely to vary with the extent of competition in the market, bureaucratic 
support and capacity available, and within local authorities for different services. 
The small Tasmanian market does not afford the opportunity for the gains in 
efficiency in competitive supply to be realised. While this is a state-wide issue, the 
problem is more acute in rural and small councils such as Sorell Council than urban 
and large ones like the HCC. Moreover, the HCC has greater resources and is better 
served by the requisite professional staff than almost all the other councils in the 
state of Tasmanian — an advantage that has enabled it to adapt more quickly to 
managerial and microeconomic reform notions such as commercialisation, 
corporatisation and the purchaser-provider split. 
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Despite the fact that all of the above factors are external to the theoretical 
prescriptions that must be met to achieve an optimal outcome in the application of 
the purchaser-provider split, they do represent factors of the environment that 
obviously affect empirical outcomes. However, the purchaser-provider split has not 
accommodated context as a function of application outcomes. Hence, greater 
efficiency gains in some councils may be attributable more to particular local 
favourable contextual conditions than to the purchaser-provider split per se. 
Conclusion 
It has been made clear from the above discussion that there is a mismatch between 
some of the theoretical benefits of the purchaser-provider split and the outcomes that 
have attended the implementation of the model in the two Tasmanian local 
government areas — Hobart and Sore11. The purchaser-provider split is found to be 
generally unrelated to service category-level (agency-level) spending. The purchaser-
provider split has not reduced total municipal service spending although it has 
decreased council employment. The postulation that client local authorities will only 
focus on controlling outputs and outcomes and so divest responsibility for the control 
of inputs and processes to in-house providers and private contractors has not also 
been validated by practice. The evidence however, seem to support the prescription 
that the implementation of the purchaser-provider split will maximise output, 
notwithstanding that these outputs have been found to be weakly related to 
outcomes. The impact of the purchaser-provider split on quality of services is 
unknown. 
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The promise of best value under the purchaser-provider split 
It is not clear whether the purchaser-provider split is indispensable for best value for 
money to be achieved and whether competition is the best way of putting the split 
into effect. Some commentators have cited tensions, secrecy and mistrust as well as 
adversarial relationships as some of the problems which have accompanied the 
introduction of the purchaser-provider split into the public sector. They also argue 
that these problems have diminished to some extent the collaboration, cooperation 
and trust which hitherto characterised many of the exchanges that took place in 
public organisations (Lewis et al 1996; Wintrobe and Breton 1986). 
Best value is concerned with continuous service improvement within local 
authorities (DETR 1998). At the heart of 'best value' is the fundamental performance 
review which subjects services to assessment based upon the following: challenge 
why and how a service is being provided; invite comparison with others' 
performance across a range of relevant indicators, taking into account the views of 
both service users and potential suppliers; consult local taxpayers, service users and 
the wider business community in the setting of new performance targets; and 
embrace fair competition as a means of securing efficient and effective service 
delivery (1998:18). 
The Government's intention behind 'best value' was to focus the attention of local 
governments on quality and cost of services. It was also to give service users and 
other stakeholders say in the shaping of service content and delivery, while at the 
same time enable councils to benchmark service delivery and operational efficiency. 
Best value removed the requirement of subjecting services to compulsory 
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competitive tendering but it did not suggest a return to direct delivery, rather it 
encouraged local authorities to review all options for service delivery for the purpose 
of selecting the one(s) that provided best value. The prescription in the UK for 
achieving best value in local government service delivery should serve to inform 
municipal authorities in Australia in their quest to achieve efficiency and 
effectiveness in the production and delivery of services to their communities. 
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CONCLUSION 
This thesis has examined the impact of the purchaser-provider split in two 
Tasmanian local government areas — Hobart and Sore11 Councils. It has explored the 
modes of the purchaser-provider spit that are adopted by the two councils and their 
implications for service delivery, employment and organisational culture and 
practices. Although two Tasmanian local government areas are the focus of analysis 
the investigation has made comparison with the experiences of other Australian 
municipal authorities with the purchaser-provider split. In particular, the impact on 
service spending under the purchaser-provider split in the Council of Sydney and 
Mornington Peninsula Council in NSW and Victoria respectively has been examined 
in such service areas as property management, parks maintenance, light fleet 
management, street cleaning, and maintenance of physical infrastructure. The study 
has also drawn on evidence on the effects of the purchaser-provider split on local 
authorities in the UK and New Zealand. A service specific approach to the evaluation 
of the impact of the purchaser-provider split has not been attempted. Rather all 
services which organsation has been affected, in terms of policy and delivery, by the 
split have been considered. 
This eight-chapter thesis is organised such that chapters one to six have been devoted 
to the discussion of public sector reforms at the international, national and state 
levels as well as the local level of government. The last two chapters have 
concentrated on analysis relating to the outcomes of the implementation of the 
purchaser-provider split in the two Tasmanian local government areas, Hobart and 
Sore11. 
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Chapter one has examined public sector reform as a universal phenomenon that 
reflects the influence of the new public management which has swept through many 
western democracies with the aim of improving efficiency and effectiveness in the 
conduct of public business. The factors that instigated the reforms were many and 
varied but in almost all countries they enfolded the imposition of budgetary austerity 
as governments strived to control and discipline public expenditure, the 
consequences of globalisation for governments as they attempted to enhance the 
competitiveness of their national economies, the growing expectations of individual 
citizens and business for quality service, and the opportunities new information 
technology provided not only for effecting savings but also for re-engineering 
service delivery. Many governments irrespective of political and constitutional type, 
organisationally decoupled responsibilities for policy and operations, while they 
emphasised the importance of the management aspects of their operations. 
Contractual relationships have been extended across governments in order to set 
explicit targets for the provision of public services, to establish service standards, and 
to apply demanding and transparent accountability regimes (OECD 1994). 
Virtually everywhere the need to respond to improved management and delivery of 
public service has received greater attention with the consequence of a reduction of 
the authority of central management agencies to regulate and direct line departments. 
The real beneficiaries of this shift are those responsible for the management and 
delivery of services who have been given increased authority to decide on the ways 
they use their resources to meet their obligations. The wave of public sector reform 
represented a steep learning curve in that Western democratic goverrunents 
regardless of political systems sought to learn from one another, and in a number of 
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instances deliberately adopted and adapted structural models from one or more 
jurisdictions (Aucoin 1998). Undoubtedly some are leaders while others are laggards 
however, the tendency has been to adopt common, even generic, principles of good 
public management, notwithstanding significant, even fundamental differences in 
constitutional and political structures (Holmes and Shand 1995). 
In chapter two the doctrines, strengths and weaknesses of theories that underpin the 
purchaser-provider split are discussed. These theories include public choice theory, 
agency theory and the new public management. It then explores the influences these 
theoretical traditions had on the Australian model of public sector reform. It has been 
acknowledged that many ideas, theories and perceptions as well as economic 
pressures and political imperatives played an important role in the reform process. 
Nevertheless, the impact of public choice theory, agency theory and the new public 
management, which are separate yet related theories have had significant impact on 
the Australian as well as other western democracies' models of public sector reform. 
The topic of the third chapter is the model of the purchaser-provider split. Its 
principles and goals together with the conceptual frameworks that undergird it 
(public choice theory, agency theory and the new public management, discussed in 
the preceding chapter) have been explicated. How the model is expressed in the 
Australian local government sector, and the predicted budgetary effects of its 
application in this sphere of government have been examined. Then, an outline of the 
Australian National Competition Policy (NCP) has been made. Further, the relation 
of the NCP both to the purchaser-provider split and compulsory competitive 
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tendering have been sketched. The chapter serves as a framework upon which 
subsequent chapters of this thesis are built. 
The focus of chapter four is public sector reform in Australia in general and local 
government reform in particular. Far-reaching financial management reforms have 
been undertaken and machinery of government changes have occurred at the federal, 
state and local government levels. Microeconomic policy reforms introduced by the 
federal government progressively since the 1980s have embraced the floating of the 
Australian dollar in 1983, significant reductions in barriers to trade and foreign 
investment, commercialisation, and some privatisation, of the government business 
enterprises that dominate large parts of the Australia's economic infrastructure; 
strengthening domestic competition; and increasing labour market flexibility (APSC 
2003: 1). Structural shifts that were specifically made in the public sector can be 
captured at three levels: broad reform of the public sector, which have affected the 
size, composition and functions of the Australian public service; changes at agency 
level to reflect changes in program budgeting, flatter structures, devolution, 
decentralisation or regional initiatives; and changes at the workplace to improve 
ways of working (APSC 2003: 1). 
Changes that occurred in Australian local government can be classified under mainly 
three headings which are namely legislative, managerial and microeconomic. These 
policy-induced changes have altered the nature and form of community government. 
Legislative reforms have changed the essential elements of councils' operations; 
granted them wider competence power, improved accountability mechanisms, 
reduced detailed prescriptions and changed planning and other delegated powers. 
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Managerial reform saw the major and continuous change for local government in its 
functional responsibilities„ in the demands placed on its professional officers, and 
the need for councillors to be adaptable and change attitude to their tasks. 
Microeconomic reform demanded economy, efficiency and effectiveness in the 
conduct of council business; it drew attention to ownership, costs, structures and 
systems; and it located public provision in relation to markets. 
The topic of chapter five is Tasmanian local government reforms of the 1990s, with a 
detailed evaluation of the outcomes of the 1990/93 Modernisation Process. First, 
changes that occurred at the state level have been sketched after which the outcomes 
of the local government reforms have been presented. The changes introduced by the 
state government included among others, reform of state authorities, a restructuring 
of state service, budgetary and management reform, and changes in the policy 
process and the statutory framework within which the state public sector operates. 
The major components of the Tasmanian local government reforms are legislative 
changes, review of the financial relationship between state and local government, 
rationalisation of roles and functions between the two tiers of government and 
amalgamations. The evaluation of these four categories of reform has been done with 
respect to efficiency, democracy and accountability. It has been shown that these 
elements of the modernisation process have not been implemented to the same 
extent, with the same vigour and over the same length of time. The rationalisation of 
roles and functions, and the review of the relative revenue capacities available to 
each level of government have lagged behind legislative and boundary changes. 
There are still several examples of unfunded mandates, despite the reforms, that have 
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impacted and are impacting on local government. For instance, councils are required 
to contribute to library, fire and hospital services, and yet have little, if any say, in 
their operations. This has implications for not only local government finances but 
also community democratisation. Various taxation exemptions, concessions, specific 
purpose grants and subsidies still characterise state-local government financial 
relationship, with consequences of a reduction in accountability and distortion of 
decision-making. 
Legislative changes affected the powers local government may exercise, procedural 
changes to the manner in which they operate and their jurisdictional boundaries. 
Legislative reforms have increased the autonomy of councils and granted them 
general competence power to appropriately respond to the needs of their 
communities. The changes have also improved accountability mechanisms and 
reduced detailed prescriptions. Structural reforms have been the most 
comprehensive, occurring over the longest period of time. The number of councils 
has been reduced from 46 to 29. The driving force behind amalgamation was the 
quest for greater efficiency through economies of scale. Secondary considerations 
were fostering some sense of community or community of interest, and 
representation and participation. The 1990/93 modernisation process was highly 
successful due to its bottom-up approach to the reform process. The failure of the 
1997 amalgamation proposals and other earlier attempts at reform were attributable 
to their top-down approach to the reform agendas, and stood in sharp contrast to the 
highly successful 1990/93 modernisation process. 
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Chapter six has appraised the outcomes of the implementation of the modernisation 
process in Hobart City Council and Sore!! Council. The process has played a major 
role in altering the structure, operations and management practices of the two 
councils. It has also pushed the boundaries of democracy, efficiency and 
accountability further. The effect of the financial relationship between the State 
government and the councils is such that the former enjoys disproportionate 
advantages. Despite the rhetoric about the rationalisation of functions and roles 
between state and local governments many instances of overlapping and duplicating 
mandates still persist, for example, in the delivery of fire, library and planning as 
well as emergency services. 
The institutional changes in HCC and Sore11 Council have been discussed in chapter 
seven. The examination shows that the purchaser-provider split and the NCP have 
changed the councils' organisational structures, operations and practices. The HCC 
and Sore!! Council have both implemented the tenets of the NCP to varying extents 
and in dissimilar fashions. The HCC embraced the corporatisation and competitive 
tendering principles of the NCP. The creation by the council of two controlling 
authorities and a joint authority has markedly changed its structure and lifted it onto 
the platform of a market-oriented future. This reconfiguration is likely to provide 
maximum level of independence and freedom for the corporatised units to enter the 
competitive market of the future with optimism irrespective of the type and extent of 
competition that may eventuate. 
Sorell Council has not followed the footsteps of the HCC, as no corporatised units 
have yet been created. Nonetheless, a range of commercial principles inclusive of 
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full cost attribution and competitive neutrality costs has been applied to a number of 
its activities, particularly its significant business activities. The council has a 
program-oriented structure that links the three new departments. Integration is 
achieved across council by subsuming provider functions under programs and their 
performances are appraised in relation to their contributions to the overall strategic 
direction of the council. 
The final chapter assesses the impact of the purchaser-provider split on Hobart and 
Sore11 Councils. Evidence from the Tasmanian council study has then been compared 
with the outcomes resulting from the introduction of the purchaser-provider split in 
other Australian municipal governments. In particular, the effect on service spending 
as a result of realignment into purchaser and provider groups in the Council of 
Sydney and Mornington Peninsula Council in NSW and Victoria respectively has 
been examined across a range of services. The study has also drawn on evidence of 
the effects of the purchaser-provider split on local authorities in the UK and New 
Zealand. The approach to the evaluation of the outcomes of the implementation of 
the purchaser-provider split is not service specific. Rather a composite_ approach 
involving all services which organisation has been affected, in terms of policy and 
delivery, by the split have been considered. 
The thesis hypothesised that the use of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC and 
Sore11 Council would be unrelated to service category-level spending. It also 
predicted that the incidence of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC and Sore11 
Council would be negatively related to total municipal service spending and 
employment. In addition, the proposition that outputs and outcomes will maximise 
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and quality of product will improve following the introduction of the purchaser-
provider split into both councils has also been investigated by this study. The validity 
or otherwise of these hypotheses have been tested by using a longitudinal research 
design to analyse data collected from mainly secondary sources such as annual 
reports, strategic and annual plans and newsletters of the study councils. Other 
secondary data sources included statistical information from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, reports of the Key Performance Indicators Committee, Local Government 
Division, Department of Premier and Cabinet, and the Local Government Board. 
This data was complimented by information from a semi-structured in-depth 
interview process. The key informants in each council were initially identified by 
their professional responsibilities and interests in relation to the purchaser-provider 
split policy development and implementation. 
The study found that the purchaser-provider split is unrelated to municipal service 
category-level spending. The split has not led to reductions in total municipal service 
spending although it has decreased employment. Its impact on quality of service is 
unknown. The investigation has also found that local governments in Tasmania are 
still preoccupied with inputs and processes regardless of whether services are 
delivered by internal or external providers. In this sense the theory of the purchaser-
provider split is too simplistic in hypothesising that client municipal authorities will 
only be concerned with outputs and outcomes and so be able to concentrate on 
strategic policy issues. This serves to qualify Walsh's (1995: 255) argument that, 
although the role of the purchaser is to operate at a strategic level, the separation of 
strategy and practice may make strategic decisions more difficult due to insufficient 
knowledge of services. The postulation that client local authorities will entrust to 
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providers issues relating to inputs and processes is not supported by the evidence. 
This argument is predicated on a simplified market model where purchasers and 
providers are anonymous parties to transactions. Even though this may represent a 
correct portrayal of most retail markets, such anonymity is scarcely obtainable 
elsewhere (Bailey and Davidson 1999). Concern of councils with outputs is evident 
even though this has a weak relation to outcomes. 
A re-assessment of the purchaser -provider split 
The introduction of the purchaser-provider split into Hobart and Sore11 Councils has 
not resolved some of the theoretical issues on the effects of competitive tendering. 
The relative merits of market provision and monopoly supply are indeterminate due 
to the methodological deficiencies that still persist in empirical studies. Valid and 
comprehensive measures of service expenditure and quality, as has been observed, 
are not without gaps: transaction costs are unidentifiable, other influences on local 
authority spending and efficiency are inseparable from the effects of competition, the 
effects of contestability (decision to seek tenders from external suppliers) are not 
distinguishable from competition (the receipt-of alternative bids to run a service), and 
the operationalisation of service quality is narrow and crude. 
The effects of these variables should be accounted for, and added to the already 
known effects, to determine the full extent of the impact of competition. This should 
then provide the basis of comparison of the relative merits of hierarchies and 
horizontal network of contracts in the provision of public services. Even if such 
comparison were possible and the evidence turned out to be broadly in favour of 
market provision, there would be no guarantee that this evidence would be replicated 
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elsewhere in the state, nation or internationally. This is because the efficiency of the 
private sector compared to the public sector has been the subject of conflicting 
research findings. Borcheding et al (1982) concluded that the empirical results agree 
with the view that public firms have a high unit cost. By contrast, Millward (1992: 
82) observed that there is 'no broad support for private enterprise superiority'. 
Some commentators have criticised the application of the purchaser-provider split to 
the public sector. In much of this literature, it is argued that the efficiency gains from 
competition implied by that split must be balanced against losses of equity, 
citizenship and accountability (William 1997; Halachini and Holzer 1993; Morgan 
and England 1988). Because governments have to achieve much broader objectives 
than just efficiency gains, it is enlightening that the combined effect of the entire 
repertoire of service modes, not just the purchaser-provider split, is considered. This 
alternative approach provides a new means of investigating the relationship between 
policy outputs and the institutional arrangements that municipal governments employ 
to fulfil their service responsibilities (Stein 1990). Each arrangement compliments 
the others and may even make singular and/or unique contributions to the 
achievement of particular dimensions of organisational goals and objectives. 
However, each alternative is inadequate in 'ranking in' all the desirable outcomes. 
The implication of the analysis in this thesis for the theory and practice of public 
administration is that the purchaser-provider split, like all predecessor government 
models, have both strengths and weaknesses, and is not a panacea for the problems 
of bureaucratic supply. A myriad of institutional arrangements for management, and 
service delivery is on the menu, however, it should be realised that the 
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appropriateness or otherwise of any alternative or a combination of alternatives, is a 




1 The new Liberal Government established an Independent commission to Review 
Tasmania's Public Sector Finances, which was chaired by Mr. Charles Curran A. 0 
(Chapman 1995:2) 
2 The matters considered were to take note of a resolution passed by the 1990 Annual 
Conference of the Municipal Association of Tasmania (MAT). 
3 For a more detailed information on the inquiry process and the recommendations of 
the board, see LGAB (1992) or the individual discussion and modernization 
proposals papers. 
This was two years after the preliminary visit to New Zealand by board 
representatives to study changes in local government that had been in place for about 
a year. This visit occurred before the minister announced the LGAB inquiry in 
August 1990 
5 The funds collected from library levy are paid to the Consolidated Fund. The state 
is precluded by statute from imposing direct charges on library users. The levy 
partially recovers the cost of library services from the wider community (Department 
of Treasury 2003) 
6 However, before 1979, the responsibility for fire protection was shared between 
two statutory bodies and 22 individual brigade boards (Department of Treasury 
2003) 
7 This levy is based on the assessed annual value of rateable property. Council may 
retain an administration (collection) charge not exceeding four percent of the gross 
value of the levy and are permitted to recover the levy from individual property 
owners provided that the component of rates attributable to the contribution is 
separately identified. The funds collected from the fire levy are paid direct to the 
State Fire Commission (Department of Treasury 2003). 
8 Specific purposes grant to local government include the following: 
Direct principal and interest subsidies under the Public Bodies Assistance Act 1971 
on borrowings for approved purposes such as for new infrastructure or the 
development of existing facilities. However, no new loans have been made under the 
this Act since 1989 (Department of Treasury 2003); 
In 2001-02, the Department of Infrastructure, Energy and Resources distributed 
grants to councils totaling $1.5million sourced from state government vehicle motor 
taxes (the 'National Road Transport Commission (NRTC) funds'); 
In 2001-02, the Department of Premier and Cabinet disbursed $111 200 to local 
government bodies under the Premier's Sundry Grants Program'. A further $404 000 
from the Social Infrastructure Fund was disbursed to the Glenorchy City Council 
towards the Wilkinson's Point Parkland Redevelopment; and 
In 2001-02, the Burnie City Council and the Devonport City Council received $40 
000 each for the operation of their respective travel centers. The Launceston City 
Council, the Meander Valley Council and the Glamorgan-Spring Bay Council 
received $5000 each from the Tourism Development Grants Program while Circular 
Head Council received $145 500 for its visitor information center (Department of 
Treasury 2003). 
9 The research revealed that: the delivery of W&S services is integrated with the 
provision of roads, paving and to a lesser extent parks. Where there are separate 
work gangs for these services, there are several functions which are jointly provided-
the road gang will, on occasions, complete sewerage work, for example. The extent 
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of this joint provision amounts to five percent of the total works budget in the case of 
the metropolitan councils and fifteen percent in the smaller rural councils. 
1°In Tasmania, all urban water services are provided by local government. 
Accordingly, in 1999 councils undertook a significant amount of work in assessing 
whether two-part tariffs were cost-effective for their urban water supply schemes 
(Department of Treasury 2003). A report on the assessment to the State Government 
in December 1999 revealed that two-part tariffs had already been, or would be, 
implemented in 24 of the 90 water schemes studied. In these cases, the 
implementation of two-part pricing for water delivers many benefits to councils and 
the broader community (Department of Treasury 2003). Correct pricing sends the 
appropriate price signal to customers to promote water use that is economically 
efficient and environmentally responsible. 
11 However, in the case of water pricing, four councils were assessed as recovering 
insufficient revenue to meet the minimum requirement for full cost recovery, while 
the revenue of one council was found to exceed the Urban Water Pricing Guidelines 
for the maximum allowable return. In the case of wastewater pricing, three councils 
were assessed as recovering insufficient revenue under the Urban Water Pricing 
Guidelines, and were found to have exceeded the maximum allowable return. 
12 For instance, case studies were used to evaluate the changes occurring in 
Tasmanian local government by Chapman (1995), the LGB (1997a) and Ryan (1997) 
(Haward and Zwart 2000). 
13 The first case study is the Southern Midlands Council, a rural council north of 
Hobart, which was formed from two existing municipalities and some additional 
rural areas. The second case involves the Huon Valley Council, a predominantly 
rural council south of Hobart, formed from three former municipalities of Cygnet, 
Esperance and the previous Huon Municipality. The third case involved the 
amalgamation of an island municipality, Bruny Island Council, and the considerably 
larger Kingborough Council. The fourth case study, the Tasman Council, has been 
included as a 'counter-factual', as it is a small council representing the Tasman 
Peninsula that resisted amalgamation. Tasman is included in order to compare its 
administrative costs and the services it provides with the amalgamated councils 
(Haward and Zwart 2000: 45). 
14 Municipal taxes consist of general and specific rates excluding fees and charges 




A decade of commissions in Australia 
Title Chairman Date 
Committee of Inquiry into 
the Public Service of 
South Australia 
Prof. D.C. Corbett May 1973 to April 1975 
Board of Inquiry into the 
Victorian Public Service 
Sire Henry Bland Oct. 1973 to Oct. 1975 
Royal Commission on 
Australian Government 
Administration 
Dr. H. C. Coombs June 1975 to July 1976 
New South Wales 
Machinery of Government 
Review 
Hon. T. J. Lewis to Jan. 
19975 
Hon. F. M. Hewitt from 
Jan. 1975 
July 1974 to April 1976 
Review of New South 
Wales Government 
Administration 
Prof P. S. Wilenski Feb. 1977 to Feb. 1982 
Review of Tasmanian 
Government 
Administration 
Phase 1: Task Forces 
Phase 2: Sir George 
Cartland 
May 1978 to Dec. 1978 
March 1979 to Nov. 1981 
Review of Commonwealth 
Administration 
Mr J. B. Reid Sept. 1982 to Jan. 1983 
Review of Public Service 
Management (South 
Australia) 
Mr B. Guerin June 1983 to Feb. 1985 
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Appendix 2 
Previous Local Government Investigations in Tasmania 
1939: Royal Commission on Local Government Report 
1960: Tasmanian Parliament: Report of the Select Committee of House of Assembly 
(M. Wedd, Chairman) 
1965: Municipal Commission of Tasmania: Report (H. E Williams, Chairman) 
1974: Municipal Commission of Tasmania: Report on Matters Relating to Local 
Government (C. Brettingham-Moore, Chairman [LGAB 1990: 54-56]) 
1979: The Board of Inquiry into Local Government in Launceston and Related Areas 
(R. J. K Chapman, Chairman) 
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Appendix 3 
Interview schedule for Hobart City Council and Sore11 Council 
Thesis title: Municipal Reforms in Tasmania: The Impact of the Purchaser- 
Provider Split on Service Delivery in Hobart and Sore11 Councils 
1. How long has the purchaser-provider split been in operation in this council? 
2. What has been the impact of the introduction of the purchaser-provider split 
in terms of administrative and operational arrangements in this council? 
3. What type of services does the council provide? 
4. What services do external providers provide? 
5. Has the introduction of the purchaser-provider split affected the relationship 
between elected representatives and council management? 
6. Has this council sought to enhance the capacity of front-line managers? 
7. How do you co-ordinate service delivery under the purchaser-provider split? 
8. How do you monitor service delivery under the purchaser-provider split? 
9. How do monitoring costs compare to the former costs of in-house supervision 
of program delivery? 
10. Has the purchaser-provider split affected the level of community participation 
in the council's decisions over the shaping of service content and delivery? 
11. What do you look for when assessing quality of services in this council? 
12. How would you assess citizens' perception of council services from the 
launch of the purchaser-provider split to date? 
13. What main problems are encountered in the implementation of the purchaser-
provider split? 
14. Do you think the purchaser-provider split is the best governance mechanism 
for service provision or are there other more attractive alternatives? 
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Appendix 4: Regression estimates for expenditure of public order and safety services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 3413000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 3447000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 3535000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 3808000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 3886000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 3886000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 3848000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 3955000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 3904000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 4065000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 4239000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 4578000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 4735000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 4757000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 4906000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 4862000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.987872 
R Square 0.97589 
Adjusted F 0.948336 
Standard E 114831.2 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance F 
Regressiot 	8 3.74E+12 4.67E+11 35.41718 5.51E-05 
Residual 7 9.23E+10 1.32E+10 
Total 	15 3.83E+12 
Coefficient andard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0" 
Intercept 12617838 8264987 1.526662 0.170681 -6925750 32161426 -6925750 32161426 
PCIN 64.77929 46.79423 1.384344 0.208776 -45.8715 175.4301 -45.8715 175.4301 
FUNGI 35170.53 30889.1 1.138607 0.29233 -37870.6 108211.6 -37870.6 108211.6 
AID 117030.5 50196.39 2.331452 0.052502 -1665.14 235726.1 -1665.14 235726.1 
MUWF 2123.164 1676.039 1.266775 0.245755 -1840.04 6086.368 -1840.04 6086.368 
PUBPAY 556.7892 485.7637 1.146214 0.289374 -591.859 1705.438 -591.859 1705.438 
TAXB 238261.6 257879.3 0.923927 0.386265 -371526 848049.4 -371526 848049.4 
POP -365.012 206.9591 -1.76369 0.121148 -854.392 124.3686 -854.392 124.3686 
PPS -5406.81 4193.158 -1.28944 0.238214 -15322.1 4508.434 -15322.1 4508.434 
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Appendix 5: Regression estimates for expenditure of health services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 395000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 403000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 413000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 418000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 422000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 310000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 538000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 607000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 589000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 615000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 690000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 817000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 842000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 942000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 1031000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 1149000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.986446 
R Square 0.973076 
Adjusted F 0.942306 
Standard E 60946.55 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
Regressior 	8 9.4E+11 1.17E+11 31.62386 8.06E-05 
Residual 7 2.6E+10 3.71E+09 
Total 	15 9.66E+11 
Coefficienk andard Err t Stat 	P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.091pper 95.0a 
Intercept -4312998 4386632 -0.98321 0.358257 -1.5E+07 6059738 -1.5E+07 6059738 
PCIN 20.10592 24.83598 0.809548 0.444842 -38.6218 78.83369 -38.6218 78.83369 
FUNCT 7287.323 16394.35 0.444502 0.670098 -31479.2 46053.81 -31479.2 46053.81 
AID -16291.9 26641.68 -0.61152 0.560182 -79289.5 46705.62 -79289.5 46705.62 
MUWF 1847.989 889.5559 2.077429 0.076375 -255.476 3951.454 -255.476 3951.454 
PUBPAY 171.1843 257.8185 0.663972 0.527964 -438.46 780.8282 -438.46 780.8282 
TAXB 93884.16 136869.2 0.685941 0.514819 -229760 417528.3 -229760 417528.3 
POP 41.22421 109.8433 0.3753 0.718551 -218.514 300.9623 -218.514 300.9623 
PPS 1419.308 2225.514 0.637744 0.543929 -3843.2 6681.811 -3843.2 6681.811 
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Appendix 6: Regression estimates for expenditure of welfare services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TA)(B POP PPS 
1989/90 457000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 462000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 470000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 477000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 485000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 658000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 1093000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 1235000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 1209000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 1377000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 1504000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 1632000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 1663000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 1628000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 1643000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 2036000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 0.996168 
R Square 0.992351 
Adjusted F 0.983609 
Standard E 70025.1 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS MS F ignificance F 
Regressior 8 4.45E+12 5.57E+11 113.5182 1.03E-06 
Residual 7 3.43E+10 4.9E+09 
Total 15 4.49E+12 
CoefficientEandard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0, 
Intercept 7376532 5040061 1.46358 0.186715 -4541320 19294384 -4541320 19294384 
PCIN 	- 146.2802 28.53553 5.126246 0.001359 78.80436 213.756 78.80436 213.756 
FUNCT -22723.1 18836.44 -1.20634 0.266871 -67264.2 21817.98 -67264.2 21817.98 
AID -98227.7 30610.2 -3.20898 0.014879 -170609 -25846 -170609 -25846 
MUWF 583.2751 1022.064 0.570684 0.586059 -1833.52 3000.071 -1833.52 3000.071 
PUBPAY 170.993 296.223 0.577244 0.581856 -529.463 871.449 -529.463 871.449 
TAXB 268669.6 157257.1 1.708474 0.131301 -103184 640523.5 -103184 640523.5 
POP -188.173 126.2055 -1.491 0.179584 -486.601 110.256 -486.601 110.256 
PPS 2118.867 2557.025 0.828646 0.434646 -3927.54 8165.269 -3927.54 8165.269 
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Appendix 7: Regression estimates for expenditure of community amenities of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 6295000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 6172000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 6206000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 6313000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 6377000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 8299000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 10263000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 11973000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 9913000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 10805000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 10228000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 9832000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 10493000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 13197000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 15113000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 16249000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.975774 
R Square 0.952134 
Adjusted F 0.89743 




df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
8 1.45E+14 1.81E+13 17.4052 0.000574 





Coefficientzandard Err t Stat 	- P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0% 
Intercept -8.1E+07 73479790 -1.10064 0.307456 -2.5E+08 92877284 -2.5E+08 92877284 
PCIN 1099.309 416.0237 2.64242 0.033306 115.5697 2083.049 115.5697 2083.049 
FUNCT -120180 274619.2 -0.43762 0.674845 -769551 529191.8 -769551 529191.8 
AID -1070748 446270.6 -2.39932 0.047513 -2126010 -15485.7 -2126010 -15485.7 
MUWF -1201.58 14900.81 -0.08064 0.937987 -36436.4 34033.24 -36436.4 34033.24 
PUBPAY -7999.56 4318.678 -1.85232 0.106405 -18211.6 2212.49 -18211.6 2212.49 
TAXB -3987536 2292674 -1.73925 0.125546 -9408849 1433776 -9408849 1433776 
POP 2598.248 1839.968 1.412116 0.200792 -1752.59 6949.081 -1752.59 6949.081 
PPS 74285.55 37279.23 1.992679 0.086549 -13865.8 162436.9 -13865.8 162436.9 
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Appendix 8: Regression estimates for expenditure of recreation and culture services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 6295000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 6172000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 6203000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 6394000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 6470000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/94 7667000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 7161000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 8166000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 10730000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 11362000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 13738000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 12904000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 12682000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 13883000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 17849000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 17541000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.990823 
R Square 0.98173 
Adjusted F 0.96085 




df 	SS 	MS  
8 2.44E+14 3.06E+13 
7 4.55E+12 6.5E+11 
15 2.49E+14 
F 	ignificance F 






Coefficientzandard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0% 
Intercept -1.6E+08 58018917 -2.67299 0.031861 -2.9E+08 -1.8E+07 -2.9E+08 -1.8E+07 
PCIN 359.5637 328.4882 1.094601 0.309919 -417.187 1136.315 -417.187 1136.315 
FUNCT -434685 216836.6 -2.00467 0.085032 -947423 78051.86 -947423 78051.86 
AID 145881.2 352370.8 0.413999 0.691265 -687343 979105.8 -687343 979105.8 
MUWF _24565.83 11765.53 2.087949 0.075197 -3255.24 52386.9 -3255.24 52386.9 
PUBPAY 8302.353 3409.985 2.434718 0.045107 239.0189 16365.69 239.0189 16365.69 
TAXB 3642167 1810273 2.011944 0.084124 -638447 7922782 -638447 7922782 
POP 2871.726 1452.821 1.976655 0.088618 -563.649 6307.1 -563.649 6307.1 
PPS 19238.6 29435.31 0.653589 0.534249 -50364.9 88842.05 -50364.9 88842.05 
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Appendix 9: Regression estimates for expenditure of transport services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 7616000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 7811000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 7914000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 8076000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 8199000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 9429000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 11860000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 11204000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 11092000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 14871000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 15369000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 14675000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 14647000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 15115000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 14839000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 14429000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.958409 
R Square 0.918549 
Adjusted F 0.825461 




df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
8 1.35E+14 1.69E+13 9.86761 	0.0034 





CoefficientEandard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0, 
Intercept 78679419 94241992 0.834866 0.43136 -1.4E+08 3.02E+08 -1.4E+08 3.02E+08 
PCIN 734.4199 533.5739 1.376416 0.211106 -527.282 1996.122 -527.282 1996.122 
FUNCT 116987.5 352214.7 0.332148 0.749502 -715868 949843 -715868 949843 
AID -567824 572367.3 -0.99206 0.354214 -1921257 785609.8 -1921257 785609.8 
MUWF -15891.6 19111.14 -0.83154 0.433117 -61082.3 29299.04 -61082.3 29299.04 
PUBPAY -784.495 5538.949 -0.14163 0.89136 -13882 12313.04 -13882 12313.04 
TAXB 1763079 2940484 0.599588 0.567673 -5190061 8716219 -5190061 8716219 
POP -1781.17 2359.863 -0.75478 0.475005 -7361.36 3799.02 -7361.36 3799.02 
PPS -1479.42 47812.73 -0.03094 0.976179 -114539 111579.7 -114539 111579.7 
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Appendix 10: Regression estimates for expenditure of economic services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 265000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 339000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 554000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 880000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 926000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 1303000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 1192000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 1579000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 1252000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 1295000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 1336000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 1287000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 1358000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 1469000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 1376000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 1429000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.976526 
R Square 0.953602 
Adjusted F 0.900577 




df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
8 2.35E+12 2.94E+11 17.98372 0.000517 





Coefficient andard Err t Stat 
	
P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0% 
Intercept 24032000 9204862 2.610794 0.034873 2265961 45798039 2265961 45798039 
PCIN 183.5163 52.11556 3.521333 0.00971 60.28255 306.75 60.28255 306.75 
FUNCT 16160.96 34401.73 0.469772 0.652801 -65186.2 97508.13 -65186.2 97508.13 
AID 8740.09 55904.61 0.156339 0.880179 -123453 140933.5 -123453 140933.5 
MUWF -5284.18 1866.635 -2.83086 0.025375 -9698.07 -870.292 -9698.07 -870.292 
PUBPAY -1117.53 541.0036 -2.06566 0.077713 -2396.8 161.7402 -2396.8 161.7402 
TAXB -509712 287204.8 -1.77473 0.119209 -1188844 169419.2 -1188844 169419.2 
POP -412.906 230.494 -1.7914 0.11634 -957.938 132.1254 -957.938 132.1254 
PPS 901.7943 4669.994 0.193104 0.852361 -10141 11944.58 -10141 11944.58 
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Appendix 11: Regression estimates for expenditure of water supply of the HCC 
YEAR 	TOTEXP 	PCIN FUNCT 	AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB 	POP 	PPS 
1989/90 4305000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 4220000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 5345000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 6885000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 7247000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 7715000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 7610000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 8055000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 8342000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 7648000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 8028000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 8169000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 8131000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 9030000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 9486000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 10149000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.976985 
R Square 0.9545 
Adjusted F 0.902501 
Standard E 519799.9 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
Regressioi 	8 3.97E+13 4.96E+12 18.35595 0.000484 
Residual 7 1.89E+12 2.7E+11 
Total 	15 4.16E+13 
Coefficienkandard Err t Stat 	P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0 
Intercept 45969956 37412634 1.228728 0.258875 -4.2E+07 1.34E+08 -4.2E+07 1.34E+08 
PCIN 539.4873 211.8207 2.546905 0.038276 38.61092 1040.364 38.61092 1040.364 
FUNCT -40223 139823.9 -0.28767 0.78193 -370854 290407.9 -370854 290407.9 
AID 279472.3 227221.1 1.229958 0.258442 -257820 816764.8 -257820 816764.8 
MUWF -14187.1 7586.83 -1.86997 0.103682 -32127.1 3752.861 -32127.1 3752.861 
PUBPAY -555.138 2198.878 -0.25246 0.807935 -5754.66 4644.383 -5754.66 4644.383 
TAXB -1279058 1167327 -1.09571 0.309464 -4039348 1481233 -4039348 1481233 
POP -686.93 936.8297 -0.73325 0.48723 -2902.18 1528.32 -2902.18 1528.32 
PPS -16048.2 18980.92 -0.84549 0.425789 -60931 28834.54 -60931 28834.54 
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Appendix 12: Regression estimates for expenditure of sewerage services of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 4478000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 4523000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 4615000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 4661000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 4756000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 4729000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 5192000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 4924000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 5780000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 6456000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 6250000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 5789000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 5789000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 6648000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 7037000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 7255000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.972247 
R Square 0.945265 
Adjusted F 0.88271 
Standard E 324833.4 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
Regressioi 	8 1.28E+13 1.59E+12 15.11101 0.000903 
Residual 7 7.39E+11 1.06E+11 
Total 	15 1.35E+13 
Coefficientsandard En. t Stat 	P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0, 
Intercept -5.1E+07 23379907 -2.16185 0.067423 -1.1E+08 4740823 -1.1E+08 4740823 
PCIN 118.6874 132.371 0.896627 0.399702 -194.32 431.6952 -194.32 431.6952 
FUNCT -49715.7 87378.75 -0.56897 0.58716 -256334 156902.2 -256334 156902.2 
AID -168190 141995 -1.18448 0.274878 -503955 167575.2 -503955 167575.2 
MUWF_ -3098.52 4741.162 -0.65354 0.534281 -14309.6 8112.543 -14309.6 8112.543 
PUBPAY 9.600706 1374.123 0.006987 0.99462 -3239.68 3258.886 -3239.68 3258.886 
TAXB 408093.7 729486.3 0.559426 0.593311 -1316867 2133055 -1316867 2133055 
POP 1224.927 585.4437 2.092305 0.074715 -159.428 2609.281 -159.428 2609.281 
PPS 11793.51 11861.56 0.994263 0.353214 -16254.6 39841.64 -16254.6 39841.64 
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Appendix 13: Regression estimates for total service expenditure of the HCC 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 33356000 15412 75 5.5 640 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 33602000 15755 76 6 633 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 35255000 16846 78 6.2 584 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 37912000 17800 78 7.6 586 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 38768000 18634 78 9.1 593 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 43996000 19719 79 7.4 583 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 48758000 20753 80 5.4 583 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 51698000 21302 82 6.5 564 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 52810000 21559 83 6.7 500 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 58494000 22397 84 6.6 513 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 61382000 23106 85 6.2 530 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 59683000 24129 88 6.4 541 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2001/02 60340000 25283 89 6.7 560 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 66670000 26586 95 6.8 570 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 73280000 28639 95 7.5 576 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 75217000 29168 95 6.1 584 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics 
Multiple R 	0.995197 
R Square 	0.990417 
Adjusted F 0.979466 
Standard E 1986010 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS MS F ignificance F 
Regressior 8 2.85E+15 3.57E+14 90.43475 2.26E-06 
Residual 7 2.76E+13 3.94E+12 
Total 15 2.88E+15 
CoefficientEandard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0% 
Intercept -1.3E+08 1.43E+08 -0.89226 0.401882 -4.7E+08 2.1E+08 -4.7E+08 2.1E+08 
PCI N 3317.334 809.3075 4.098978 0.004579 1403.626 5231.042 1403.626 5231.042 
FUNCT -505502 534227.8 -0.94623 0.375541 -1768750 757745.7 -1768750 757745.7 
AID -1390546 868148 -1.60174 0.153247 -3443390 662298.2 -3443390 662298.2 
MUWF -10487.1 28987.15 -0.36178 0.728188 -79030.8 58056.62 -79030.8 58056.62 
PUBPAY -1497.88 8401.296 -0.17829 0.863544 -21363.8 18368.03 -21363.8 18368.03 
TAXB 877952.2 4460030 0.196849 0.849539 -9668344 11424248 -9668344 11424248 
POP 3411.701 3579.363 0.953159 0.372255 -5052.15 11875.55 -5052.15 11875.55 
PPS 88686.51 72520.78 1.222912 0.260933 -82797.9 260170.9 -82797.9 260170.9 
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Appendix 14 
Calculation of beta weights of service category level spending of the HCC 
Service category level effects of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC 
Public order and safety 
B 1 = Beta weight of public order and safety 
Si= Standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
Sy = Standard deviation of expenditure on public order and safety 
b1 = Coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates) — see 
appendix 4) 
S I = 37.094 
Sy = 505203.061 
b1 = -5406.81 
B 1 = Si/Sy * b1 
B 1 = 37.094/505203.061 * -5406.81 
B 1 = -0.397 
Health 
B2 = beta weight of health services 
S i = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
S2y = standard deviation of expenditure on health services 
b2 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates —see 
appendix 5) 
Si= 37.094 
S2y = 253736.272 
b2 = 1419.309 
B2 = S i/S2Y * b2 
B2 = 37.094/253736.272* 1419.309 
B2 = 0.207 
Welfare 
B3 = beta weight of welfare services 
Si= standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
S3y = standard deviation of expenditure on welfare services 
b3 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 6) 
S1 = 37.094 
S3y = 546957.063 
b3 = 2118.867 
B3 = S1/S3y *b3 
B3 = 37.094/546957.063 * 2118.867 
B3 = 0.144 
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Community amenities 
B4 = beta weight of community amenities 
S1 = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
S4y = standard deviation of expenditure on community amenities 
= coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 7) 
S1 = 37.094 
S4y = 3187687.228 
b4 = 74285.55 
B4 = S 1/S4Y * b4 
B4 = 37.094/3187687.228 * 74285.55 
B4 = 0.864 
Recreation and culture 
B5 = beta weight of recreation and culture services 
Si = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
Sy = standard deviation of expenditure on recreation and culture services 
b5 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 8) 
S1 = 37.094 
S5y = 4074026.272 
b5 = 19238.6 
B5 = S 1/S5y * b5 
B5 = 37.094/4074026.272 * 19238.6 
B5 = 0.175 
Transport 
B6 = beta weight of transport services 
Si = standard deviation of the purchaser-provider split 
S6y = standard deviation of expenditure on transport services 
b6 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 9) 
S 1 = 37.094 
S6y = 3134127.329 
b6 = -1479.42 
B6 = S1/S6Y * b6 
B6 = 37.094/3134127.329 * -1479.42 
B6 = -0.018 
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Economic services 
B7 = beta weight of economic services 
S i = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
S7y = standard deviation of expenditure on economic services 
= coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 10) 
Si = 37.094 
S7y = 405593.228 
1:07 = 901.7943 
B7 — S i/S7y * b7 
B7 = 37.094/405593.228 * 901.7943 
B7 = 0.082 
Water supply 
Bg = beta weight of water supply 
S1 = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
Sy = standard deviation of expenditure on water supply 
b8 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 11B) 
Si = 37.094 
Sgy = 1664699.741 
b8 = -16048.2 
B8 = S i/S8Y * b8 
Bg = 37.094/1664699.741 * -16048.2 
B8 = -0.358 
Sewerage 
B9 = beta weight of sewerage services 
S1 = standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
S9y = standard deviation of expenditure on sewerage services 
b9 = coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
appendix 12) 
S1 = 37.094 
S9y = 948484.115 
b9= 11793.51 
B9 = S1/S9y * b9 
B9 = 37.094/948484.115 * 11793.51 
B9 = 0.461 
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Appendix 15 
Calculation of beta weights of total service expenditure of the HCC 
Aggregate policy effect of the purchaser-provider split 
Per capita income (PCIN) 
B 1 = Beta weight of per capita income 
Si = Standard deviation of per capita income 
Sy =Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b1 = Coefficient of per capita income (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 13) 
S1= 4166.4 
Sy = 13859235.495 
B 1 = 3317.334 
B1= Si/SY * b2 
B1= 4297.648/13859235 * 3317.334 
B1=1.029 
Functional scope (FUNCT) 
B2 = Beta weight of functional scope 
S2 = Standard deviation of functional scope 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b2 = Coefficient of functional scope (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 13) 
S2 = 6.846 
Sy = 13859235.495 
b2= -505502 
B2 = S2/Sy * -505502 
B2 = 6.846/13859235.495 * -505502 
B2 = -0.250 
Grants (AID) 
B3 = Beta weight of grants 
S3 = Standard deviation of grants 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b3 = Coefficient of aid (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 13) 
S3 = 0.9061 
Sy = 13859235.495 
b3 = -1390546 
B3 — S3/Sy * b3 
B3 = 0.9061/13859235.495 *4390546 
B3 = 0.091 
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Municipal workforce (MUWF) 
B4 = Beta weight of municipal workforce 
S4 = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b4 = Coefficient of municipal workforce (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 13) 
S4 = 37.524 
Sy = 26385162 
b4 = -10487.1 
B4= 54/5y * 
B4 = 37.524/13859235.495 * -10487.1 
B4 = -0.028 
Public wages (PUBPAY) 
B5 = Beta weight of public wages 
S5 = Standard deviation of public wages 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b5 = Coefficient of public wages (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 
13) 
S5 = 608.667 
Sy = 13859235.495 
b5 = -1497.88 
B5 — S5/Sy * b5 
B5 = 608.667/26385162 * -1497.88 
B5 = -0.066 
Tax burden (TAXB) 
B6 = Beta weight of tax burden 
S6 = Standard deviation of tax burden 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b6 = Coefficient of tax burden (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 13) 
S6 = 0.2338 
Sy = 13859235.495 
b6 = 877952.2 
B6 = S6/Sy 
B6 = 0.2338/13859235.495 * 877952.2 
B6 = 0.015 
Population (POP) 
B7 = Beta weight of population 
S7 = Standard deviation of population 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
410 
Appendix 15 (continued) 
137 = Coefficient of population (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 13) 
S7 = 436.704 
Sy = 13859235.495 
1:17 = 3411.701 
B7 = S7/Sy * b7 
B7 = 436.704/13859235.495 * 3411.701 
B7 = 0.108 
Purchaser-provider split (PPS) 
B8 = Beta weight of purchaser-provider split 
S8 = Standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
b8 = Coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 13) 
S8 = 37.094 
Sy = 13859235.495 
b8 = 88686.51 
B8= S8/Sy * b8 
B8 = 37.094/13859235.495 * 88686.51 
B8 = 0.237 
411 
Appendix 16: Regression estimates for employment of the HCC 
YEAR MUWF FUNCT AID PCIN PUBPAY TAXB POP PPS 
1989/90 640 75 5.5 15412 2484 4.2 47280 0 
1990/91 633 76 6 15755 2291 4.8 47270 0 
1991/92 584 78 6.2 16846 2492 4.5 47681 0 
1992/93 586 78 7.6 17800 2518 4.4 47560 0 
1993/94 593 78 9.1 18634 2442 4.4 47629 0 
1994/95 583 79 7.4 19719 2635 4.3 47630 0 
1995/96 583 80 5.4 20753 2792 4.2 47378 0 
1996/97 564 82 6.5 21302 3078 4.1 46926 72.4 
1997/98 500 83 6.7 21559 3459 4.3 47378 72.4 
1998/99 513 84 6.6 22397 3314 4.3 47502 72.4 
1999/00 530 85 6.2 23106 3502 4.3 47439 72.4 
2000/01 541 88 6.4 24129 3576 4.3 47446 72.4 
2002/02 560 89 6.7 25283 3629 4.1 47681 72.4 
2002/03 570 95 6.8 26586 3783 4.1 48069 72.4 
2003/04 576 95 7.5 28639 4006 3.8 48533 72.4 
2004/05 584 95 6.1 29168 4077 3.9 48569 72.4 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.881903 
R Square 0.777752 
Adjusted F 0.583286 




df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
7 16426.91 2346.701 3.999411 0.035216 





Coefficienttandard Err t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09ipper 95.0 
Intercept -359.413 1738.827 -0.2067 0.841409 -4369.16 3650.329 -4369.16 3650.329 
FUNCT 9.938181 5.48738 1.811098 0.10771 -2.71574 22.5921 -2.71574 22.5921 
AID -13.1918 9.506202 -1.38771 0.202654 -35.1132 8.729518 -35.1132 8.729518 
PCIN -0.00583 0.009653 -0.60439 0.56233 -0.02809 0.016426 -0.02809 0.016426 
PUBPAY -0.1325 0.091134 -1.45395 0.184037 -0.34266 0.077651 -0.34266 0.077651 
TAXB -76.5001 47.1982 -1.62083 0.143714 -185.339 32.33919 -185.339 32.33919 
POP 0.022135 0.04295 0.515376 0.620226 -0.07691 0.121178 -0.07691 0.121178 
PPS -0.03521 0.884441 -0.03981 0.969221 -2.07473 2.004317 -2.07473 2.004317 
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Appendix 17 
Calculation of beta weights of employment of the HCC 
Aggregate policy effect of the purchaser-provider split in the HCC 
Functional scope (FUNCT) 
B 1 = Beta weight of functional scope 
SI = Standard deviation of functional scope 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b 1 = Coefficient of functional scope (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 16) 
S = 6.846 
Sy = 37.524 
1)1 = 9.938181 
B1= Si/Sy* b2 
= 6.846/35.5 * 9.938181 
= 1.8 
Grants (AID) 
B2 = Beta weight of grants 
S2 = Standard deviation of grants 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b2 = Coefficient of grants (derived from regression estimates- see Appendix 16) 
S2 = 0.9061 
Sy = 37.524 
b2 = -13.19182 
B2 = S2/Sy * b2 
B2 = 0.9061/37.524 * -13.19182 
B2 = -0.319 
Per capita income (PCIN) 
B3 = Beta weight of per capita income 
S3 = Standard deviation of per capita income 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b3 = Coefficient of per capita income (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 16) 
S3 =4297.648 
Sy = 37.524 
b3 = -0.00583 
B3 = S3iSy * b1 
B3 = 4297.648.4/37.524 *-0.005834 
B3 = -0.668 
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Public wages (PUBPAY) 
B4 = Beta weight of public wages 
S4= Standard deviation of public wages 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b4 = Coefficient of public wages (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 
16) 
S4 = 608.667 
Sy = 37.524 
= -0.132504 
B4 - S4/Sy * b4 
B4 = 608.667.7/35.5 * -0.132504 
B4 = -2.149 
Tax burden (TAXB) 
B5 = Beta weight of tax burden 
S4 = Standard deviation of tax burden 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b5 = Coefficient of tax burden (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 16) 
S5 = 0.2338 
Sy = 37.524 
b5 = -76.50006 
B5 - S5/Sy * b5 
B5 = 0.2338/37.524 * -76.50006 
B5 = -0.477 
Population (POP) 
B6 = Beta weight of population 
S6= Standard deviation of population 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b6 = Coefficient of population (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 16) 
S6 = 436.704 
Sy = 37.524 
b6 = 0.022135 
B6 = S6/Sy * b6 
B6 = 436.704/35.5 * 0.022135 
B6 = 0.258 
Purchaser-provider split (PPS) 
B7 = Beta weight of purchaser-provider split 
S7 = Standard deviation of purchaser-provider split 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
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b7 = Coefficient of purchaser-provider split (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 16) 
S7 = 37.094 
Sy = 37.524 
b7 = -0.035208 
B7 = S7/Sy * b7 
B7 = 37.094/37.524 * -0.035208 
B7 = -0.035 
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Appendix 18: Regression estimates for total service expenditure of SoreII Council 
YEAR TOTEXP PCIN FUNCT AID MUWF PUBPAY TAXB POP 
1989/90 6141000 15412 45 22 36 2523 1.3 7550 
1990/91 6192000 15755 55 27.3 38 2522 1.2 7750 
1991/92 6213000 16846 56 23.3 40 2523 1.1 8518 
1992/93 6263000 17800 58 21.7 42 2522 1 9160 
1993/94 6314000 18634 60 27.8 44 2523 1.2 9175 
1994/95 7866000 19719 60 23.6 45 2485 1.5 9219 
1995/96 7576000 20753 62 22 51 2479 1.5 9435 
1996/97 8417000 21302 64 28.8 54 2509 1.4 10634 
1997/98 8303000 21559 65 37 55 2527 1.5 10701 
1998/99 7931000 22397 65 54.9 54 2495 1.5 10878 
1999/00 8675000 23106 66 24.2 52 2500 2.2 10939 
2000/01 8069000 24129 66 25.4 59 3511 2.1 10941 
2001/02 8354000 25283 66 30.6 66 3523 2.1 10072 
2002/03 10527000 26586 66 38 76 3525 2.1 11160 
2003/04 12027000 28639 68 35.3 85 3546 2 11304 
2004/05 12266000 29168 68 25.2 93 3522 2.1 11428 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.983975 
R Square 0.968206 
Adjusted F 0.940387 
Standard E 476032.2 
Observatic 16 
ANOVA 
df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
Regressioi 	7 5.52E+13 7.89E+12 34.80308 2.25E-05 
Residual 8 1.81E+12 2.27E+11 
Total 	15 5.7E+13 
Coefficienkandard En- t Stat P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0, 
Intercept 5332761 2110273 2.527048 0.035418 466463.2 10199059 466463.2 10199059 
PCIN -2.59254 349.0261 -0.00743 0.994255 -807.448 802.2632 -807.448 802.2632 
FUNCT -60013.9 66941.65 -0.89651 0.396155 -214382 94353.81 -214382 94353.81 
AID -6286.65 17421.27 -0.36086 0.727547 -46460.2 33886.88 -46460.2 33886.88 
MUWF 137315.4 52524.12 2.614331 0.030922 16194.58 258436.2 16194.58 258436.2 
PUBPAY -1445.01 581.0401 -2.48693 0.037702 -2784.89 -105.126 -2784.89 -105.126 
TAXB 898253.6 961686.3 0.93404 0.377614 -1319399 3115906 -1319399 3115906 
POP 182.7925 372.4661 0.490763 0.636772 -676.116 1041.701 -676.116 1041.701 
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Appendix 19: Calculation of beta weights of total service expenditure of Sore11 
Council 
Per capita income (PCIN) 
B 1 = Beta weight of per capita income 
Si= Standard deviation of per capita income 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
1) 1 = Coefficient of per capita income (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 18) 
S1 = 4297.648 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b1 = -2.592542 
B1= Si/Sy *1)1 
B1 = 4297.648/1949685.680 * -2.592542 
B 1 = -0.006 
Functional scope (FUNCT) 
B2 = Beta weight of functional scope 
Si = Standard deviation of functional scope 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b2 = Coefficient of functional scope (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 18) 
S2 = 6.087 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b2 = -60013.91 
B2 = S2/SY * b2 
B2 = 6.087/1949685.680 *-60013.91 
B2 = -1.87 
Grants (AID) 
B3 = Beta weight of grants 
S3 = Standard deviation of grants 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b3 = Coefficient of grants (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 18) 
S3 = 8.661 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b3 = -6286.651 
B3 = S3/Sy * b3 
B3 = 8.661/1949685.680 * -6286.651 
B3 =- 0.028 
Municipal workforce (MUWF) 
B4 = Beta weight of municipal workforce 
S4 = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
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b4 = Coefficient of municipal workforce (derived from regression estimates - see 
Appendix 18) 
S4 = 16.749 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b4 = 137315.4 
B4 - S4/Sy * b4 
B4 = 16.749/1949685.680 * 137315.4 
B4 = 0.1.180 
Public wages (PUBPAY) 
B5 = Beta weight of public wages 
S5 = Standard deviation of public wages 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
b5 = Coefficient of public wages (derived from regression estimates - see Appendix 
18) 
S5 = 486.423 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b5 = -1445.006 
B5 = S5/Sy * b5 
B5 = 486.423/1949685.680 * -1445.006 
B5 = -0.361 
Tax burden (TAXB) 
B6 = Beta weight of tax burden 
S6= Standard deviation of tax burden 
Sy = Standard deviation total municipal service expenditure 
b6 = Coefficient of tax burden (derived from regression estimates - see Appendix 18) 
S6 = 0.4177 
Sy = 1949685.680 
b6= 898253.6 
B6 = S6/Sy * 
B6 = 0.4177/1949685.680 * 898253.6 
B6 = 0.192 
Population (POP) 
B7 = Beta weight of population 
S7 = Standard deviation of population 
Sy = Standard deviation of total municipal service expenditure 
137 = Coefficient of population (derived from regression estimates - see Appendix 18) 
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S7 = 1265.383 
Sy = 1949685.680 
= 182.7925 
B7 = S7/Sy * b7 
B7 = 1265.383/1887232 *182.7925 
B7 = 0.119 
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Appendix 20: Regression estimates for employment of Sorel! Council 
YEAR MUWF PCIN FUNCT AID PUBPAY TAXB POP 
1989/90 36 15412 45 22 2523 1.3 7550 
1990/91 38 15755 55 27.3 2522 1.2 7750 
1991/92 40 16846 56 23.3 2523 1.1 8518 
1992/93 42 17800 58 21.7 2522 1 9160 
1993/94 44 18634 60 27.8 2523 1.2 9175 
1994/95 45 19719 60 23.6 2485 1.5 9219 
1995/96 51 20753 62 22 2479 1.5 9435 
1996/97 54 21302 64 28.8 2509 1.4 10634 
1997/98 55 21559 65 37 2527 1.5 10701 
1998/99 54 22397 65 54.9 2495 1.5 10878 
1999/00 52 23106 66 24.2 2500 2.2 10939 
2000/01 59 24129 66 25.4 3511 2.1 10941 
2001/02 66 25283 66 30.6 3523 2.1 10072 
2002/03 76 26586 66 38 3525 2.1 11160 
2003/04 85 28639 68 35.3 3546 2 11304 
2004/05 93 29168 68 25.2 3522 2.1 11428 
SUMMARY OUTPUT 
Regression Statistics  
Multiple R 0.990191 
R Square 0.980479 
Adjusted F 0.967465 




df 	SS 	MS 	F 	ignificance  F 
6 4125.61 687.6017 75.33978 3.51E-07 





Coefficientsandard Err t Stat 	P-value Lower 95%Upper 95%ower 95.09Ipper 95.0" 
Intercept 1.960664 13.37645 0.146576 0.886698 -28.299 32.2203 -28.299 32.2203 
PCIN 0.00616 0.000831 7.414424 4.04E-05 0.004281 0.008039 0.004281 0.008039 
FUNCT -0.66272 0.36288 -1.82627 0.101092 -1.48361 0.158173 -1.48361 0.158173 
AID -0.066 0.10835 -0.6091 0.557519 -0.3111 0.179108 -0.3111 0.179108 
PUBPAY 0.000997 0.003672 0.271359 0.792236 -0.00731 0.009304 -0.00731 0.009304 
TAXB -13.8468 3.993073 -3.4677 0.007074 -22.8797 -4.81382 -22.8797 -4.81382 
POP -0.00176 0.002289 -0.77074 0.460616 -0.00694 0.003414 -0.00694 0.003414 
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Appendix 21: Calculation of beta weights of employment of Sore11 Council 
Per capita income (PCIN) 
B1 = Beta weight of per capita income 
S I = Standard deviation of per capita income 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
1) 1 = Coefficient of per capita income (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 20) 
Si= 4297.648 
Sy = 16.749 
b 1 = 0.00616 
B1 = Si/Sy * 
B 1 = 4297.648/16.749 * 0.00616 
B1 = 1.581 
Functional scope (FUNCT) 
B2 = Beta weight of functional scope 
S2 = Standard deviation of functional scope 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b1 = Coefficient of functional scope (derived from regression estimates — see 
Appendix 20) 
S2 = 6.087 
Sy = 16.749 
b2 = -0.662718 
B2 = S2iSY * b2 
B2 = 6.087/16.749 *-0.662718 
B2 = -0.241 
Grants (AID) 
B3 = Beta weight of grants 
S3 = Standard deviation of grants 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b3 = Coefficient of grants (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 20) 
S3 = 8.661 
Sy = 16.749 
b3 = -0.065996 
B3 = S3iSy * b3 
B3 = 8.661/16.749 * -0.065996 
B3 = -0.034 
Public wages (PUBPAY) 
B4 = Beta weight of public wages 
S4 = Standard deviation of public wages 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b4 = Coefficient of public wages (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 
20) 
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Appendix 21 (continued) 
S4 = 486.423 
Sy = 16.749 
= 0.000997 
B4 - 	y * b4 
B4 = 486.423/16.749 * 0.000997 
B4 = 0.029 
Tax burden (TAXB) 
B5 = Beta weight of tax burden 
S5 = Standard deviation of tax burden 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b5 = Coefficient of tax burden (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 20) 
S5 = 0.4177 
Sy = 16.749 
b5 = -13.84678 
B5 — S5/Sy * b5 
B5 = 0.4177/16.749 * -13.84678 
B5 = -0.345 
Population (POP) 
B6 = Beta weight of population 
S6 = Standard deviation of population 
Sy = Standard deviation of municipal workforce 
b6 = Coefficient of population (derived from regression estimates — see Appendix 20) 
S6 = 1265.383 
Sy = 16.749 
b6 = -0.001765 
B6 — S6iSy * b6 
B6 = 1265.383/16.749 * -0.001765 
B6 = -0.133 
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